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T I-I E 




STAFF DEPARTMENTS 


OF THE 


UNITED STATES AEMY, 


THEIR VALUE IN AVAR AND IN PEACE, THE NEED OF A 
PERMANENT STAFF. THE ADVISABILITY OF DETAILS, 
^AND THE PRACTICABILITY OF CONSOLIDATION; 


BEING 


EXTRACTS FROM THE GARFIELD, COBURN, BANNING, MAISH, 
AND BURNSIDE REPORTS, PUBLISHED IN CONGRES¬ 
SIONAL DOCUMENTS FROM 1869 TO 1878, 


GIVING 


THE VIEWS OF ARMY OFFICERS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
SEVERAL COMMITTEES, AND EXTRACTS FROM BILLS SUBMIT¬ 
TED BY THEM RELATIVE TO STAFF ORGANIZATION; 


TOGETHER WITH 


A STATEMENT OF THE EXISTING LAW ON THE SUBJECT, AND THE VIEWS 
OF WASHINGTON ON THE NEED OF A STANDING ARMY. 





Compiled for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs, 
House of Representatives, 

BY 


HERMAN H. REEVE, 

Cler}z of the Committee. 


YVASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 

1900 . 







Gilt 

Mrs. Hdwin O. Dinwiddle, 
D60. 25, 1935 


OOjSTTEiSrTS. 


Page. 

Reports of Congressional committees. 6 

Methods pursued in conducting the investigation, and witnesses examined ... 7 

Value of testimony of army officers.!. 10 

Value of an efficient staff. 11 

How the present staff system worked during the war of the rebellion. 15 

Permanent staff appointments, details for staff duty, the value of specialists, 

and legislation suggested by officers of the Army. 22 

Consolidation of staff departments. 86 

Recommendations of committees, extracts from bills reported by them pro¬ 
viding for consolidation of, and details to, staff departments, and legislative 
history of the bills reported; with a review of legislation on army organiza¬ 
tion by General Garfield. 162 

Present state of the law as to the organization of.the staff departments, and 

appointments, promotions, and transfers therein*. 178 

Washington’s views of the need of a standing army, followed by general 

remarks upon the subject. 184 

Index. 191 




3 




















STAFF DEPARTMENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES ARMY. 


REPORTS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. 


February 26, 1869, Hon. James A. Gartield, chairman of the Com¬ 
mittee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, submitted a 
report with accompanying testimony on ‘‘Army organization” (H. R. 
33, Fortieth Congress, third session, 132 pages), which was laid on 
the table and ordered to be printed. 

Members op ^'he Committee. 


James A. Garfield, of Ohio, R. 
William A. Pile, of Missouri, R. 
John H. Ketcham, of New York, R. 
Henry D. Washburn, of Indiana, R. 
Grenville M. Dodge, of Iowa, R. 


Green B. Raum, of Illinois, R. 

Isaac R. Hawkins, of Tennessee, R. 
Charles Sitgraves, of New Jersey, D. 
Benjamin M. Boyer, of Pennsylvania, D. 


February 2, 1873, Hon. John Coburn, chairman of the Committee 
on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, submitted a report with 
views of a number of officers of the Army on “army staff organiza¬ 
tion ” (H. R. 74, Forty-second Congress, third session, 309 pages), which 
was ordered to be printed and recommitted to the Committee on Mili- 
tray Affairs. H. R. No. 495 had been referred to the committee, and 
the committee with their report submitted a bill embodying their sug¬ 
gestions. The bill is printed with the report. 

Members of the Committee. 


John Coburn, of Indiana, R. 

William L. Stoughton, of Michigan, R. 
John B. Hay, of Illinois, R. 

William G. Donnan, of Iowa, R. 

Frank Morey, of Louisiana, R. 


George E. Harris, of Mississippi, R. 
Henry W. Slocum, of New York, D. 
Lewis D. Campbell, of Ohio, D. 
William Terry, of Virginia, D. 


April 6, 1874, Hon. John Coburn, chairman of the Committee on 
Military Affairs, House of Representatives, submitted a report with 
testimony of a large number of witnesses, both in the Army and civil 
life, to accompany the bill (H. R. 2546) “to provide for the gradual 
reduction of the Army of the United States” (H. R. 384, Forty-third 
Congress, first session, 415 pages), which was recommitted to the 
Committee on Military Affairs, and ordered to be printed. The bill 
submitted by the committee is printed with their report. 


5 



6 


Members of the Committee. 


John Coburn, of Indiana, R. 

William G. Donnan, of Iowa, R. 

John B. Hawley, of Illinois, R. 
Joseph R. Hawley, of Connecticut, R. 
Lewis B. Gunckel, of Ohio, R. 

Charles Albright, of Pennsylvania, R. 


Clinton D. MacDougall, of New A'ork, R. 
Jacob M. Thornburgh, of Tennessee, R. 
James AV. Nesmith, of Oregon, D. 

Pierce M. B. Young, of Georgia, D. 

Eppa Hunton, of Virginia, D. 


March 9, 1876, Hon. Henry B. Banning’, chairman of the Committee 
on Militaiy Affairs, House of Representatives, submitted a report to 
accompaii}" bills H. R. 2817, 2935, and 2592, on the “Reduction of 
Army officers’ pay, reorganization of the Arm}", and transfer of the 
Indian Bureau” (H. R. No. 351, Forty-fourth Congress, first session, 
231 pages). The report was ordered to be printed with the testimony 
and the replies of a number of officers to a circular letter of the com¬ 
mittee. 

Members of the Committee. 


Henry B. Banning, of Ohio, D. 

John M. Glover, of Missouri, D. 
Alpheus S. AVilliams, of Michigan, D. 
AVilliam Terry, of Virginia, D. 

Philip Cook, of Georgia, D. 

John Reilly, of Pennsylvania, D. 


Augustus A. Hardenbergh, of New Jer¬ 
sey, D. 

Clinton D. MacDougall, of New York, R. 
Jacob jM. Thornburgh, of Tennessee, R. 
Stephen A. Hurlbut, of Illinois, R. 
Horace B. Strait, of Alinnesota, R. 


Section 4 of the act of Congress approved JuH 24, 1876, provided 
for a commission to examine “the whole subject-matter of reform and 
reorganization of the Army of the United States.” The commission 
consisted of: 


Hon. Joseph R. AVest, United States Senate. 

Hon. Francis M. Cockrell, United States Senate. 

Hon. Stephen A. Hurlbut, House of Representatives. 

Hon. Henry B. Banning, House of Representatives. 

Hon. James D. Cameron, Secretary of AA^ar. 

Gen. William T. Sherman, United States Army. 

Brig. Gen. Alontgomery C. Aleigs, Quartermaster-General United States Army. 

The commission met August 11, 1876, and elected the Hon. James 
D. Cameron. Secretaiy of War, president of the commission. 

On motion of Mr. West it was— 

“Ac.wZcccf, 1 hat the members of the commission have permission to 
sulnnit their views in writing upon the matters confided to their atten¬ 
tion by section 4 of the act approved Julv 24, 1876, Quaking appro¬ 
priations for the support of the Armv, and for other purposes,’ the 
same to he transmitted to the recorder, who is hereby authorized to 
have the same printed in confidence for the use of the commission.” 

In an article entitled “The Army of the United States,” by Gen. 
James A. Garfield, published in the Burnside report, pages 101 to 115 
it is stated (p. 103): 

• leipiiied the commission to report to Cong’ress the results 

ot then deliberations by the 1st da}" of December following. The com- 


mission accumulated much valuable material, but their term of serv¬ 
ice expired before it was possible to reach satisfactory conclusions. 
* * * papers laid before the commission already referred to, 
but not yet published, are of great value, both on account of the ability 
with which they were prepared, and the high character and varied 
experience of their authors.” 

Some of the documents referred to b}" General Garfield as having 
been laid before the commission of which Secretary Cameron was presi¬ 
dent were published with the Burnside report. Senate report 555, part 
2, Forty-fifth Congress, third session. 

March 21, 1878, Hon. Levi Maish, of the subcommittee of the Com¬ 
mittee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, submitted a 
report relating to ‘‘the organization of the Army,” which, with the 
testimony, reports, letters, and copies of bills agreed to by the com¬ 
mittee, was ordered to be printed. (House Miscellaneous Document 
No. 56, Fort 3 ^-fifth Congress, second session, 159 pages.) 

Members of the Committee. 


Henry B. Banning, of Ohio, D. 

Levi Maish, of Pennsylvania, D. 
James Williams, of Delaware, D. 
George G. Dibrell, of Tennessee, D. 
Alvah A. Clark, of New Jersey, D. 
John H. Evins, of South Carolina, D. 


Edward S. Bragg, of Wisconsin, D. 
Horace B. Strait, of Minnesota, R. 
Harry White, of Pennsylvania, R. 
Anson G. McCook, of New York, R, 
Benjamin F. Marsh, of Illinois, R. 


December 12, 1878, Hon. Ambrose E. Burnside, United States Sen¬ 
ator, from the Joint Committee of the two Houses, appointed under 
sections 10, 11, and 12 of the act of Congress approved June 18,1878, 
submitted a report, to accompany^ Senate bill 1191. The report was 
ordered to be printed and is published as Senate report No. 555, Forty- 
fifth Congress, third session. On the same day the bill (S. 1191) and 
papers accompanving the report were ordered printed. (See Senate 
report 555, part 2, Forty-fifth Congress, third session, 512 pages.) 


Members of the Committee. 


Ambrose E. Burnside, of Rhode Island, United States Senate, R. 
Preston B. Plumb, of Kansas, United States Senate, R. 

Matthew C. Butler, of South Carolina, United States Senate, D. 
Henry B. Banning, of Ohio, House of Representatives, D. 

George G. Dibrell, of Tennessee, House of Representatives, D. 
Horace B. Strait, of Minnesota, House of Rrepresentatives, R. 
Harry White, of Pennsylvania, House of Representatives, R. 


METHODS PURSUED BY COMMITTEES IN CONDUCTING INVESTI¬ 
GATION AND WITNESSES EXAMINED. 

Garfield report, 1869, page 1. 

“With a view to obtaining information respecting the present con¬ 
dition of the Army^, its strength and distribution, the organization of 


the several staff departments and the duties performed by theni, to 
serve as a basis for such legislation as might be considered expedient, 
the committee have examined a number of prominent offScers of the 
Army to ascertain not only the facts within their knowledge, but also 
what reforms or changes in organization their experience led them to 
recommend, and what measures could wisely be adopted to retrench 
the heavy expenses of the military establishment.” 

The committee examined Generals Thomas, Hancock, Schofield, 
McDowell, the Surgeon-General, the Paymaster-General, the Chief of 
Engineers, the Chief of Ordnance, the Quartermaster-General, the 
Commissary-General of Subsistence, two inspectors-general, and three 
other staff officers. 

Coburn report, 1873, page 1. 

“The question of reorganizing the staff' of the Army is one of such 
magnitude that the committee were reluctant to act upon it without 
mature reffection and the fullest possible consultation with those who 
are practicall}^ as well as theoretically well informed upon the subjects 
involved, and as a preliminary step propounded certain interrogatories 
to a large number of officers of the Army, whose education, as well as 
experience on the staff' and in the line, necessariH gave them the 
amplest opportunities to make themselves familiar with all the points 
in controversy.” 

The committee examined Secretary of War Belknap, Generals Sher¬ 
man, !Meade, Howard, Ord, and Augur, of the active list; Generals 
Hooker, Heintzelman, Wood, Ricketts, and Case}", of the retired list; 
Generals McClellan, Franklin, and Buell, of the volunteers; General 
Longstreet, of the Confederate service; chiefs of bureaus; 21 other 
staff' officers, and 21 field officers of cavalry, artillery, and infantry. 

Coburn report, 1874, page 1. 

“The committee examined a large number of witnesses, composed 
of gentlemen of intelligence and prominence both in Army and civil 
life, and have accumulated a large amount of testimony upon the sub¬ 
jects named, which must of itself be of no little value as an aid to 
intelligent legislation upon all matters involved in the investigation.” 

The committee examined Secretary of War Belknap, Secretary of 
the Interior Delano, Generals Sherman, McDowell, Pope, Harney; the 
several chiefs of bureaus; Colonel Reynolds, of the Third Cavalry; 
the Commissioner of Pensions, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
Hon. Felix R. Brunot, and several Indian agents and inspectors. 

Banning report, 1876, page 1. 

“To obtain certain information relative to the military establish¬ 
ment and the management of Indian aff'airs as a basis for such leg¬ 
islation as might be deemed necessary, the committee caused to be 
sent to a numbei’ of officers a circular letter with a request for an 
expression of opinion.” 


9 


^ The committee examined Secrctaiy of War Taft, Generals Sherman, 
Sheridan, Hancock, Schofield, McDowell, Howard, Terry, Ord, Augur, 
and Crook; the chiefs of bureaus; thirteen other staff officers; the colo¬ 
nels of the cavalry, artilleiy, and infantry regiments; one lieutenant- 
colonel and three captains of infantry; one captain of cavaliy; Gen. 
John B. Sanborn, of Minnesota; Dr. W. A. Burleigh, of Dakota; and 
Hon. William Welsh, of Pennsylvania. 

Cameron commission, 1876. No report. 

The president of the commission was authorized to have printed 
such documents as he should judge necessary, and the members of the 
commission were permitted to submit their views in writing upon the 
matters confided to their attention by section 4 of the act approved 
July 24, 1876. 

Maish report, 1878, page 5. 

‘‘The subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, who were 
charged with the collection of information and facts in relation to the 
organization of the Arm}^ beg leave to submit the following testimony, 
reports, letters, and copies of bills agreed to by the committee.” 

The committee submitted letters and testimony from Secretar}^ of 
War McCrary, Generals Sherman, Hancock, Schofield, Pope, Howard, 
and Ord; the chiefs of bureaus of the War Department, and nine other 
staff officers; four colonels of cavaliy; one colonel, one major, and two 
captains of artilleiy; thirteen colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, two 
majors, one captain, and one lieutenant of infantry, and one retired 
officer. 

Burnside report, 1878, page 1. 

“After an informal discussion, it was decided to call upon the gen¬ 
eral officers and the chiefs of staff departments of the Army, and cer¬ 
tain prominent men of military experience outside of the Arnw, for 
drafts of bills for the reorganization of the Army, and for such views 
upon the subject as they might see fit to present to the committee.” 

The committee submitted with their report drafts of bills from Gen¬ 
erals Sherman, Hancock, Schofield, McDowell, Terry, Johnson, Upton, 
Adjutant-General Townsend, Inspector-General Marcy, Quartermaster- 
General Meigs, Commissary-General Macfeely, Paymaster-General 
Alvord, and Chief of Engineers Humphre 3 ^s; also letters and opinions 
from the officers named, and also from Generals Sheridan, McClellan, 
Meade, Thomas, Pope, Howard, Ord, Crook, Franklin, Foster, 
Smith, Wright, Allen, Schriver, Longstreet, Surgeon-General Barnes, 
Acting Chief of Ordnance L}Tord, Colonels Hazen and Hunt, and 
from two lieutenant-colonels, one major, one surgeon, one assistant 
surgeon, two captains, and four lieutenants. 



10 


VALUE OF TESTIMONY OF ARMY OFFICERS. 

Coburn report, 1873, page 1. 

The committee said: 

‘‘Their views (the views of a large number of army officers) accom¬ 
pany this report, and form, it is believed, a representative collection 
of the various opinions of our arnw officers upon the subject of staft' 
duties and organizations, and combine such a mass of thoughts upon 
the points mooted as can be found nowhere else. The differences of 
opinion upon many of the most important questions are radical and 
thorough, and involve the inquirer in an investigation of subjects 
which have exhausted the capacities of the most profound and success¬ 
ful leaders from the beginning of the period when the waging of war 
became a science.” 

Maish report, 1878. 

Brig. Gen. John Pope, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, served 
in the Florida and Mexican wars; during the civil war commanded 
Army of the Mississippi and Army of Virginia; afterwards major- 
general, United States Army: 

(Page 31.) ‘'The reason why there are so maii}^ differences of opin¬ 
ion among army officers concerning the details of armj^ organization 
does not seem difficult to explain. Every officer, it is to be presumed, 
bases his opinion upon his own experience, which is greater or less, 
extended or limited, according to his years, his rank, and the nature 
of the service he has performed. What would be a complete and 
efficient system for a small force operating against hostile Indians in 
a remote district would perhaps be entirely unsuited by expansion to 
a whole army, in scarce any part of which would the same conditions be 
found. So, too, every officer is naturally more or less interested in 
the organization of the special arm to which he belongs, and is apt, 
unconsciously, to attach an undue importance to it relatively to other 
arms of the service. The staff being, to say the least, a semiindepend¬ 
ent branch of the service, and controlling the disposition of so much 
that is needed by the line, is of course subjected more than any other 
branch of service to adverse criticism, which, instead of being con¬ 
fined, as in 1113 " opinion it should mainlv be, to objection to methods of 
administration, applies itself almost whollv to forms of organization, 
and cites errors or failures as faults of organization rather than faults 
of administrative S 3 "stem.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Brig. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord, U. S. A., major-general of volun¬ 
teers. Served in the Florida war and Mexican war; in the civil war 
was division, corps, and department commander; afterwards major- 
general, U. S. A: 

(Page 71.) ‘'The staff' corps and officers administering the principal , 
duties pertaining thereto are called on and do pass upon the accounts 
and manner of expending funds and propert 3 " of general officers com¬ 
manding departments. The pay of the last-named officers is frequently 


11 


stopped at the suggestion of quartermaster, commissary, and other 
staff officers on duty at Washington, perhaps with reason, yet the dif¬ 
ferent sorts of duty performed by the officer of the bureau and the 
officer in the field—the fact that the former is called on to hold back 
funds, supplies, or material which the latter ma}^ think indispensable, 
or to recommend stoppage of his pay—is likely to beget rather a want 
of good will than an affection between them, and under the circum¬ 
stances I am not quite sure that an opinion of mine upon the subject 
of consolidation of the several staff' corps into one or more would be 
free from prejudice, and, if it is not imperative, I would prefer to remain 
silent upon that subject.” 

VALUE OF AN EFFICIENT STAFF. 

Coburn report, 1873, p. 1. 

The committee said: 

“To adjust and perfect the subtle and intricatQ machinery hy which 
great masses of soldiers are to be fed, clothed, armed, moved, inspired 
with confidence, and carried through victorious battles, is, after all, 
wrapped up in the perfection of staff organization. Take the best 
field officers, take the best-drilled soldiers, take a good cause, take all 
natural advantages of situation, and take away from the general the 
indispensable aid he must have in an efficient staff, and neither courage, 
good conduct, nor skill in the line can redeem a large army from the 
character of a mob.” 

Banning report, 1876, p. 3. 

The committee said: 

“The committee has endeavored to proceed on the basis that legis¬ 
lation should not be parsimonious, thus to avoid a temporary economy 
of an injurious character. 

“Our Army is viewed as a nucleus wherein is to be acquired and 
preserved military knowledge, and from which should radiate the 
elements of instruction and discipline, thus to form in time of war a 
competent force endowed with talent to direct it as a whole, and pro¬ 
vided with agencies capable of grasping the responsibility, organiza¬ 
tion, and distribution of numerous supplies necessary to the conduct 
of successful military operations. 

'"The principles of organization in peace must be such that there 
will be no departure from them in time of war, so that the country’s 
strength may be readily developed when the Government shall be 
called to make known its force.” 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Letter submitted by Gen. W. T. Sherman, U. S. A., dated Depart¬ 
ment of War, December 11, 1818, and signed by J. C. Calhoun, Sec- 
etary of War, 

******* 

(Page 110.) “In fact, no part of our military organization requires 
more attention in peace than the general staff. It is in every service 
invariably the last in attaining perfection, and, if neglected in peace. 


12 


when there is leisure, it will be impossible, in the midst of the hurry 
and bustle of war, to bring it to perfection. It is in peace that it 
should receive a perfect organization, and that the officers should be 
trained to method and punctuality, so that at the commencement of 
war, instead of creating anew, nothing more should be necessary than 
to give to it the necessary enlargement. In this country particularly 
the staff can not be neglected with impunity. * * * With a defect¬ 

ive staff' we must carry on our militaiy operations under great disad¬ 
vantages and be exposed particularly at the commencement of a war, 
to great losses, embarrassments, and disasters.” 

******* 

(Page Idl.) * * * “ It is believed that the organization of the War 
Department, as well as the general staff of the Army, is not suscepti¬ 
ble of much improvement. The act of the last session regulating the 
staff' has not only made important savings in the expenses of the Army, 
but has given both to the Department and the staff' a much more efficient 
organization than they ever before had. Every department of the 
Army charged with disbursements has now a proper head, who, under 
the laws and regulations, is responsible for its administration. The 
head of the Department is thus freed from detail, and has leisure to 
inspect and control the wffiole of the disbursements.” * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. A. 
******* 

(Page 208.) ‘‘One of the greatest difficulties met with in organizing 
armies during the late Avar Avas in the deficiency of number of educated 
staff' officers, aids-de-camp, etc. It is in this direction that efforts 
should be made to improve the organization and instruction of the 
Army, and it is absolutel}" certain that our proper policA" is to make 
the number of officers on the permanent establishment very large in 
proportion to the number of men.” 

* * * * .H- * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

Brig. Gen. C. C. Augur, U. S. A., major-general of A'olunteers, 
division, corps, and department commander: 

(Page dT.) “The Army in our country must always be small, but I 
think it should be of the A’^ery best (good Lord, deliver us from the 
perils and dangers of a cheap armv); and the ad\"antages attending its 
seiwice should be such as to induce our brightest A'oung men to engage 
therein, for it is to be the repository of the military customs and 
traditions of the country; it is to preserve and extend the militarv 
service, every day improving, and is to be the great fountain from 
Avhich our A^olunteers are to draw the skill, knowledge, and morale 
which soon com^erts them into great and formidable armies.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. August V. Kautz, Eighth Infantry, brigadier-general in vol¬ 
unteer service, brevet major-general; commanded cavaliy division. 
Army of the James, and First Division, TwentA-fifth Arnw Corps: 

(Page 90.) The staff' is the most important part of a skeleton armv. 
In it is preserA^ed the military knowledg’e and experience necessary for 


13 


carrying on war in the most soientitic and economical manner. Could 
we have had a stall sufficient to have fully controlled the late war, the 
expenses of the same would not have been one-half what they were.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Randolph B. Marcv, Inspector-General, U. S. A., brigadier- 
general of volunteers, and chief of stall' to General McClellan in the 
Army of West Virginia and in the Army of the Potomac: 

(Page 26.) “The importance of this subject (stall corps) and the 
absolute necessiW of properlv organizing, educating, and training offi¬ 
cers of the stall' and supply departments in time of peace upon a basis 
adequate to the requirements of an army called suddenly into the held 
to encounter an enemy was probabh^ never more forcibl}^ illustrated 
than in the English army during the Crimean campaign. 

“ Sir Archibald Allison, baronet, colonel in the English army, an 
intelligent and sensible writer upon arn^ organization, in discussing 
this subject, says: 

“ ‘ It is not too much to say that an arni}^ sent into the held without 
efficient and thoroughlv well-organized and long previously trained 
staff and supply departments is an arnn" foredoomed to dogs and vul¬ 
tures, and that no eocpenditure at the moment^ hou'er^er lavish^ can supj)^y 
these toants or a^ert this doom. 

“ ‘‘Our army which embarked (for the Crimea) in 1854 was the hnest 
this country ever produced, but it was bound together by a rope of 
sand, and it melted away like snow before the hrst touch of the hard¬ 
ships and inclemencies of winter; and this was the direct, necessary, 
and inevitable consequence of the ignorant economy of the Parliament 
of Britain in not sustaining in time of peace proper staff and supph" 
departments. 

“ ‘The green mounds in the quiet graveyards by Sebastopol where 
this same system (the defective staff' and supply organizations) has laid 
in its still abode an army, rank and hie, attest this. * * * 

“ ‘Our peace staff' and supply departments should, therefore, be so 
organized that they could instantly furnish the number of fulh" trained 
officers required in their respective branches for our army upon a war 
footing. The necessity for this was fully recognized at the close of the 
Crimean war, but year by 3 "ear since then the hnancial pruning hook 
is being applied in cutting down estimates as the lessons of the past 
fade away from the minds of a generation plunged in the strife and 
whirl of the present.’” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Thomas M. Vincent, assistant adjutant-general, brevet brigadier- 

general, and afterwards colonel and assistant adjutant-general. 

* * * * * * * 

(Pages 203, 204.) “We can not but deprecate the interminable 
changes which staff' organization seems doomed to undergo in our serv¬ 
ice. An}" system which could be made stable would be preferable to 
the best one in theory that is never allowed time to develop itself in 
practice. 

“In conclusion, the following additional extracts from Jomini will 
be found instructive: 

“ ‘ A government which neglects its army, under any pretext what¬ 
ever, is then a government guilty in the eyes of posterity, since it pre- 


14 


pares humiliations for its colors and its country, instead of preparing 
them for successes, hy following a contrary course. Far from us the 
thought that a government ought to sacrifice everything for the army. 
This would be an absurdity. But it ought to make it the subject of 
its constant cares, and if the prince have not himself a military educa¬ 
tion it is difficult to attain that end. In this case, which unfortunately 
happens but too often, it must be supplied by wise and provident 
institutions, at the head of which will be placed, without doubt, a good 
staff syatem^ a good system of recruiting, and a good system of national 
reserves. It is, especially in times of protracted peace, important to 
watch over the preservation of armies, for it is then that they can 
more easily degenerate, and that it is important to maintain in them a 
proper spirit, and to exercise them in great maneuvers, very incom¬ 
plete semblances, doubtless, of eft'ective wars, but which incontestably 
prepare troops for them. It is not less important to prevent them 
from falling into effeminacy by employing them in labors useful for 
the defense of the country. 

‘‘ ‘It is important that the study of the military sciences be pro¬ 
tected and recompensed as well as courage and zeal. The corps to 
which these sciences are necessary ought to be esteemed and honored. 
It is the onl}^ means of calling into them from all parts men of merit 
and genius.’ 

'"It has been well said by another writer that ^hy joerfectmg our¬ 
selves ^ in m ilitary science^ paradoxical as it may seem^ we are thereby 
assisting in the diffusion of and hastening on the approach of 

that period when swords shcdl be beaten into plmvshares and sjoears into 
pruning hoohs^'^ 

Banning report, 1876. 

Maj. Thomas M. Vincent, asssistant adjutant-general, brevet briga¬ 
dier-general, and afterwards colonel and assistant adjutant-general: 

(Page 135.) “Our staff is not merely for the Kegular Army, but it 
should be viewed as the rationed niilitary staffs applicable alike to the 
regular, volunteer, and militia forces; and it should be organized and 
trained in time of peace so as to be adequate to the wants of an army 
suddenly called into service. 

“The staff and line—our peace establishment—are maintained for 
the acquirement and preservation of military knowledge arid to per¬ 
fect military discipline, to construct defenses and organize the mate¬ 
rial necessary in war, and generally to form the stock, in all its parts, 
on which an army competent to the defense of the country ma}^ be 
ingrafted. 

“Past experience has pointed to the following facts: The saving in 
clothing, provisions, arms, and other things, by not being compelled to 
call out militia or volunteers, would amply supply a considerable force 
which, well officered, would be daily improving; the expenses of mili¬ 
tia and volunteers invariably exceed those of the regulars by several 
hundred per cent; the Black Hawk and Florida wars necessitated 
55,000 militia and an expenditure of 130,000,000, and would have been 
avoided, in each case, had there been two regiments of regulars avail¬ 
able for early service; a well-organized available force of 12,000 would 
have enabled the Government to avoid the Mexican war and its conse¬ 
quent expenditure of millions of dollars and a large sacrifice of human 


15 


life; and the recent rebellion would have been stayed by an available 
force of a few thousand men. * * * Xhe magnitude attained by 

the rebellion is the most instructive, for the public debt and money 
paid to pensioners * * * w^ould maintain our present force, cost- 

ing, sa\^, 130,000,000 3 ^earl 3 % for ninety-nine and two-thirds years. 
Now, however, and as a result of a temporary economy, we have to 
pay the debt, expend nearly $30,000,000 yearly for pensions, and sup¬ 
port a militaiy establishment costing $30,000,000; consequently we 
have lost, b}^ not having an available force to prevent rebellion, the 
enormous amount of $2,998,447,641.49.” * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

Maj. Samuel Breck, assistant adjutant-general, brevet brigadier 
general, U. S. A., and afterwards Adjutant-General of the Army: 

(Page 139.) ‘‘Had the Army been large enough so that President 
Lincoln could have put 35,000 or 40,000 regulars at once in the held, I 
believe the incipient war would have ended promptly and property 
and money been saved siifhcient to pay the expenses of an army of 
50,000 men three hundred years, not to speak of the lives of those 
who perished. 

“Those who look forward to an unending period of peace may think 
with proht how few of the North in 1860 anticipated any war at all, 
and even when the hrst call for men was made the war was expected 
to be a small affair of sixU' or ninety days. The last twenty-hve years 
have given rise to the war in the Crimea, the war in Italy, the war 
between Prussia and Austria, the war in Franee, in addition to our 
own, and the wars with and among half-civilized peoples. Does this 
past promise a long future of peace? Few nations of the earth have 
been exempt from war in this period of twenty-five years, and the art 
of war, both on sea and land, has made progress hitherto without a 
parallel. Can we with safety disregard the wisdom contained in the 
maxim, ‘In time of peace prepare for war?’ 

“The staff' corps of the Army ought to be not merely for the present 
necessities of the Army, but also for the purpose of having an educated 
and trained body of experts to assist in raising an army and putting it 
in the field when war comes. This needs only to be thought of to be 
an acknowledged necessity. As a matter of fact, however, these corps 
are barely sufficient for the present wants of the service. The Quar- 
termasteFs Department and Subsistence Department have large num¬ 
bers of line officers detailed for their duties, the Medical Corps has con¬ 
stantly a large number of contract surgeons, the Inspector-General’s 
Department has a number of officers detailed to perform its duties. 
None of these officers, so far as I know, are idle except from disa¬ 
bility.” * * * 

HOW THE PRESENT STAFF SYSTEM WORKED DURING THE WAR 
OF THE REBELLION. 

Garfield report, 1869, page 2. 

The committee said: 

“Much can be said in praise of these departments (staff'departments) 
for their efficient services during the late war. No large army was 


16 


ever so well clothed and fed, so promptly transported, or had so effi¬ 
cient medical attendance or comfortable provision made for its sick and 
wounded as ours.” 

Coburn report, 1873, page 2. 

The committee said: 

‘‘The present division of duties (staff duties) is the result of long 
experience, and very recentl}", in the struggle against rebellion, was 
found to work successfully in the widest theater of action. Is there 
any other system that will operate more favorably than this If so, 
what are combinations and subdivisions that will secure the desired 
end?” (See the question further discussed under title “Consolida¬ 
tion,” page 86, post.) 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Gen. W. T. Sherman, U. S. A.: 

(Page 466.) “A staff sj^stem that has admitted of an increase of the 
line of the Army from the mere nucleus of 1860 to a million of men, and 
its reduction back to the present standard without confusion, and with 
the most perfect accountability as to property and money, at all times 
providing for the Army abundantly, is entitled to our respect.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Lieut. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, U. S. A.: 

(Page 17.) “The present system has worked veiy satisfactorily, I 
think. It has carried us through a long war, and I believe that, prop¬ 
erly managed, it is about as good as anything we can get. As other 
nations have different systems some officers want to make changes, but 
they forget that other nations are subjected to different conditions, so 
that what might be good for Germany or France in the staff organiza¬ 
tion would not be suitable for the United States.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. A.: 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 207.) “It has grown up under the hands of able administra¬ 
tors and has met the wants of the peace establishment as well as of our 
various Indian wars, the Mexican war, and the late civil war. The 
test to which it was submitted during the war of 1861 to 1865, when 
an immense army was built up upon the narrow foundations of the 
old establishment, resulted so favorably that it would, in my judgment, 
be exceedingly unwise to revert to a system tried and condemned long 
years ago.” (Note. — A system of temporary details for staff duty ter¬ 
minated in 1837-38^ when the wesent system of the staff toas estahlished. 
See testimony of Adjutant-General Townsend, Cohurn repxmt, 1873, 
pages 50 and 51, post.) 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, 
commanded Army of the Potomac, at present (March 4,1872) in com¬ 
mand of the Military Division of the Atlantic: 

(Page 15.) “I have had a fair opportunity to observe the workings 
of the present s^^stem both in time of war and peace. It has always 


17 


worked well. * * .*. The distribution of labor to distinct depart¬ 
ments, the characteristic of the system, was adopted from the very 
fact of the previous systems not working well. * * * During the 

war I had, at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, visits from 
numerous foreign officers, and 1 do not remember a single instance 
where fault was found with our system. Among these there was a 
colonel of the French artillery who was permitted to remain several 
months at mj" headquarters and who very thoroughly studied our whole 
systeni of administration, and who considered our S 3 ^stem of distribu¬ 
tion of labor in our supplv departments as greatlv superior to the sys¬ 
tem in use in the French arni 3 % where all supplies are furnished b 3 " 
one department, that of the intendence.” 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. A., major-general of volun¬ 
teers, commanded Second Armv Corps, Army of the Potomac, fifth 
military district, Militaiy Division of the Atlantic, etc.: 

(Page 90.) ‘‘Those departments (quartermaster’s, commissar 3 ", and 
pa 3 ^) as the 3 ^ conducted their work during the war, gave great satis¬ 
faction.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Hancock: 

(Page 26.) “ From the recent experience of our great war we have 

an assurance that those (staff) departments can be relied upon under 
the present S 3 ^stem to perform their respective duties in the most 
successful manner under all circumstances.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, U. S. A., major-general of volun¬ 
teers, commanded Armv of the Ohio, Twenty-third Army Corps; now 
Lieutenant-General, U. S. A. (retired): 

(Page 28.) “Our present system works well in time of peace, and 
proved remarkably effective in war, though I believe nearly all arm 3 ^ 
commanders fouhd defects which the 3 ^ were compelled to remedy by 
their own assumed authority.” 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, 
commanded Arm 3 " of the Potomac, Army of the Rappahannock, 
division, corps, and department commander: 

(Page 110.) “ Our Army was perhaps more abundantly supplied by 

far (during the civil war) than any other army that was ever put in 
the field. The amount of supplies allowed so far exceeds that allowed 
any other service that even if a portion of those supplies should be 
given to the men they would be better off than if all the supplies 
allowed in other armies were given them. Our men have a very 
abundant ration, which during the war was largely increased by act 
of Congress. They have more clothing than they can use, in addition 
to which they have their pay. The amount of transportation neces¬ 
sary to send forward the supplies was immense; but they were all 


7114—00-2 



18 


sent forward, and the Army, with very rare exceptions, was always 
abnndantlv fed and well clothed, far more so than the French and 
English armies. 

‘‘This resulted from the nature of our Army, the quality and kind 
of persons who went into it, and what they had been used to having 
at home. I do not think that the supplies were in' any disproportion 
to what the men had been ac^customed to as citizens. * * * 

“This abundance was due to the spirit that animated every part of the 
land—every town, every city, every club, every organization.” * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, U. S. A., major-general of volun¬ 
teers, commanded Fourth and Eleventh Army Corps, the Army of the 
Tennessee, and now Major-General, U. S. A. (retired): 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 148.) “When a great war surprised us we had the present 
sjT^stem in the germ—only expansion, according to the emergency, was 
required. The Quartermaster, with slight additional help, forwarded 
camp and garrison equipage and moved armies with remarkable prompt¬ 
itude. The Commissary kept his eye upon his specialty and with great 
regularity supplied the vast numbers with the requisite food, and the 
Pay Department, doing only its own work, rarely failed to forestall 
one very fruitful source of discontent—the uncertain and irregular 
payment of troops in the field.” 

* * * * * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

Brig. Gen. Christopher C. Augur, U. S. A., major-general of 
volunteers, commanded a division in the Fifth Army Corps, the 
Department of Washington, and Twenty-second Army Corps: 

(Page 48.) “Experience has shown that our staff organization is 
efficient for field service on the largest scale.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Brig. Gen. Edward D. Townsend, Adjutant-General U. S. A., brevet 
major-general. Prior to appointment in the Adjutant-General’s 
Department served in the artillery in the Florida war and in the 
Cherokee Nation: 

(Page 125.) “The present army organization is the product of grad¬ 
ual experience. It has stood the test of war and peace, and though 
it may not be perfect, is probably as nearly so as it is possible to make 
it.” * * * 

(Page 129.) “In 1837-38 the present system of the staff was estab¬ 
lished, and in two great wars which have occurred since the manner 
in which our armies have been clothed, transported, fed, paid, and 
provided with medical attendance has attracted the admiration of the 
military world.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Maj. Samuel Breck, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., brevet 
brigadier-general, afterwards Adjutant-General of the Army. Prior 


19 


to appointment in the Adjutant-Generars Department served in the 
artillery in the field during the civil war until July, 1862: 

‘•The present organization certainly produced wonderful results 
during the war, and it is hard to conceive a more severe test of its 
merits.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Randolph B. Marcy, inspector-general, U. S. A., brevet major- 
general, brigadier-general of volunteers, and chief of staff to General 
McClellan in the Army of West Virginia and in the Army of the 
Potomac; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A., inspector-general: 

(Page 25.) “The lesson taught us during the rebellion, which I am 
confident every volunteer general officer will readily admit, is that our 
admirable stall' s^^steni contributed largely toward our success. With¬ 
out it we would have been unable to properly organize, equip, and sup- 
pi}^ such large armies as we were called upon suddenly to put in the 
field, but with it we achieved results that have elicited the commenda¬ 
tion and applause of military men throughout the world.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Marc}": 

(Page 143.) “No army of equal proportions was ever organized 
from raw levies in less time, and no mobilized troops ever so well sup¬ 
plied with transportation, subsistence, and war material, or more 
promptly paid or mustered in and out of service with as little dissatis 
faction or complaint as were our forces during our late war, all of 
which was achieved through the direct agency of our admirably organ¬ 
ized staff departments, and it is upon these departments we must in 
future, as in the past, mainly rely for great war exigencies.” 

Coburn report, 1874. 

Col. James A. Hardie, inspector-general, U. S. A., brevet major- 
general. Prior to appointment in the Inspector-General’s Department 
served in the artillery; during the civil war served as aid on the staffs 
of Generals McClellan and Burnside: 

******* 

(Page 249.) “At the breaking out of the war of the rebellion our 
efficient staff system provided ample administrative service for the 
wants of the large body of men suddenly called into existence. An 
imperfect staff system would have frustrated military success. 
******* 

“Q. When the late war began, notwithstanding the staff was much 
smaller than it now is, there was great rapidity and efficiency mani¬ 
fested in putting armies into the field?—A. Yes; but the staff itself 
was manifestly too small. The body of experience that it had was 
diffused rapidly, it is true, among the officers; but I think that the 
experience of all the officers of both armies. North and South, was that 
there was a lamentable deficiency of capable staff officers of the supe¬ 
rior grades. There was not an officer, from the Secretary of War to 
the major-generals commanding the troops who were charged with the 


20 


duties of the collecting of bodies of men and supplying them and mov¬ 
ing them, who did not feel the great deliciency that there was in the 
higher grades of staff officers. As the war progressed we got some 
talented staff' officers from the volunteer service, and we have some of 
them now in the service—some of the best officers we have.” * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Absalom Baird, assistant inspector-general, U. S. A., brigadier- 
general in volunteer service and brevet major-general; afterwards 
inspector-general with the I’ank of brigadier-general: 

(Page 41.) “I served during nearly the whole of the rebellion as a 
general of volunteers, commanding either a brigade or a division in 
the field, and after the war had command of a geographical militaiy 
department. * * * 

"‘In our short experience as a nation almost every conceivable method 
of staff organization has in some of its parts been experimented on, 
arriving at length at what we now have, and with this we have gone 
through two wars—one a veiy great one—with success.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Stewart Van Vliet, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., 
brevet major-general, served in the artillery before the civil war; was 
chief quartermaster Army of the Potomac; now colonel, U. S. A. 
(retired): 

(Page 164.) “When large armies were suddenly called into the field 
the staff corps supplied their wants promptly and efficiently. While 
almost everything was changed during the war, the organization of 
the staff remained the same; they were expanded, but never changed.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Rufus Saxton, deputy quartermaster-general, U. S. A., 
brigadier general of volunteers, brevet major-general; served in 
artillery until 1861; on the staff of General McClellan; military gov¬ 
ernor Department of the South; now colonel, U. S. A. (retired): 

(Page 33.) “I can not regard the present organization of the staff 
of our Army as faulty in any particular. It is the growth and result 
of years of experience. It stood the test in the late war nobly, and 
there is to-day no army in the world that has a staff organization so 
simple, effective, and common-sense, and it should not be changed 
without grave reasons.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Judson D. Bingham, quartermaster, U. S. A., brevet brigadier- 
general; served in artillery before the civil war; was chief quarter¬ 
master Seventeenth Army Corps and of the Army of the Tennessee; 
now colonel, U. S. A. (retired): 

* * * -x- * * * 

(Page 62.) “Experience in war, especially during that of the rebel¬ 
lion, has shown our staff organization to be equal to any demands that 


21 


have been or are likely to be made on it, and without a superior in any 
other army in the world.” 

* ******* 

Banning report, 1876. 

Brig. Gen. Robert Macfeely, Commissary-General of Subsistence, 
U. S. A.; served in infantry before appointment in Subsistence Depart¬ 
ment ; was chief commissary, Army of the Ohio, Fifteenth Army Corps, 
and Army of the Tennessee: 

(Page 167.) ‘‘The experience of the past fifty years and the late war 
prove that each department as now organized had as much as it could 
do to perform its appropriate and legitimate duties, and the manner 
in which these duties were performed, and the immense armies supplied, 
proved the efficiency and wisdom of the separate organizations.” * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Alexander E. Shiras, Assistant Commissary-General of Sub¬ 
sistence, U. S. A., brevet major-general, afterwards Commissary-Gen¬ 
eral of Subsistence with rank of brigadier-general, U. S. A.; served 
in artillery prior to appointment in Subsistence Department: 

(Page 55.) “The experience of the Mexican war and of our late 
civil war attests the advantage of our staff organization, and I fear¬ 
lessly assert that in all history no example can be found where equally 
large numbers of troops operating over so large a territory were as 
well supplied with every requisite by its staff' officers as was our Army.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. John G. Foster, Engineers, major-general of volunteers. 
Served in Mexican war; during civil war was a corps and department 
commander: 

(Page 26.) “Our organization is essentially an American one^ and 
has fully demonstrated its excellence during our recent wars. It is 
not too large or costly for a peace establishment, and is capable of 
expansion to meet the requirements of a great war. 

* * * * * * * 

“ It has stood the test of a great war successfully, and I should regret 
to see an}^ changes made in the interest of mere experiment.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Quincey A. Gillmore, Engineers, major-general of volunteers, 
division, corps, and department commander during civil war, after¬ 
wards colonel of engineers: 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 165.) “In my judgment, the duties of the QuartermasteFs 
Department are so essentially different in character from those of 
either the Pay or the Subsistence departments, and in time of war 
especially are so varied and onerous, that separate organizations should 
be maintained for these services. * * * During the war the duties 

of these three departments were discharged with conspicuous ability, 
and their general efficiency under the peace establishment has, I believe, 
never been questioned.” * * * 


22 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. John G. Parke, Engineers, major-general of volunteers, corps 
commander during the civil war; afterwards colonel of engineers: 
***** * * 

(Page 73.) “I believe that our armies were supplied and adminis¬ 
tered as well as it was possible under all the circumstances and con¬ 
sidering the very limited number of officers in our Army who had at 
the beginning of the war any practical knowledge or experience in the 
movement and supply of large bodies of troops.” * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

Maj. Godfre}^ Weitzel, Engineers, major-general of volunteers, divi¬ 
sion and corps commander during civil war: 

(Page 185.) ‘‘The present army organization has carried the coun- 
tiy through two wars in the most successful manner. I think as few 
changes as possible should be made in it, and these changes should be 
carefully matured.” * * * 

PERMANENT STAFF APPOINTMENTS, DETAILS FOR STAFF DUTY, 

THE VALUE OF SPECIALISTS, AND LEGISLATION SUGGESTED 

BY OFFICERS OF THE ARMY. 

Coburn report, 1873. 

The committee said: 

(Page iv.) “The committee made inquiry into the subject of the per¬ 
manency of the staff, the confining of officers to specialties of the service, 
and their efficiencv and ability in consequence of such limitation of their 
duties. Upon this subject there is a variety of opinion among 
officers. 

“As to the question whether there should be a permanent staff there 
was no doubt. But as to what portion of it should be permanent and 
what detailed there is great diversity. Some would cut down the pres¬ 
ent number of staff' officers largely, leaving but a few at the head of 
each branch; others would fix the number and fill up all vacancies per¬ 
manently, from the lowest to the highest. Others occupy an inter¬ 
mediate position, and w^ould leave the lower positions of each branch 
vacant, to be filled by detail from the line, as a school and preparation 
for the more responsible duties of the higher ranks of the staff or line, 
as future emergencies may require. 

(Page V.) “The testimon}^ is concurrent that the knowledge and 
experience gained by the performance of staff' duties is of the highest 
value; that the officer has been fortunate who in his earlier career may 
have by practice acquired a complete knowledge of the adjutant’s, the 
quartermaster’s, commissaiT’s, and the inspector’s duties, each and all 
so necessary to daily efficienc}" in the service, whether in the camp or 
the field. And if he can add to these the practice in the Ordnance and 
Engineer Corps he may be safely said to combine in his experience 
the highest preparation for the great soldier. 

“Can this exq^erience be given to the younger officers of the Arm}" 
by a system of details in different branches of the staff'? It seems to 
be possible and worthy of experiment. The additional question here 


23 


arises, Should they be detailed from different branches of the perma¬ 
nent staff to do duties in the others alternately, or should they be 
detailed from the line to go back to it again to serve with the troops ? 
If the former, then the vacancies of the staff should be filled at once, 
and a system of details adopted b}" which these officers could be trans¬ 
ferred from one branch to another, so that the entire staff should in 
the shortest possible time become acquainted with all of its varied 
duties not strict!}^ scientific specialties. On the other hand, if the lat¬ 
ter proposition be the better one, the vacancies in the staff' should be 
left open and provision be made for the selection of efficient, intelli¬ 
gent, and meritorious officers of the line to do the required staff duties. 
XVill the service suffer bv reason of such a system of details? is a ques¬ 
tion that here arises. It would seem that with capable heads to each 
branch of the staff' and an experienced corps of officers to aid him 
no possible detriment could occur from a system of details from the 
officers of the line. In the volunteer service a system of details was 
absolutely essential, and w orked well. If the detail for staff duties was 
made after a thorough examination and as a rew^ard of meritorious 
service, competition would furnish capable and qualified officers for all 
the vacancies that could occur.” 

Note.— The bill reported b}- the committee provided for details 
from the line, for a period not to exceed four years, to fill vacancies 
in the staff' as follows: Five vacancies in the grade of major in the 
Adjutant-General’s Department; ten vacancies in the grade of captain 
in the Quartermaster’s Department; six vacancies in the grade of 
captain in the Subsistence Department; ten vacancies in the grade of 
major in the Pay Department; ten vacancies in the grade of first lieu¬ 
tenant and five in the grade of second lieutenant in the Corps of 
Engineers; and five vacancies in the grade of first lieutenant and five 
in the grade of second lieutenant in the Ordnance Department (see 
page 163, post). 

Coburn report, 1874. 

The committee said: 

(Page iv): “It was also found to be expedient to reduce the staff in 
certain respects, and to proffide, in addition, that certain portions of 
the staff' shall not be filled permanently, but by details from the line, 
thus saving the expense of permanent officers in the staff' and giving 
officers of the line a fair opportunity to become acquainted with many 
of the most important duties of the staff', and vice versa. No doubt 
it is true that officers of the staff' may be benefited by service in the 
field with the troops, may become familiar with the duties of the line, 
and thus rendered more capable and efficient in great emergencies. 
A system of details gives to the Army an opportunity to have a selec¬ 
tion of the best talent for staff' duties ni addition to the highest degree 
of training and development. Certain branches of the staff' which 
require high professional knowledge and skill or great scientific attain¬ 
ments, such as the medical and legal departments and the Engineer 
Corps, would not admit of the application of this principle. To be a 
skillful physician, to be a profound lawyer, to be an able engineer 
require devotion to a specialty for years, and thorough and long- 
continued study. No officer of the Army could be detailed to act in 


24 


either corps with safety. But the duties of adjutants-general, inspec¬ 
tors, quartermasters, and commissaries come within the range of the 
knowledge and capacity of all of the officers of the Army, and they 
may be performed without difficulty by them.” 

Note. —The bill reported by the committee provided for details from 
the line to the staff for a period not to exceed four years, as follows: 
For 8 assistant adjutants-general, to rank as captains of cavalry; 4 offi¬ 
cers to act as assistant inspectors-general; 10 assistant quartermasters, 
to rank as first lieutenants of cavalry; 6 commissaries of subsistence, 
to rank as captains of cavalry, and 6 first lieutenants and 10 second 
lieutenants of ordnance (see page 165, post). 

Coburn report, 1874. 

Gen. William T. Sherman, U. 8. A., Commanding General of the 
Army from March 8,1869, to February 8, 1884. Received the thanks 
of Congress for Chattanooga, the Atlanta campaign, and the march to 
the sea. 

****** * 

(Page 276.) ‘‘Q. In your judgment, do the duties of the Ordnance 
and Engineer Corps, being scientific specialties, require their separa¬ 
tion from the ordinary routine of army duties? Do they require 
seclusion, as it were, from the Army?—A. I think not. I think, on 
the contrary, that all officers of the Army, in their own interest, 
should know what a soldier can do, in order to know what works of 
defense and offense are proper. I asked the question of Field Marshal 
Von Moltke, in Prussia, who, I suppose, at this moment stands at the 
very head of the military profession. I said to him, ‘You are chief 
of the staff which embraces all the staff departments of the Prussian 
army. You bring young officers to Berlin to school, as we send our 
young men to West Point. Do you ever send them to their regi¬ 
ments?’ His reply was, ‘Oh, yes; they go to their regiments. We 
never separate an officer from troops except by way of detail. He 
goes back to his troops again as soon as the special service is ended. 
No ofiScer is ever permanently out of the line of the army.’ * * * 

(Page 277.) My understanding, from the conversation I had with Von 
Moltke and others, however, w^as that officers of the staff departments 
in the Prussian army are detached as chiefs of staff and assigned to 
generals of corps, generals of divisions and brigades, but that these 
officers are at no time for a very long period separated from the troops 
of the line. In other words, every staff officer is required, for a con¬ 
siderable period of his life, to serve with soldiers. In our Army, as 
I have said, an ordnance or engineer officer knows no more about com¬ 
manding soldiers and of the conduct of the men who carry the 
muskets than other well-educated gentlemen.” 

(Page 277.) “ Q. Would you advise a change or transfer of the 
officers of these corps into the line, and officers of the line into these 
corps, as a general rule?—A. I would insist upon every officer of the 
Ordnance or Engineer Department for his own good and to enlarge 
the sphere of his usefulness, serving a portion of his time on duty 
with troops, and upon their not being kept so distinct and separate. 
They go to IVest Point and graduate there after four years’ instruc- 


25 


tion. They then go into the Ordnance or Engineer Departments and 
settle down into ordnance and engineer officers; that is all, and nothing 
more.” 

(Note.— Vacancies in lowest ordnance grade, first lieutenant, now 
filled by transfer from the line.—Act June 23, 1874. See p. 181, 
post.) 

‘‘They are perfectly qualified for these duties, but, as I have said, 
they can know nothing about commanding soldiers except b}" inspira¬ 
tion. My owm preference would be to require these graduates to serve 
for a length of time in the line of the Army before being eligible to 
either of these staff departments, and I would then require them, after 
a certain period of time, to be sent back to the line of the Army to 
serve for another period, when the}^^ might again be reeligible in the 
ordnance or engineer service. 

“ Q. It has been suggested by some of the officers who have answered 
questions to this committee that the term of staff duty be prescribed, 
and that officers should be limited to a short term of duty and then 
sent back to the troops. Would you regard that as a good polic}^ ?— 
A. I would regard that as an excellent policy. 

“ Q. Have you looked at the law to see what changes would be effec¬ 
tual to secure this result?—A. 1 have not; and 1 should not like even 
to suggest such a change, because to frame a law or to criticise a law 
presumes a knowledge of the principles of government greater than I 
aspire to. I merety say that such a law as would result in bringing 
harmony into all parts of the Army would be most desirable. * * * 

“Q. Do you think anything substantial is to be gained by confining 
these staff officers to special duty in their corps for a great length of 
time?—A. No, sir; they should go back and serve with the troops of 
the line a fair proportion of their period of service. 

“Q. How would you regard a provision of law requiring every offi¬ 
cer in the Engineer and Ordnance Corps below the grade of major or 
lieutenant-colonel to serve at least two out of every four years with 
the troops?—A. I think every officer should serve with troops four 
years before he is eligible to detail in ain^ of the staff corps, and that, 
having remained on staff duty for four 3 ^ears, he should then return 
to the line and serve four ^^ears more before becoming reeligible for 
staff duty of a higher grade.” 

* * * * * * * 

(Note. —See legislation recommended by General Sherman in Burn¬ 
side report, 1878, in which an organization Is provided for all of the 
staff departments, with a provision (section 90) for transfers by the 
President from the line to the staff and from the staff' to the line, and 
for details of quartermasters and commissaries with the rank of cap¬ 
tain, p. 29, post.) 

(Page 278.) “Q. In time of peace is it or is it not expedient to 
reduce the staff' in proportion to the reduction of the Army ?—A. No, 
sir; the staff ought to be liberal in its number. They are undergoing 
a system of instruction and preparation for war. We found in the 
Mexican war and in our civil war the large number of staff' officers 
very advantageous. 

(Page 279.) “Q. Would it be better to allow generals in command 
of armies, corps, or departments to select their adjutants-general, or 


26 


allow them to be selected, as at present, by the head of that depart¬ 
ment?—A. * * * In the held, during war, a general should choose 

from among his own officers the best men he can hnd for his adjutant 
and inspectors, without reference to the departments. In time of 
peace I rather think it is better that the officer should be assigned from 
the Adjutant-General’s Department. These are more familiar with 
the routine, which insures regularity in returns and reports, which is 
extremely desirable. 

* . * * * * * * 

‘‘Q. What is your opinion as to the comparative number and rank 
of the staff corps and officers of the line?—A. * * * I think the 

present organization of the staff corps was recommended by General 
Thomas, General Meade, and myself in 1868. And I feel, therefore, 
committed to the conclusion that the present grades are about fair and 
just and sufficiently remunerative to make them desirable. It makes 
men more careful if they occupv a position of high rank and trust. 

* * * "* * * * 

(Page 280.) ‘‘ * * My idea is that the fighting soldier, pure and 

simple, should be the veiy highest part of the military profession, and 
all these other be adjuncts; never the reverse. In other words, we 
should make it for the interest of the officer to be with his company 
and regiment wherever that company and regiment may be, and he 
should feel more honored in the discharge of the particular duty 
attached to his company or regiment than in any other detached duty 
whatever.” 

* * * x- * * * 

Burnside report, 1878. 

General Sherman: 

(Page 79.) “We need more first lieutenants, because of the many 
details for civil colleges, signal service, recruiting. West Point, and 
for detail as quartermasters, commissaries, etc., below the rank of 
major. 

* * * * * * * 

“In the proposed plan of organization you will notice that I vary 
slightly from that suggested in a former paper submitted to the board 
of reorganization two years ago, in this, that I now omit all regi¬ 
mental quartermasters and commissaries, and all officers of the general 
staff' below the grade of major, adhering to my recommendation that 
every company in the Army should have two first and one second 
lieutenants, so as to form a sufficient number of first lieutenants for 
detail for temporaiy service in the various staff' bureaus, limiting 
details to four years, and then compelling them to return to their 
companies and to be replaced b}" the detail of others, thus affording 
some variety of employment for this most valuable class of officers.” 

* * * * * * * 

Burnside report, 1878. 

General Sherman.—Extract from his letter to commission on reor¬ 
ganization, dated September, 1876: 

(Page 107.) “ On considering any paper organization it is safe to 
assume that about one-third are usually absent. This seems a large 


27 


proportion, l)ut it is the result ot* experienee extendino- baek for cen¬ 
turies. Good discipline and good administration diminish this ratio; 
while had discipline and worse administration increase it largely. The 
usual causes of diminished ranks are wounds and sickness, furloughs 
and leaves of a))sence, confinement by way of punishment, details for 
cooking, for care of sick, as teamsters, care and distri))ution of sup¬ 
plies, detachments for escorts of trains and ex])osed points along the 
routes of supply, etc. These causes are common to all armies in 
peace and in war, besides which our peace establishment is specially 
subject to causes which take officers away from their legitimate regi¬ 
ments and companies. It is a very common popular error that an 
army is necessarily idle in time of peace, and for this alleged reason 
influential families strive to draw their sons and friends away from 
their duty. No army in war performs more real hard work than 
does our American peace establishment, building forts and posts along 
our ever-changing frontier, Iniilding roads hundreds and thousands of 
miles in extent, guarding trains, and in explorations, which cause 
them to march thousands of miles in a single season, etc. Among 
these special causes I will enumerate the following: The Military 
Academy at all times draws from the regiments thirty officers, the 
civil universities are entitled to thirty bv law, the recruiting service 
requires forty, ])esides which are courts-martial, boards of survey, 
boards to examine new inventions in arms, accouterments, clothing, 
and ecpiipments. centennial l)oards, etc. At this very time there 
are three hundred and thirty-five officers so absent from their proper 
companies, besides many more who have leave of absence from their 
division and department commanders. I am satisfied that discipline 
and good economy demand that there never should be less than two, 
and habitually not less than three, officers present with each organized 
compainq and it is for this reason that I have added one first lieuten¬ 
ant to each company of cavalry and infantry, the same as now exists 
in the artilleiy companies.’' 

Burnside report, 1878. 

(jeneral Sherman.—Suggestions regarding revision of Revised Stat¬ 
utes of the United States, Title XIV, Chapter I, ‘The Army:” 

* * * •j;- * * * 

(Page 83.) ^‘Sec. 31. The Adjutant-Generars Department of the 
Army shall consist of one Adjutant-General, with the rank of brigadier- 
general; two assistant adjutants-general, with the rank of colonel of 
cavalry; four assistant adjutants-general, with the rank of lieutenant- 
colonel of cavalry; and eight assistant adjutants-general, with tjie 
rank of major of cavalry. 

“Sp:c. 32. All vacancies in the grade of major in the Adjutant-Gen¬ 
eral’s Department shall, when filled, be filled by selection from cap¬ 
tains of the Army. 

“Sec. 33. The Inspector-General's Department of the Army shall 
consist of one Inspector-General, with the rank of brigadier-general; 
one assistant inspector-general, with the rank of colonel of cavalrv; 
and two assistant inspectors-general, with the rank of lieutenant- 
colonel of cavalrv. 

(PageSd.) “Sec. 34. The Quartermaster’s Department of the Army 
shall consist of one Quartermaster-General, with the rank of brigadier- 


28 


general; four assistant quartermasters-general, with the rank of colonel 
of cavalry; eight deputy quartermasters-general, with the rank of 
lieutenant-colonel of cavalry; twelve quartermasters, with the rank of 
major of cavalry;-assistant quartermasters, with the rank of cap¬ 

tain of cavalry; and such number of military storekeepers, not 
exceeding-, as may be required, with the rank of captain of cav¬ 

alry. Nothing herein shall deprive of his office any person now hold¬ 
ing the office of quartermaster, with the rank of major. 

* * -X- * * * * 

“Sec. 41. The Subsistence Department of the Army shall consist 
of one Commissary-General of Subsistence, with the rank of brigadier- 
general; two assistant commissaries-general of subsistence, with the 
rank of colonel of cavalry; two assistant commissaries-general of sub¬ 
sistence, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel of cavalry; eight commis¬ 
saries of subsistence, with the rank of major of cavalry; and- 

commissaries of subsistence, with the rank of captain of cavaliy. 

* * * * * * * 

“Sec. 43. The commanding officer of each military post, or of a 
detachment in the held of two or more companies, when there is not 
present a regular quartermaster or commissary, may appoint, from 
among the subalterns present for duty, one to act as assistant quarter¬ 
master and commissary, who shall be subject to all the rules ^ind regu¬ 
lations for officers of these departments, and shall perform the duties 
thereof, and be entitled to receive, as full compensation therefor, in 
addition to the pay and allowances of his rank, the sum of hfteen dol¬ 
lars a month if the command be one hundred enlisted men or less, and 
the sum of twent}" dollars a month if the command exceed one hundred 
enlisted men. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 85.) “Sec. 51. The Corps of Engineers shall consist of one 
brigadier-general, six colonels, twelve lieutenant-colonels, twenty-four 
majors, thirty captains, thirty hrst lieutenants, ten second lieutenants, 
and one battalion of engineers. 

******* 

“Sec. 58. The Corps of Ordnance shall consist of one brigadier 
general, two colonels, four lieutenant-colonels, eight majors, ten cap¬ 
tains, twenty first lieutenants, ten second lieutenants, and a battalion 
of ordnance. 


****** * 
(Page 86.) “Sec. 65. The Medical Department shall consist of one 
Surgeon-General, one assistant surgeon-general, sixty surgeons, and 
ome hundred and twenty assistant surgeons: Protrlded, That at least 
one surg’eon and two assistant surgeons be assigned to duty with each 
of the regiments provided for in this act. The Surgeon-General to 
have the pay and allowances of brigadier-general, the assistant surgeon- 
general to have the pay and allowances of colonel, the surgeons of 
majors, and assistant surgeons of captains mounted. 

“Sec. 66. There shall be one purveyor or apothecary-general, with 
the pay and allowances of colonel, and four assistants, with the pay and 
allowances of lieutenant-colonel, and who m^y be required to perform 
the duties of a surgeon, at the discretion of the President. 


* * 


* * 


* 


* 




29 


‘‘Skc. 7(). The l^V Department shall consist of one Pa 3 "master- 
General, two assistant pa 3 nnasters-u:oneral, two depuG paymasters- 
general, and tiftv pav^inasters. The Pa\nnaster-(Teneral to have the pa^^ 
and allowances of brigadier-general, the assistant pa\miasters-general 
of colonel, the deput}^ paymasters-general of lieutenant-colonels, and 
paymasters of majors. 

***** * 

(Page 87.) ‘‘Sec. 83. The Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster- 
General, the Commissarv-General of Subsistence, the Surgeon-General, 
the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Ordnance, and the Paymaster- 
General shall be appointed b}" selection from the Army at large. 

"'Sec. 84. There shall be one Chief Signal Officer, with the rank of 
colonel of cavalry, who shall have charge, under the direction of the 
Secretary of AVar, of all signal duty and of all books, papers, and 
apparatus connected therewith. 

“Sec. 85. The Department of ^lilitaiy Justice shall consist of one 
Judge-Advocate-General, as brigadier-general; one assistant judge- 
advocate-general, lieutenant-colonel, and four judge-advocates, majors. 
******* 

"Sec. 90. Officers may be transferred from the line to the staff and 
from the staff' to the line by the President without prejudice to the 
grade and date of commission of either party so transferred; and the 
President may appoint from among the first lieutenants of the line not 
to exceed twenty (juartermasters and ten commissaries, who shall serve 
four years and no more, with the pay and allowances of captains, and 
then return to their proper companies and regiments, to be replaced 
b}' a like number; these officers to serve as depot or post quarter¬ 
masters and commissaries of subsistence under the rules and regula¬ 
tions for officers for these departments. 

* * ***** 

(Page. 88.) ‘"Sec. 98. None of the provisions of this title relating 
to the organization of the Army shall be construed to vacate the com¬ 
mission of any officer now proper!}" in the service or borne on the Army 
Kegister as an officer retired from active service, or to require new 
appointments to till the grades mentioned herein, which are now prop¬ 
erly tilled according to said provisions.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. ^ 

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. A., commanding general of 

the Army from November 1, 1861, to March 11,1862: 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 208.) “The effect of continuing the same officers in a par¬ 
ticular department or corps of the staff' is, with a proper organization 
and under proper restrictions, to render them competent to perform 
their duties. 

“It is very desirable that candidates for every staff corps or depart¬ 
ment should be examined with great care as to their professional, 
physical, and moral capacity—their soldierly feeling; and it is very im¬ 
portant that, prior to their permanent appointment on the staff, they 
should have served long enough in at least two branches of the service to 
render them fully acquainted with all the duties of officers of the line 


30 


and with all the requirements of troops—the mode of handling them, 
as well as to show their own military capacity. 

‘‘It is also desirable that the functions of the lower grades in the 
various staff corps should be performed hy officers detailed from the 
line for a period long enough to instruct them fulh^, and that the higher 
grades should be permanently filled by selections from among the best 
of the line officers who have been thus detailed. These details should 
not continue longer than some four years. In this manner the knowl¬ 
edge of staff duties would be widely spread through the line, to the 
benefit of the whole service. To provide for this without injury to 
the regimental and company service there should, of course, be a suf¬ 
ficient number of supernumeraiT officers.” 

* * * * * * * 

Burnside report, 1878. 

General McClellan: 

(Page loT.) * * The statesmen must control, but if wise 

and equal to the responsibility they will obtain their data from not too 
many soldiers of wisdom and experience, and. after determining the 
general principles, will leave most of the details to the professional 
men. In determining the proper organization of our Army it would 
appear indispensable first to establish the conditions of the problem in 
some such way as this. 

* * * * * 

(Page T55.) “The experience of our own and other countries proves 
that it is false economy to reduce the peace establishment of the Army 
unduly, for the reason that the employment of large masses of new 
troops upon the breaking out of war involves an immense expenditure 
out of all proportion with the savings resulting from reducing the 
peace establishment too much. For similar reasons it is wise and nec¬ 
essary to furnish in peace due supplies of all war materials not liable 
to deterioration. 

* * * ■«• * * * 

(Page 457.) “Another question which merits careful consideration 
and comes to a great extent within the domain of the statesman is 
whether the arms, equipments, ammunition, etc., for the Army should 
be made in the arsenals or obtained by purchase from private firms, 
under a system of rigid inspection. There enters here not only the 
question of costs, including interest on capital invested, etc., but also, 
the consideration of encouraging private companies in time of peace, 
so that in emergencies the Government may have larger facilities at 
their disposal. 

******* 
“engineek corps. 

“I can imagine no good reason for changing the existing organiza¬ 
tion of these companies, which was established for strong and sufficient 
reasons. The proposed organization would destroy or seriously impair 
their efficiency. 

“ordnance corps. 

“The strength of this corps must depend upon the solution of the 
question presented above—in regard to the manufacture of arms, etc. 


31 


‘‘The clause permitting the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-Gen¬ 
eral, Commissary-General, Surgeon-General, Chief of Engineers, Chief 
of Ordnance, and Paymaster-General to be selected from the Army at 
large instead of, as at present, from their respective corps, seems to 
me most objectionable, and opens the door to grave abuses, without 
any corresponding advantage. In the vast majority of cases, officers 
better fitted for the responsible duties of the positions named will be 
found in the corps than outside of it, and the chances are that improper 
motives would guide a selection made outside of the corps. 

“In such an army as ours the principle of seniority in promotion is 
the safest one, qualified by the condition that the first promotion to 
any vacancy shall be entirely fit for it. If the first is not, then the 
next who is fit should be taken. If no one in the corps is fit, then 
the best outside of the corps at once. Any system other than that of 
promoting the next senior officer possessing the requisite qualifications 
will destroy all pride and interest in the service. From the nature 
of ^ the case, this principle does not apply to the selection of general 
officers. * 

‘"The clause authorizing the President to promote an officer from 
one grade to the next higher, on the occurrence of the first vacancy in 
the same corps or regiment, for distinguished services in battle, is 
liable to the same grave objection.” 

******* 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, U. S. A.; Secretary of War; now 
lieutenant-general U. S. A. (retired); major-general in the volunteer 
service; Commanding General of the Army from August 14, 1888, to 
September 29, 1895: 

(Page 123.) “I am of the opinion that losses occur under the present 
system to a very considerable extent from the practice and necessity 
of detailing officers of the line at the various minor posts, for the dis¬ 
charge of the duties of these several departments, who are not bonded 
officers and who are frequently officers of no experience in the duties 
of these departments. I think, perhaps, that a most important reform 
could be effected in this regard with or without consolidation, but 
especially if these corps were consolidated by the enactment of a law 
authorizing an addition to the supply department of a pretty large 
number of officers of the line, they still retaining their commissions in 
their regiments and being subject to be relieved from staff duty and 
returning to their respective regiments whenever it might be deemed 
expedient. I would require these officers to be bonded officers. I think 
that would make the service safer and would secure to the supply 
department a greater permanence of character than can be secured 
under the present system. * * * 

“I do not think bonds are always a safeguard. I think the advan¬ 
tage of bonds is rather in their moral effect than otherwise.” 

(Page 125.) “Q. State your opinion as to what would be the effect 
of discontinuing the Adjutant-General as a permanent officer and assign¬ 
ing a brigadier-general to perform the duties of Adjutant-General.— 
A. I do not know that it would be objectionable. The principal effect 
of it would be to add what might be called a chief of staff to the pres¬ 
ent organization. As a matter of course the officer going into the 


32 


department would know little of the duties of Adjutant-General, and 
would depend for all the details of the office upon some one perma¬ 
nently in the Adjutant-General’s Department. The adoption of such 
a plan would amount to what has been advocated a g’reat deal—^the 
assignment of an officer as chief of staff. I think, myself, the principle 
is pernicious; I think that every officer in command should perform 
his own duties, and that in time of peace, and when not in the field 
with a separate army, the general should command the whole Army, 
staff as well as line" When that occurs the Adjutant-General will 
become what he ought to be—an officer in charge of the mere details 
of his department. * * * 

“Of course the consolidation of the staff' bureaus spoken of must be 
done b}^ legislation if at all. I ma}^ say in this connection that as a 
general thing whatever can possibly be done by Executive action in 
relation to military matters had better be done in that way than by 
legislation. It is a prett}- difficult thing to command an arm}^ by law.” 

• 

Maish report, 1878. 

General Schofield: 

(Page 26.) “The number of staff officers actually required is much 
greater than the numbers composing the several corps of tbe general 
staff of the Army. A large number of line officers are at all times on 
staff duty. The number so actualh" employed, as shown by the returns 
in the War Department, will give a just indication of "the required 
number. This will be found to be nearly independent of the numeri¬ 
cal strength of the Army. A still larger proportion of staff duties in 
the Quartermaster’s and Subsistence departments might be performed 
by line officers. This would probably be wise in view of the veiy large 
proportion of staff officers required in our service. 

* * -X- * * * «• 

“ * * * The greatest evil of our present military system, or 

lack of system, is that the staff departments are practically ‘inde¬ 
pendent corps.’ These departments are excellent in themselves. Their 
organization, though it might be improved, is good enough. An}^ 
possible question of their consolidation or reorganization in an}^ wa}^ 
is utterly insignificant as compared with that of their union with the 
line as part of the whole under one head. 

“So far as I can see, consolidation would not justify any material 
reduction in the number of staff officers, though it might be fairly 
advocated on other grounds. The numiber of staff officers can be 
reduced only by devolving their duties upon officers of the line. If 
the latter are to have only skeleton companies to command they ma}^ 
as well do all the required staff duties. But if the companies "are to 
be kept at effective strength, then the line officers have enough to do 
in their proper sphere.” 

***** -X- * 

Burnside report, 1878. 

General Schofield: 

* ****** 

(Page 246.) ‘ ‘ The permanent organization of the Adj utant-General’s, 

Inspector-Generars, Ordnance, Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay 


33 


departments, to consist of the chiefs and the necessary field officers; 
all other officers, captains and lieutenants, required for service in 
these departments to be detailed from the line for limited periods, say 
six years. Details for the ordnance should be made from the artillery 
only. 

‘"Appointments to the grade of major in any of these staff depart¬ 
ments should be made from captains of the line who have served a 
certain period—say not less than six years—with troops and a like 
period in the staff' department to which they are to be appointed, and 
should be based upon a competitive examination as to qualifications 
for service in such staff department, in addition to the general exam¬ 
ination required before all promotions. 

"‘ Every officer should be entitled, upon passing a satisfactory exam¬ 
ination as to his moral, physical, and professional qualifications, to 
promotion to^ the next higher grade up to that of colonel upon the 
completion of a definite period of service in each grade. 

“And no officer should be promoted without such examination. 

The periods of service in the several grades should be fixed so 
that the grade of colonel would be reached in about thirty 3 ^ears. 
The greatest periods should be about six 3 ^ears for a second lieutenant, 
eight years for a first lieutenant, ten years for a captain, six 3 "ears for 
a major, and four years for a lieutenant-colonel; total, 34 3 ^ears. 
Every officer to be retired after 44 years of service, or at 66 years 
of age.” 

* ****** 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Proposed reorganization of the Army, submitted by General Scho¬ 
field August 2, 1878. He provides a permanent organization for each 
of the staff' departments with modifications as follows: 

* * * * * * * 

(Page. 248.) “Sec. —. The general staff of the Arm}- shall consist 
of * * * such additional officers of the line as maj" be neces¬ 

sary, in the judgment of the President, to perform the service required 
in the general staff'. The officers of the general staff shall perform the 
duties which have heretofore been performed b}^ the officers of the 
Adjutant-General’s Department and of the Inspector-General’s Depart¬ 
ment. 

(Page. 249.) “Sec. —. All vacancies in the grade of major in this 
department shall be filled by selection from captains of the Army. 

“ Sec. — . The Quartermaster’s Department of the Army shall consist 
of * * * such number of captains and first lieutenants of the 

line as the President may assign to duty in this department, not to 
exceed the number of militaiy posts and detachments of troops in the 
field requiring the service of such officers. 

* * * * * * * 

“Sec. —. The Subsistence Department of the Armj" shall consist 
of * * * number of captains and first lieutenants of the 

line as the President may assign to duty in this department, not to 
exceed the number of militaiy posts and detachments of troops in the 
field requiring the services of such officers. 

* * * * * * * 

7414-00--3 


34 


(Page 250.) “Sec. —. The Corps of Engineers shall consist of 
* * 

“Sec. —. The Corps of Ordnance shall consist of * * * and 

such number of captains and first lieutenants of artillery as the Presi¬ 
dent may assign to duty in the corps. 

* * * -x- * x- * 

(Page 252.) “Sec. —. The Signal Bureau shall consist of * * * 
and such number of first lieutenants of the Army as the President 
may assign to duty in that Bureau, and not to exceed four hundred 
and fifty enlisted men. 

* ***** * 

“ Sec. — . The Chief of the General Staff, the Quartermaster-General, 
the Commissary-General of Subsistence, the Surgeon-General, the 
Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Ordnance, the Paymater-General, 
the Judge-Advocate-General, and the Chief Signal Officer shall be 
appointed by selection from the Army at large. 

“Sec. —. Appointments to the grade of major in an}^ of the staff 
departments shall be made from captains of the line who have served 
not less than four j^ears in such department, and not less than six 
years with troops in the duties of the line. 

“Sec. —. The period of services of officers of the line assigned to 
duty in any staff' department shall be limited to six years, and no offi¬ 
cer shall be detached from the duties of his corps until he has served 
therewith at least four years. 

“Sec. —. Lieutenants of engineers before their promotion to the 
grade of captain shall be assigned to and serve with troops not less 
than two years. 

(Page 253.) “ Sec. —. Officers of the line shall be assigned b v the War 
Department to regiments and companies or other duties authorized by 
law, according to the necessities of the service from time to time, in 
such manner that the junior officers of the line generally shall have 
experience in the administrative duties of the staff, and that officers 
appointed in the staff' shall have served not less than six years with 
troops before such appointment. 

* ****** 

“ Sec. —. None of the provisions of this title relating to the organ¬ 
ization of the Army shall be construed to vacate the commission of 
any officer now properly in the service, or borne on the Army 
Kegister as an officer retired from active service, or to require new 
appointments to fill the grades mentioned herein, which are now 
properly filled according to said provisions. But the President may 
transfer officers made supernumerary in any corps to fill vacancies in 
any other corps.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers; 
ommanded the Army of the Potomac; then (March 4, 1872) in com¬ 
mand of the military division of the Atlantic: 

(Page 16.) “The experience and knowledge acquired by an officer 
in discharging special duties ought to add to his efficiency^and render 


35 


his retention benelicial to the service; beino- retained, it is but justice 
to give him such promotion as his corps affords. * * * 

'‘In all departments of life education and experience are considered 
valuable, and are followed bv rewards and promotion. I see no 
reason why the same consideration should not hold good in the military 
profession. * * * 

“I do not think it would be good policy [to allow commanders of 
corps, armies, or departments to select their adjutant-generals from 
the line or staff']. In some instances the personal convenience of the 
general and, perhaps, the public interests might be promoted, but the 
tendency to indulge in friendly and personal considerations would be 
more likely to detract from than to add to the efficiency of the 
service.” 


Garfield report, 1869. 

Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, U. S. A., major-general of volun¬ 
teers, division, corps, and army commander—commanded the Army 
of the Cumberland: 

(Page lid.) “It is not natural to suppose that an officer detailed 
temporarily to do such duty [ordnance duty] would take so much 
interest in it as one who had been appointed to the position on account 
of his scientific attainments. The latter would take special pains not 
only to keep himself up to the mark, but would endeavor so far as 
possible to improve. A person only engaged temporarily in a thing 
will not take so much interest in it as one who is engaged in it 
permanently.” 

(Page 116.) “ Q. What would you say of its influence on the Army, as 
being good or bad, to have the Adjutant-General of the Army assigned 
by selection from prominent officers of the Army an^^where, without 
regard to promotion in his own corps?—A. We might get by the 
selection, if judiciously made, a much more efficient Adjutant-General; 
but the duties of an Adjutant-General are so peculiar that it would be 
a difficult matter to select an officer from the Army qualified in all 
respects to perform those duties. The duties of the Adjutant-General 
are ver}^ much detail duties—exact and statistical, too. It requires a 
good deal of close stud}- and a peculiar turn of mind to master the duties 
of the office and to retain sufficient recollection of them so as to keep 
the papers always correct; therefore I am inclined to think that on the 
whole it would be better to select the Adjutant-General of the Army 
from the corps of adjutants-general.” 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. A., major-general of volun¬ 
teers; commanded Second Army Corps, Army of the Potomac, Fifth 
Military District, Military Division of the Atlantic: 

(Page 87.) “I would suggest that general officers might be allowed to 
take from the Army officers of not higher rank than major or captain, 
and let them be detailed from time to time as adjutants-general in their 
respective commands. In that way we would be able to secure the 
services of the most talented young men in the Army, and it would be 
a great improvement on the present system. If the Adjutant-General 
should be taken in the way I have' suggested—by detail from the 


36 


brigadier-generals of the Army—he might be detailed by the Presi¬ 
dent or th^e Secretary of War, and might be relieved from time to 
time, to be succeeded by some other officer, selected from among those 
officers most useful and distinguished. The same rule in reference to 
the captains and majors detailed.” 

Maish report, 1878. 

General Hancock: 

(Page 5.) * * * ‘AVereW upon creating armies from our popu¬ 

lation when the necessity for them has actually arisen or is impending. 
But ' In peace prepare for war ’ is an accepted and respected maxim 
among us. Under the operations of these somewhat contradictory 
principles we have been led to the compromise of a small standing 
Army, which is expected to keep pace with the progress of the profes¬ 
sion, construct adequate and suitable national defenses, hold some of 
our most important militaiy positions, preventing their sudden seizure 
by an enemy, his occupation of our harbors and destruction of our 
great commercial cities; be prepared at all times to supply the national 
forces with the most improved Aveapons, implements, and munitions of 
war, and to guard these and other public property until distributed for 
service; be ready at a moment’s notice to organize, equip, and supply, 
with efficienc}" and economy, armies of an}^ magnitude which the occa¬ 
sion may call for, and, lastly, to serve as a nucleus for the raw levies 
raised as needed. 

‘'These I understand to be the main purposes for which our Regu¬ 
lar Army is maintained. As a physical force, our little standing 
Army can never be of appreciable importance after a great contest 
has set in. Its value consists in its serving as a model and a standard 
for the militia, and in the knoAvledge and system, the spirit of dis¬ 
cipline, and the military information which its members store up in 
peace, and disseminate among the national forces Avhen the struggle 
comes. ” 

* ****** 

(Page 7.) * * * “Ourstandingarmy should be a small, complete, 
compact, vigorous, healthy body, always in a thorough state of disci¬ 
pline and instruction, serving as a model and a standard for the national 
forces, and not preserved as a skeleton into Avhich it is expected to 
infuse vitality, actiAut}^, and knoAvledge at the moment an emergencv 
arises. 

“the engineer corps. 

“This branch of the service is of special importance in time of peace. 
Speaking generally, its duties consist mainly in the preparation of per¬ 
manent defenses. * * * The strength which the corps should have 

for its military duties is, like the artillery, quite independent of the 
strength of any other arm of service or of all of them combined. If 
their duties required it and their services justified it, the corps might 
even be largely increased in both the numbers and rank of its officers 
without any just criticism from the rest of the Army. * * * As 

far as I am able to judge from the limited information I possess, the 
corps is not larger than it ought to be for the performance of the duties 
required of it. 

* * * * * * ^ 


37 


‘•THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. 

‘'The relations of the Ordnance Department to our governmental 
system and to our small standing Army are quite similar to those of 
the Engineer Corps. * * * It is the duty of the Ordnance Depart¬ 
ment to lead in, or at least to keep pace with, these improvements, and 
all of the military interests, not only of the Regular x4rmy, but of the 
nation, are largely dependent upon the rapidity of its progress and 
the certainty of its conclusions in the specialty confided to it. * * 


'‘the medical department. 

"The iMedical Department, like the Engineer Corps and Ordnance 
Department, is, properly speaking, rather a special corps than a part 
of the staff. * * * *' 

* * * there are great questions in time of war which can 

onl}’ be properl}^ handled b}^ a regular medical corps. * * * 

* * * the Army medical officer is expected to maintain a 

high degree of proffciency in all branches, and if he does this it can 
only be by hard and constant study of a profession in which theories 
vary more rapidly, perhaps, than in any other. 

***** * * 

“It would not be correct to say that the oldest man in this branch 
is necessarily the best doctor, but it must, I think, be admitted that 
experience in this corps is of peculiar and especial value—that it is 
obtained only by extra hazardous risk from contagion, etc.—and hence 
length of service in the Medical Department is entitled to marked con¬ 
sideration and full compensation. * * * 

“chief signal officer. 

(Page 9.) * * * “It, however, strikes me as very anomalous 

that a proposition should be entertained to increase the Army by cre¬ 
ating a number of high grades for a signal corps about the time that a 
reduction is made in a corps so necessary and so valuable as the Judge- 
Advocate’s Department.” 

“the quartermaster’s, subsistence, and pay departments. 

“These are essentially the supply departments of the Army. I do 
not see why any one of them should ever be larger than necessary to 
ffll the deniand made on it by the Army actually in service. Regulated 
by this rule in time of peace, I have no doubt that each would in the 
future, as it has in the past, be found a complete and sufficiently large 
nucleus on which to build in case of war. In my judgment the Sub¬ 
sistence and Pay departments are now, in thpir strength and organiza¬ 
tion, well suited to the wants of the Army. * * * 

“It is generally, if not universally, admitted that these corps, with 
their present distinct organizations, have worked well both in war and 
peace. No great failure, perhaps no important shortcoming even, was 
charged to them during all the trials and difficulties of our last great 
war. 

***** * * 


38 


“the bureau of military justice and the corps of judge- 

advocates. 

* «• * * w * * 

“The duties of judge-advocates are inseparable from the military 
system. They can only be fully and properl}" performed by men who 
make a specialty of them. 

******* 

(Page 11.) * * * “A thorough knowledge of military law in its 

higher principles as well as the intricacies of its details is particularly 
necessary in new armies. Its prompt and correct application is one 
of the principal proceedings in the establishment of discipline and 
order in the armies which we rely upon in time of need. This can 
only be accomplished through a corps prepared beforehand. Ours is 
peculiarly a government of law in the Army as well as out of it. 

***** * * 

“These are some of the general considerations which lead me to the 
conviction that a judge-advocate’s department is an important and 
necessary feature of our military establishment, whether the Regular 
Army be large or small. 

“ inspector-general’s department. 

“This is one of the most important branches of the stalf. Unlike 
most others, its officers can not simply make a specialty of some one 
subject, but they should be well acquainted with every arm and depart¬ 
ment of the service. They must examine and report whether proper 
and thorough instruction is given, whether discipline is maintained, 
whether administration is honestly and efficiently conducted, whether 
arms and equipments are suitable and sufficient, whether accounts are 
properly kept and rendered, whether punishments are conformable to 
law, and, in general, whether laws, regulations, and orders are impar¬ 
tially and rigidly enforced throughout the military service. To pass 
properly upon all these questions they must understand the subjects. 
This requires a high and peculiar order of ability, great industry, large 
experience, and matured judgment. I have adverted only to the gen¬ 
eral duties of this department. In addition to them, its officers have 
a variety of special duties of great significance which I need not men¬ 
tion in detail. * * * 

“the adjutant-general’s department. 

(Page 12.) “Our Regular Army is composed of three parts—the 
general officers, the general staff, and the line. As we use the term 
‘staff,’it comprises some thirteen distinct legal organizations, with 
specific duties allotted to each. * * * And thus we have the Quar¬ 

termaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments, constituting the supplv 
staff; the Adjutant-General’s Department, the Inspector-General’s 
Department, aids-de-camp, etc., constituting the military staff, while 
others, such as the Engineers, Ordnance, etc., are special corps. 

“Staff' duties have their origin in the fact that it is beyond human 
capacity for a commander to attend in person to all of those details of 
service which are unavoidable in large military commands, and which 


39 


have increased with the progress of military science. The staff officer, 
speaking in general terms, is one who aids the commander in the labors 
which belong directly to his office. 

‘‘In this view of the subject, the Adjutant-General’s Department is 
essentially the staff corps of our Army. Every other branch of the 
staff' (except, perhaps, the Inspector-General’s Department) aids the 
commander, as a general thing, onh^ in the direction of the specialty 
intrusted to it. But the duties of an Adjutant-General, as essential 
on the battleffeld as in the bureau, extend not only to all arms of the 
line, but to all branches of the staff*. In addition to certain office 
duties which belong to him under the routine of his bureau, he is 
practically the principal assistant to the commander. 

“ He of necessity exercises vast power. Although he acts invaria¬ 
bly in the name of the commander, and not, as the Secretary of War 
does, in his own name, yet the relations between an adjutant-general 
and his commander are in principle the same as those between the 
Secretary of War and the President. 

* * * * * * * 

“Of daih" importance to the peace establishment, there is no corps 
or department in the military service on w^hich the prompt and effect¬ 
ive organization of a war establishment so large!}" depends as on the 
Adjutant-General’s Department, which furnishes an additional and 
potent reason for preserving the strength and efficiency of the corps. 
It is charged with the preservation and care of records of great public 
and personal interest, but this is a minor duty of the corps which 
might be sufficiently well performed by faithful and intelligent clerks. 

'•In fact, this duty must and ought to be left mainly to that class of 
employees, in order that the officers of the corps may be able to con¬ 
cern themselves with the living, active affairs of the profession. It is 
a serious defect in our system that the officers of the corps by their 
limited numbers and the constant and pressing routine duties of their 
offices are prevented from acquainting themselves as thoroughly as 
they otherwise might with the details of the various arms of our own 
service, as well as with those of foreign services. It has even been 
suggested that this defect is so grave that the corps should be abolished 
and its duties performed by officers detailed at will from the line of 
the Army. The officer detailed would, however, rarely be as well 
qualified in all respects for staff' duty as the Adjutant-General, sup¬ 
posed to have been selected originally for aptitude in that branch and 
who had received the benefit of long study and practice in it, and the 
detailed officer, being taken from either the artillery, cavalry, or infan¬ 
try, would, from his training and interest in a particular arm, probably 
be more of a specialist than an adjutant-general now is. The wiser 
course, it seems to me, is to enable this valuable corps to acquire the 
additional information and experience which it may be thought to 
need. The officers of this department are ex officio inspectors- 
general, and from time to time for short pei’iods should be placed on 
duty as inspectors-general to enable them to become acquainted with 
the "localities at which the troops are stationed throughout the country 
or throughout the geographical command to which they are assigned, 
to learn the routes for transportation of supplies, to become acquainted 
with the personnel of the officers of the Army, and to observe the 
discipline of the service. * * * 


40 


Burnside report, 1878. 

Draft of a bill from General Hancock, which provides a permanent 
organization for each of the stall' departments with modifications as 
follows: 

* * * * * * * 

(Pages 240-243.) “ Sec. 18. That the organization of the Adjutant- 
General’s Department shall be as follows: 

* * * * 

‘‘As many captains may be detailed from the line of the Arnyy for 
service as assistant adjutants-general with the commanding generals of 
militaiT divisions and departments as, in addition to said ofiicers of the 
Adjutant-General’s Department, will provide a sufficient number for 
the public service, such officers to remain on such detail not longer 
than four years. And while on such duty such officers shall have the 
rank, pay, emoluments, and allowances of mounted officers one grade 
higher than that held by them in their regiments or corps. And all 
vacancies which may occur in the rank of major and assistant adjutant- 
general shall be filled by selection from the officers so serving, or who 
shall have so served, by detail as aforesaid, if any there be, and other¬ 
wise from officers of the Army of the rank of captain. 

“ Sec. 19. That the organization of the Inspector-General’s Depart¬ 
ment shall be as follows: 

* * * * * * * 

“As many majors may be detailed from the line of the Army for 
service with the commanding generals of militar}" divisions and depart¬ 
ments as, in addition to said officers of the Inspector-General’s Depart¬ 
ment, will provide a sufficient number for the public service, such 
officers to remain on such detail not longer than four years. And 
while on such duty the officers so detailed shall have the rank, pay, 
emoluments, and allowances of mounted officers one grade higher than 
that held by them in their regiment or corps. And all vacancies which 
may occur in the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Inspector-General’s 
Department shall be filled by selection from the officers so serving, or 
who shall have so served by detail as aforesaid, if any there be, and 
otherwise from officers of the Army of the rank of major. 

“Sec. 20. That the organization of the Judge-Advocate’s Depart¬ 
ment shall be as follows: 

* * * * * * * 

“As many captains may be detailed from the line of the Army for 
service as judge-advocates with the commanding generals of military 
divisions and departments as, in addition to said officers of the Judge- 
Advocate’s Department, will provide a sufficient number for the public 
service, such officers to remain on such detail not longer than four 
3 ^ears. And while on such dut^" the officers so detailed shall have the 
rank, pa^^, emoluments, and allowances of mounted officers one grade 
higher than that held b}^ them in their regiments or corps. And all 
vacancies which ma}- occur in the rank of major in the Judge-Adcocate’s 
Department shall be filled by selection from the officers so serving, or 
who shall have so served by detail as aforesaid, if anj" there be, and 
otherwise from officers of the Army of the rank of captain. 

* * * * * * * 


41 


“ Sec. 22. That the organization of the Quartermaster’s Department 
shall he as follows: * * * 

* * * * * * * 

“Vacancies in the grade of captain in the Quartermaster’s Depart¬ 
ment shall be tilled selection from the regimental quartermasters 
or from the tirst lieutenants of the Arm}' serving or who may have 
served as post quartermasters, but such selection shall Iv limited to 
officers who shall have served at least two years either as regimental 
or post quartermasters, or both. 

“Sec. 23. That the organization of the Subsistence Department 
shall be as follows: 

******* 

“Vacancies in the grade of captain in the Subsistence Department 
shall be tilled by selection from the first lieutenants of the Army serv¬ 
ing or who may have served as post commissaries of subsistence, as 
provided for in section 38 of this act. But such selection shall be 
limited to officers who shall have served as post commissaries of 
subsistence for at least two years. 

“Sec. 24. That the organization of the Medical Department shall 
be as follows: 

***-}(*** 

“As many medical purveyors may, from time to time, be detailed 
from the surgeons of the Army of the rank of lieutenant-colonel or 
major as may be necessary for the public service; such medical pur- 
ve 3 "ors to have the rank, pay, emoluments, and allowances of mounted 
officers one grade higher than that held by them as surgeons. 

“ Sec. 25. That the organization of the Pa}^ Department shall be as 
follows: 

******* 

“There ma}^ be detailed from the officers of the line of the Army, of 
the rank of captain, as many officers as, in addition to said officers 
of the Pay Department, may be necessary for service in said Depart¬ 
ment; such officers to remain on such detail for not more than four 
years, and to have while so detailed the rank, pay, emoluments, and 
allowances of . mounted officers one grade higher than that held by 
them in their regiments or corps. All vacancies in the rank of major 
in the Pay Department shall be tilled by selection from the officers so 
serving or who shall have so served by detail as aforesaid, if any there 
be, and otherwise from the officers of the Army of the rank of 
captain.” 

* * * * * * * 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers*, 
commanded Army of the Potomac, Army of the Rappahannock; divi¬ 
sion, corps, and department commander. Draft of a bill to reduce and 
reorganize the Army, submitted by General McDowell, which provides 
a permanent organization for each of the stafi" departments, with moditi- 
cations as follows: 

******* 

(Page 260.) “ Sec. 21. The officers of the present Adjutant-General’s 
Department and the officers of the Inspector-General’s Department 


42 


shall be merged into the Adjutant and Inspector-Generars Depart¬ 
ment, and shall take place therein according to grade and date of 
commission. 

******* 

‘‘Sec. 23. In addition to the foregoing permanent officers, there 
shall be attached to the department twelve assistant adjutant and 
inspector g(^ierals, who shall be detailed from the majors and captains 
of cavaliy, artillery, and infantiy, and who shall remain in the depart¬ 
ment for a tour of service not to exceed three years, and who shall not 
be eligible to a second detail till after having served at least two years 
with their regiments. 

“Sec. 24. Appointments to the grade of major in the Adjutant and 
Inspector General’s Department shall be made only by selection from 
those officers who have been attached to and served in the department, 
as provided for in section 23, and who shall have received special cer¬ 
tificates from the Adjutant and Inspector General, approved by the 
General or Lieutenant-General of the Army as the case may be, set¬ 
ting forth that the}- have, while serving in the department, received 
the special approbation of the commander to whose staff they were 
attached. 

(Page 261.) “Sec. 25. No officer nowin the Adjutant-General’s or 
the Inspector-General’s Department shall, b}^ reason of the provisions 
of section 22 of this act, be either reduced in grade or discharged from 
the military service. * * * 

“Sec. 26. The officers of the present Quartermaster’s Department 
and the officers of the Subsistence Department shall be merged into 
the Quartermaster and Commissary Department, regard being had to 
grade and date of commission. 

“Sec. 27. * * * And as man\^ post quartermasters and com¬ 

missaries as the service may require, not exceeding one for each post, 
exclusive of those at which a regimental quartermaster and commis¬ 
sary may be serving. 

* * * * * * * 

“Sec. 30. Promotion to the grade of captain in the Quartermaster 
and Commissar}^ Department will be made only by selection, under 
such rules as the Secretary of War may establish, from the regimental 
quartermasters and commissaries who have distinguished themselves 
in the knowledge and practice of the duties of their office. 

^ “Sec. 31. No officer now in service in the Quartermaster’s or Sub¬ 
sistence Department shall, by reason of the provisions of section 27 of 
this act, be either reduced in grade or be discharged from the militaiy 
service. * * * 

* ****** 


Maish report, 1878. 

Brig. Gen. John Pope, U. S. A., afterward major-general, U. S. A., 
major-general of volunteers, commanded Army of the Mississippi, 
Army of Virginia, also department and division commander: 

(Page 28.) “I presume that all military men are agreed that there 
must be a staff ; that is, a body of officers specially selected and instructed 
for special duties. This has been an axiom in all modern armies, and 
nothing in army organization is better settled than the need of a 
.staff. * * * 


* * * * * 


* 


* 


43 


(Page 31.) To say that a staff should consist of officers temporarily 
detached from the line and to be interchanged at short intervals does 
not appear sound, except in a very limited sense, and for the transac¬ 
tion of the mere local business of military posts. To extend such a 
system generalh" would be as unwise as to appl^^ the same rule to a 
railroad, and to interchange conductors with locomotive engineers, 
train dispatchers with freight agents, or brakesmen with porters, or 
superintendents with civil engineers, etc., indiscriminately. Such a 
proposition carries no greater absurdity on its face in railroad than in 
army matters. I do not consider anv proposition to do without a staff' 
and to depend upon details from the line for staff' duties at all tenable, 
except in the limited sense referred to, and in that sense this practice 
is and practically has alwa 3 ^s been in operation. 

^"The reason why there are so man\" differences of opinion among 
armv officers concerning the details of army organization does not 
seem difficult to explain. Everv officer, it is to be presumed, bases 
his opinions upon his own experience, which is greater or less exten¬ 
sive or limited, according to his vears, his rank, and the nature of the 
service he has performed. What would be a complete and efficient 
S 3 ^stem for a small force operating against hostile Indians in a remote 
district would perhaps be entirel}" unsuited b}" expansion to a whole 
armv in scarce an}- part of which would the same conditions be found. 
So, too, everv officer is naturalh" more or less interested in the organi¬ 
zation of the special arm to which he belongs, and is apt, unconsciously, 
to attach an undue importance to it relatively" to other arms of the 
service. The staff being, to sa\" the least, a semi-independent branch 
of the service and controlling the disposition of so much that is needed 
by- the line is, of course, subjected more than anv other branch of 
service to adverse criticism, which, instead of being conffned, as in my- 
opinion it should mainlv be, to objection to methods of administration, 
applies itself almost wholly- to forms of organization and cites errors 
or failures as faults of organization rather than faults of administra¬ 
tive svstem. 

***** * * 

(Page 32). 1 propose, therefore, with all respect, that, to determine 

the question of staff' organization and administration, the committee 
recommend an act or joint resolution of Congress, appointing a board of 
five or seven officers, to be designated in the act itself, and to be officers 
of rank and experience most likely to be best acquainted with all the 
facts, and whose opinions from their known character and standing 
before the country- would carry- weight and command respect—the board 
thus appointed to submit a plan of organization for the staff' of the 
Army- and a sy-stem of administering the details of its business, the 
latter to be embodied, in a code of Armv Regulations. When com¬ 
pleted, their plan to be laid before the military committees of Con¬ 
gress for their consideration, and subject to such modifications and 
alterations as they consider judicious, to be enacted into law and to be 
thereafter only susceptible of change by law. Of course it is under¬ 
stood that the* committees, if they think proper, should invite opinion 
and criticism of every- portion of the work of the board from such 
officials or others as they believe competent to criticise, allowing, how¬ 
ever, the officers of the board to present replies and to maintain, by- 
reason and argument, the provisions they- have adopted. 


44 


“By these means it is believed that the best opinion of the Army 
on the questions involved can be obtained in such succinct form that 
the committee and Congress can understand and act intelligently upon 
them. The practice heretofore has onlv loaded down committees of 
Congress with a great mass of conflicting or inharmonious opinions 
and suggestions which can not be reconciled, and man 3 ^of which, it is 
not unfair to say, have not been carefull}^ considered in a broad view 
of general results, or are mainly devoted to the discussion of special¬ 
ties of those particular arms of service in which the writers are natu¬ 
rally most interested. 

“ I do not know what success the committee has met with in the 
efi'ort to evolve from the great mass of papers submitted to them any 
well-considered or well-understood svstem of army organization and 
administration, but I do know that there are not manv armv oflicers, 
if indeed there be one, who could deduce an^" well-detined opinion 
concerning these matters from the mass of letters addressed to the 
committees of Congress heretofore which it has been my fortune 
to read. 

***** * 

(Page 33.) “* * * To say that because a s^^stem of army 

organization and administration has worked well in Germanv or 
France, or elsewhere, where there exists such wide difierences both in 
the character and hal)its of the people and the nature of the military 
service to be performed, it should therefore be adopted in this countr}^ 
is no more sound than to say the same thing of a political form of 
government. The logic of such a proposition leads absolutel}^ to the 
opposite conclusion.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, LJ. S. A., now major-general, U. S. A. 
(retired), major-general of volunteers, commanded Fourth and Eleventh 
Corps, and the Army of the Tennessee. Received the thanks of Con¬ 
gress for services at Gettysburg. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 148.) “A reduction of force would be gained bv a more fre¬ 
quent temporaiy detail of officers to quartermaster and commissary 
duty, but it would be necessarily at the expense of the efficienc}" of 
the companies, which are alreadv sufi'ering by the large number of 
absentee officers, and also at a loss of efficienc}^ of service rendered, 
b}" reason of inexperience, and because few men ever do their best in 
the functions of an office not their own. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 149.) “There are evils resulting from the assignment of stafi‘ 
officers to generals with whom they have no personal sympathy. This 
is sought to be avoided by courtesy and some previous arrangement. 
The freedom of details proposed would doubtless facilitate such har¬ 
monious arrangements by enlarging the held of selection. A more 
frequent detail would relieve the monotony of service often in time 
of peace, and give those who have the rougher work an opportunity 
to take their turn at more pleasant posts; yet my judgment inclines 
against the detail and transfer system, as involving inevitable loss of 


45 


efficienc}^ on the principle I have named above, that a trained officer 
working in his specialt}^ ceteris paribus, is superior to any other. 
For variety, let quartermasters change posts with quartermasters, and 
commissaries with commissaries, artillery officers with artillery officers, 
and so on. Thus, every variety of service, after its kind, is passed 
through in the course of a term of years.” 

* * * * * * * 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Teny, U. S. A., afterwards major-general, 
U. S. A., major-general of volunteers; division and corps commander. 
Beceived the thanks of Congress for the capture of Fort Fisher: 
****** * 

(Page 421.) ‘G would suggest that the present division of duties 
among the several statf departments should remain unchanged. The 
present stall' system has been severely tried, and has endured every 
test to which it has been submitted. 

••In my judgment, it is more than doubtful whether any other sys¬ 
tem could be substituted for it without injury to the service. 1 feel 
sure that the consolidation of any two or more of these departments 
would be productive of evil alone. That the internal organization of 
some of these departments might be improved is probable, but on this 
point the heads of the departments respectively can advise the com¬ 
mittee much more wisely than I can.” 

****** * 

(Page 422.) ‘‘Notes upon General Sherman’s bill for the reorgan¬ 
ization of the Army. 

******* 

• 

“Sec. 34. Add to this section: ‘All vacancies in the grade of a.ssist- 
ant quartermaster shall be tilled by selection from the first lieutenants 
of the Army.-’ 

‘‘Sec. 41. Add to this section: ‘All vacancies in the grade of com¬ 
missary of subsistence with the rank of captain shall be tilled by selec¬ 
tion from the first lieutenants of the Arm}".’ 

****** * 

“Sec. 65. Amend this section by striking out the words ^ Provided^ 
That at least one surgeon and two assistant surgeons shall be assigned 
to duty with each of the regiments provided for in this act.’ This 
provision is impracticable in time of peace; the regiments are broken 
up into small detachments, which are often widely separated. In time 
of peace the medical officers are therefore stationed at posts and with 
troops in the held, not with regiments. 

“Sec. 85. The corps of judge-adv^ocates provided for in this section 
is too small. There should be at least ten judge-advocates with the 
rank of major. 

“Sec. 90. Insert after the words ‘the staff,’ wherever they occur in 
the second line of this section, the words ‘excepting the Pay Depart¬ 
ment.’ The reason for this amendment is this: Civilians, or perhaps 
lieutenants in the Army, may be appointed to the semicivil, seminiili- 
tary position of paymasters with the rank of major. And, under this 
section as it now stands, persons so appointed, if they could find a 
major of the line willing to transfer with them, would become field 


46 


officers of the line over the heads of captains grown gray in service. 
This section formally sanctions what has heretofore been of at least 
doubtful legalit}".” * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Brig. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord, U. S. A., afterwards major-general, 
U. S. A. (retired), major-general of volunteers; served in the Florida 
war, the Mexican war, and the war of the rebellion; division, corps, 
and department commander: 

(Page 72.) “I think the President should be allowed to transfer or 
assign officers of the same rank from the stall' to the line, or the 
reverse, at his option. It would be a check on disbursing officers, and 
would enable the President to select for either dut}^ from a much 
larger number of officers, and until he could find a man lit for the 
place, besides giving the stalf officer an opportunity of learning by 
actual experience something’ about the wants of the troops. The laws 
as they now stand are unequal. If a vacancy occurs among the gen¬ 
eral officers of the line, any staff officer is eligible for appoitment to it, 
but a vacancy of brigadier-general in a staff bureau is not open to 
officers of the line.” 

****** * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Brig. Gen. Christopher C. Augur, U. S. A., major-general of vol¬ 
unteers; commanded a division in the Fifth Army Corps, the Depart¬ 
ment of AVashington, and Twenty-second Army Corps. 

****** * 

(Pages 132,133.) ‘‘This depends entirely upon the character of the 
men selected for educating, training, etc. I doubt the good effect of 
great latitude in transferring from one corps to another, unless 
restrained by the consent of the officers transferred. 

****** * 

‘‘I do not think an officer should be put on the general staff' until 
he is thoroughly familiar with the duties and responsibilities of a line 
officer. After that he should confine himself to the specialties of the 
particular branch of the staff' to which he is assigned.” 

****** * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, U. S. A. (retired); served in 
Florida war, Mexican war, and war of the rebellion; corps com¬ 
mander. 

****** * 

(Page 70.) “ Special corps have the advantage which a long course 

of devotion to one branch of service affords, but if carried too far you 
lose sight of the human material with which you have to work.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. A. (retired), major-general of vol¬ 
unteers; division and corps commander; commanded Arm}^ of the 
Potomac, and Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, Army of the Cumberland. 


47 


(Pago 99.)^ the system of our education at the Military 

Academy, officers are educated in all the arms of service alike, and 
that, to my mind, is the beauty of the system. It should be extended 
to the stati' corps and preserved in the line of the Army after they 
become officers. All other things being equal, that army which is the 
best instructed in all the branches of the service will be the most 
■efficient. It also more readily adapts itself to expansion when 
required.” 

***** -H- ■55- 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, U. S. Volunteers, colonel and assistant 
adjutant-general, U. S. A.; commanded Department and Army of the 
Ohio. 

(Page 60.) “The effect of continuing the same officers in a particular 
department or corps of the staff' is to promote economy and to increase 
the efficiency of the department and of the officers themselves. Of 
course the selections should be carefully made in the first place. * * * 

“Officers are rendered more efficient by being educated and trained 
for specialties of the service; and I do not, at this moment, see how 
any improvement could be made upon the present system, unless by 
greater care in original selections. The system has not been unsuc¬ 
cessful heretofore, and no system of temporary details from the line 
for staff service can ever be otherwise than pernicious.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. Volunteers, brevet major- 
general, U. S. A.; brigade, division, and corps commander; com¬ 
manded Sixth Army Corps, Army of the Potomac. 

•St * * * * * * 

(Page 78.) “1 think that officers are more efficient from special train¬ 
ing. But I believe that it would improve the present status of the 
Army if there would be assigned from the graduates of the Military 
Academy every year a small number of officers who would be at once 
rated as staff officers. They should serve two ^-ears in each arm of 
the line (artillery, infantry, and cavalry) as company officers, should 
then undergo a rigid examination, and if they are found qualified, 
should then be eligible for appointment in the lowest grades of the 
various staff departments, which grades should in some of the corps 
be lower than they are now. 

“This arrangeinent would virtually allow a greater freedom of detail 
and transfer, and I think would conduce to a higher grade of knowl¬ 
edge among the officers of the staff departments. The reasons are 
obvious, for every intelligent officer will have learned by his six 3 ^ears’ 
service details that he never will forget, nor can learn later in life. 
This knowledge would be of enormous service to the country and to 
the officers. 

* * * * * * * 

“But if in time of peace we are to hold ourselves in readiness to 
raise an enormous army rapidl}^ when war comes upon us, it will be 
impossible to attain this end without a staff at the very commencement 


48 


quite as large and quite as much separated into corps as that which 
now exists. Troops must be raised and organized at many centers 
throughout the United States. Any one who remembers the confusion 
and extravagance which attended these organizations at the commence¬ 
ment of our late war at points where officers of the old Armj^ were 
not present, and who knows the waste of life and of money consequent 
upon the ignorance and inefficiency there shown, will, I think, conclude 
that although a large staft' is in time of peace an expensive appendage 
to the Army, yet when war comes on it is so entirely indispensable, 
and becomes immediately so entirel}^ inadequate in numbers to the 
wants of the service, that it ought to be kept up to its present strength 
and with nearly its present organization, so long as the country has 
any expectation that it will ever have another war. 

"'When the war of the rebellion broke out the staff was as large in 
proportion to the size of the Arm}" (except the Medical Corps) as it is 
now. The appointment of an enormous number of stalf officers at 
once showed the feeling of deficiency that existed, and there were not 
nearly enough stalf officers in the old Army to give even a little 
instruction to the large army of new staff officers. If the staff be 
materially reduced now, and no change of policy take place before the 
occurrence of the next war, we will be then even worse off if possible 
than we were at the commencement of the last war.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. James B. Ricketts, U. S. A. (retired), brigadier-general, 
U. S. Volunteers; served in the artillery in the Mexican war and 
war of the rebellion. 

******* 

(Page 161.) "Specialties in all branches, military or civil, have 
been fully proven to secure superior efficiency, and transfer or detail 
impairs usefulness and weakens knowledge already acquired by mental 
application and experience. 

******* 

" Staff officers should be exclusively confined to the special duties of 
their separate departments for which they have been selected.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, U. S. A. (retired), major-general of 
volunteers; served in the Mexican war and war of the rebellion; 
division and corps commander. Army of the Ohio and Army of the 
Cumberland. 

(Page 11.) "The effect of continuing the same officers in a particu¬ 
lar department or corps of the staff, and of allowing only promotion 
within them, is generally of a twofold nature—one beneficial, the 
other detrimental. * * The first, or beneficial, effect * * * 

is to render them more expert and efficient, * * * and a sense of 

permanent responsibility is necessary to give the highest degree of 
cultivated and enlightened capacity. * * * To exert himself to 

the full measure of his ability every man must feel that his position is 
reasonably well assured, and that a just and fair reward for efficient 
and useful performance of his duties is equally well assured. The 


49 


deleterious influence is to render officers of staff corps or departments, 
to some extent at least, arrogant and offensive to the great body of the 
Arm}^, and the influence of the system is to narrow and cramp their 
intellects for general usefulness at tirst, and after a long service, even 
for their own special duties; in short, to fossilize them. * * * 

‘‘Officers educated, trained, and promoted for specialties are more 
efficient, provided that real merit, and not nepotism or political influ¬ 
ence, has been the controlling element in the selection. * * * 

Greater freedom of detail and transfer than is at present exercised 
would not be beneflcial. * * * ^ ^rell organized military establish¬ 

ment should be well adjusted to its position, and work without friction; 
and this implies special training, education, and experience. * * * 

(Page 12.) “In a representative form of government a thousand 
political and personal intrigues for reciprocal personal and political 
advantage and advancement come into play in all cases of detail and 
selection. * * * more baneful influence ever infested a mili¬ 

tary establishment than the determination of promotion and advance¬ 
ment from consideration of nepotism, political influence, or personal 
solicitation. This the danger likely to arise from allowing a wide fleld 
of selection in this matter of staff' appointments or details. * * * 

Staff corps and organizations are an undeniable necessit 3 \ * * * 

(Page 13.) “The allowing generals to select their adjutant-generals 
from the line or staff' would open the door to nepotism—a curse to an}^ 
armv. * * * The most trifling class of officers in the service is 

composed of those who are constantlv seeking fancy details, which 
take them awav from their lineal or staff' positions. The less fleld for 
the gratitication of this disposition to get on details, the better for 
the efficiency of the Arm}".” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Gen. James Longstreet, surveyor of customs at New Orleans; lieu¬ 
tenant-general in the Confederate service: 

(Page 35.) “ Officers should be kept, as a rule, in the department or 
corps to which they belong. Great care should be exercised, however, 
in selecting officers for service. * * * 

“Military science is similar to that of law, medicine, philosophy, 
etc., in this, that military men should be selected and promoted accord¬ 
ing to their special qualiflcations, * * * and when selected, if well 

selected, should be kept at such duties. 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Brig. Gen. Edward D. Townsend, Adjutant-General, U. S. A., bre¬ 
vet major-general; prior to appointment in the Adjutant General’s 
Department, served in the artillery in the Florida war, and in the 
Cherokee Nation: 

******* 
(Page 96.) “The effect of continuing the same officers in a particu¬ 
lar branch of the staff, and of allowing promotions only within them, 
is to give them a motive and pride in perfecting themselves in every 
sort of infoi'ination that can make them efficient. If sure of a continu¬ 
ance and promotion in the line of duties of their choice, their zeal and 


7414—00-4 



50 


fidelit}^ rarely flag. If alwa 3 "S under the apprehension or certainty of 
being transferred to other duties, perhaps by no means so genial to 
their tastes and talents, they can not be expected to take interest in 
their stafl' duties, except so far as to accpiit themselves without actual 
blame. The hope of promotion is always a healthy stimulus. 

-X- -X- * * * * 

‘‘The system of keeping all kinds of records originating in the Adju¬ 
tant-General’s Office and carried out by officers instructed by its means 
contributed, first, to the preservation, in good form, of valuable papers, 
and second, to having them safeh" deposited in the AVar Office after 
their use at the headquarters where they originated had ceased. That 
this is due to an organized staff' department appears from the fact that 
there are no such records relating to the times when commanding gen¬ 
erals detailed for acting assistant adjutant-generals any officers they 
chose foi’ the time being. In those days the generals were apt to con¬ 
sider all letters and correspondence not immediately forwarded for 
action to Washington as their own private property. The slight traces 
of those old records now to be found show a great contrast with the 
elaborate files of recent dates, so carefully arranged and preserved as 
to afford, without loss of time in searching, almost all necessary data 
in ail}" given case. 

“The conclusion is that general staff officers are more efficient and 
valuable than line officers, temporarily detailed, would be, because they 
take a pride in the department to which they belong, and not being, 
as it were, the creatures of their generals, they feel the responsibility 
constantly weighing upon them of accountability to the War Depart¬ 
ment. Nor does this in any degree weaken their obligation to perfect 
military subordination to their commanding general for the time being. 
The generals have, on the other hand, aids-de-camp who are chosen 
by themselves and bear to them a more personal relation as staff officers, 
fulfilling in this respect all needful purposes. Besides the objections 
already mentioned to freedom of detail or transfer of staff officers from 
one branch of the service to another, there is a serious one of a politi¬ 
cal nature. Had the Executive the uncontrolled power to transfer and 
appoint there might be a time when, by skillful collection of agents 
from all branches of the Army, at influential political centers, with 
large contracts and heavy disbursements to be made, a most dangerous 
power could be wielded. Under the present system such a thing would 
not be possible once in a century. 

“Corps of oflicers trained in special staff duties, while performing 
these duties in time of peace, are perfecting themselves and keeping 
alive their system. When war conies they are so many skilled direc¬ 
tors and instructors for volunteer officers appointed to their depart¬ 
ments for service with volunteer troops called into action. There is 
no more perfect mode of rapidly organizing and mobilizing bodies of 
raw troops. 

* * * -K- * 45. * 

“Theold Florida war is a standing exemplification of the inefliciency 
of the system of temporary details for staff duty. There were con¬ 
stant well-grounded complaints of want of supplies and facilities of all 
kinds for the troops, and, as the records will show, no lack of expend! 
ture of money meantime. In several instances large commands were 
well-nigh losing their scalps in consequence of starvation in their 
beleaguered forts. 


51 


"‘In 1837-38 the present system of the staff was established, and, in 
the two great wars which have occurred since, the manner in which 
oiu* armies have been clothed, transported, fed, paid, and provided 
with medical attendance has attracted the admiration of the military 
world. Undue extravagance during the late war has been alleged 
against the disbursing l)ranches of the staff'; but it should be remem¬ 
bered that the people through their governors. State and national leg¬ 
islatures, demanded that eveiy comfort and convenience should be 
given to the men who left their homes and business to serve in the 
war. Special enactments were passed to this end, and appropriations 
made to cany them out. The officers concerned, then, only did their 
duty in obedience to those behests. Since the war closed a rigid econ¬ 
omy has been more and more carefully enforced, until the Army can 
not fail to perceive the contrast between the supplies of the war time 
and the mere necessaries now furnished them.” 

******* 

Burnside report, 1878. 

The draft of a bill sul)mitted by General Townsend provides a per¬ 
manent organization for each of the staff' departments, with notes as 
follows: 

(Page 265.) “Sec. T. Adjutant-General’s Department: 

“Note. — * * * It is well known that in this, as in every coun¬ 

try, deference is shown to rank and title, and this trait of human nature 
can not be ignored without weakening the legitimate inffuence of the 
most zealous and judicious officers holding such high and responsible 
positions. The same remark is applicable to the other heads of staff' 
departments. This fact was recognized when the Army consisted of only 
10,000 or 12,000 men, for all the heads of staff' departments who held 
brevet rank of general officers were assigned to duty as such and drew 
the pay, while the Quartermaster-General held the full rank of briga¬ 
dier-general.” 

“Sec. 5. Inspectors-General: 

“Note. —These officers should inspect the Army under the orders 
of the President, Secretary of War, and Commanding General of the 
Army, who, through their means, ought to be well informed as to the 
discipline and condition of every part of the military establishment. 
They should not be assigned to subordinate commanders. The latter 
can detail officers to perform such duties for their commands.” 

(Page 266.) “Sec. 6. Judge-Advocate-General’s Department: 

“Note. —The Judge-Adv^ocate-General needs two assistants in his 
office, and one as professor of law at the Military Academy. 

“Officers of the line can be detailed for all other duties in this 
department.” 

“Sec. T. Quartermaster’s Department: 

‘"Note. — * * * The assistant quartermasters would have charge 
of depots and transportation to expeditions in the held; other duties of 
the Quartermaster’s Department can be performed by regimental quar¬ 
termasters and officers detailed from the line.” 

“Sec. 9 . That in the absence of any officer of the Quartermaster’s 
or Subsistence Department, a captain or subaltern may be assigned to 
perform the duties of such department at any post or depot; and the 
officer iM) assigned shall, with the authority of the Secretary of War, 
receive J^20 a month extra pay while actually performing such duties.” 


52 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. James B. Fiy, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., 
afterwards colonel and assistant adjutant-general; served in the Mex¬ 
ican war; during the war of the rebellion was brigadier-general and 
provost-marshal-general: 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 162.) * * * I have no more doubt that officers are 

‘ more efficient wdio are educated, trained, and promoted for special¬ 
ties of the service,’ than I have that a patent lawyer is more efficient 
in a patent suit than a criminal or admiralty lawyer. Though it may 
be true that the legislation lixing our present staff system has been 
influenced, in a few instances, Iw personal considerations, it is a fact 
that this system is well adapted to our service, and has the special 
merit of being, in the main, the result of our own experience and 
necessities. It is, therefore, far more valuable to us than the systems 
of other countries could be, which systems, so far as we are concerned, 
are mere theories. The division of labor under it is about as near the 
natural and proper one as we can get without further experience; 
both in peace and war it has proved eminentl}" successful for our 
purposes.” 

***** * 

(Page 163.) ^ I do not see that ‘a greater freedom of 

detail and transfer than at present exercised, from one branch to 
another, would be beneficial.’ In weighing this point, it is necessary 
to consider the probable evil, as well as the possible good, to arise 
from the change proposed. It is ahva^^s pretty well known to the 
chiefs of staff bureaus, and to the Army at large, before a vacanc}^ in 
the staff is filled, who is, and who is not, qualified for the place. 
Notwithstanding this, improper appointments are sometimes made, 
but so far as there is an evil in this respect, it is not in the S 3 ’stem 
but in the administration of it. The power to transfer would, I 
believe, aggravate the evil. There is no reason to suppose that more 
wisdom would, in any instance, be practiced in transfers or details 
than in permanent appointments. The probabilities are, in fact, the 
other way. They would be more easiA made, appear less important, 
and be more influenced by merely personal considerations; and the 
selection of unfit persons might, therefore, be expected more fre¬ 
quently under the s^^stem of temporary than under the s^^stem of 
permanent selection. The evils from an old bad bargain—there being 
time and opportunity to make the most of it—are not as great as those 
from oft-recurring new ones. But there is a danger beyond that of 
transferring unfit men in. If vacancies could be created so easilv b}^ 
transfer, it is not going too far to say that theA^ might often be pro¬ 
duced by transferring out better staff officers than they brought in. 
Without further elaborating the point, I will say that, as a feature of 
the militaiy system, that uoav under consideration seems to me veiy 
objectionable, and likely to produce damaging confusion, if not 
demoralization.” 

* * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. William D. Whipple, assistant adjutant-general, afterAA'ards 
colonel and assistant adjutant-general; brigadier-general of vofunteers, 
and chief of staff to Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas: 


58 


(Page 30.) “Officers of the staff are generally selected on account 
of particular aptitude displa 3 "ed in the performance of duties apper¬ 
taining to some particular department, and appointed accordingly. 
Continuance therein must advance their education, and consequently 
increase their titness. * * * 

‘'An officer temporarily detailed to such duty, and liable to be 
returned to his regiment at any time, could not be expected to devote 
himself to the interests of such staff* department and the service to the 
extent of an officer who was permanent in his position.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Thomas M. Vincent, assistant adjutant-general, afterwards 
colonel and assistant adjutant-general; brigadier-general by brevet. 
Served in Florida hostilities, and in the held during the civil war to 
August, 1861; in charge of organization and muster out of the volun¬ 
teer armies: 

******* 

(Page 181.) “The effect of continuing the same officers in a partic¬ 
ular department or corps of the staff*, and of onh" allowing promotion 
within them, is to increase efficienc^^, and, consequently, to promote 
the public interest. 

******* 

(Page 185.) ‘‘MilitaiT officers are more efficient who are educated, 
trained, and promoted for specialties of the service, and a greater 
freedom of detail and traih^fer than at present exercised would prove 
detrimental to the efficiency of the Arm\\ 

‘‘General officers now select their aids-de-camp from the troops, 
and on the list at the present time wetind several relatives of the gen¬ 
erals. Of the others, several were evidenth" selected through personal 
or political considerations. Therefore wx see in the practical working 
that the good of the service and the 'military value of an aid are out of 
sight. If such is the case with the present limited field, the evil would 
not be less Iw granting a greater freedom. 

“ Where officers are transferred, by new i\\)^omimQ\\iii^ perraanently 
to the staff*, the same abuses exist to a certain extent, but the door to 
favoritism is in such cases more difficult to open than in those of tem- 
poraiw transfer b}" detail.” 

******* 

Maish report, 1878. 

General Vincent: 

(Page 12.) “Experience has fully established the fact that a small 
armv" requires propcrrtionally a larger staff* and a greater number of 
line officers than a large one.” * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 13.) “No doubt the contemplated new and revised Army 
Regulations will embrace all that may be necessary to the discipline of 
the Army.” * * ^ 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Randolph B. Marcy, Inspector-General, U. S. A., brigadier- 
general of volunteers, and chief of staff* to Major-General McClellan 


54 


in the Army of West Virginia, and in the Army of the Potomac; 
afterwards hrigadier-general and Inspector-General: 

(Page 25.) ‘‘The effect of continuing the same officers in a particu¬ 
lar department or staff' corps, and of allowing promotions only therein 
is to encourage them in devoting their time and energies in gaining 
knowledge and proficiency in their special duties. If these officers 
were relieved periodical^ they would not be likely to take that pride 
or interest in perfecting themselves in their duties that they would 
when permanently assigned. Moreover they would be likely to for¬ 
get the greater part of what they had learned after a few years.” 

Coburn report, 1874. 

General Marcy: 

****** * 

(Page 309.) “Under the act of 1869 most of the staff corps are now 
being materially reduced by casualties, and some of the vacancies in 
the lower grades might advantageouslv be filled by periodical details 
from the line, which would instruct a good man}" young officers in 
staff' duties and render them available for extensive military operations 
in time of war, but the officers in the higher grades should have 
matured experience in their special branches of service. 

****** * 

“So far as a reduction of officers now holding position in the staff' 
corps is concerned, the results of my own observation and the reports 
of other inspectors go to show that their time is fully occupied in the 
performance of their duties. If, therefore, any reduction is made in 
the number of these officers, the work necessarily imposed upon those 
remaining would be too burdensome.” * * * 

Maish report, 1878. 

General Marcy: 

(Page 46.) * * * “ It is admitted by almost all military men who 

are not actuated by personal motives that the staff' of an army should 
in time of peace be so constituted, organized, and instructed as to 
admit of raj)id expansion sufficient to meet all war exigencies, and 
that to this end it should be permanent. The lesson taught us during 
the civil war, the truth of which I am confident every volunteer gen¬ 
eral officer will readily admit, is that our admirable staff' system con¬ 
tributed largely toward success. Without it we would have been 
unable to properly and speedily organize, equip, and supply such vast 
armies as we were called upon suddenly to mobilize and put in the 
field: whereas, by its direct agency, we achieved results that elicited 
the commendation and applause of military men throughout the civil¬ 
ized world.” 

****** * 

(Page 47.) “Mr. Crawford, Secretary of War in 1815, in a letter 
to the Military Committee of the House in response to certain inqui¬ 
ries touching the peace establishment, said: 

“ ^The experience of the two first campaigns of the last war, which 
has furnished volumes of evidence upon this subject, has incontest¬ 
ably established not only the expediency but the necessity of giving to 
the military establishment in time of peace the organization which it 
must have to render it efficient in a state of war. 


55 


‘‘‘It is believed to be demonstra))le that a complete organization 
of the stall will contribute as much to the economy of the establish¬ 
ment as its efticienc}". 

The stationary staff of a military establishment should be sub¬ 
stantially the same in peace as in war, without reference to the num¬ 
ber of troops of which it is composed.’ 

“Mr. Calhoun, Secretary of War in 1818, who studied the subject 
of military atfairs more and probably understood it better than any 
other civilian SecretaiT of War who has ever occupied that position, 
and whose opinions are entitled to great consideration, in speaking of 
arm}" organization, said: 

* * * ■}«•*** 

“'In fact no part of our military organization requires more atten¬ 
tion in peace than the general stall'. It is in every service invariably 
the last in attaining perfection; and if neglected in peace, when there 
is leisure, it will be impossible, in the midst of the hurry and bustle 
of war, to bring it to perfection. In this country particularly the staff 
can not be neglected with impunity.’ 

“General Sherman, in his annual report for 1869, says of staff corps: 

“ 'In number and rank they do seem disproportionate to the line of 
the Army; but this has been the case for a number of years, and the 
experience of the war of the rebellion demonstrated its wisdom. A 
staff' system that has admitted of an increase of the line of the Army 
from the mere nucleus of 1860 to a million of men, and the reduction 
back to the present standard without confusion, and with the most 
perfect accountability as to property and money—at all times provid¬ 
ing for the Army abundantly—is entitled to our respect.’ 

* * * * * * * 

“ General McClellan, in a letter to the House Committee on Mili¬ 
tary Affairs, in May, 1872, in answer to certain inquiries, stated: 

'' ‘It (our staff' organization) has grown up under the hands of able 
administrators, and has met the wants of the peace establishment as 
well as of our various Indian wars, the Mexican war, and the late 
civil war. The test to which it was submitted during the war of 1861 to 
1865, when an immense army was built up upon the narrow foundations 
of the old establishment resulted so favorably that it would, in my 
judgment, be exceedingly unwise to revert to a system tried and con¬ 
demned long years ago. I have no reason to believe that the number 
of officers in the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments 
is now in excess of the demands of the service, nor do I believe that a 
consolidation would decrease the number; and, in this connection, I 
may be permitted to sa}" that the number of staff' officers in peace 
should be kept as large as possible in order to provide for the con¬ 
tingency of a sudden increase in the event of war. The difficulty in 
efficiently organizing a new army is more in the special and staff corps 
than in the line.’ 

“Our present staff' system was introduced into the service in 1837- 
38, and was the result of extended experience, matured study, and 
thought on the part of our best military minds; and, although it has 
been somewhat modified since to meet the requirements of the service 
during the late war, the principles of its original organization have 
not been materially changed. 


56 


'‘The personnel of some of the staff departments as now constituted 
may appear large in comparison with the strength of the line, but 
when the fact is borne in mind that no arm}^ of equal proportions was 
ever organized from raw levies in as brief a period and no such large body 
of mobilized troops ever was as well supplied with transportation, sub¬ 
sistence, medical attendance, and war material, or as promptly paid or 
mustered into and out of service with as little dissatisfaction or com¬ 
plaint as were our forces during the late civil war, all of which was 
achieved through the direct and masterly working of our admirably 
organized permanent staff' departments, and that it is upon these 
agencies that we must in the future as in the past mainly rely for great 
and sudden war requirements, I believe it will be acknowledged by the 
gentlemen of 3 "our committee that retrenchment in this direction would 
be unwise in the extreme. In view of these significant facts it must 
be admitted that economy, integrit}", and accountability are, under the 
present system, as well secured as thej" can be by an\" other, and it 
seems to me hazardous to attempt b\" experiments of doubtful expe¬ 
diency to improve upon organizations w^hich exhibit results of such 
satisfactoiT character.” 

* * * * * * * 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Draft of a bill submitted b\" General Marcy; provides for each of 
the staff' departments: 

(Page 273.) “Sec. 6. That hereafter no officer shall be detailed to 
an}" staff' appointment or other situation the duties of which will detach 
him from his company, regiment, or corps until he has served at least 
four years with the regiment or corps to which he properly belongs; 
and no such detail shall be for a longer period than four years at anv 
one time. 

“Remakks.—* * * 

“1 beg leave to state, for the information of the joint committee, 
that, in my judgment, the existing organization of the staff' corps, with 
some slight modifications, is well adapted to the requirements of the 
service. 

“ Our present staff system was introduced into the Army in 1837-38 
and was the result of extended experience, as well as of matured studv 
and thought, on the part of our able military administrators, anS 
although it has been somewhat modified since to meet war exigencies 
the principles of the original scheme have not been materially 
changed.” 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Edmund Schriver, Inspector-General, U. S. A., brevet major- 
general, U. S. A.; served in the Florida war; during the war of the 
rebellion was chief of staff. First and Second Army Corps; also 
inspector-general, Army of the Potomac. 

* * ***** 
(Page 81.) “The effect of continuing the same officers in a particu¬ 
lar department or corps is, generally, to promote efficiency, and to 
encourage them to perfect themselves by constant and systematic 


57 


study, for the skillful performance of their duties. Experience is 
gained, and this quality often is preferable, and more useful in the 
transaction of business than talent. Should an oliicer on the eve of 
promotion, or at any other time, be untit for the proper performance 
of his duty, there are existing agencies for ridding the department of 
him. With these, and the introduction of fresh and competent per¬ 
sonnel from the lower grades, the department may be kept in a healthy 
condition.” 

* * ***** 

Coburn report, 1874. 

Col. James A. Hardie, Inspector-General, U. S. A., brevet major- 
general; served in the Mexican war, and in the civil war as aid-de- 
camp to Generals McClellan and Burnside. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 243.) ‘‘One advantage to be derived from details from the 
line for the staff is, that there is and always has been a feeling on the 
part of the line that the staff is the most privileged branch of the serv¬ 
ice, without being the more deserving. This jealousy works mis¬ 
chief. 1 would be glad for the line officers to share our labors and our 
privileges, whatever they amount to. I think there might be harmony 
produced possibly, and a better state of feeling, which would be 
greatly to the benefit of the public service. * * * Another 

advantage, and a very important one, would be this: we would be 
training up a set of younger officers from whom the permanent officers 
of the corps could be taken if these should be the more favored candi¬ 
dates, as the}^ ought to be. Appointments from outside, forced upon 
the staff' corps without consulting the heads of those corps, have not 
been the most fortunate appointments made. * * * 

’would rather see things as they are than have them disturbed. 
The advantages possessed are ascertained; those promised by any new 
arrangement are not certain.” * * * 

Corburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Absalom Baird, assistant inspector-general, U. S. x4., briga¬ 
dier-general of volunteers; chief of staff'. Fourth Arm}" Corps; brigade 
and division commander; commanded a division in the Army of the 
Cumberland; afterwards Inspector-General with rank of brigadier- 
general, U. S. A. 

(Page 45.) “1 think that all staff duties, except those of aids-de- 

camp, should be made specialties, and that officers should be kept at 
those in which they have acquired skill.” 

Coburn report, 1874. 

General Baird. 

(Page 181.) “Q. Would it not be a good plan to detail officers of 

the line to do duty temporarily in the staff corps, requiring them to go 
back to their regiments after a tour of duty here of four or five years ? 

“A. No, sir; I think not. There are some always detailed to per¬ 
form that duty, but this detail would soon become a matter of favor- 


58 


itism, and there would be constant trouble and change resulting from 
it. I do not think it would be as just as it is now. 

‘‘Q. Would it be any more a matter of favoritism than the appoint¬ 
ment in the first place 

“A. Yes; 1 think it would be. Every lieutenant in the Army 
would be using all the political and other influence he could get to get 
a detail of this kind. Of course, the}^ do use influence now to receive 
the appointment, but after the}" are once in the office there is but little 
trouble afterwards.” 

******* 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General, U. S. A.; 
served in artillery, engineers, and infantry; was Quartermaster-Gen¬ 
eral during the civil war. 

Draft of a bill submitted by General Meigs, provides a permanent 
organization for each of the staff departments; the proposed general 
staflf includes a combined Adjutant-General’s and Inspector-General’s 
Department and a Quartermaster’s Department; other modifications 
are as follows: 

(Page 276). ‘‘Organization for an army of twenty-five thousand 
enlisted men. 

* ****** 

‘'Much is said lately against the strength and rank of our present 
general staff. * * * But the general staff is the staff, not of 

25,000 men, not of a corps d’armee, not of a State or province of 
40,000 square miles, but it is the staff of an empire of 45,000,000 people 
and occupying 3,000,000 square miles of territory; and the Secretary 
of War, the lawful head of the military administration, must be pre¬ 
pared at shortest notice, through the officers of the general staff, to 
place a soldier or a body of soldiers on any square mile of the 3,000,000, 
and there to keep them fully equipped, clothed, armed, munitioned, 
fed, and efficient for any required duty. 

* * * * * * 

(Page 278.) “general staff. 

* * * * ■ 5 :- * * 

“Thirty-two assistant quartermasters, with rank of captain, who, as 
vacancies occur, shall be replaced by lieutenants of the line, detailed 
for terms of not more than three years, during which term they shall 
hold the temporary rank and pay of captain in the Quartermaster’s 
Department. At the end of three years they shall return to their 
companies, and serve at least one year therewith before being eligible 
to be detailed again. 

“Vacancies among the majors of the Quartermaster’s Department 
shall be filled by promotion of the assistant quartermasters now in 
service, and thereafter by selection from army officers who have 
served for three years in the Quartermaster’s Department and shown 
capacity and merit. 

* * * * * 


* 


59 


“subsistence department. 

* * * * * * * 

“Vacancies occurring among the captains to be tilled by detail of 
lieutenants of the line, with temporary rank of captain ani commis¬ 
sary of subsistence, for not longer than three years, and then to 
return for not less than one year’s seryice with their companies before 
being eligible for another such detail. 

“Vacancies occurring among the majors to be tilled by selection 
from officers of the line who, h^aying seryed for three years as cap¬ 
tains and assistant commissaries of subsistence, haye shown capacit}^ 
and merit in the duties of the department. 

“corps of engineers. 

* * * * * * * 

“No officer to be appointed into the Corps of Engineers until he has 
seryed two years with troops as lieutenant. 

“All yacancies occurring among the lieutenants to be tilled by detail 
of three years from the line, after which the officer shall return for at 
least one year’s seryice with his company. 

(Page 279.) “ordnance departnent. 

* * ***** 

“Twenty captains, who, as yacancies occur, are to be detailed with 
temporary rank of captain of ordnance for terms of three years from 
the lieutenants of the line who show the necessary qualities and who 
haye seryed at least two years as lieutenants. 

“After three years’service as captains of ordnance these officers 
shall return to the line and serye at least one year with their companies 
before being eligible for another detail to ordnance duty and rank. 

“Vacancies among the majors of ordnance to be tilled by selection 
from officers who haye seryed in the corps for three 3 "ears and shown 
capacit}^ and merit in its duties. 

* * * * * * * 

“pay department. 

* * * * * * * 

“ Vacancies occurring among the captains to be tilled by lieutenants 
detailed from the line for not longer than three 3 ^ears, with temporaiy 
rank of captain and assistant paymaster, then to return for at least 
one 3 "ear to their companies before being again eligible for detail. 

“These officers to be assisted at remote posts b 3 ^ officers of the staff 
corps there stationed, or hy the commanders of companies to whom, 
as may be directed in general orders, the funds for paying the troops 
may be sent 1)3^ the Pa 3 ^ Department so as to insure frequent and punc¬ 
tual pa 3 mient to all soldiers of their just dues. 

“ JUDGE-ADyOCATE-GENERAU’s DEPARTMENT. 

* * * * * * * 

“The captains to be officers detailed from the lieutenants of the line 
for not more than three 3 ^ears at an 3 " one time, and to return for at 


60 

least one year’s service with their companies before being eligible to 
another detail. 


“’NOTES. 

* * * * * * * 
“staff corps. 

(Page 280.) ‘‘A system of detail and promotion and appointment 
which opens staff service to all officers who are best qualiffed, and grants 
permanent commissions only to those who have shown practical knowl¬ 
edge, merit, and ability, will also hold out rewards and encouragement 
to all officers to excel in their respective duties, and will secure in the 
permanent positions on the staff' men who are quailfied and who like the 
service. 

“By the time an officer attains the rank of major it is thought that 
his career should become ffxed and definite, and, though still liable to 
sudden changes of station, he should be safe against sudden and unex¬ 
pected changes in the character of his line of business or duty. 

“By that time he will be a skilled and tried adjutant, quartermaster, 
commissary, etc., and unless a foreign or great domestic war calls for 
radical changes, he should be protected in the exercise of his particu¬ 
lar specialty in the profession of arms. 

“Should another great war break out, the experience of the last 
will be repeated. It is from the captains of the Army that the greater 
number of successful generals will be drawn. Field officers will be 
generally too far advanced in life, and too much accustomed to routine 
duties, to suddenly expand into successful generals. 

“The more captains and first lieutenants we have for training in the 
Army, therefore, the better will be that greater army which must be 
organized on the outbreak of foreign or domestic war. 

“The standing army of the United States of 25,000 men is nothing 
but a training school and a police force to keep alive military knowl¬ 
edge and practice, and to protect the frontier, exterior, or interior 
from insult or ravage, either by foreign nations or subject barbarians 
and savages. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 281.) “Proper provision should be made in any bill reorgan¬ 
izing the Army to protect the interests of officers who have given their 
life service to the countiy, and wffio should not be discharged without 
their consent or without liberal provision on such a misfortune hap¬ 
pening to them. If in reorganization any become surplus, they should 
be placed on leave of absence, until recalled to fill vacancies. The 
ordinary casualties of service would soon deplete the present lists of 
regiments and corps and provide places for all who would become 
supernumerary under the organization herein proposed.” 

* * * * * * * 

Maish report, 1878. 

Col. Rufus Ingalls, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., briga¬ 
dier-general of volunteers, served in the Mexican war, and in the civil 
war as chief quartermaster Army of the Potomac, succeeding General 


G1 


Van Vliet, afterwards quartermaster-general with rank of brigadier- 
general. 

(Page 55.) * * A regular, well-organized, highh" experienced 

staff, such as we now have, is indispensable to render an army actively 
efficient. The really invaluable services rendered b}" the staff in the 
earl}" stages of the rebellion demonstrated its necessity and usefulness. 
The present organization of the staff should no more be subject to 
change than that of a regiment of infantiy. It can be excused in a 
line officer to think differently, certainly should he be seeking a high 
staff' detail. The staff should be filled by selection from the line, but ' 
rotation, particularly in the disbursing departments, would impair the 
efficiency" of the service.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Stewart Van Vliet, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., 
brigadier-general of volunteers, served in the artillery before the war; 
was chief quartermaster Army of the Potomac. 

(Page 64.) “From long experience, I am satisfied that the best 
results are obtained by continuing officers in a particular department 
or corps of the staff. B}" this means they become familiar with their 
duties and acquire that esprit de corps which exercises such a power 
not only in the Army, but in all civil pursuits.” 

* * * * * * * 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Judson D. Bingham, quartermaster, U. S. A., brevet briga¬ 
dier-general, served in the artillery before the war; was chief quarter¬ 
master Seventeenth Army Corps and of the Army of the Tennessee; 
afterwards colonel and assistant quartermaster-general. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 62.) “The effect of continuing the same officers in a particular 
department or corps is to better qualify them for their duties than 
thev would be if subject to details for duty in several departments. 
No officer should be appointed in a staff' department until he has served 
from six to ten years in the line of the Army. Service in the line will 
give an officer some knowledge of the duties of the different staff corps 
and of their relations to each other. After appointment in a staff 
department, service should be continuous in it.” 

* * -X- * * * * 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Alexander E. Shiras, assistant commissary-general, afterwards 
Commissary-General with rank of brigadier-general; in the artillery 
before appointment in Subsistence Department; served in the h lorida 
and Mexican wars and war of the rebellion. 

(Page 55.) “The effect of continuing the same officer in a particular 
department or corps of the staff is that he becomes more perfect in his 


62 


duties, understanding them better and better; and the advantage of 
‘allowing only promotions in them” is to hold up a stimulus for exer¬ 
tion. While it is to be supposed that, when placed in the corps, the 
officers were at least the equals for the place of those who were not 
selected, their experience renders them better for promotion therein. 
At the same time, by such rule of promotion, less room is given for 
favoritism. * * * 

“ Military officers, as a general rule, are more efficient by being edu¬ 
cated, trained, and promoted for specialties of the service. The advan¬ 
tage of a division of labor holds good with them as with those employed 
in other walks of life, and the skillful workman is found to be formed 
by this division of duties. A greater freedom of detail and transfer 
would be likely to prevent proficienc}" and destroy" the pride in their 
particular branches. The old adage that ‘ a Jack of all trades is mas¬ 
ter of none’ holds good here.” 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Brig. Gen. Robert Macfeely, Commissary-General of Subsistence, 
U. S. A.; served in infantry; was chief commissary Arm}" of the Ohio, 
Fifteenth Army Corps, and Army of the Tennessee. 

Draft of a bill submitted by General Macfeely. (Relates onl}^ to 
Subsistence Department.) 

***** * * 

(Page 282.) “And the President may appoint from among the first 
lieutenants of the line, not to exceed ten, acting commissaries of sub¬ 
sistence, who, while so acting, shall receive the pay of captain of cav¬ 
alry; these officers to serve for four years and no more; no officer to 
be eligible for such appointment unlil he has served for a period of 
four years with his regiment. 

“Appointments to rank of captain and commissary of subsistence 
shall be made from among first lieutenants who have performed dut}" 
as acting commissary of subsistence under the provisions of this sec¬ 
tion, but no such officer shall be so appointed until he shall have been 
examined by a board of not less than three officers, a majority of whom 
shall be officers of the Subsistence Department, and recommended by 
said board for such appointment. 

***** * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Capt. John P. Hawkins, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A., 
brigadier-general of volunteers, chief commissary Thirteenth Army 
Corps and Army of the Tennessee; brigade and division commander; 
afterwards Commissarv-General, with rank of brigadier-general, U. 

S.A. 

^ (Page 67.) “I think that when an officer has been assigned to a par¬ 
ticular staff' department he should feel that it is to be his sole business 
to learn its duties. If he were to feel that he might soon be trans¬ 
ferred to another branch of the service he would probably take but 
little interest in perfecting himself. 

“The best work of the world, in all branches of knowledge and in 


68 


all kinds of practice, is performed by those who make a specialty" of 
some particular subject. 

It might make our officers apparently more accomplished to trans¬ 
fer them every year or two from one branch of the service to another. 
It would give them a superticial knowledge of many things; but as 
officers are kept in the employ of the Government for getting needed 
work done well, and not for their having an appearance of knowing all 
possible things, it would be an injury to the service to make the tenure 
of office in an}’^ branch of the Army less secure than it now is.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

]Maj. Benjamin Alvord, paymaster. Acting Pa^unaster-General, 
brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Florida and Mexican 
wars; was district commander in the civil w^ar; afterwards Paymaster- 
General, with rank of brigadier-general, U. S. A. 

(Page 21.) Under the councils of the first Napoleon a permanent 
organization was given to the staff of the French army. * * * Of 

this corps, this great military critic (Jomini) said: ‘ It should be per¬ 
manent. and should be employed in time of peace in labors preparatoiy 
to all possible eventualities of war. A good staff has the advantage of 
being more durable than the genius of any single man, and must be 
regarded as the nursery whence the commanding general can raise his 
principal support, as a body of officers whose intelligence can aid his 
own.’ * * * Baron Stafiel, in his report on the Prussian staff, 

says: ‘ In Prussia the composition of the staff' is controlled b}" neither 
law nor regulations; General de Moltke is “the absolute commander,” 
details and sends away at will “every member of the body.” ’ * * * 

A later Prusian writer, Baron von Leedinghausen, says ‘that promo¬ 
tion takes place according to seniority in the staff after the officer is 
finally appointed; and that the process, under General Moltke, 
described by Baron Staff'el is only one of probation before final 
appointment.’ * * * The lieutenant-general of our Army, who 

witnessed the Prussian war, has stated that their suppl}- departments 
were very imperfect. * * * The force (of the British arny) that 

landed at Balaklava was nearly starved the first winter, when only 
7 miles from the sea, before Sebastopol. It was for want of respon¬ 
sible staff' departments, who could have planned beforehand the whole 
programme of transportation and subsistence. * * * An English 

military critic says: ‘It is not too much to say that an army sent into 
the field without efficient and thoroughly well-organized and long pre¬ 
viously trained staff and suppU departments is an army foredoomed 
to dogs and vultures.’ * * * 

“In forming a cool judgment of the value of our present staff' 
organization, it is but just and reasonable to reflect that for half a 
century these separate departments have had their growth; each has 
naturally had its special sources of pride and ambition, and each has 
written its name on the history of the country. They have been sepa¬ 
rately identified with great events in peace and in war—each corps has 
ts distinct record and traditions. Are such traditions and such ties 
to be lightly esteemed and suddenU snapped asunder F’ 


64 


Coburn report, 1874. 

General Alvord: 

* *■«•**** 

(Page 315.) ‘Gn the war of 1812 there were some regimental pay¬ 
masters, and it was found that the percentage of loss to the Govern¬ 
ment by defalcation and b}" immature experience in the discharge of 
their duties w^as startling. Gen. Nathan Towson, under Mr. Calhoun 
as Secretary of War, devised the present system of organization of the 
Pa}^ Department, giving rank, respectability, and permanence to the 
position, and it must be said that the experiezice of half a century has 
justihed the prophecy of Mr. Calhoun as to the propriety of the system 
adopted. The percentage of loss during the Mexican and civil wars 
was trifling in comparison with the percentage of loss during the war 
of 1812.” * ^ * 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Draft of bill submitted by General Alvord, Paymaster-General, 
U. S. A.: 

* ****** 

(Page 284.) ‘‘Sec. 5. That the number of pa 3 nnasters in the Arni}" 
of the grade of major shall gradually be reduced, as vacancies shall 
occur, to forW-flve, and appointments to that grade shall hereafter be 
made from captains of the line of the Arm}^ or from those who may 
have served as additional pajmiasfers: Provided^ That no one shall be 
appointed to such office who is over forW-flve vears of age, nor until 
he shall pass a satisfactoiy examination before a board of three oflicers, 
designated bv the Secretarv of War, one of whom shall be a medical 
officer.” 

* ****** 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphrej^s, Chief of Engineers; major- 
general of volunteers; served in the Florida war; during civil war 
was division and corps commander; chief of staff to General Meade. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 285.) “Mr. Calhoun reported a plan December 12,1820, reduc¬ 
ing the noncommissioned officers, musicians, and privates to that num¬ 
ber (6,000), but without reducing the Corps of Engineers and the Topo¬ 
graphical Engineers, as then existing. 

“Among his principles are: 

“ ‘The great and leading objects of a military establishment in peace 
ought to be to create and perpetuate militaiy skill and experience, so 
that at all times the country may have at its command a body of officers 
sufficientlv numerous and well instructed in everv branch of dut}^, both 
of the line and stafl', and the organization of the Armv ought to be 
such as to enable the Government, at the commencement of hostilities, 
to obtain a regular force adequate to the emergencies of the countiy, 
proper!}^ organized and prepared for actual service.’ 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 286.) “Respecting anv modifications in the organizations, 
practical working, or svstem of administration of the Corps of Engi¬ 
neers, the Ordnance Department, and the several staft‘ departments of 


65 


the Army, b}" which their efficieiic\Y and usefulness can be increased 
and their cost of maintenance be reduced, after a careful consideration 
of all that has been presented to Congress and its committees in the 
last ten years, I am of the opinion that the weight of testimony is 
greatly in favor of maintaining those branches of the service under 
their existing organization and system.” 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 287.) Draft of a bill submitted by General Humphreys (relates 
only to the line of the Army). 

* * * * * * * 

“Sec. —. That the officers made supernumerary by this act shall 
be retained in service for such special duty as the}" may be required 
for, and as vacancies occur shall be assigned by the President to regi¬ 
ments without prejudice to their rank.” 

* * * * * * * 

Burnside report, 1878, p. 288. 

[Extract from Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1875.] 

* * * * * * * 

“A.-THE ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, 1869. 

* * ‘ * * * * * 

(Page 293.) “* * * The term general staff, as used by us, means 

usually something very different from the same term in France, where 
it is used to designate the marshals and general officers only. In 
France there is but one staff corps, the highest grade in it being that 
of colonel. Officers of all the arms of service in the French army do 
staff' duty by detail.” 

* * * * * * * 

“B.—THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 299.) “The ‘staff’ in this country really now consists, the 
word being used in its proper sense, of the General, the Lieutenant- 
General, the five major-generals, the eight brigadier-generals, the 
adjutant-generals, the inspector-generals, and the officers attached to 
the personal staff of commanding officers. The duties of the adjutant- 
generals relate in time of peace to orders, reports, recruiting, records, 
etc. In time of war they may act also as aids-de-camp. The duties 
of inspectors are defined by their title. What in our service are called 
sometimes ‘staff departments,’ such as the quartermaster, commissar}^, 
medical, pay, and law departments, are called in the French service 
‘intendance.’ Their officers have no real military rank or command 
whatever. The engineers belong neither to the ‘staff’ nor to the 
‘intendance,’ but to the ‘line,’ and constitute an independent ‘arm of 
the service.’ ” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Horatio G. Wright, engineers, major-general of volun¬ 
teers; during civil w"ar was brigade, division, and corps commander; 

7414—00-5 


66 


commanded Sixth Army Corps, Army of the Potomac, afterwards 
brigadier-general and Chief of Engineers. 

* ****** 

(Page 131.) ‘‘I think the effect of continuing the same officers in 

a particular department or corps of the staff', and of allowing ^ only 
promotions within them, is calculated to secure the greatest efficiency 
possible. The different branches of the staff' as at present subdivided 
are specialties of the militaiy service, requiring the whole attention 
and study of the officer. 

* ****** 

'‘I am satisfied that military officers are most efficient who are edu¬ 
cated, trained, and promoted for specialties of the service, and that 
no greater freedom of detail and transfer than at present exercised, 
from one branch to another, would be beneficial, inasmuch, as before 
stated, the whole study and attention of the officer is needed to secure 
his greatest efficiency in his particular specialty.” 

* ***** * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. John Newton, engineers, major-general of volunteers; 
brigade, division, and corps commander; afterwards .brigadier-general 
and Chief of Engineers. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 91.) ‘'As a general rule, I think it proper to continue offi¬ 
cers and promote them in their own departments of the staff, such 
practice tending to greater efficiency and a proper esprit de corps. 

* * * * ' * * * 

'‘As a rule, officers are more efficient who are educated and trained 
for specialties of service. However, details from the artillery or cav¬ 
alry to the infantry would be more proper than from the latter to the 
former.” 

* * * * * * * 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. John G. Foster, engineers; major-general of volunteers; 
served in the Mexican war; during civil war was brigade, corps, and 
department commander. 

(Page 28). “ Military officers educated, trained, and promoted for 
specialties of the service are more efficient. Any freedom of detail 
or transfer would not be beneficial, and would probably degenerate 
into a mere favoritism. * * * 

'‘Every staff' duty is a specialty, and should have officers exclusively 
devoted to it. * * * 

“ Selection in the Army means, in most favoritism^ and officers 
selected do not generally perform their duties as well as those who are 
detailed for duty from a corps especially trained for the service. I 
have tried both classes, and like the detailed officers best. The}" gen¬ 
erally perform their duties with care, intelligence, and expedition.” 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Quincy A. Gillmore, engineers; major-general of volunteers; 
division, corps, and department commander; afterwards colonel of 
engineers. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 168.) “’The etfectof continuing the same officers in particular 
departments or corps of the staff, each with a distinct and separate line 
of promotion, is to secure a greater degree of efficiency than would 
be practicable under any organization where the principle was recog-' 
nized of temporary transfer from corps to corps, from the line to the 
staff', or the reverse. Any attempt to distribute the duties of any 
special service among more officers than are really required for their 
performance can only result in impaired efficiency. This is a fact 
patent to all men who have enjoyed even limited opportunities for 
reading or observation upon army organization. Moreover, the prin¬ 
ciple of temporaiy transfer, or special assignment, once legalized and 
put in practice, w^ould almost immediately degenerate into favoritism, 
than which nothing can be more demoralizing to an army or destruc¬ 
tive of laudable ambition and esprit. 

* * * * * * * 

“Military officers are more efficient who are educated, trained, 
and promoted for specialties of service. A greater freedom of detail 
and transfer than at present exercised would result in injury to the 
service in proportion, as it would subdivide and dissipate the special 
knowledge which it is essential that only comparatively few should 
possess. It might secure respectable mediocrity among the many, but 
it would be at the expense of professional eminence among the efficient 
few. There are few men possessing unusual genius. With rare excep¬ 
tions all great results have been achieved by excellence in specialties. 
Mediocrity accomplishes little, and is practically destitute of all the 
elements of aggressive progress.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. John G. Parke, engineers; major-general of volunteers; corps 
commander; afterwards colonel of engineers. 

(Page 75.) * * * “ Officers who are educated, trained, and pro¬ 

moted for specialties of the service are more efficient than those who 
are not thus trained; but whether it would be better for the service 
that there should be greater freedom of detail and transfer than at 
present exercised, from one branch to another, is a question that 1 am 
not fully prepared to answer.” 

* -X- * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gouverneur K. Warren, engineers; major-general of volun¬ 
teers; chief engineer Army of the Potomac; commanded Fifth Army 
Corps, Army of the Potomac; afterwards lieutenant-colonel of 
engineers. 

(Page 50.) “Details would be sought by men incompetent per¬ 
haps in their own corps, and at any rate depriving that corps of an 
essential member, if he is good for anything, and injuring his own 
esprit de corps.” 


68 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. William E. Merrill, Corps of Engineers; colonel U. S. Vol¬ 
unteer Engineers; assistant engineer, Arm}" of the Potomac; chief 
engineer, Army of Kentuck}" and Arnw of the Cumberland; after¬ 
wards lieutenant-colonel of engineers. 

****** * 

(Page 81.) ‘‘If officers are properl}^selected in the first place, the}" 
are undoubtedly more efficient for paying special, though not exclusive, 
attention to their specialties, just as in civil life we always go to a 
dentist to have a tooth drawn, although we might go to a physician in 
an emergency. All arms of the military service are mutually depend¬ 
ent, and the thorough officer will be well informed in them all, though 
specially studying his own. Considering that the staff departments 
and the engineer and ordnance are meant by the term ‘specialties of 
the service,’ I will answer in detail. Engineer officers when they first 
join would be much benefited by a brief service with troops, but after¬ 
wards they will have more than they can attend to in their own pro¬ 
fession. My views on the ordnance I have already given. Should the 
Ordnance Corps be reconstructed, as I suggest, its permanent officers 
should remain exclusively on ordnance duty. Medical officers, of 
course, need not practice any other than their legitimate duty. The 
other ‘ specialties ’ of the service are filled by aj)pointment from the 
line, in which it may be assumed that all the members have seen suffi¬ 
cient service. 1 think, therefore, that they should not be returned to 
the line, believing that such a course would tend to discourage efforts 
to become perfect in the specialty.” 

******* 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Brig. Gen. Stephen V. Benet, Chief of Ordnance; served during the 
civil war as captain of ordnance. 

******* 

(Page 369.) “Two vital principles underlie this subject, and must 
be considered together: 

‘'First. The organization of an army i^ifor war. 

“Second. The best organization is one that proved most efficient 
in vxir. 

“The present organization has shown itself an efficient one, certainly 
in two wars, the latter of such proportions as to strain it to the utmost. 
For war purposes, therefore, the Army ought not to be reorganized. 

“ Is it the part of wisdom to so organize it in peace that in the con¬ 
fusion, haste, and turmoil of war the peace organization shall have to 
be transformed for w"ar purposes ? The mere mention of such a neces¬ 
sity carries with it its own condemnation. In my opinion the organi¬ 
zation of both line and staff’ should remain undisturbed. 

“So many special conditions necessarily enter into the organization 
for each country that it is a matter of surprise that organizations 
based on the experience of foreign countries should in their details be 
expected to fit in with the peculiar conditions of ours; as if our wars 
have not been of sufficient magnitude, not only as regards men and 
supplies, but in extent of strategical operations, to supply all the 
varied experience with armies upon which to base correct conclusions.” 
******* 


69 


Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Albert J. Myer, Chief Signal Officer, U. S. A., brevet brigadier- 
general; afterwards Chief Signal Officer with the rank of brigadier- 
general. 

(Page 156.) “This is a government of law; and in the Army, where 
especially law is too apt to be ignored or disregarded, competent law 
officers, in my opinion, are absolutely necessary. The officers of the 
Judge-Advocate’s Department, so far as I know them, are experts ir\ 
militaiy law and general legal knowledge. I have had occasion myself, 
from time to time, to consult the officers of the Bureau of Military 
Justice upon questions of law arising in my office, and have always 
received valuable assistance from them.” * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Charles P. Kingsbury, U. S. A. (retired), brevet 
brigadier-general, late of Ordnance Corps; served in Mexican war; 
during the civil war was chief ordnance officer. Department of the 
Ohio and Army of the Potomac: 

(Page 38.) “The natural effect of transfers from one duty to another 
is to enlarge the mind and liberalize the ideas of the officer, and thus 
qualify him for a wider range of duties, and better fit him for those 
sudden exigencies of service which he may at any moment be called 
to meet.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Joseph J. Reynolds, Third Cavalry, major-general of volun¬ 
teers, chief of staff Army of the Cumberland; eorps and department 
commander: 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 210.) “Q. State what is the effect of continuing the same offi¬ 
cers in a particular department or corps of the staff, and of allowing only 
promotions within them.—A. This must be done as at present, unless 
all staff duties are performed by details from officers of the line of the 
Arny; and no promotion in staff corps. 

* * * * * * * 

“Would advise ‘a greater freedom of detail and transfer.’” 

* * * * * * * 

“A better system for the efficiency and harmony of the service 
would be to have the duties of staff' departments referred to performed 
by officers detailed for that purpose, and not to be retained on such 
duty for a longer time than four years for one tour of staff duty.” 

* * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1874. 

General Reynolds: 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 402.) “If you leave out the Medical Corps, the Corps of 
Engineers, the Ordnance, and Bureau of Military Justice, there is no 


70 


department of the staff requiring an^^ special and prolonged training 
to discharge its duties. 

* -x- * * * * * 

‘‘The duties of the other staff corps, after those 1 have named, can be 
performed by any officer who is competent to hold a commission in 
the Army. The alternation from duty with troops to staff duty, from 
time to time, would be beneficial to the officers of the Armj^, without, 
I conceive, being in the least detrimental to the staff' departments. 

* * * * * * * 

“ Q. How long a period of duty would you detail these officers 
for?—A. I would say four years on any one detail; not longer than 
that. 

‘"Q. Would you let these details run into the higher branches of 
the staff', or into the lower grades ?—A. There is no reason why it 
should not run throughout the department staff corps. It may require 
a few surplus officers, but I would have them attached to regiments, 
and I would have promotions in the staff corps, if it exists at all, con¬ 
fined to a ver}^ few men. 

******* 

“ Q. Please state how you would obtain a sufficient supply of offi¬ 
cers to fill the various grades in the staff.—A. You would simpl}- 
want to attach to the regiments a number over and above those 
required for regimental duty equal to the number required for staff 
duty.” 

* * ***** 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Benjamin S. Roberts, U. S. A. (retired), late of Third 
Cavalry; brigadier-general of volunteers; served in Mexican war; 
during the civil war was chief of cavalry, Department of the Gulf, 
and commanded cavalry division in District of West Tennessee. 

(Page 7.) “ The effect of continuing the same officers in a particular 
department or corps Of the staff' tends to destroy army esprit de corps 
that should run through all branches, arms, and departments. * * * 

Officers can not be eminently and generally useful when they are 
unfamiliar and inexperienced in the duties and practical functions of 
the great m*ms of service that play the principal parts in actual war. 
The experience of the great civil war of the rebellion has demonstrated 
that the more valuable officers were developed from the general serv¬ 
ice, such as Grant, George H. Thomas, Phil. Sheridan, Sedgwick, 
J. F. Reynolds, Lyon, Hancock, et al. Therefore greater freedom of 
detail and transfer than at present exercised from one branch of serv¬ 
ice to another would be highl}^ beneficial. * * * j qualify my 

answer by saying the peculiar duties of inspecting officers, the quar¬ 
termasters, the medical officers, and the officers of the judge-advo¬ 
cate’s departments, require permanence of organization and special 
promotion, as independent supplying and staff corps. Any system of 
detail in these departments would impair efficiency, as they are spe¬ 
cialties of quasi-military characterization, requiring great experience, 
study, and peculiar capabilities to perfect their usefulness.” ’ 


71 


Maish report, 1878. 

Col. Ranald S. Mackenzie, Fourth Cavaliy, brigadier-general of 
volunteers; assistant engineer, Ninth Army Corps; regimental, bri¬ 
gade, and division commander; commanded cavalry division. Army of 
the James; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.: 

I* * ***** 

(Page 80.) ‘‘The staff, as it is called in our Army, may be divided 
into the militaiy staff and the department of supply. 

"'The military staff, having charge of correspondence and orders," 
and of the duty of collecting, arranging, and furnishing information 
on questions of detail to the President and various general officers, 
which is the real staff' of the Army, embraces the Adjutant-General’s 
and Inspector-General’s. * * 

***** * * 

“The Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments may be 
grouped together under the general head of supply department, while 
the ordnance is, in part, a special scientific corps and in part a depart¬ 
ment of supply. 

"‘Probably the most important organization of the Arny is its staff' 
proper. 

***** * * 

(Page 81.) “The routine life of an officer in one of our large cities 
may perhaps produce an officer of great method and care in the man¬ 
agement of important records, but is little likely to form a kind and 
judicious adviser on great militaiy questions which the higher officers 
of the staff' should be always. Probably no officer of the line of the 
Army who has been brought into immediate contact with troops who 
has not thought very often, with perhaps some bitterness, how veiy 
much time and effort were expended over the little by the staff', how 
matters were carefully considered that should be disposed of by 
subordinates, and how on questions of quite serious public business it 
was sometimes impossible to obtain even an answer. 

"‘The legislation making the positions in the Adjutant and Inspector 
General’s departments permanent is at the root of the present want 
of harmony between the line and the staff', at the root of a discourage¬ 
ment which is quite general, and of a bitter feeling that those who 
should be the first to represent what would benefit the mass in legisla¬ 
tion are far more taken up with what will benefit themselves. * * * 

***** * * 

(Page 82.) “There is a simple, practical remedy for the present 
state of affairs which will not work the least injustice to any staff 
officer. Consolidate the Adjutant and Inspector General’s depart¬ 
ments in one staff' corps, with one brigadier-general as chief, three 
colonels, six lieutenant-colonels, and twelve majors, the same number 
now allowed by law. After the decrease in the Inspector-General’s 
Department shall have taken place, enact, first, that in case a vacancy 
in the position of Adjutant-General, it be filled by the transfer of any 
officer of the same grade on selection and promotion of any officer in 
the Army. Second. That on the 1st day of January of every alter¬ 
nate year, commencing with 1879, that the colonels of longest service 
in the Adjutant-General’s Department be transferred to the line, and 


72 


an officer, by a method to be hereafter designated, be transferred to 
till his place. Third. That on the 1st of January of every year the 
lieutenant-colonel and the two majors of the longest service in the corps 
be transferred to positions in the same grade in the line, the vacancies 
being filled in a manner to be hereafter indicated. Fourth. That no officer 
be transferred from the grade of brigadier-general to the position of 
Adjutant-deneral, or promoted from any grade to be Adjutant-Ger^ral, 
except on the recommendation of the General of the Arm 3 ^ That depart¬ 
ment commanders shall yearly recommend such lieutenant-colonels and 
majors serving in their departments as are, in their opinion, suitable 
for transfer to the Adjutant-General’s Department; that the General 
shall select and be authorized to transfer yearly one lieutenant-colonel 
and two majors to the Adjutant-General’s Department, who will be 
chosen from those recommended by department commanders and 
approved by all higher authority in the usual course, below the com¬ 
manding general. That the General of the Army be authorized to 
transfer one colonel every alternate year, commencing with the 1st of 
January, 1879, from the line of the Army, but such colonel must have 
been recommended by the department commander and every higher 
military authority in due course. That the officers of longest service 
in the Adjutant-General’s Department, referred to in the various 
grades of colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and major, be transferred to the 
vacancies in the line, occasioned by the transfer of the officers of cor¬ 
responding grades in the line. That all officers of the staff department 
thus transferred shall be eligible for a retransfer to the staff', after 
four years’ continuous service with troops in the departments which 
embrace the wilder portions of the country, but that no officer shall 
be eligible until four years of such continuous service have been 
performed. 

“In writing what I have I wish it understood that I am making no 
personal attack on the present Adjutant-General, but on what 1 con¬ 
sider a very false S 3 ^stem and bad legislation, to the great injuiy of the 
Government in the interest of a few officers. 

“The Quartermaster’s and Subsistence departments could be consoli¬ 
dated, and a very great decrease in number of officers made. 

******* 

(Page 83.) “The consolidation of these two corps should be made 
with great care, and no officer should be retained in the new organiza¬ 
tion who was not onl^^ of unquestionable integrity, but of far more 
than ordinary business capacity. All worthy officers who were not 
considered sufficiently capable should be provided for by retirement 
or otherwise, while those who were not thought particularly entitled 
to consideration might very well be dropped from the service. 

“In this corps the positions might be to a degree made more per¬ 
manent than in the staff' corps proper formed from the union of the 
Adjutant-General’s Department and that of the Inspector-General; but 
the principle should be recognized that an officer of good character, 
but found to have little business capacity, might, on recommendation 
of the chief of the corps, be transferred to the line of the Arim% and 
an officer of similar grade in the line, who had received the recom¬ 
mendation of fitness from his department commander and all superiors, 
in due course be transferred to the department in his stead. 

******* 


73 


‘‘The Corps of Engineers and of Ordnance are special in their nature. 
The engineers are rarely brought in contact with the line of the 
Army. The ordnance, so far as the infantry and cavalry are concerned, 
endeavors with judgment to give satisfaction.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Wesley Merritt, Ninth Cavalry, major-general of volun¬ 
teers; commanded cav^alry brigade and division, Army of the Potomac, 
and in the Shenandoah and Richmond campaigns; afterwards major- 
general, U. S. A. 

******* 

(Page 157.) “Although the etfect of continuing the same officers in 
a particular staff, corps, or department has disadvantages, 1 have grave 
doubts as to whether an advantage would accrue by making selections 
and transfers from the line or other staff' corps. Promotion in the 
Army in time of peace in any other way than by seniority and in the 
same arm of the service would, 1 fear, produce one of two effects, viz, 
a disregard of duty by those who had no prospects of promotion, either 
from want of influence or merit, or a struggle for favor and consequent 
discord among those whose chances of preferment were, in their indi¬ 
vidual opinion, substantial. 

******* 

“If some safe checks could be applied to prevent an ill-considered 
discrimination in favor of political influence in promotions, it would, 
I have no doubt, be greatly for the benefit of the service to promote 
by selections and transfers. Until safety from unworthy selections 
and promotions b}^ improper influence can be assured, the Army is 
safer from needing a service reform as promotions and details now 
stand than if a change was made. 

* ****** 

“The special duties for which the staff departments and corps are 
organized are all important. 1 do not think that a study, even of the 
army organizations in the Old World, will suggest any important 
change or modification in this particular in our Army as it now exists.” 

Maish report, 1878. 

General Merritt: 

(Page 86.) “The general and staff officers, as now allowed by law, 
are few enough, in my opinion. The staff of general officers should, 
I think, be extra officers. In my regiment (the Fifth Cavalry) there 
are eight first lieutenants permanently detached; five as aids to gen¬ 
eral officers, one on signal service, one as an instructor at West Point, 
and one on recruiting service. In addition to this, there is one first 
lieutenant who is suspended from rank for a year, and two ^ffio are 
sick and disabled for duty, leaving but one first lieutenant out of twelve 
in the line for duty in the regiment. * * * Thus it will be seen 

that from natural causes and details the regiment is left in scarcely an 
efficient state because of lack of officers. This evil would be partially 
avoided by making the officers detailed for staff duty extra lieutenants 
by law, requiring them to vacate their regimental commissions on 


74 

being advanced to the grade of a captain, or else to return to their 
regiments. 

* * * * * * * 

‘‘The staff departments of the Army, as now organized, despite the 
criticisms of thoughtless persons, are well enough. I am of the opin¬ 
ion that there should be captains in the Adjutant-General’s and Pa}" 
departments as well as in the Commissary and Quartermaster’s 
departments.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Edward Hatch, Ninth Cavalr}^, brigadier-general of volunteers; 
brigade and division commander; commanded cavalry division Army 
of the Tennessee. 

* ****** 

(Page 101.) “The effect of continuing the same officer in a particu¬ 
lar department or staff and allowing only promotions in the same, I 
consider bad. Officers serving in departments become so assured of 
their positions and advancement that they lose all emulation to excel, 
knowing that no degree of excellence can advance them. They should 
be selected from the Army at large by the General of the Army. 
This would create a strong wish to excel in their duties and to acquire 
a knowledge of their profession, for which there is not the same 
inducement at present.” 

* ****** 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Benjamin H. Grierson, Tenth Cavalry; major-general of vol¬ 
unteers; commanding cavalry brigade, division, and corps; brevetted 
major-general for gallant services in raid through Mississippi; after¬ 
wards brigadier-general U. S. A. 

* * * * * * * , 

(Page 151.) “A greater freedom of detail for the several branches 
would be beneficial, for the reason that an officer educated for one 
branch does not know enough of other duties. An opportunity should 
be given officers to transfer, and every officer should be compelled to 
serve a portion of his time with troops in the field.” 

* ****** 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Emory Upton, First Artillery; brigadier-general of vol¬ 
unteers; commanded artillery brigade. Sixth Army Corps; brigade 
and division commander; afterwards colonel Fourth Artillery. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 140.) “Staff’ corps, some of which from the nature of their 
duties must be permanent, are necessaiy in every army. In such 
corps promotions must be confined within themselves. 

* ****** 

“In special corps, like the Engineer or Medical Corps, officers are 
unquestionably more efficient who are educated, trained, and promoted 


75 


specially for these services. Bat in order to increase the amount of 
staff knowledge in the Army and to keep the officers of the staff' corps 
acquainted with the wants and requirements of the line, transfers from 
the staff' to the line, and the reverse, for a period not exceeding four 
years, would in the highest degree be beneficial. 

* ****** 

“The staff' corps to which officers should especially be confined are 
the Engineer, Ordnance, and Medical Corps. The duties of the adju¬ 
tant and inspector generals, quartermasters, commissaries, and pay¬ 
masters are in no uegree scientific, and can be learned from officers 
detailed from the line. 

* * * * * * * 

‘ ‘ It is also my opinion that the efficiency of the Engineer and Ordnance 
corps would be increased by prohibiting graduates of the Military 
Academy from entering them immediately upon graduation, and pro¬ 
viding (after abolishing the grade of second lieutenant in each corps) 
that promotions to the grade of first lieutenant should be made b}^ 
selection after competitive examination from among first or second 
lieutenants who had served three years in the line.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. »Tohn M. Brannan, First Artillery, brigadier-general of volun¬ 
teers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was division 
commander in the Arni}^ of the Cumberland; afterwards colonel Fourth 
ArtilleiT. 

(Page 47.) “An adjutant-general requires knowledge which can onh^ 
be obtained by long experience; a detail might only give place to a 
favorite, who would not always be relieved in proving bimself ineffi¬ 
cient. * * * With a proper selection of officers as adjutants- 

general I should prefer a permanenc}", but would retain the power to 

transfer to the line anvone who failed to come up to the standard. 
* * * 

“As a general rule, where an officer takes an interest and pride in 
the profession and has the necessary ability and industry to make 
himself perfectly acquainted with tfie peculiar duty of the depart¬ 
ment or staff' corps in which he is serving, the promotion should be 
within that department or staff' corps.” 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Maj. fJohn Hamilton, First Artillery; served in the Mexican war; 
brevetted in the war of the rebellion for gallantry at Fort Pulaski, 
Ga., Secessionville, James Island, S. C., and at Olustee, Fla.; after¬ 
wards colonel Fifth Artillery. 

* * * " * * * * 

(Page 482.) “I will here venture a few of the arguments cogent to 
me in favor of detail for staff duties: 

“1. There is no more danger of an improper favoritism in making 
these details than now actually exists in making permanent appoint¬ 
ments. 

* * * * * * 


* 


76 


‘‘4. An officer, knowing that he is to be for detail for a staff duty and 
still that selection can be exercised against him, will do everything 
to prepare himself for the proper discharge of the duty. 

“5. An officer, knowing that on his return to the line he will have 
to give an account to his brother officers for the proper discharge of 
his duties on the staff', will avoid those supercilious airs that have 
made the line so inimical to the staff'. * * * 

* * * * * * * 

‘‘We think that permanent appointments in the staff' enervates 
officers. Just as soon as an officer is planted in Washington we all 
think he becomes a trimmer. He is afraid of his position and he 
is generally so easily disposed of that he fears to tell unpalatable 
truths. * * * 

* * ^ 5 - * * * * 

(Page 483.) “We think that accountability, returns, renderings of 
law, and accumulation of regulations are unnecessarily complicated 
forms that have been devised for carrying out the original intention 
of enactments; that by putting a detailed officer in charge for a period 
it would become his interest to simplify rather than complicate affairs 
and the administration of his department. 

* * * * * * * 

“10. This merging should only be of the supply departments. I 
have never seen any serious cause of complaint against the Adjutant- 
General’s Department. The Quartermaster’s and Subsistence depart¬ 
ments should be merged and in the Arm 3 ^ The Pa}" Department 
should be reduced b}^ lapsing of incumbency by casualty until there be 
a head at Washington, an assistant, and one paymaster to each military 
department. * * * 

* * * * * * * 

“The Engineer Corps 1 consider so good that it would be dangerous 
to tamper with it. * * * 

-X- * * * * * * 

(Page 484.) “The merging of the staff would necessarily affect the 
company and regimental organization, for supernumeraries for detail 
to all detached service would haA^e to be provided for. One thing 1 Avill 
A^enture to say, that a regiment does not need two supply officers. One 
officer should transport, feed, and pay his regiment; he should have 
as many warrant officers and clerks as would be necessary to enable 
him to perform his duties, and they and he should be paid extra. 

* * * * * * * 

“I should not recommend any interference Avith the Adjutant- 
General’s Department, at all events with the officers above a certain 
rank. I think that probably one-half its number might be filled by 
detail from the line, the senior half to be of permanent appointment 
selected from the best of those having had service in the department 
by detail. 

“ * * * As keeping brushed up in professional books and physi¬ 

cal science, I consider myself not the inferior of a veiy large majority 
of graduates. Yet I know that the Army would lose by putting ine 
on engineer or ordnance duty to-morrow, even in a very subordinate 
position. The duties are and should be a special profession or branch 
There is no doubt that the present incumbents are well fitted for it 


and that they have able chiefs who work them systematically and 
well. * . 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 485.) “ Make details for the inferior grades of the Adjutant- 
General’s Department; for all of the one supply department (Quarter¬ 
master and Commissary of Subsistence combined) except its chief, who 
should be permanent; for the Pay Department, which by rny scheme 
would have only about a dozen in it—its chief would not need to be 
more than a colonel. To subject most officers to f 3 ut two years’ staff 
duty, during which time they would be liable to move, would be very 
unpopular and distasteful. Moving is our bane in the Army, and any 
unnecessary move is more than distasteful.” * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. William F. Barry, Second Artillery, brigadier-general of vol¬ 
unteers; served in the Mexican war; was chief of artilleiy, Army of 
the Potomac and Military Division of the Mississippi, during the civil 
war. 

(Page 3.) ‘‘The effect of continuing the same officers in Adjutant- 
General’s and Inspector-General’s departments is, as a general thing, 
injurious to the best interests of the service; but if selections in the first 
instance are properly made for certain officers of Inspector-General’s, 
Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments, and if those officers 
retain their aptitude and ability, it would be injurious to change them 
for others. * * * Military officers are decidedl}^ more efficient 

who are educated, trained, and promoted for specialties of service; but 
this presupposes that, in the first instance, a judicious and wise selection 
puts the right man in the right place. * * * if the officer justifies 

the wisdom of the original selection or assignment, it would be injurious 
to the military service to remove him from any of its specialties.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. William H. French, Second Artilleiy, major-general of 
volunteers; served in the Florida and Mexican wars; corps commander 
during the civil war; afterwards colonel Fourth Artiller}-. 

(Page 53.) ‘‘Continuing officers in the same corps of the staff height¬ 
ens their esprit de corps. They aim to be more efficient in their 
specialty. * * * 

“I think an educated officer commences with more efficiency than 
an uneducated officer. The transfer from one branch of the service to 
another is as well left to the course of events as in any other ^vsty. An 
infantry officer is President of the United States, an artillery officer is 
general in chief, a topographical officer is Chief Engineer, and a 
military engineer is Quartermaster-General of the Army, and so 
throughout.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Horace Brooks, Fourth Artillery, and brevet brigadier-general, 
U. S. A.; served in the Florida and Mexican wars and in the war of 
the rebellion. 

(Page 52.) “It often creates a laxity of discipline to transfer offi¬ 
cers to and from different corps.” 


78 


Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Henry J. Hunt, Fifth Artillery; brigadier-general of volunteers: 
served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was chief of artillery, 
Army of the Potomac, succeeding General Barry: 

(Page 70.) “Ordnance Department: In all other armies the duties 
of this department are, and for many good reasons ought to be, 
devolved on the artillery, which is provided with its special statf for 
the purpose. Our former separate Ordnance Department was merged 
in the artillery in 1821, and with the best results to the service. * * * 

A separate Ordnance Department gives us no advantages commensu¬ 
rate with its cost to the country, and when we take into account the 
positive evils its simple existence entails on other branches of the serv¬ 
ice, in diminished efficiency, we ma}" well feel justified in condemning 
its establishment as an error. 

(Page 71.) “Adjutant-General’s Department: It is doubtful if there 
should be such a ‘ department’. The functions of its officers are, like 
those of inspectors-general, essentially of a personal character, and 
their true and proper heads are the generals to whose staffs they 
belong. Their functions, in comparison with those of ‘general staff*’ 
officers, properly so called, are, in a military sense, extremely limited, 
and their real places in the military system are those of ' aids ’ for 
special purposes. They are the proper officers to put in form and 
distribute the military orders of the generals under whom they serve, 
to receive, examine, consolidate, and preserve the reports and stated 
returns of his command, and to prepare for his signature those he 
himself renders. * * * Xhe law of 1821 required that the duties 

of the Adjutant-General should be performed by one of the aids of 
the general, and this indicates verv clearly the nature of their proper 
status. In my former letter I stated that the department assumes to 
be the ‘general staff*’ corps of the Army, and its bureau attempts as 
such to regulate and control the affairs of the Army b}" absorbing the 
functions of the commanders of troops (this to an extent unprece¬ 
dented in other armies), and that so far as my own branch of the service 
is concerned, such interference has been mischievous. I now add 
that the whole system of the absorption of the powers of the imme¬ 
diate commanders of troops, by higher headquarters and by this 
bureau, which system finds its main support in this department, is 
not only unnecessary, costly, and injurious to the efficiency of the 
routine of the service, but that it tends to the destruction of discipline; 
is incompatible with the established organization of the Army and the 
laws passed for its government, and for the protection of the rights 
of officers and soldiers. * * * 

“The mode of payment to troops should be changed, so that they 
may be paid oftener, and that when soldiers are discharged their 
accounts may be settled and paid off* without subjecting them to plun¬ 
der by usurers. Captains who settle the accounts of their men should 
also pay them. Of all the fallacies by which an evil is perpetuated in 
our service, this one, that captains can not pay their men, is the great¬ 
est. When lieutenants these same captains could act as quartermas¬ 
ters and commissaries, receive and disburse larger sums to soldiers 
and others than they would have to handle as captains, and this with 
little or no difficulty.” * * * 


79 


Maish report, 1878. 

General Hunt: 

(Page 112.) However useful a large and well-ordered permanent 
staff may be as a preparation for war, and no one recognizes this fact 
more clearly than 1 do, one that is 7}ot well ordered can not add to the 
value of any army, and ours is not now w^ell ordered either in the 
mode of selection and appointment, which is by pure favor, or in its 
relations to the troops.” 

* * ***** 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Truman Seymour, Fifth Artillery; brigadier-general of volun¬ 
teers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was brigade 
and division commander: 

(Page 58.) Special education and training are indispensable in an}^ 
good service; and if selections for the lower grades of the staff' corps 
be made from the line of the Army, and never without due examina¬ 
tion, all the benefits likely to accrue from ‘greater freedom of detail 
and transfer’ will be realized.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Samuel W. Crawford, Second Infantry; brigadier-general of 
volunteers; brevet major-general, U. S. A.; division commander at 
Antietam and Gettysburg: 

(Page 89.) * * The effect of continuing the same officers in 

a particular department of corps of the staff' tends, in my judgment, 
to separate to an unwise degree the staff’ and line of the Army. 

* * ***** 

“1 am not clear that any benefit w^ould result from a transfer from 
one branch to another of the staff', unless it is contemplated that after 
a term of service the officer is to return to the line. 

******* 

“ Whatever system is adopted, it should be one capable of great expan¬ 
sion in case of emergenc}" or in time of war. The most serious obstacle 
to the efficiency of the Army in the beginning of the war was the lack 
of trained or experienced staff officers. Had the Government been able 
to have furnished such officers to the general officers, as they were 
appointed, or to corps, division, and brigade headquarters, the differ¬ 
ence both in economy and efficiency would have been very great. I 
see every reason why, in any peace establishment, the freest oppor- 
tunit}" should be given to the officers of the line of the Army to learn 
these important duties. 

“There are many officers of experience and wisdom who think that ■ 
the nuclei of the present corps should be preserved and made the basis 
of unlimited expansion in any emergency, and they point, and with 
reason, to the unparalleled efficiency of these corps during the war.” 
******* 


80 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Silas Casey, U. S. A. (retired), was colonel Fourth Infantry; 
major-general of volunteers; served in the Florida war, Mexican war, 
and war of the rebellion: 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 93.) “By continuing officers in the same corps an esprit de 
corps is excited, and I doubt if anj" advantage which might inure from 
a dilierent system of promotion would make amends for the loss of that 
spirit.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. William B. Hazen, Sixth Infantry; major-general of volunteers; 
brigade, division, and corps commander; afterwards Chief Signal Offi- 
-cer, with rank of brigadier-general, U. S. A.: 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 171.) “Except the officers of the supply department, who 
need no technical military education, all officers should have a well- 
grounded technical and militaiy education, besides a good general 
education, after which the}^ should receive special training for their 
special services, but never should be entirely detached from troops, 
but have regular alternate periods of duty with them.” * * * 

Maish report, 1878. 

General Hazen: 

(Page 122.) “* * * The organization of a general staff for an 

arny 1 believe to be of very great importance. At present, while all 
other armies have such a body of men, which they are constantl}" 
improving and increasingly feel the need of, we have none, but in its 
place a number of special branches, all lacking the great essential to 
military efficiency—occasional tours of duty with troops. They are 
essentially office men, performing many of those clerical duties which 
ought to be done by officers detailed from regiments preparatory to 
regular staff dut}^ Their special character unfits them for the general 
purposes which become all-important in war as aids of the highest 
grade of military experience to general commanders.” * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. John Gibbon, Seventh Infantiy; major-general of volunteers; 
served in the Mexican war; during civil war was chief of artillery to 
General McDowell; brigade, division, and corps commander; com¬ 
manded Second Corps at Gettvsburg; afterwards brigadier-general, 

U. S. A. 

* ***** -x 

(Page 147.) “The staff of an army should consist of the very first 
brains of the service, thoroughly conversant with all of its details; and 
.such a knowledge can only be attained by service in the different arms. 

* ****** 

""All persons educated, trained, and promoted for a specialty, are 

more efficient for that particular specialty^ but officers of the Arm}" 


81 


are not more efficient as military officers from being so educated; and 
there is no reason why their efficiency as such should not be increased 
by greater freedom of detail and transfer, as described above. 

“In conclusion, I will state that the staff organization in our service 
should be such that in case of war it could be at once and efficiently 
used to organize and supply an immensely larger force than we are in 
the habit of maintaining in time of peace; in other words, should be 
capable of indeffnite extension.” 

* ****** 

Maish report, 1878. 

Col. JohnH. King, Ninth Infantry; brigadier-general of volunteers; 
served in the Mexican war; brigade and division commander in 
civil war: 

(Page 128.) “I have the honor to recommend the following: 

* ****** 

“That the staff departments remain as independent corps, organized 
as now, but the number of paymasters should be reduced, and line 
officers detailed to pay the troops monthly, on a more simple roll than 
the one now used. Paymasters could be stationed at important points 
and furnish enough money for each payment as required.” * * * 

Maish report, 1878. 

Maj. Thomas M. Anderson, Tenth Infantry; in the field during 
the civil war; commanded Twelfth Infantry in Wilderness campaigns; 
major-general of volunteers, Spanish war; afterwards brigadier- 
general, U. S. A.: 

(Page 152.) “1 should be very sorry to see the organization of our 
staff department changed. * * * They should come back to the 

line now and then, if for no other reason, to learn from practical 
experience our necessities.” 

* ****** 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. George P. Buell, Eleventh Infantry; brevet brigadier- 
general, U. S. A.; during civil war was colonel Fifty-eighth Indiana 
Volunteers; brigade commander; afterwards colonel Fifteenth 
Infantry: 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 155.) “Any man is more efficient in his particular business 
who follows it closely for a peried of years, but he is fit for nothing 
else. The Army would be much more efficient if a greater freedom 
of detail were authorized. There is no branch of the service (except 
the engineer, medical, and ordnance) that any officer of ordinary edu¬ 
cation, good sense, energy, industry, ambition, pride, and courage can 
not accomplish in a few years.” * * * 

7114—00-^6 



82 


Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Orlando B. Willcox, Twelfth Infantry; brigadier-general of 
volunteers; served in the Mexican war; in the civil war was division 
and corps commander; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.: 

(Page 96.) ‘‘These corps (the Adjutant-General’s, Quartermaster’s, 
and Commissary Departments) should be constantly replenished with 
young officers, to be selected from the line, for peculiar fitness, and if 
not found fit, to be returned to their regiments. With this object in 
view, 1 would urge the readoption of the plan of appointing captains 
in each of these corps from first lieutenants of the line, to serve 
until promoted to their own regiments, and then either returned or 
retained.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Isaac V. D. Reeve, U. S. A. (retired), late of Thirteenth Infan- 
tr}^; brevet brigadier-general; served in the Florida war, Mexican 
war, and in the civil war; was captured by General Twiggs; on recruit¬ 
ing duty and in command of draft rendezvous: 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 160.) “10. Q. State what is the effect of continuing the same 
officers in a particular department or corps of the staff and of allowing 
only promotions within them. 

“A. The effect is to make the department more efficient by its mem¬ 
bers having a thorough knowledge of its duties by acquiring excel¬ 
lence from long practice and study and a pride in their performance. 
After years of service in a special and congenial duty it certainly 
would be detrimental to the service to promote an officer to strange 
duties in which he can not feel the same interest as in those he has left. 
This would often be the result of promoting out of the departments, 
because the members of those departments have usually sought them 
from preference for their duties.” 

******* 

Maish report, 1878. 

Lieut. Col. William P. Carlin, Seventeenth Infantry; bridadier-gen- 
eral of volunteers; brigade and division commander; afterwards 
brigadier-general, U. S. A.: 

(Page 143.) “The Quartermaster-General’s Department, Adjutant- 
General’s Department, Inspector-General’s Department, and Ordnance 
Department, as separate staff corps should be abolished, and the duties 
now performed b}^ these separate corps should be performed by officers 
detailed for a term of years from the line of the Army. The number 
of such officers should be regulated by the exigencies of the service 
and be determined by the President. 

* ***** * 

“1. Adjutant-General’s Department: One of the 10 brigadier- 
generals of the Army should be detailed as adjutant-general for a 
term of years; there should be such number of officers detailed from 
the line of the Army to act as assistant adjutants-general as the Presi¬ 
dent may direct, and they should be assigned to such duties as he may 
deem necessary.” 


83 


(Page 14-i.) ‘‘ 2 . Inspector-General’s Department: The inspector- 
general should be a colonel detailed from the line of the Army for a 
term of years; there should be such assistant inspectors-general as the 
President may decide to be necessary, and they should be detailed from 
the line of the Army for a term of years. 

‘‘3. Quartermaster-General’s Department: One of the general offi¬ 
cers of the Army should be detailed to act as quartermaster-general 
for a term of years. Such quartermasters and assistants as the Presi- ^ 
dent may deem necessaiy to perform services required should be 
detailed for a term of years from the line of the Army. 

‘‘d. Subsistence Department: A brigadier-general of the Army 
should be detailed to act as Commissary-General of Subsistence. The 
other officers of the department should be selected as now provided by 
law. If any more should be required they should be detailed from the 
line of the Army for a term of years, or so long as their services may 
be deemed necessary by the President. 

‘‘5. The Ordnance Department: A colonel of the line should be 
detailed for a term of 3 ^ears to act as Chief of Ordnance, and such 
assistants as the President may deem necessary should be detailed from 
the line of the Army for a term of years. 

‘‘ 6 . Medical Department: This should consist of a surgeon-general 
with the rank of colonel, 1 surgeon, and 2 assistant surgeons for each 
regiment of the line, whose rank shall be the same as now provided 
by law. Such other surgeons and ph^^sicians as may be required should 
be emplo 3 "ed by contract. 

‘" 7. Pa}' Department: The pa^'master-general should be a colonel of 
the line detailed for a term of 3 'ears. The department should in other 
respects remain as at present organized b}' law. 

8 . Bureau of Military Justice: The Judge-Advocate-General should 
be a colonel learned in the law, and should be selected by the President. 
The Bureau should in other respects remain as now organized. 

“9. The Signal Corps: A captain of the Corps of Engineers should 
be placed in charge of this corps, and he should be on the staff of the 
General of the Army. His assistants should be such young lieutenants 
and enlisted men as may be deemed necessary b}^ the General of the 
Arm}'. 

^‘ 10 . Engineer Corps: This should be organized as advised above, 
and reduced to the number required b}^ the actual necessities of the 
militar}^ service.” 

* *->:-**** 

Maish report, 1878. 

Col. Charles H. Smith, Nineteenth Infantiy, brevet major-general. 
During the civil war was colonel First Maine Cavalry; commanded 
cavalry brigade in army of the Potomac: 

(Page 137.) “I do not think I can offer with advantage any views 
relating to staff officers in addition to the mass of conflicting opinions 
already before the military committee. * * * A company should 

have a captain, a first lieutenant, and a second lieutenant. Captains 
and second lieutenants should serve with their companies; first lieu¬ 
tenants should be available for detail and detached service.” * * * 


84 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Alfred Sully, Nineteenth Infantry, brigadier-general of 
volunteers. Served in the Florida war, the Mexican war, and in the 
civil war was brigade commander; afterwards colonel Twenty-tirst 
Infantry: 

(Page 40.) “I approve of officers holding the higher positions being 
continued in a particular department or corps of the staff and promo¬ 
tion being made only in them, provided the officer proves himself to 
be fitted for the position. * * * 

‘‘Unquestionably, officers educated, trained, and promoted for spe¬ 
cialties of the service are much more efficient, but the greatest care 
should be taken in selecting proper officers to fill staff* appointments. 

* * * X i . 

“I think, before an officer is appointed in the staff*, he should serve 
at least five years as a company officer and most of that time in the 
field, so that he may become thoroughly acquainted with the wants 
and necessities of the enlisted men and the service generally.” 

Maish report, 1878. 

Colonel Sully: 

(Page 138.) “I think the younger officers of the line should be 
detailed to serve for a period of time in all the staff corps, except the 
Engineer Corps and the Medical Department, to acquaint them with 
these duties and to give the authorities in Washington an opportunit}^ 
to select those best fitted for such important positions.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. David S. Stanley, Twenty-second Infantry; major-general of 
volunteers, division and corps commander; chief of cavalry, army of 
the Cumberland; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.: 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 145.) “That the staff duties of the Army are difficult to 
acquire, that the correspondence, the feeding, clothing, quartering, 
and transportation of troops are difficult subjects, we have seen con¬ 
tradicted by the rapidity with which the volunteer staff* officers acquired 
the knowledge and practice of these duties in the field during the late 
war. ^ I do not think I ever saw a regular quartermaster or commis¬ 
sary in the field, but we had, in the army of the Cumberland, an old 
ex-railroad superintendent who seemed is much at home amid pork 
and hard bread as though he had spent a lifetime apprenticeship at it. 
As there is nothing special in these duties, the transfer of an officer 
from one to the other is beneficial in extending his business education 
and preparing him for general usefulness.” 

******* 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. George Crook, Twenty-third Infantry; major-general of 
volunteers, division commander; in command of cavalr}", army of the 
Potomac; afterwards major-general, U. S. A.: 

***** * * 


85 


(Page 152). ‘‘If staff officers were to go more among the troops I 
think it would be better to have them educated, trained, and promoted 
for specialties of service, but under the present management I think 
a greater freedom of transfer and detail would be better.” 

* * * * * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

Lieut. Col. Richard I. Dodge, Twenty-third Infantry; during the 
civil war lieutenant-colonel and assistant inspector-general. Fourth 
Army Corps; afterwards colonel Eleventh Infantry: 

(Page 121.) “Engineer Department: It would be a work of super¬ 
erogation to comment upon a body of men whose genius and whose 
labors have identified them with almost every important work of the 
country, and to whose ability as engineers the shipping and commer¬ 
cial interests of the world are indebted. 

* * * * * * * 

“Signal Corps: The same remarks apply to this admirable, well- 
managed, and most important corps.” * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Abner Doubleday, Twenty-fourth Infantry; major-general of 
volunteers; served in the Mexican war; was brigade, division, and 
corps commander during the civil war; commanded First Corps at 
Gettysburg: 

(Page 11:3.) * * * “In my opinion, everything in the Arm}" 

should be subordinate to the fighting element. To transfer from the 
line to the staff and from the staff to the line has a tendency to bind all 
parts of the service together and to excite the young officers to study 
and to emulate each other. 

***** -x- * 

“I think the Engineer, Ordnance, and Medical departments should 
still be retained as special branches of service, not subject to transfers 
except for very special reasons.” 

******* 


Banning report, 1876. 

Col. George L. Andrews, Twenty-fifth Infantry; during civil war 
was lieutenant-colonel First Missouri Volunteers; major Seventeenth 


Infantry, and lieutenant-colonel Thirteenth Infantry; regimental and 
brigade commander, Army of the Potomac: 

(Page 117.) “ I think, with the exception of the Medical Department, 
that details from the line, under proper restrictions as to length of 
detail and service with their proper commands before being eligible 
for new detail, will supply the necessary number of officers of all 
grades for the administrative and supply departments, and will alone 
preserve that harmony and unity of interests so essential to effective 
service.” * * 


86 


CONSOLIDATION OF STAFF DEPARTMENTS. 

Garfield report, 1869. 

The committee said: 

(Page 2.) “Little fault can be found with the efficiency of the staff, 
but their work was done at a very great expense. There is no doubt 
that with less diversity of organization the cost might have been 
largely diminished.” 

(Pages 2 and 3.) “ The committee recommend the consolidation of 
the Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments into one depart¬ 
ment of supply. Such a department could, it is believed, do all the 
work of the three departments named, with not more than two-thirds 
of the officers now employed, and with a considerable saving of expense 
in other particulars, such as office rent, transportation, mileage, clerk 
hire, etc. * * * The considerations in favor of the union of the 

Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments are freely and abl}^ 
given in the annexed evidence of the Secretary of War, and of Gen¬ 
erals Hancock, McDowell, Ingalls, and others.” 

(Page 3.) “The departments of the Adjutant-General and Inspect¬ 
or-General can with propriety be combined, as both have to do with 
the personnel of the Army. There appears to be no good reason for 
their separation, and the consolidation will simplify their organization 
and reduce in some degree their expenses. 

“In the opinion of the committee the duties of the Signal Corps can 
be as well performed by the Engineer Corps. 

“The committee are also of the opinion that the Engineer Corps 
could do the work of the Coast Survey, now a bureau of the Treasury 
Department. 

“A union of the Ordnance Department with the artillery is recom¬ 
mended, and would effect a large saving of expense.” 

(Page 4.) “The committee invite especial attention to the consider¬ 
ations in favor of a union of the War and Navy departments, sug¬ 
gested by the Secretary of War in his evidence.” 

(Page 1.) “As the committee will not have an opportunity to report 
any bill to be acted upon before the expiration of the present Congress 
they can only present the information they have gathered, and ask that 
it be printed for the information of all concerned, and for use in the 
next Congress.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

The committee said: 

(Page 2.) “It (the Army) is designed for a state of hostilities in 
some measure commensurate with the power of our people, and with 
the foreign foes of great force against whom we may be compelled to 
contend. And the question arises whether, in a momentous emergency 
of that kind, we can safely trust under the control of any single man 
more than one of the present departments or corps of the staff. Has 
the Quartermaster-General an}^ less than he can do well at such a time ? 
And so with the Inspector, the Adjutant, the Paymaster, and the Com¬ 
missary generals, and the Chief of Ordnance and the Chief of Engi¬ 
neers. 

“ The classification of staff duties should be such that those of any 
branch can be promptly and efficiently discharged in time of war on a 


87 


large scale. And unless we have an organization capable of expansion 
to an almost unlimited extent we may well question whether it rests 
upon a safe basis. * * * xhe head of each department should be 

able to have a thorough and personal knowledge of all its affairs, and 
should be able at all times to know its entire operations and manage 
them with facility. Not to be able to do this is regarded justly as a 
defect; while, on the other hand, a counterbalancing evil occurs by 
the fact that these departments, having a different responsibility, do 
not at times work in harmony with each other. 

‘‘The head of each department should be thoroughly acquainted with 
all the minutiae of it, and never at a loss to detect errors or derelic¬ 
tions of duty. Nothing but long experience as a permanent officer can 
give this. The danger is that, by long custom and routine, he may 
become rigid, formal, technical, and unable to accommodate himself 
to circumstances and to rise with great emergencies; may ‘rust in the 
staff.’ But this evil is more than counterbalanced by the superior 
knowledge, skill, and ability gathered by long and faithful service; 
indeed, such qualifications then become almost invaluable. 

“A perfect acquaintance with his duties, a familiarity with all its 
details, a pride and spirit in their prompt and exact discharge are the 
result of veteran service in the stall' departments, and while many of 
the duties in the different branches are similar in part, yet the division 
is sufficiently marked to prevent collisions or discord.” * * * 

(Page 3.) “The first three departments (the Quartermaster’s, Com¬ 
missary, and some of the duties of the Ordnance Department) have 
many points in common, and yet are sufficiently diverse to justif y their 
separation when great emergencies require a sudden and important 
effort from each. At such a time it would seem that the duties of any 
one of these departments are sufficient for the officers assigned to their 
discharge. To consolidate them in peace would but require their sepa¬ 
ration in war in effect, if not in name. The duties to be performed 
under the head of a single great department of supply, embracing these 
three, would be classified and arranged at least to fall into different 
hands, and whatever might be their appellation could hardly be better 
disposed of than at present. 

‘‘While in time of peace the number of officers and their clerks 
would be somewhat decreased, on the other hand, in time of war it 
would not be materially reduced, and it is veiy questionable whether 
the efficiency of one head for the three departments would be as great 
with the vasdly increased responsibility thus thrown upon him. The 
danger would be that the overburdened department would at the very 
time when its efforts were most needed sink beneath the load. 

“ On the other hand, it is urged that ‘ the general similarity of duties, 
unity of action, some reduction in the aggregate number of officers, 
more uniform promotion, greater room for economy in the distribu¬ 
tion of officers to particular bureaus or branches of duty, according 
to their fitness, and a larger field from which to select officers for im¬ 
portant administrative positions in times of emergency,’ would justify 
a consolidation of the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay and the 
administrative branch of the Ordnance Department into a single one 
of supply. The advantages thus to be gained can not be denied, but 
are deemed of less importance than those the present system affords, 
with its division of labor and distribution of responsibility. 

* * * ‘‘It certainly would require higher cultivation to be able 


88 


to do the scientific duties of the present Ordnance and Engineer Corps 
than of either one separately, as at present, and the training of officers 
to do the duties of both is no doubt desirable, but a consolidation of 
two corps that have done so well hardly rises above the range of ex¬ 
periment. 

“The distribution of scientific labor, like that of all other kinds, has 
been found to be advantageous, and the greatest skill, as well as the 
most rapid progress, is the sure result of such division. There seems 
to be no more reason why the Ordnance Corps should be consolidated 
with the artillery than the infantry or cavalry, for it is the duty of 
that corps to make, improve, and supply all kinds of ammunition and 
arms to the service, small as well as great. TJie evidence goes mainly 
to show that the ordnance should be kept as a separate branch of the 
stafi‘, as at present.” 

(Page 4.) * * * “The consolidation of the Inspector’s with the 

Adjutant-General’s Department, though advocated by a few, has met 
with general disfavor. The duties are but slightl}" akin, and the inde¬ 
pendence of the inspectors from all branches of the line and stafl‘ can 
only be secured by a complete separation from them. The duties of 
the adjutant-general confine him closely to his post * * * those of 

the inspector carry him over a wide field. 

“The Medical Department and the Bureau of Military Justice, being 
professional and scientific specialties of the highest order, are removed 
from all questions of consolidation with any other branches of the stafi'. 

“In view of these reflections and of the testimony adduced from the 
most respectable authority it is fair to conclude that the consolidation 
of any one of the different staff corps and departments with another is 
inexpedient. Whatever may be gained in expense in time of peace 
would possibly and probably be lost in war when a divided responsi¬ 
bility, as at present, would become necessary and might devolve upon 
inexperienced hands.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

The committee said: 

(Paged.) “The question of consolidation in the staff has been a 
vexed one, and the results reached are embraced in the section of the 
bill looking to a department of supplies. 

“The Pay Department has not, as recommended by some officers, 
been consolidated with the Quartermaster’s and Subsistence depart¬ 
ments, but it has been reduced in number of 20 majors, one-third, and 
a provision made that the lieutenant-colonels and majors of the depart¬ 
ment of supplies shall be paymasters ex officio. 

“ * * * An opportunity will be aff orded to test the practicability 

of officers of the department of supplies performing the duties of 
paymasters.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Hon. William W. Belknap, Secretary of War; during the civil war 
was colonel Fifteenth Iowa Volunteers, brigadier-general of volun¬ 
teers, and brevet major-general. 

* ***** * 

(Page 212.) “The present division of staff' departments seems to be 
the most natural one to secure a proper division of labor and accounta- 


89 


bility. It is natural that provision for troops and provision for horses 
should be separated. The appropriations are separate, the returns are 
different, the method of their purchase, care, preservation, and dis¬ 
tribution is different, and although a lieutenant is usually detailed at 
small posts to perform both the duties of quartermaster and com- 
missmy, 3 ^et he is obliged to employ two persons, either soldiers or 
civilians, one to take charge of the quartermaster matters, and one to 
take charge of commissary matters, the officer overseeing both. 

* ****** 

‘‘But when it comes to large posts and depots, it becomes a matter 
of necessity to have two officers to perform the duties, the labor and 
responsibility being very great and the accounts very numerous. 
Now, it is obvious that whether these officers are called, respectively, 
commissary and quartermaster, or whether they are called officers of 
the ‘supply department,’ it does not diminish the necessity for them; 
it does not diminish their number, or the number of their accounts, or 
their responsibility. 

* * * seems to me that if company and detachment com¬ 

manders should have money placed in their charge, and be required to 
keep it constantly on hand, in a common safe, for the pa 3 unent of their 
men, the danger of loss from the exposed positions in which such 
mone}^ would be placed would be intiniteh^ increased.” * * * 

(Page 213.) “ Why the ordnance corps should be consolidated with 

the artillery anj" more than with the cavaliy or infantry, I am at a loss 
to understand. 

* ****** 

“A consolidation of the Adjutant-General’s and Inspection depart¬ 
ments could not well be effected, for the reason that the duties of 
assistant adjutant-generals require them to be almost constantly in 
their offices, and those of inspector-generals require them to be con¬ 
stantly" on the move.” 

* ****** 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Gen. William T. Sherman, U. S. A., Commanding General of the 
Army from March 8,1869, to November 1,1883. Received the thanks 
of Congress by name for Chattanooga, the Atlanta campaign, and the 
march to the sea: 

* * ***** 

(Page 272.) We may change the names of men, but the same duties 
will have to be performed by somebody, and I doubt very much whether 
we will gain anything in quality or efficiencv by dropping the titles 
‘quartermaster and commissary,’and calling the same an ‘officer of the 
control department,’ as they do now in England. In every army, 
whether large or small, there must be some person to look to the horses, 
means of transportation, and to the supply of the necessary fuel, forage, 
clothing, etc., and it seems to me it is a matter of very little differ¬ 
ence whether we call him a quartermaster or an officer of the control 
department. If he attends to his business properly he will generally 
have as much as one man can or ought to do. The same remark will 
apply to the commissary. The feeding of an army is so important, as 
we all remember in the civil war, that there must be with every detach- 


90 


ment, however large or small, some one man qualified and charged by 
law or by general regulation with the feeding of that command there 
on the spot. 

“ Q. Is there, under the present system, an}" conflict between officers 
of the Commissary and Quartermaster’s departments that would be 
avoided by a consolidation?—A. None. 

“Q. Does not one operate as a check on the other in the matter of 
accounts ?—A. I rather think the}^ do have that effect, although in case 
of a small detachment, below a regiment, say of four or less companies, 
one officer has done, and can well do, both duties. In fact, the bulk of 
duties of the Quartermaster’s and the Commissary departments to-day is 
done by young lieutenants, detailed as acting quartermasters and acting 
commissaries, both offices generally united in one. * * * 

‘‘We have an Adjutant-General’s Department and an Inspector- 
GeneraUs Department. Their duties are distinct, and it would be very 
confusing in its results if they were to be merged in the same person, 
for no one knows better than you, gentlemen, that we must have com¬ 
plete records of all parts of the Army, S 3 ^stematized, and the knowledge 
at hand, for on them are based claims for bounties, pensions, etc., which 
follow for years, sometimes for almost 100 years after the disbandments 
of any part of the Regular or Volunteer Army. This is a very impor¬ 
tant duty imposed on the Adjutant-General’s Department, and I do not 
think you can separate the two departments from their respective offices. 
I do not think you could send your Adjutant-General to make inspec¬ 
tions as a general rule. He should be at his office or in presence of 
his immediate commander charged with collection of the necessary 
returns, muster rolls, and reports, and with seeing that they reach a 
safe place of deposit for future reference. * * * 

“Tffie Inspector-General has charge, usually in time of peace or war, 
of making the inspection of troops, of posts, and of the staff' officers 
charged with disbursements, and doing the very duty which the com¬ 
manding general should do in person if able or if he had sufficient 
time. He should be, as it were, the eyes of the commanding general. 

“The Quartermaster’s Department is very important, and I doubt 
the wisdom of any change. 

“The Subsistence Department is all-important and I doubt the wis¬ 
dom of any change, save that I think there ought not to be an increase 
in the number of officers allowed under the existing law, but rather 
that the number should be permitted to run down without discharging 
any officers to a standard which will enable the Commissary-General 
here in Washington to retain two or three assistants, or'whatever 
number may be necessaiy, and to allow one to each of the great head¬ 
quarters, say ten or twelve in number, leaving to the regimental 
quartermasters, and regimental commissaries, and acting assistant 
quartermasters, and acting assistant commissaries at posts, to fulfill 
the duties, which they can do perfectly well, and which they actually 
do with^ great advantage to themselves by acquiring experience in 
transacting business, which will be of great service to them afterwards. 
We all know that General Grant acquired his first lessons in business 
as a regimental quartermaster. The same is true of Sheridan. The 
same is true of most of the other successful military commanders, and 
I have to confess to the same experience myself. Every general officer 


91 


acknowledges the great advantage of the experience gained by him in 
early life in these positions, enabling him to study the system of 
accountability in business matters, which was of infinite advantage to 
him in after life. 

“The Medical Department, of course, is professional, and it is one 
which I, perhaps, ought not to touch, but my experience, as 1 stated 
in the early part of my examination, is that "there should be a regi¬ 
mental surgeon and two assistant surgeons for each regiment, just as 
we had at the close of the late war. The regimental surgeon and the 
assistant surgeons should follow the regiment and be with it at all 
times. They should be as much a part of it as the regimental colors. 
That, however, will not obviate the necessity of another large number 

of staff surgeons and assistant surgeons such as we now have.” 
****** * 

(Page 274.) “The Pay Department has kept the payment of the 
troops up well, and it is all-important. They have accounted for the 
mone}^ well. They are appointed from civil life or military life at the 
option of the President, and I doubt whether you will gain anything, 
either in economy or efficiency, by requiring payment to be made the 
troops as in Europe—b}" the captains of companies or by pa}^ sergeants. 

“ Q. There has been some complaint in relation to the infrequency of 
payment. Is there any real fault connected with that?—A. I think 
not. The European troops are paid very little. In Russia only three 
or four dollars a year; in England at the rate of a shilling a day, 
with some little additions from indirect sources. The}^ get their pa}^ 
dail}^, but they have to buy their own rations out of it. We supply 
our soldiers in kind with rations, clothing, and really all the necessaries 
of life. Our soldiers do not enlist as a life business. * * * Our 

soldiers have therefore really no need of mone}^, and I think the pay¬ 
ment of them every muster "day, or every two months, is sufficiently 
frequent.” * * * 

(Page 275.) “Q. Can you see any economy in a diminution of offi¬ 

cers by a consolidation of the Quartermaster’s with the Commissary 
Department, and either of them with the Pay Department, or both with 
that department?—A. No, sir; I see no economy either in the number 
or in the amount of pay involved. It simply changes the name of the 
officers, as has been done in England; and there was a unanimous con¬ 
clusion there, as I was informed, on the part of the line officers, that 
the change w^orks badly.” * * * 

Coburn report, 1874. 

General Sherman: 

(Page 29.) “Q. Why can not the Paymaster’s Department of the 

Army be transferred to the Quartermaster’s Department?—A. The 
Quartermaster’s Department could make the payments to the troops, 
but the experience of the last twenty years has been so favorable to the 
Pay Department that I would not like to suggest such a change. * * * 

“The Paymaster’s Department has paid the troops well and has 
accounted for the money well, and I am told that it has done it cheaply, 
viz., at a very small percentage on the aggregate disbursement. To 
change a well-established system for another system is always of doubt¬ 
ful wisdom. 

* * ***** 


92 


‘‘Q. In detached posts why not make the commanding officer of the 
post pay the troops under his command ? * * * —A. I would not 
like to see a commanding officer of a post hampered with any disburse¬ 
ment of money, for which he would have to account to the Paymaster’s 
Department or even to the Treasury Department. This would tie him 
down when he should be on the wing. He is responsible for the safety 
of his post and of the neighborhood, and should not be a disbursing 
officer. * 

“Q. Could the Quartermaster’s Department and the Commissary 
Department be consolidated?—A. The general view is, if consolidation 
must be, that the Inspector-General’s Department and Adjutant- 
General’s Department might be united; and the Paymaster’s, Quarter¬ 
master’s, and Subsistence departments might be united, as they aye 
in England, under the name of ‘Control;’ and the Ordnance and 
the Artilleiy. The duty of the Signal Department might be imposed 
on the adjutants of regiments and the noncommissioned staff.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Sherman: 

(Page 7.) “Q. Would it not be practicable to consolidate the Quar¬ 
termaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments into one corps?—A. 
Yes.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Lieut. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, U. S. A., commanding general of 
the Army from November 1,1883, to August 5, 1888; general United 
States Army, June 1, 1888; received the thanks of Congress b}^ name 
for gallantry displayed in battles in Shenandoah Valley, and especially 
at Cedar Run. 

(Page 19.) “Of course they can be consolidated (the Quartermaster’s, 
Commissary, and Pay departments), but I doubt whether you will get 
as good a replt as you have now. 1 do not believe in tearing things 
down, especially when they have done well. They have certainl}" done 
well as they are, and I do not know that an}^ great saving is to be made 
by consolidation. I am not prepared to recommend anything of the 
kind. * * * 

(Page 21.) “I think probably I might select something else on which 
to economize. I would stop the fortifications.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, late of United States Army, com¬ 
manding general of the Armv from November 1, 1861, to March 11, 
1862. 

* * ***** 

(Page 207.) “I do not think that any of the staff departments can 
be consolidated advantageously, for the reason that their duties are 
quite distinct, requiring special experience and training. Our present 
system is the slow growth of nearly sixty years, embodying the results 
of the experience of peace and war. 

cc* * * j reason to believe that the number of officers 

in the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments is now in 


93 


excess of the demands of the service, nor do I believe that a consoli¬ 
dation would decrease the number; and, in this connection, I may be 
permitted to say that the number of staff officers in peace should be 
kept as large as possible, in order to provide for the contingency of a 
sudden increase in the event of war; the difficulty in efficiently organ¬ 
izing a new arni}^ is more in the special and staff* corps than in the line. 

* * * * * * * 

‘*■1 can see a great many serious and fatal objections to the proposi¬ 
tion of causing the company and department commanders to pay their 
commands, and no advantage commensurate with the evils involved. 

* * * * * * * 

“■I can see no possible reason for consolidating the Adjutant and 
Inspector General’s departments, and very many reasons against it. 
There is no similarity in the duties of the two corps, and entirel}^ dif¬ 
ferent qualiffcations are needed for them. I should regard such a 
consolidation as ver}" unwise.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, U. S. A.; major-general of volunteers; 
commanded Army of the Potomac; received the thanks of Congress 
by name for Gettysburg. 

(Page 15.) “The subject of the consolidation of the staff of the 
Army into few^er branches has been for several years the subject of 
discussion, and on a previous occasion of Congressional investigation. 
I can not say that after reading all that has been written and said I am 
prepared to advocate consolidation. T have had a fair opportunity to 
observe the workings of the present system, both in time of war and 
peace. It has always vnorhed well. I doubt if any army is better sup¬ 
plied or has its wants more promptly attended to than ours; and when 
consideration is given to this fact, it would seem to me the part of 
prudence is to let well enough alone and not hazard experiments which, 
even if successful, could attain no better result than all admit is now 
attained. Besides, the present system is the result of years of experi¬ 
ence and the work of able minds. fTohn C. Calhoun, in 1820, and Joel 
R. Poinsett, in 1838, are the creators of the present organization, 
based on the experience and judgment of the officers of their days. 
The distribution of labor to distinct departments, the characteristic of 
the system, was adopted from the very fact of the previous systems 
not working w^ell. dffie adoption has been found to work admirably; 
it may, and undoubtedly is, open to some improvements, but they are 
secondary and insignificant to the main principle involved, viz., the 
distribution of labor. The only advantage to be gained, as far as I 
can learn from the advocates of consolidation, is their belief that it 
will require fewer agents, and hence less cost; but in this I fear they 
will be mistaken. All departments of the staff, it is admitted, have 
now as much as they can attend to; each year the annual reports of the 
heads of their departments complain of having more work than they 
can properly attend to, and ask for an increase of their corps. 1 speak 
now principally of the consolidation of the Quartermaster’s, Commis¬ 
sary, and Pay departments. Now, if each of these departments are 
fully w^orked when divided, is it reasonable to suppose the same amount 


94 


of work can be done when they are united hy fewer persons? If 
not, the result of consolidation will simply be a change of name, and 
the consolidated departments will require as many officers as the three 
had before consolidation; the only gain will he the dispensing with the 
heads of bureaus and their attendant machinery. ^ The fact that Euro¬ 
pean armies are differently organized is sometimes quoted h}" the 
advocates of change, but we should be careful before drawing any 
conclusion to be satisffed that these European armies are more effi¬ 
ciently supplied than ours. So far as I have been able to learn, such 
is not the case. During the war I had at the headquarters of the Army 
of the Potomac visits from numerous foreign officers, and I do not 
remember a single instance where fault was Tound with our system. 
Among these was a colonel of the French artillery, who was permitted to 
remain several months at my headquarters, and who very thoroughly 
studied our whole system of administration, and who considered our 
system of distribution of labor in our supply departments as greatly 
superior to the system in use in the French army, where all supplies 
are furnished by one department—that of the intendance. Again, in 
making comparison with foreign armies the totallv different condi¬ 
tions of the problem should be considered; and to illustrate this, one 
has only to glance at the map of Prussia or France and then at the 
United States to see that a system working well in one case would not 
necessarily do so in the other.” 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, U. S. A.; major-general of volun¬ 
teers; division, corps, and army commander; commanded Army of 
the Cumberland; received the thanks of Congress by name for 
defeating General Hood. 

(Page 113.) ‘‘Q. State what your opinion is of the propriety and 
feasibility of uniting the Commissary and Quartermaster departments 
into one department of supplies, and the Pay Department also.— 
A. I do not think it would be advisable to unite them, either one with 
the other, or to unite the whole three together. Their duties are sepa¬ 
rate, and I think they are very wisely divided as they are. * * * 

The duties of the quartermaster and commissary at the same post 
should be performed by the same officer. * * * They ought to be 

divided as soon as the duties have to be performed by an officer in 
either capacity away from a post, except in time of war the regimental 
quartermaster should be the regimental commissary.” 

(Page 114.) ‘‘Q. Please give the committee your judgment on the 
propriety of consolidating the ordnance corps with the artillery.— 
A. I should prefer it as it is, because the furnishing of ammunition, 
preparing of ammunition, and storing of ammunition are all special 
services; and it is not natural to suppose that an officer detailed tem¬ 
porarily to do such duty would take so much interest in it as one who 
had been appointed to the position on account of his scientific attain¬ 
ments. The latter would take special pains not only to keep himself 
up to the mark, but would endeavor as far as possible to improve. A 
person only engaged temporarily in a thing will not take so much 
interest in it as one who is engaged in it permanently. * * * 


95 


“1 know no reason whatever why the duties of the Coast Survey 
Department might not be done by the Engineer Department of the 
Army. They are both scientilic, and similar in their nature. * * * 
The only difficulty in the way (consolidating the Navy and Army 
Ordnance Department) seems to me to be the fixing of the responsi¬ 
bility of that Bureau, i. e., who should control it; whether it should 
be under the control of the Army or Navy, or whether it would be 
better to make it a separate bureau, being independent of both the 
Army and Navy, being under the President, as a matter of course.” 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. A.; major-general of volun¬ 
teers; commanded Second Corps, Army of the Potomac, fifth milir 
tary district, and militar}^ division of the Atlantic; received the 
thanks of Congress by name for Gettysburg. 

(Page 89.) “It has frequently been suggested that it (Inspector- 
General’s Department) might be made a part of the Adjutant-General’s 
Department. * * * I think that the Inspector’s Department should 
have a recognized separate head. * * * x am not clear about it 

(concerning the propriety of consolidating the Quartermaster’s, Com¬ 
missary, and Pay departments). * * * If they were consolidated 
I think the result would be that, instead of three separate depart¬ 
ments, with distinct heads, it would be necessary to have in the new 
department a bureau representing each of the existing departments. 
* * * But it is a difficult question. I think the consolidation might 

be made, and especially of the Quartermaster’s and Commissary depart¬ 
ments, but it would have to be made with great care, and I have not 
studied the subject enough to be able to say anything more about it 
than to simply express my belief that it might be accomplished. * * * 
In the field with armies I think it much better to have officers pay the 
troops, who have no other duty. * * * j Relieve that a wise com¬ 
bination might be made of the artillery officers and those necessary to 
select for ordnance duty. * * * jf the Ordnance Department were 
to cease the fabrication of arms it would remove one serious cause of 
hostility to the service, from sources outside of it. * * * 

“ Q. Is the character of the Engineer Corps such as to make it feas¬ 
ible for them to perform the duties now performed by the Coast Sur¬ 
vey ?—A. I see no reason why they should not; indeed, it is legitimately 
a part of their business. -* * * Whether it would be wise to make 
the change is another matter. * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Hancock: 

(Page 25.) ‘‘It would be practicable to consolidate the Quarter¬ 
master’s, Commissary, and Pay departments into one corps, but the 
operation would be difficult and attended with no great advantage or 
economy. All or most of the persons who now constitute the separate 
corps would appear in the consolidated corps, and they certainly would 
not act any more efficiently or economically on account of the consol¬ 
idation. 


Maish report, 1878. 
General Hancock: 


96 


THE OKDNANCE DEPARTMENT. 

(Page 8.) “To the men who make the arms, etc., is intrusted the 
solution of all questions in relation to them, the men who use them 
being excluded from these deliberations. The oft-repeated effort to 
consolidate the ordnance and artillery are attributable mainly to the 
practice just mentioned. The consolidation is not necessary, and prob¬ 
ably if made would not remove the difficulty felt by the artillery. 
Under existing laws the Government can keep just as much artillery 
as it chooses in the constant practice of its profession. It could not 
do more after consolidation. Nor is it artillery experience alone which 
should be injected into the manufacture of arms. The cavalry and 
infantry should be brought to bear on the subject, not as an interfer¬ 
ence with the ordnance in the pursuit of its specialty, but to add to its 
stock of information. No consolidation is required to effect the object 
here suggested. It is only necessary that the isolation and independ¬ 
ence of this department, in whose labors all of the Army is specially 
interested, shall cease, and that it be brought under the control of the 
general in chief.” 

* * * * * * * 

Burnside report, 1878. 

General Hancock: 

* * * * * ' * * 
“the quartermaster’s, subsistence, and pay departments. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 431.) “It would be ‘practicable’ to consolidate the Quarter¬ 
master’s, Commissary, and Pay Departments into one corps, but the 
operation would be difficult and attended with no great advantage or 
econom3N 

****** * 

“Iadhere to that opinion. The subject is one that has been pretty 
full\^ discussed, through inquiries made of the most prominent offi¬ 
cers of the Army by committees of Congress. In 1869, 4 officers or 
ex-officers expressed themselves in favor of it. In 1874, 15 were in 
favor of it and 34 against it. In 1876, 20 were in favor of it and 35 
against it. (In all cases, as the matter was presented to me, but 
especially in the last case, the form of inquiry was as to practica¬ 
bility^ father than advisability of the consolidation.) Of the number 
mentioned as in favor, a part merely answered the question of practi¬ 
cability. Officers of rank, distinction, and acknowledged ability are 
found on both sides in the opinions given in the years above named. 
A careful examination of all the views expressed will not only show 
that the weight of evidence has been against consolidation of these 
corps, but that the opposition to it has decidedly increased, and that 
while some who at first favored it now either oppose or do not sup¬ 
port it, there are no changes of opinion in the other direction. 

“ It is generally, if not universally, admitted that these corps with 
heir present distinct organizations have worked well in both war and 


97 


peace. No great failure, perhaps no important shortcoming even, 
was charged to them during all the trials and difficulties of our last 
great war. A proposition to consolidate them must, therefore, appear 
in the light of an attempt to improve by legislation—which is not easily 
changed, even if it works badly—what is unquestionably good; rather 
a dangerous and unnecessary experiment. The consolidation would, 
it seems to me^be practically substituting a foreign theory iov our own 
experience. When we observe how lamentably some of these foreign 
theories fail even in the nations to which they are supposed to be specially 
applicable, and how suddenly and totally they are discarded when they 
break down in practice, we should certainly esteem the more highly 
systems which are the growth of our own experience and necessities, 
which work admirably in time of peace, and which have stood the test 
of as hard actual service as we are likely to encounter. I understand 
that the supply branches of the British army have recently undergone 
consolidation of some kind, but the experiment has been but partiall}^ 
tested in peace, and has not yet been subjected to that trial in a great 
war which would enable us to judge of its success. 

* * * * * * * 


""THE BUREAU OF MILITARY JUSTICE AND THE CORPS OF JUDGE- 

ADVOCATES. 

“ * * * j,j jjjy judgment it would be better to have a single corps, 

termed ''Judge-Advocates Department^ as we have one called a Quar¬ 
termaster’s Department, and another a Subsistence Department—the 
duties remaining as at present. 1 regard it as a grave defect in the 
present laws not to authorize in this corps the grades of colonel and 
lieutenant-colonel. As the matter now stands, promotion is ended 
forever with a major and judge-advocate. If anything can destroy 
the proper pride and ambition, the zeal, industry, and usefulness of 
an officer of the Army, it is to find all prospect of promotion cut off 
by law while he is yet laboring faithfully and honorably in the lower 
grades of the profession. * * * q^he duties of judge-advocate are 

inseparable from the military system. They can only be fully and 
properly performed by men who make a specialty of them. If the 
regular "corps be abolished or crippled, the duty must be indifferently 
done, wholly or partly, by officers taken for the time from their proper 
positions: * * * 

* * Without going into the details of the various duties 

required of them, I will say that I consider them absolutely necessary. 
But the necessity’ for maintaining these officers does not rest alone on 
the importance "of their current duties. A thorough knowledge of 
militar}" law in its higher principles, as well as the intricacies of its 
details, is x)articularh" necessary in new armies. Its prompt and cor¬ 
rect application is one of the principal proceedings in the establish¬ 
ment of discipline and order in the armies which we rely upon creat¬ 
ing in time of need. This can only be accomplished through a corps 
prepared beforehand. Ours is peculiarly a government of law, in the 
Army as well as out of it. 

* * * * * * * 


7414—00-7 


98 


“ inspector-genekal’s department. 

‘'This is one of the most important branches of the staff. Unlike 
most others, its officers can not simply make a specialty of some one 
subject, but they should be well acquainted with every arm and depart¬ 
ment of the service. They must examine and report whether proper 
and thoroug-h instruction is given, whether discipline is maintained, 
whether administration is honestly and efficiently conducted, whether 
arms and equipment are suitable and sufficient, whether accounts are 
properly kept and rendered, whether punishments are conformable to 
law, and, in general, whether laws, regulations, and orders are impar¬ 
tially and rigidly enforced throughout the military service. To pass 
properly upon all these questions they must understand the subjects. 
This requires a high and peculiar order of abilit}", great industry, 
large experience, and matured judgment. I have adverted only to 
the general duties of this department. In addition to them, its officers 
have a variety of special duties of great significance which I need not 
mention in detail. 

* * * * * * * 
‘‘the adjutant-general’s department. 

** Our Regular Arni}^ is composed of three parts—the general officers, 
the general staff, and the line. As we use the term staff it comprises 
some thirteen distinct legal organizations, with specific duties allotted 
to each. Although we have found it best not to consolidate these organ¬ 
izations, yet by the nature of their duties some of them are naturalU 
grouped together, and thus we have the Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, 
and Pay Departments, constituting the supply staff; the Adjutant-Gen- 
erahs Department, the Inspector-General’s Department, aids-de-camp, 
etc., constituting the military staff; while others, such as the engineers, 
ordnance, etc., are special corps. 

“Staff duties have their origin in the fact that it is be 3 "ond human 
capacity" for a commander to attend in person to all of those details of 
service which are unavoidable in large military commands, and which 
have increased with the progress of military science. The staff officer— 
speaking in general terms—is one who aids the commander in the labors 
which belong directly to his office. 

“In this view of the subject, the Adjutant-General’s Department is 
essentiallv the staff corps of the ArnnL Every otheP branch of the 
staff' (except perhaps the Inspector-General’s Department) aids the com¬ 
mander, as a general thing, only in the direction of the specialt}’^ intrusted 
to it. But the duties of an adjutant-general—as essential on the battle¬ 
field as in the bureau—extend not only to all arms of the line, but to 
all branches of the staff. In addition to certain office duties which 
belong to him under the routine of his bureau, he is practically the 
jwmcrpal assistant to the commander. 

‘ ‘ He, of necessity, exercises vast power. Although he acts invariably 
in the name of the commander, and not as the Secretaiy of War does, 
in his own name, 3 ^et the relations between an adjutant-general and his 
commander are, the same as those between the Secretary 

of War and the President. 

“It is always assumed, even when not stated, that the Secretary of 
War acts bv order of the President, there being no other person b}^ 


99 


whose authorit}" he can act. But an adjutant-g’eneral may, under his 
assignment from time to time to the staff of different officers, act by 
the order of any one of them, and regulations and custom require that 
he shall state, in every instance, by whose order he acts. Upon a ques¬ 
tion which arose in 1827, as to the validity of a staff' officer’s action, the 
Duke of Wellington, while general-in-chief of the British army, said in 
a general order: ‘ Every staff officer must be considered as acting- 
under the direct orders and superintendence of the superior ofii(?er for 
whose assistance he is employed, and he must be considered responsible 
for his acts. To consider the relative situation of general officer and 
staff in any other light would tend to alter the nature of the service, 
and, in fact, to give the command of the troops to the subaltern staff 
officer instead of to the general officer.’ 

'"Of daily importance to the peace establishment, there is no other 
corps or department in the military service on which the prompt and 
effective organization of a war establishment so largely depends as on 
the Adjutant-General’s Department, which furnishes an additional and 
potent reason for preserving the strength and efficiency of the corps. 
It is charged with the preservation and care of records of great public 
and personal interest, but this is a minor duty of the corps which might 
be sufficiently well performed by faithful and intelligent clerks. 

‘"In fact this duty must, and ought to be, left mainly to that class 
of employees, in order that the officers of the corps may be able to 
concern themselves with the living, active affairs of the profession. 
It is a serious defect in our system that the officers of the corps, by 
their limited numbers, and the constant and pressing routine duties of 
their offices, are prevented from acquainting themselves as thoroughly 
as they otherwise might with the details of the various arms of our 
own service, as well as with those of foreign services. It has even 
been suggested that this defect is so grave that the corps should be 
abolished, and its duties performed by officers detailed at will from 
the line of the Army. The officer detailed would, however, rarely be 
as well qualified in all respects jd??’ staff duty as the Adjutant-General, 
supposed to have been selected originally for aptitude in that branch, 
and who had received the benefit of long study and practice in it; 
and the detailed officer being taken from either the artillery, cavaliy, 
or infantry, would, from his training and interest in a particular arm, 
probably be more of a specialist than an adjutant-general is now. 
The wiser course, it seems to me, is to enable this valuable corps to 
acquire the additional information and experience which it may be 
thought to need. The officers of this department are ex-officio 
inspectors-general, and from time to time, for short periods, should 
be placed on duty as inspectors-general, to enable them to become 
acquainted with the localities at which the troops are stationed 
throughout the country, or throughout the geographical command to 
which they are assigned; to learn the routes for transportation of sup¬ 
plies; to become acquainted with the personnel of the officers of the 
Army, and to observe the discipline of the service. With the infor¬ 
mation thus obtained, they would necessarily be able more intelligently 
to perform their duties as adjutants-general. At present, owing to 
the small numbers of the Adjutant-General’s Department, all its offi¬ 
cers are confined to their offices, and rarely leave them for the pur¬ 
poses of instruction referred to. 

“I learn that the Prussian staff, which we hear so highly com- 


100 


mended in late years, is, like our Adjutant-General’s Department, a per¬ 
manent corps, with regular promotions; but special and prolonged 
study and preparation, involving actual service with the ditferent 
arms, is necessary for admission to it. There are no transfers between 
officers of the line and officers fully admitted to the Prussian staff, 
but as a necessary part of the continued education of the officers in the 
latter, they are, until they reach the grade of colonel, detailed accord¬ 
ing to their rank for short periods of duty as line officers. 

* * * * * * * 


Garfield report, 1869. 

Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, United States Army, Secretarv of 
War; major-general of volunteers; commanded Army of the Ohio and 
Twenty-third Army Corps; Commanding General of the Arni}^ from 
August Id, 1888, to September 29, 1895; afterwards Lieutenant-Gen¬ 
eral, United States Arni}". 

(Page 123). “ 1 have no doubt of the practicability of consolidating 
these three departments (Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay), and 
1 think it would promote efficiency of administration. How much it 
would conduce to economy is a matter which could hardl}^ be decided 
except by actual experiment. * * * The consolidation of the two 

departments would not necessarily result in a very great diminution 
of the officers employed. If the officers now employed in the Quar¬ 
termaster’s Department and Commissary Department have all the 
business that they can attend to, so far as the personnel is concerned, 
the same number of officers will be retained. * * * 

‘‘My theory of administration is much more expanded. * * * 

For the purpose of illustration, more than anything else, I would say 
that I would consolidate the War and Navy departments. I think 
there is nothing that could be proposed that would more promote the 
efficiency of the service than such a consolidation. The one holding 
the position of Secretarv would have charge of the administrative part 
of the duties, leaving the general in command of the Army and the 
admiral in command of the Navy. * * * 

“ Q. Do 3 ^ou know of any reason why officers appointed as disburs¬ 
ing officers can not pay the Armv’- as well as paymasters'^—A. I 
do not; coupled, however, 1 woidd suggest, with the same plan I have 
mentioned in relation to the Quartermasters’ and Commissaries’ depart¬ 
ment—that is, to detail minor officers of the Armv and make them 
bonded officers. * * * 

‘‘Q. What would you say as to the safety of disbursing nione}^ in 
that wa}" % —A. It would not be as safe as it is now. * * * 

“Q. If they^ were all bonded officers would there still be danger ^— 
A. Yes, probably; I do not think bonds are always a safeguard. 1 
think the advantage of bonds is rather in their "moral effect than 
otherwise. 

**«■*** * 

“Q. State your opinion as to the propriety of consolidating the 
Inspector’s and Adjutant-General’s Department.—A. I do not think 
there are very strong reasons for or against it. The duties of the two 
departments are quite separate and distinct. No officer could at the 
same time perform both. * * * 


101 


‘'As an original proposition in the organization of the Army, I 
would not hesitate to say that the ordnance and artillery should be one 
corps, because their duties are so intimatel}^ connected. * * * 

‘•Q. Would there be ain" expense saved to the Government by such 
consolidation ?—A. I should think not—very little at all events. Some¬ 
thing might be gained in the way of efficiencv, but not to a verv great 
extent. 

X 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Schoheld: 

(Page 28). “As an original proposition, it is my opinion that the 
duties now performed b}- our Quartermaster, Subsistence, and Pay 
departments could be better and more economically performed under 
one organization. But the remodeling of an old system is by no 
means the same thing as the organization of a new one. The immedi¬ 
ate effect of such reorganization and consolidation of the three depart¬ 
ments named would be considerable confusion and disorder without 
corresponding economical or other benefit. The ultimate result, after 
some years of experience, would, in my opinion, be increased efficiency, 
and some, though not great, economy. 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Maj. Gen. Irvin ^McDowell, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers; 
commanded Army of the Potomac and Army of the Rappahannock— 
division, corps, and department commander. 

(Page 100.) “I am of the opinion that the Quartermaster’s and 
Subsi.stence departments should not be distinct, but that they should 
be merged into a single department. * * * i am not so entirel}" 

clear upon the question of amalgamating the Pay Department with the 
two supply departments. * * * I do not think that the Quarter¬ 

master’s Department would be the right department to supply these 
articles (medical stores). * * * j think the Inspector-General’s 

Department and the Adjutant-General’s Department in our service 
should be merged into one. * * * j believe good would come by 

having a general officer assigned from time to time to act as Adjutant- 
General. * * * I am in favor of consolidating the Adjutant-Gen¬ 

eral’s and Inspector-General’s departments, and have two officers on 
the staff—one to communicate orders and the other to see that they 
are obeyed—the officers to alternate in the discharge of these duties. 

* * *^ * artilleiw men mostly desire it, but the ordnance corps 

oppose the consolidation. If you had asked the question as to whether 
the corps could not have been constituted that would do these two 
services better than the present two organizations, I should say yes. 
You get considerable advantage in keeping a man on some special 
subject. But as the making of ordnance is not the end, but the means, 
and as the effective use of what is prepared requires now, more than 
ever, as much ability as the preparation, I think the artilleiy should 
be raised to as high a degree of excellence as the ordnance. * * * 

I have no doubt that it would be advantageous to consolidate the 
Engineer Department and the Coast Survey.” 


102 


Banning report, 1876. 

General McDowell: 

(Page 32.) “This subject (consolidation of the Quartermaster's, 
Commissary, and Pay departments) was taken up l)y the Military 
Committee in January, 1869, and on the 2Tth and 28th of that month 
I was fully examined by it, and beg to refer the present committee to 
the record for the statements I then made, which ^-e too extended to be 
conveniently reproduced in this letter. The subject since that time 
has been a good deal discussed, and much opposed by many of our best 
officers, and, in fact, I know of but few who are favorably impressed 
with the idea of a single department of supply. But I still adhere to 
the views given to the Military Committee in 1869, and I do so not 
from anything drawn from other services, as much as from the experi¬ 
ence of many years in our own.” 

Burnside report, 1878. 

General McDowell: 

(Page 256.) “I have proposed to consolidate the Adjutant^General’s 
and Inspector-General’s departments, and have provided a sufficient 
number of officers for the consolidated department for the duty at the 
War Department, the headquarters of the Army, and two to each divi¬ 
sion and department. This is in pursuance of a plan once adopted in 
the service. The advantages claimed are that officers will not, as now, 
either be chained to their desks as assistant adjutant-genei*als, or, like 
the inspectors, be always on the move; but that the officer who issues 
the orders of his commander ma}" have the advantage of going peri¬ 
odically to all parts of the command, and thus come to know in per¬ 
son the service and troops concerning which he is called on to act. I 
have, as an assistant adjutant-general, had to do the two duties, and 
act from my own experience in suggesting the consolidation.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, U. S. A., Major-General of Volun¬ 
teers; commanded Eleventh Army Corps, Army of the Potomac, and 
Fourth Corps, Army of the Cumberland; the Army of the Tennessee; 
received the thanks of Congress by name for services at Gettysburg; 
afterwards major-general, IT. S. A. 

****** -x- 

(Page 148.) “I was at first inclined to believe that such consolida¬ 
tion would tend to economy, but after mature deliberation I can see 
that the actual reduction of employees would be very small, and that 
the gain by this reduction in the point of econoru}^ would be more 
than counterbalanced by loss in efficiency. It might seem to a mind 
trained to business that in time of peace a single system of supply 
under the control of a single mind might serve to cover all the wants 
of the Army, and that the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Pay depart¬ 
ments could therefore be consolidated into one. But careful inquiry 
will, I am confident, discover grave difficulties in. the way of such con¬ 
solidation. * * * No one officer at the head of such a triform depart¬ 
ment could keep up an efficiency equal to that with which the three 
departments are now worked. Again, an entire army would require 


103 


to be educated to a new system and the process would show that either 
of the foreign methods of supply to which reference is niade lias 
incident to it all the ordinary mistakes and difficulties; and I believe 
that experience would soon turn us back to the old methods which 
have come to us as an outgrowth of actual service. * * * 

‘‘The duties required by the ordnance and artillery would, of course, 
be unchanged. I see no economy possible in the consolidation; for if 
the artillery should absorb the duties of the ordnance corps it would 
require to be enlarged bj^ at least all the skilled labor and clerical force 
that are now needed at the different armories and arsenals. The ord¬ 
nance officers might gain efficiency in artillery service and the artillery 
officers in ordnance service by the union of the two branches. But 
the efficiency of the general service will be increased in case of war 
by having the ordnance attend to its present specialty of suppl}” and 
I judge the artillery officers have at present all they can do to render 
the artillery what it ought to be and employ it effectively. Thus the 
general service would lose rather than gain in point of efficiency by the 
union of these two departments.” 

* * * * * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Howard: 

(Page 39.) “I think the Subsistence and Pay and Quartermasters 
departments could be combined if great care were exercised in the 
work of organization, and I say this not to reflect in any way upon 
the great diligence and efficiency of the quartermaster, commissary, 
and pay officers on duty here.” 

Maish report, 1878. 

General Howard: 

(Page 36.) “I hesitate to recommend the breaking down of a good 
system, which has grown up by practice and the requirements of 
necessity, and therefore will only suggest as a substitute for the pres¬ 
ent independent staff departments— 

‘^That the Pay, Quartermaster, and Commissary Departments inujld 
be consolidated under one chief with three assistants, one at the head 
of each department; the other places to be filled by details from the 
line, made in rotation and for a fixed period. 

‘‘The business to be transacted as much as possible by mercantile 
channels—moneys forwarded and received by checks; drafts and cash, 
by express. 

“The Judge-Advocate’s department might be merged in that of the 
Adjutant-General, with a claim on the Attorney-General for advisory 
assistance. 

“The ordnance and artillery might, of course, be consolidated, and 
the whole made a scientific and practical corps.” 

* * * * ' * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, 
division and corps commander. Received the thanks of Congress by 
name for capture of Fort Fisher; afterwards major-general, U. S. A.: 

(Page 37.) ‘H think that to consolidate the Quartermaster’s, Sub¬ 
sistence, and Pay departments into one corps would be to disregard a 


104 


principle which underlies all modern progress, the principle that the 
best results are obtained by the division of labor; that the best work 
is done by specialists—a principle that is of quite as piuch importance 
in military organization as in civil life. The Quartermaster’s Depart¬ 
ment is already loaded down b}^ the multiplicity of subjects over which 
it has control; to add to its duties would, 1 think, impair its efficiency. 
I think that the change suggested would be merely nominal; that it 
would lead to no economy.” 

Coburn report, 1873. / 

Brig. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord, U. S. A., major-general of volun¬ 
teers. Served in the Florida war, Mexican war, and the war of the 
rebellion; division, corps, and department commander; afterwards 
major-general, United States Army: 

* , * * * * * * 

(Page 71.) ‘‘ The staff corps and officers administering the principal 

duties pertaining thereto are called on and do pass upon the accounts 
and manner of expending funds and property of general officers com¬ 
manding departments; the pay of the last-named officers is frequently 
stopped at the suggestion of quartermaster, commissary, and other 
staff officers on duty at Washington, perhaps with reason, 3 ^et the dif¬ 
ferent sorts of duty performed by the officer of the bureau and the offi¬ 
cer in the field, the fact that the former is called on to hold back funds, 
supplies, or material which the latter may think indispensable, or to 
recommend stoppages of his pay, is likely to beget rather a want of 
good will than an affection between them; and, under the circum¬ 
stances, I am not quite sure that an opinion of mine upon the subject 
of consolidation of the several staff' corps into one or more would be 
free from prejudice; and, if it is not deemed imperative, I would prefer 
to remain silent upon that subject. 

* * * * * * * 

‘Mn answer to the question as to the benefit that would accrue from 
a union of artillery and ordnance, I think it is doubtful if there would 
be any. We would have more officers in the consolidated corps to 
compete for assignment to duty at comfortable arsenals in the East, 
but the artillery, which should take its share of service on the plains, 
gives the young officers a chance to command men in action, and learn 
their wants and habits in camp and on the march. And this 1 regard 
as of as much importance as learning to pack or test ammunition and 
arms.” 

-X' * * * * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Ord: 

(Page 46.) ‘‘ It would be practicable (to consolidate the Quarter¬ 

master’s, Commissary, and Pay departments). In time of peace we 
might get along, for the same officer frequently does quartermaster 
and commissary duties now, but if we keep the Army on a basis ready 
for war, and the staff' on the basis to serve for the purpose for a larg’e 
army of from one to two hundred thousand troops, I think the present 
system is as good a one as we can have. I know no better. It has 
stood the test of experience very well.” 


105 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Brig. Gen. Christopher C. Augur, U. S. A., major-general of vol¬ 
unteers; commanded a division in the Fifth Army Corps, the Depart¬ 
ment of Washington, and Twenty-second Army Corps: 

(Page 131.) ‘‘State whether, in your opinion, any departments of 
the staff of the Army can, advantageously to the service and the coun- 
tiy, be consolidated; if so, what departments, and for what reasons. 

“3. Would it be better to have a single department of supply, 
whose duty it should be to discharge the functions of the Quarter¬ 
master's, CommissisaiT, and Pay Departments? If so, give your 
reasons. 

‘ * 4. Would such a consolidation reduce the number of officers engaged 
in these duties? If so, in what proportion? 

‘*1 answer, in my opinion, no.” 

* * * * * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Augur; 

(Page 48.) “Practicable, undoubtedly (to consolidate the Quarter¬ 
master’s, Commissary, and Pay Departments), but, in my opinion, not 
advisable. Experience has shown that our staff organization is efficient 
for field service on the largest scale. It should be preserved, but 
reduced or extended to meet the requirements of the service.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Brig. Gen. George Crook, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, 
division commander; in command of cavalry, Army of the Potomac; 
afterwards major-general, U. S. A. 

* * * * * -X- * 

(Page 151.) “I think the Pay Department could be advantageously 
consolidated with the Quartermaster’s Department. Our present pay 
system is expensive, unwieldy, and unsatisfactory. * * * 

" “ With the exception of the Quartermaster’s Department having too 
many officers of high, and not enough of the lower, grades in it, I 
think our present system for the Subsistence and Quartermaster’s 
Departments is good.” 

* * * * * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Crook: 

(Page 49.) “I think it would be practicable to consolidate the 
Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay Departments.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, U. S. A. (retired), major-general 
of volunteers. Served in the Florida war, Mexican war, and war of 
the rebellion; commanded Third and Fourth Corps, Army of the 
Potomac.” 

* * * * * * * 


106 


(Page 70.) Whether the ordnance and artillery corps can be advan¬ 
tageously consolidated, I am not sufficiently familiar with the details 
to express an opinion, but I have no doubt it would be advantageous 
to make details for the lowest grades, and then, from those who show 
most aptness, industry, and ability, fill the higher grades. 

******* 

‘‘The duties of the Inspector-General are of so confidential and deli¬ 
cate a nature that the corps should be a permanent one, and I do not 
believe it advisable to consolidate it with any other corps.” 

* * * * * ' * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. A. (retired), major-general of vol¬ 
unteers, division and corps commander. Commanded Army of the 
Potomac and Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, Army of the Cumberland. 
Received the thanks of Congress by name for protecting Washington 
and Baltimore from General Lee: 

(Page 98.) “I much prefer a supply department to the Quarter¬ 
master’s, Commissary, and Pay Departments, for the reason it reduces 
the staff numerically, and the duties would not be burdensome, as all 
our commands in time of peace are small. 

******* 

“I would have in the ordnance corps officers enough to take care of 
the armories and arsenals, and all other officers on ordnance duty to 
be detailed from the artillery, and the details be changed every two 
years. This will diffuse information throughout the artillery corps, 
and in my judgment the corps will become much more efficient in 
consequence.” 

* ***** * 

(Page 99.) “The Adjutant and Inspector-General’s Departments can 
be consolidated advantageously. The former, in my judgment, should 
only consist of the number necessary to discharge the duties at the 
headquarters of the Army. Division and department commanders 
should have authority to appoint their own staff* officers.” 

* ***** * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. Don Garlos Buell, U. S. V., colonel and assistant adjutant- 
general, U. S. A. Served in the Florida war and Mexican war. Dur¬ 
ing the civil war commanded Department and Army of the Ohio. 

(Page 58.) “A general outline for staff* organization: 

“First. General officers to command. 

“Second. An adjutant-general’s department as a medium of com¬ 
mand. In it may be included the duties of recruitment. 

‘'Third. Judge-Advocate’s Department. 

“Fourth. A corps for engineering and ordnance. 

“Fifth. Medical and veterinaiy departments. 

“ Sixth. A department of supply, or corps of intendants for the per¬ 
formance of those administrative duties which in our service are dis¬ 
tributed among the Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, Pay, and Ordnance 
Departments. 

* * * * * * * 


107 


“Reasons: General similarity of duties, unity of action, some reduc¬ 
tion in the aggregate number of officers, more uniform promotion, 
greater room for economy in the distribution of officers to particular 
bureaus or branches of duty according to their litness, and a larger field 
from which to select officers for important administrative positions in 
times of emergency. * * * I do not think that a consolidation of 

the Ordnance Department and artillery is desirable, though such a 
system prevails to a considerable extent in foreign countries. It would 
be no more efficient in any sense than the present arrangement. It 
will be less so if the assignments to ordnance duty are temporary, 
because it will lose the advantage to be derived from long and unin¬ 
terrupted habits of study and experiment.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. V., colonel, Twelfth Infantry. 
Served in the Mexican war and civil war; brigade, division, and corps 
commander. Commanded Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac. Re¬ 
signed from the Army March, 1866. 

* * ***** 

(Page 76.) “It is not my opinion that any departments of the stafl' 
of the Army can, advantageously to the service and the country, be 
consolidated. 

* * ***** 

“Such a consolidation ought not, in my opinion, to materially reduce 
the number of officers engaged in those duties. 

* * ***** 

“I believe that the effect of adopting a system whereby compaiw 
and detachment commanders should pay their own commands, would, 
with the Army at its actual size, and in time of peace, be economical, 
but not so much so as at first sight appears. There is no doubt that 
company officers could soon make themselves well enough acquainted 
with'the laws governing the pay of the Army to make the ordinary 
muster payments once in two months. But with the Arm}^ at its pres¬ 
ent size 6,000 men are discharged every year. Every man of these 
6,000 must have his final papers made out, the distance from his place 
of discharge to his place of enlistment must be accurately determined, 
and if his captain is to pay him he must either receive the money from 
him or be paid by check. In the first case the man would probably 
either lose his money or be robbed before he reached his home, and in 
the second case hundreds of new accounts would have to be opened 
with the Treasury, for each captain would have to keep money in a 
depository to meet such payments. It does not follow either that a 
man may not be a very good company officer, and yet a poor disbursing 
officer. Every captain, however, would under this system necessarily 
become a disbursing officer, and upon many officers the feeling of 
moneyed responsibility would weigh more heavily than all of their 
military duties, taking off' their time and attention from the duties that 
now legally belong to them. 

****** * 

“In time of w^ar the result of the change would be that large amounts 
of money would have to be carried with the armies, or the men could 


108 


not be paid until after the completion of a campaign, an an’angement 
which would entail great hardship upon the troops. During a cam¬ 
paign, too, a compan}^ officer who does his duty has as much as he can 
do in attending to it as it is now defined by law and regulation. 

****** * 

‘*1 know no reason why the ordnance and artillery corps should be 
consolidated, unless it is that as the artillery regiments are very heavily 
officered, and are in times of peace stationed where they generally have 
merely garrison duty to perform, some of these officers could be 
detailed to do ordnance duty^ and thus the ordnance corps might be 
abolished. But I believe that it would be more economical and for the 
good of the service to discharge the supernumerary lieutenants than 
to abolish the ordnance corps. The duties of that corps are more 
special and technical than are those of any other corps. A long time 
is required to learn them. The officers of ordnance must be familiar 
with the manufacture and care not only of cannon and ammunition for 
the artillery, but of small arms, cartridges, sabers, and horse equip¬ 
ments, for the other arms of service. Artiller^^ officers are not likely 
to learn these duties more easily than are officers of other corps. It 
would only be good policy in the War Department to keep an officer 
who is detailed for such service, and who has been found efficient, 
constantly in it, and there would therefore grow up a body of detailed 
officers, who would only differ from the ordnance corps in not being 
secure in their positions, and therefore not as interested in learning 
their duties. Neither would they have the esprit de corps which expe¬ 
rience has shown to be valuable in a corps organization. Another 
objection is, that as the ordnance officers necessarily have pleasant and 
quiet posts in time of peace, political influence would soon be felt in 
the details, which would be made without reference to the fitness of 
the officer for the dut}^ 

******* 

'‘There is, in my opinion, nothing objectionable to the consolidation 
of the Adjutant-General’s and Inspector-General’s departments, pro¬ 
vided the inspections are rigidly kept up. The danger is that the 
whole corps would, in case of consolidation, become an adjutant-gen¬ 
eral’s corps instead of the combined corps, because the duties of an 
inspector-general are much more disagreeable than those of an adjutant- 
general. Nothing is more conducive to the discipline of the Army 
than a system of inspection which shall be frequent and searching and 
rigid. An inspector should belong to each department staff, and make 
his reports not only to the department commander, but to the chief of 
his corps in Washington, and he should be obliged to make his tours 
a specified number of times each year. Inspectors should also be sent 
on tours from Washington (unaccompanied by their commanding offi¬ 
cers), under direct orders from the Secretary of War or the General of 
the Army, and should inspect everything from department headquar¬ 
ters down.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. James B. Ricketts, U. S. A. (retired), brigadier-general 
of volunteers. Served in the Mexican war and war of the rebellion; 
division and corps commander, Armv of the Potomac. 

****** 


* 


109 


(Page 160.) ‘yrhe staff departments of the Army, as now organized, 
are the result of long experience, and the recent severe test of their 
usefulness is convincing that no change of organization can be advan¬ 
tageously made.” 

***** * * 

(Page 161.) ‘‘What would be the effect of adopting a system 
whereby company and detachment commanders should pay their com¬ 
mands ? 

“ It would involve the duty of procuring, guarding, and disbursing, 
and might diffuse through the Armv^ the temptation to speculate, or 
the improper use of public money. It is also objectionable by addi¬ 
tional accounts at the Treasury, thereby enlarging the Auditor’s 
department.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, U. S. A. (retired), major-general of 
volunteers. Served in the Mexican war and war of the rebellion; 
division and corps commander. Army of the Ohio and Army of the 
Cumberland. 

(Page 8.) ‘M am of the opinion that it would be better to have but 
a single department of supply to perform all the duties now performed 
by the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pa}^ Departments. * * * 

The nature of the duties now performed by these separate depart¬ 
ments is not so separate and distinct that all of them could not be 
readily merged in one department. * * * Consolidation would sim¬ 
plify organization, as well as make responsibility more direct; * * * 

would considerably reduce the number of officers; * * * would 

be most beneficial (to authorize company and detachment commanders 
to pay their commands). * * * 

‘"The proposition to consolidate the ordnance and artillery corps is 
not a new one. It underwent a very thorough discussion in the decade 
between 1850 and 1860, the officers of the artiller}^ urging the consolida¬ 
tion, and the ordnance officers opposing it. I was satisfied the ordnance 
officers had much the best of the discussion. The ordnance service is 
of such peculiar nature as to require a trained body of experts. Eveiy 
argument for the consolidation of the artillery arm and ordnance corps 
applies with reduplicated force to a proposition to consolidate the ord¬ 
nance corps with the infantry or cavalry. * * * qffie true solution 

is to have a separate ordnance corps to supply the arms and ammunition. 

“The Adjutant and Inspector-Generars E)epartments could be advan¬ 
tageously consolidated. Their duties are cognate; * * * would 

do away with circumlocution; giv^e more directness in making reports, 
and lessen number of officers, especially those of high rank.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Gen. James Longstreet, surveyor of customs at New Orleans; lieu¬ 
tenant-general in the Confederate service; served in the infantry in 
the Mexican war: 

(Page 34.) “Do not think that the interests of fhe military will be 
advanced by consolidating the departments of supply and pay. The 
departments as organized at present have been efficient and economical. 


110 


and can always be kept well in hand by efficient chiefs. Under the 
present organization an inefficient chief would only impair the efficienc}" 
of one department. Consolidated, the evil attending such consequence 
.would extend throughout the departments, and the probability of such 
<?ontigency is just as great under consolidation as in any one of the 
departments. The pa}^ and quartermaster’s duties were united in the 
same department in the Confederate service. It was not a success. 

* * * * * 

'"The duties and disbursements of the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, 
Pay, and Medical Departments are sufficiently burdensome and com¬ 
plicated when kept as separate departments. Consolidated, an officer 
of higher grade would be the chief, while the organizations would virtu- 
allv remain as before. The onl}" good reason that I can find in favor 
of consolidation is that a place may be made for some distinguished 
and meritorious officer. 

■it ***** * 

‘‘Consolidation does not necessarily reduce the number of officers, 
for the same amount of duty and service will be needed, and experience 
the world over teaches us that more can be accomplished b}^ a proper 
subdivision of and organization of labor than where one machine is 
required to manufacture eveiything. Consolidation, to be as efficient 
^s the service now is, should require an additional officer as its chief. 

* * * * * * * 

‘‘Commanders of troops should not be their paymasters or their 
medical advisers. 

* * * * * * * 

“The ordnance and artillery are most excellent corps as thej^ are 
organized at present, and may be improved under the present system. 
The officers of all corps should be of the highest order of intellect, 
application, and energy. But the officer who attempts to handle chemi¬ 
cals and machinery one year and men the next is not likely to excel 
at either. The one may require the same intellectual characteristics as 
the other, but to handle men upon the field successfully one should 
have good judgment of men, great resolution, nerve, moral and ph 3 ^si- 
cal courage, combativeness; and he should be somewhat aggressive. 
The ordnance officer may understand the philosophy of forces and 
appl}’ it with great skill and success in his machinery and chemicals 
without possessing some of the most essential characteristics for a field- 
marshal, and if placed suddenly" in the field, in high position, he might 
be as much out of place as Bonaparte would have been in the labora- 
tor}". Either branch of the service for successful practice requires 
the useful application of all the strong qualities with which men are 
endowed; to attempt to force them into one brain would be likely to 
impair the efficiency of both branches.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Brig. Gen. Edward D. Townsend, Adjutant-General U. S. A., brevet 
major-general. Prior to appointment in Adjutant-General’s Depart¬ 
ment, served in the artilleiy in the Florida war and in the Cherokee 
Nation. 

******* 

(Page 91.) “To consolidate the three departments—Quartermaster, 
Subsistence, and Pa^^ — in one supply department would practicall}^ 


Ill 


work as follows: The head of the supply department could not possiblj^ 
attend personally to the entire business, lie would, therefore, assign 
a junior to the charge of each of the three branches in his own office, 
and would become acquainted with operations of his entire department 
through the medium of the head of each branch. While, therefore, 
the present system would actuall}^ not be changed, there would be a 
loss of responsibilit 3 \ * * * 

“ Such consolidation would not reduce the number of officers engaged 
in those duties. 

******* 

(Page 95.) ‘‘The only argument, to my knowledge, yet adyanced in 
fayor of consolidating the ordnance and artillery is that men who use 
the arms and ammunition should haye something to do with their selec¬ 
tion and manufacture. This certainly applies equally to the cayaliy 
and infantry. Why not, then, include them in the consolidation ? Prior 
to the organization of the Ordnance Department officers of artilleiy 
were detailed on ordnance duties for two years and then relieyed b}^ 
others. Those were the days of flintlocks and smoothbores. To 
pursue that plan now would result in one of two things—either there 
would be an utter loss of progressiye knowledge and discoyery in the 
science of arms and projectiles, because the officers charged with their 
preparation, etc., would be changed so often that no one would haye 
time or feel interest enough to make that science a special duty, or else 
the officers most adapted to that seryice would be constantly kept upon 
it. * * * 

‘"The duties of officers of the Adjutant-General’s Department and 
of inspectors-general are entirely different, and nothing could be 
gained by consolidating them. There is no need whateyer of a head 
to the Inspector’s Department. The proper theory of inspections is 
this: A diyision or department commander should haye inspections 
made within his command to inform him of matters needing correction. 
Reports of such inspections should not go beyond the commander for 
whom the}" are made, for he does not wish unnecessarily to expose to 
higher authority defects in his own jurisdiction which he can remedy. 
The ranking inspectors should be sent by the President, Secretary of 
War, or Commanding General of the Army to make confidential 
inspections of staff' or other operations, quite independent of the diyi¬ 
sion or department commanders who may be affected by such inspec¬ 
tion. * * * Both duties can not be done at one time by the same 

officer, because inspecting invmlyes trayeling away from the headquar¬ 
ters, where adjutant-general’s duties must be done. * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Townsend: 

(Page 125.) “I decidedly think it would be impracticable to consoli¬ 
date any of the staff' departments.” ^ 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 129.) “In 1837-38 the present staff system was established, 
and, in two great wars which haye occurred since, the manner in which 
our armies haye been clothed, transported, and fed, paid, and proyided 
with medical attendance has attracted the admiration of the military 
world.” 


112 


Maish report, 1878. 

General Townsend: 

(Page 37.) ‘‘The staff organization has practically demonstrated its 
efficiency in war and peace. I have had the opportunity of seeing the 
working of the military establishment with and without it.” 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 39.) “I beg leave to add one remark upon the plan of consol¬ 
idating an}^ of the supply departments under one head. Each head of 
a staff bureau has now as much as he can well attend to. Should two 
or more departments be consolidated under one head, the result must 
be that he would be forced to place an officer over each branch under 
him lo manage the separate business of the separate branches. The 
responsibilit}^, then, instead of resting upon the one head, as now, 
must be divided between him and his next subordinate, at the same 
time that, practically, the business of each branch will be performed 
as now by the officer at the head of that branch.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. James B. Fry, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A. 
Served in the artillery before appointment in Adjutant-General’s 
Department in 1861. Served in the Mexican war; in the civil war 
was chief of staff to Generals McDowell and Buell; and provost-mar¬ 
shal-general with rank of brigadier-general; afterwards colonel and 
assistant adjutant-general. 

* * * * * * * ■ 

(Page 162.) “In ni}^ opinion there are no staff departments in the 
Army the consolidation of which would result advantageous!}^ to the 
service and country. To ‘consolidate’ would be to take a step back¬ 
ward, only sooner or later to retrace it. The division of labor and 
pursuit of specialties are in conformity with a natural law, the grow¬ 
ing operation of which marks this as an age of improvement. Proof 
of the force of this law is to be found in the history of the progress 
made of late years in every branch of science and business, and in 
every profession and trade. The present staff organization of the 
Army is the result of the operation of this law in our military system.” 
* * * * * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

Lieut. Col. John C. Kelton, assistant adjutant-general, U. 8. A., 
colonel Ninth Missouri Volunteers, brevet brigadier-general. Served 
in infantry before the civil war; during the war w^as assistant adjutant- 
general on the staff of General Halleck; afterwards Adjutant-General 
with the rank of brigadier-general, U. 8. A. 

(Page 131.) “The advantages from the union of the corps (Quarter¬ 
master, Commissary, and Pay) will be found in undivided responsi¬ 
bility at the great centers of supply and distribution; in diminishing 
the number of officers required there; by having one less accounting 
bureau in Washington; by diminishing the number of and simplifying 
accounts and returns, and thereby diminishing stationery and postage 


113 


accounts very considerably in the aggregate. There are but seven 
purchasing commissaries. It surely can not be contended that these 
officers can not perform this duty as well after consolidation as now. 
All other officers of the department are in charge ,of stores and super¬ 
vising their general distribution at department and division head¬ 
quarters and at important military posts.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. William D. Whipple, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., 
brigadier-general of volunteers. Served in the infantry before 
appointment in the Adjutant-General’s Department in 1861; was 
chief of staff to Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas; afterwards colonel 
and assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A. 

(Page 28.) “ I do not think that any of the staff departments can be 
consolidated, for the reason that, as at present organized, the duties 
devolving upon them are widely different, and, if properly attended 
to, require the whole time of the officers assigned to them. * * * 

•"If the artillery school at Fortress Monroe is necessary to the 
instruction of artillery officers in the use of ordnance after it is fabri¬ 
cated, what additional amount of study would not be necessary to 
acquire a thorough knowledge of its fabrication?” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Thomas M. Vincent, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., brevet 
brigadier-general. Served in the artillery before appointment in the 
Adjutant-General’s Department in 1861. Served in Florida hostilities 
and in the field during the civil war until August, 1861, then in charge 
of organization and muster out of volunteer armies; afterwards colonel 
and assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 180.) “In my opinion, no department of the staff can, advan¬ 
tageously to the service and the countiy, be consolidated. 

* * * * * * * 

“At times, from 1775 to 1821, the offices of Adjutant-General and 
Inspector-General were consolidated, and in 1821 the ordnance, pre¬ 
viously a distinct department, was merged into the artillery. But 
war and peace experience developed the defects of consolidation, and 
pointed clearly to the necessity of dbusion^ based upon the theory that 
our staff ‘ ought not to be considered merely the staff of the Pegular 
Army, but as the national military f^taf, applicable alike to the regu¬ 
lar, volunteer, and militia forces, when called into the service of the 
United States.’” 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 182.) “A system whereby company and detachment com¬ 
manders would have to pay their commands could not be applied, 
practicallv, in our service without confusion or loss, not to mention 
the injuiy resulting to the service from the time of the commanders 
being taxed with duties not appropriate to their important positions. 
* * * * * * * 


7114—00-8 


114 


“The ordnance and artillery can not be advantageously consolidated. 

“ ‘The Ordnance Department should be so organized as to require no 
augmentation in war; its most important lal)ors are peiformed in peace. 
It is then that arms must be fabricated and every munition prepared, 
and that depots should be established on all the great avenues leading 
to the frontiers. The operations of this department were paralyzed 
by the act of 1821, which merged the corps in the artilleiT.’” 

* * * * - * * * 

(Page 203.) “We could do without any staff at all and without an}^ 
army at all in time of peace; but a wise government is supposed in 
time of peace to make some preparations for the contingency of war. 
We expend freely millions for fortifications, for the construction of 
arms, accouterments, ordnance stores, etc., and shall we grudge the 
expense of maintaining a corps which is indispensabl}^ necessary to 
give these preparations proper effect? 

* * * * * * * 

“Shall we not repent that forgetfulness, and, adding its sad experi¬ 
ence to that of the great rebellion, be taught by the lesson and the 
fact that, had we in 1861 possessed a proper staff organization and an 
expansive system for our Army, such as would have carried {without the 
addition of a single commissioned officer) its strength to 80,000, the war 
would not have attained magnitude; the billions of debt now causing 
the countiy to groan would have been saved, and lives, numbering 
hundreds of thousands, would have been spared the ‘ hivouac of the 
dead^ ''on famds eternal camping ground.''^^ 

* * * * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Vincent: 

(Page 136.) “It would not be practicable to consolidate the Quarter¬ 
master’s, Commissary, and Pay departments into one corps. * * * 

(Page 137.) Consolidatlcm marked the embryo of our supply sys¬ 
tem. But war and peace experience developed the defects of consoli¬ 
dation, and pointed clearly to the necessity of divisicm. 

Banning report, 1876. 

Maj. Samuel Breck, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A.; brevet 
brigadier-general; served in artilleiy before the war, in the field 
during the war until July, 1862; afterwards adjutant-general with 
rank of brigadier-general, U. S. A. 

^ (Page 140.) “The consolidation of the three departments. Pay, Sub¬ 
sistence, and Quartermaster’s, is not believed to be wise practically, 
whatever may be the theoretical grounds in its favor. * * * 

present organization certainly produced wonderful results during the 
war, and it is hard to conceive a more severe test of its merits.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Maj. Louis H. Pelouze, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A.; brevet 
brigadier-general; served in artillery and infantry before appoint¬ 
ment in Adjutant-General’s Department; in the field during the civil 
war until August, 1863. 



115 


(Page 112 .) ‘‘It would be an experiment (to consolidate the Quar¬ 
termaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments), in 1113 ^ opinion, not 
worth the trial. It seems to me' that the present division of duties 
would have to be kept up, and the present chiefs of these departments 
have now as much as they can attend to. To consolidate these depart¬ 
ments an officer would have to supervise the duties now required of 
the three departments, and the result would be to remove these depart¬ 
ments one step farther from access to the Secretaiy of War.” 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Randolph B. Marc\% inspector-general, U. S. A.; brigadier- 
general of volunteers; chief of staff to Major-General McClellan in 
the Anil}" of West Virginia and in the Ariu}^ of the Potomac; after¬ 
wards inspector-general, U. S. A., with the rank of brigadier-general. 

(Page 23.) ‘‘No departments of the staff' can with advantage to the 
service and to the countiy be consolidated. 

“The officers of the Quartermaster’s Department have all the}" can 
possibly attend to in performing the multifarious and responsible 
duties alread}" required of them. 

“The Subsistence Department, as all must admit, is well organized 
at present, and has never failed to suppl}" the Army bountifull}- when¬ 
ever it was possible to do so. 

‘‘The Pay Department as now organized has worked well for many 
3 "ears and its operations have been conducted much more economically 
and honestl}" than under the previous system of regimental and bat¬ 
talion paymasters. * * * would be difficult to find men an}-- 

where who would disburse as large amounts of mone}" as those involved 
in the pa 3 mients of the Arm}" during the past fifty years with as little 
loss to the Government as has resulted under the present system. The 
following facts, obtained from the records of the War Department, 
fully attest this: From 1808 to 1811, under the old system of regimental 
and battalion paymasters, and which was somewhat analogous to that 
proposed by the advocates of consolidation, the average annual loss by 
defalcation amounted to 1.58 per cent on the amount disbursed, and 
the annual average expenses of paying the Army for that period was 
3.10 per cent. During the war of 1812-1815, under the same sys¬ 
tem, these averages were: Defalcations 2.98 per cent and the expenses 
4.36. From the reorganization of the Pay Department in 1821 upon 
the existing basis to 1839 there was not one dollar lost to th e Govern¬ 
ment on account of defalcations, and the total average of expenses 
from 1825 to 1839 was reduced to only 1^ per cent upon disburse¬ 
ments. During the Mexican war $24,000,000 were disbursed by the 
Pay Department, mostly in an enemy’s country, in small amounts, and 
not one dollar was lost by defalcations. Finally, during the entire 
period of the rebellion the reports of the Paymaster-General show 
that of the immense disbursements of this Department the total losses 
and expenses of every kind, including captures, accidents, the salaries 
and expenses of paymasters and their clerks, fell short of three-fourths 
of 1 per cent on the amount disbursed. * * * Economy, integrity, • 

and accountability are under the present system as well secured as 
they can be by any other; and it seems to me hazardous to attempt by 
experiments of doubtful expediency to improve upon organizations 
which exhibit results of such satisfactory character. * * * The 


116 


consolidation indicated would not, therefore, reduce the number of 
officers, but would add to the present organization another officer of 
high rank and pay, while it would weaken and impair the responsi- 
bilit}^ and efficiency of the organization. * * * I do not think 

the ordnance and artillery corps could be advantageously consoli¬ 
dated. ^ * 

‘‘The duties of the adjutants-general and the inspectors-general 
are so entirely different and disconnected 1 am unable to perceive that 
anything would be gained by consolidating the two.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Marcy: 

(Page 141.) “For the reason that each of the departments named 
(Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay) has all the work it can effi¬ 
ciently perform now, and as the chiefs of these departments have 
abundant occupation in properly administering the affairs of their 
separate departments, I think the consolidation indicated would dimin¬ 
ish their efficiency and add to the expense the pay and allowances of 
another officer of high rank, who could know but little about the 
numerous details of every department.” 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Col. Edmund Schriver, Inspector-General, U. S. A., brevet major- 
general; colonel and acting aid-de-camp in the volunteer service; 
served in the artiller}^, the infantiy, and the Adjutant-General’s Depart¬ 
ment before appointment as Inspector-General; served in the Florida' 
war; in the civil war was chief of staff'. First and Second Army corps, 
and inspector-general. Army of the Potomac. 

(Page 74.) “In general terms, very great objections (to merging 
the Quartermaster’s, Commissaiy, and Paymaster departments, two 
or all of them, into one corps). No one man is capable of supervising 
and administering satisfactoriW a department to the extent which would 
be produced by merging these three branches of the service, all dif¬ 
ferent in their nature. * * * j have no hesitation in saying that 

that system is the best which provides for a subdivision of the various 
branches of the service to an extent which will enable one officer to 
superintend personally and well the particular branch intrusted to him¬ 
self. Even if the merging proposed were practicable in time of peace, 
it would be utterly impossible for one officer to properly administer 
more than one of the existing bureaus in time of war, and the organ¬ 
ization of a military establishment in this respect should always be with 
a view to the latter condition of affairs. * * * if more duty, espe¬ 

cially of a diversified character, be imposed upon a man than he can 
perform, he will either do it imperfectly or depute another to do it, 
and the moment the latter is done you practical!}" divide the two 
branches.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

General Schriver: 

(Page 82.) “I think that none of the existing staff departments of 
the Army can advantageously to the service be consolidated. On the 


r 


117 

contrary, there are grave objections to the merging system urged or 
favored by some, for no one man is capable of supervising and admin¬ 
istering satisfactorily an extensive department the several branches of 
which are dilierent in their nature. There should be distinct bureaus 
of a number sufficient to enable the head of each to keep himself per¬ 
sonally well acquainted with all the workings and details thereof. 
This would be physically impossible were two or three branches dif¬ 
ferent in character merged in one department. The officer in charge 
of this monster organization finding himself overwhelmed and over¬ 
burdened Avith work would seek relief by subdividing duties and 
deputing their perfomiance to others, and thus what is proposed to 
effect by consolidation would not practically be realized. As officers 
in charge of these subdivisions and all the usual business appliances 
would have to be maintained, it is doubtful whether an economy at all 
commensurate with the disadvantages certain to attend the merging 
project would be effected. The same remarks apply in a greater or 
less degree to the functions of the inferior officers. 

******* 

**The same shortsightedness which urges cdnsolidation of shiff 
departments would, if consistent, recommend the abolition of field 
officers and regimental organization in time of peace, on the theory 
that the same were unnecessary and unsuitable for our wideh" scattered 
military stations, garrisoned on the basis of company’ unit, a theory 
which all must acknowledge to be an entire fallacy’.” 

* ****** 

(Page 84.) “The duties being decidedly distinct, I can see no advan¬ 
tage in merging them. Before the organization of the Ordnance 
Department in 1832, and when details for ordnance duty were made 
from the artillery, the want of a permanent personnel by which officers 
could be constantly engaged in their specialty was sorely felt, and I 
can imagine that no greater evil could befall this branch of the mili- 
tarv service than by having its important duties performed by officers 
occasionally detailed or selected, even if regard were always had to 
special fitness, which every experienced officer knows has not and will 
not be done. Peraonal preferences and political partiality" would pre¬ 
vent this. Witness the way appointments have been made and brevets 
been conferred.’’ 

******* 
Garfield report, 1869. 

Col. James A. Hardie, Inspector-General, U. S. A., brevet major- 
general. Prior to appointment as Inspector-General served in the 
artillery. During the civil war was aid-de-camp on the staffs of 
Generals McClellan and Burnside. 

(Page 53.) “Q. What, in your judgment, would be the advantages 
and disadvantages of more completely uniting the two services of 
Adjutant-General and Inspector-General?—A. I see no advantage to 
be gained at all. If you were to have the officers of such a combined 
organization detailed" for inspection services and for the duties of the 
Adjutant-Generars Department, the result would be the same, as far 
as the necessity for employing the same number of officers, and per¬ 
haps the same individuafs, is concerned. At no department head- 


118 


quarters can one officer perform the duties of adjutant-general and 
inspector-general, for the reason that the adjutant-general must be 
habitually at headquarters, and the inspector-general must be habitu¬ 
ally absent. * * * The existing institutions in the Arm}^ have 

brought us through a long war without failure, and I think it would 
be rash to undertake in the reconstruction any radical change. ” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Ideut. Col. Roger Jones, assistant inspector-general, U. S. A. 
Served in the Mounted Rifles before the war. During the war was 
captain and assistant quartermaster until November, 1861, when 
appointed in the Inspector-General’s Department; afterwards Inspector- 
General, United States Army, with rank of brigadier-general. 

(Page 223.) * * * ‘‘The present system is not the growth of a 

day or of a year, but the result of an experience of over half a century, 
and has been thoroughl}^ tested in domestic and foreign wars. * * * 

We need an organization suitable not simply to times of peace, but to 
a state of war. Such an organization, as a disinterested observer who 
has had unusual facilities for observing the management and work¬ 
ings of the two Departments, I have no hesitation in declaring we now 
have.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Absalom Baird, assistant inspector-general, U. S. A., brigadier- 
general of volunteers; chief of stafl', Fourth Army Corps; brigade and 
division commander; commanded division in Fourteenth Corps, Army 
of the Cumberland; afterwards Inspector-General, U. S. A., with rank 
of brigadier-general: 

(Page II.) “I regard the staff establishment of the Army as it now 
exists as the outgrowth of the necessities of our service, inspired by 
the general character and habits of our people, the ph^^sical character¬ 
istics of the face of our country, and the nature of our sources of 
supply, as well as of the manner in which our soldiers require that 
supplies should be delivered to them. 

“ Our methods might not work well with a different race of people 
or on a different theater of war, but I have never seen an occasion 
when military operations could not be successfully carried on with our 
present system of administration and supply. 

have known embarrassments to arise, but they resulted from 
having had men in positions they were unfit for, and were not faults 
of the system. Much is said of late days respecting French methods 
and German methods, but I doubt wffiether we have much to learn in 
the art of making war from the older nations. I am quite sure that 
we could conduct a campaign in Europe in our own way, and I am 
equally sure that no continental power could successfully make one 
here after their fashion of doing things. 

“I do not believe that Europe has ever seen a better arm}" than the 
Army of the Cumberland, as I knew it. 

‘‘In our short experience as a nation, almost every conceivable 
method of staff organization has in some of its parts, been experi¬ 
mented on, arriving at length at what we now have; and with this we 


119 


have gone through two wars, one a very great one, with success. I 
think, therefore, it would be very hazardous to give up or materially 
modify that which we know will work for something new and untried, 
unless sure that we will gain by the exchange. 

‘"Nevertheless, while 1 regard our staff organization, taken as a 
whole, as satisfactory, there are some changes and consolidations 
which, in view of greater econonn" and efficiency and for the general 
good of the service, ought, I think, to be made.” * * * 

(Page 12.) "‘I think that, notwithstanding all the difficulties, the 
Subsistence, Pa}", and Quartermaster’s Departments might be united 
into a single corps, upon such conditions as would be just to all, and 
ought to be satisfactoiw. * * * 

“A commissary-general of all army supplies could not, of course, 
give as much attention to the minute details of all of the departments 
as the present chiefs do, and he would probably find it to be wise to 
keep many officers at their present posts of duty. Men who have 
acquired skill and experience in the purchase of provisions would 
probably be kept chiefl}^ on that duty, and all ought to be employed 
at that for which they are best fitted; but any could be removed or 
transferred when the interests of the service make it desirable. 1 
think that the union of the three supply departments ought to be a 
measure of considerable economy; but I have no figures to ofi'er, and, 
possibly, it might not be very much so.” * * * 

(Page 43.) ""The Inspector-General’s Department, the Adjutant- 
General’s Department, the Bureau of (Military) Justice, and a few 
officers outside of these, all perform duties which are sometimes called 
administrative, to distinguish them from the duties of the supply 
departments, from which they differ widely. All of the officers thus 
emploved ought to be united in a single corps, with a single chief or 
head.’’ * * * 

(Page 44.) ‘"The Signal Service of the Army ought properly to be 
performed by or under the direction of the Adjutant-General’s 
Department, and I recommend that it be transferred accordingly, and 
that an officer of the Department be detailed to take charge of it. 
******* 

‘"The Ordnance Department has at all times since its organization 
been one of the most useful and valuable corps of thcxlrmy; * * * 

but to combine this corps with a larger arm of the service, like the 
artillery, all of whose officers are not capable, or inclined to studious 
investigation (although they might be distinguished in the field), would 
be to destroy a valuable establishment for no good purpose. 

Our artillery, likewise, has always been a most distinguished arm of 
the service, and a large proportion of the most prominent soldiers we 
have produced had their training in it. But artillery officers have 
never been happ}" or contented. They have at all times yearned for 
an employment that would confine them more closely to the special 
duties of their own arm, so that they might make a degree of profes¬ 
sional progress, precluded by the ordinary routine of infantry garrison 
duty, to which they have been mostly confined. They have imagined 
they would find this in a union with the Ordnance Department, but I 
think it would prove a mistake. A few cunning artillery officers, 
perhaps a score, would procure permanent details on ordnance 
duty, and the remainder would see no more of scientific gunnery 


120 

than they now do, while the Ordnance Department would be seriously 

(Page 46.) * * * “While I have no doubt that the staff would 

be improved by being reduced to three main divisions—the adminis¬ 
trative, the medical, and of disbursements and supply—I fear very 
much that the formation of the supply department at the present time 
would work unfairly toward many valuable officers.” 

Coburn report, 1874. 

General Baird: 

(Page 181.) “Q. Are there an}^ branches of the staff' which may be 
be diminished in nnmber or consolidated with others?—A. In the testi¬ 
mony which I gave to the Military Committee last year, I favored the 
consolidation of the supply departments into one department, and also 
of the Adjutant-General’s Department, the Inspector-General’s Depart¬ 
ment, the Signal Service, and others into another department. I was 
in favor of that, but there is a great diversiW of opinion on the subject 
in the Army.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Brig. Gen. Joseph Holt, Judge-Adv^ocate-General; was formerly 
Postmaster-General and Secretar}^ of War. 

(Page 206.) “That in the performance of its already enumerated 
duties the bureau has earned the approval and confidence of a large 
majority of the officers of the Army, may be safely asserted. But 
while this is true, it can scarcely be doubted that it has given offense 
to a small class of officers who, unwisely impatient of the restraints of 
law in military affairs, are, of course, impatient of the scrutiny to 
which their conduct has been or is liable to be subjected b}^ this bureau 
as the law adviser of the War Department. That such officers should 
seek to depreciate the bureau, and be willing for it to disappear from 
the military organization, will not excite surprise. 

“In conclusion, I have but to add that, in my opinion, the present 
Bureau of Militaiy Justice, with the small corps of judge-advocates of 
the Army acting under its general direction, is not only an important 
but an essential part of the existing Army staff. Some such an estab¬ 
lishment is certainly necessary in eveiy civilized countiy that proposes 
to submit its military administration to the guidance and limitations of 
law, and which, while subjecting the ofiEicers and soldiers of its army 
to a strict and judicious discipline, seeks at the same time to protect 
them from oppressive treatment, and to secure to them the enjoA^ment 
of all the rights which remain to the citizen after he has entered the 
military service, thus counteracting that tendenc}^ to arbitrary action 
which, as its histor}^ shows, has characterized the profession of arms, 
in varying degrees, under all forms of government.” 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General,U. S. A., 
brevet major-general; served in artilleiy, engineers, and infantry; 
was Quartermaster-General during the ciAul war. 

(Page 19.) “The first time I heard of such a proposition (the con¬ 
solidation of the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pa}- departments) 
was from General Halleck, who, several times in the course of the war. 


121 


after he came here as General in Chief, told me that he was of opinion 
that there ought to be only one supply department, and that the Quarter¬ 
master’s Department and the Commissary Department (I do not think 
he spoke of the Pay Department) should be conducted bv the same per¬ 
son, so as to have a unity of supply. My reply to him then was that 
I had enough to do. * * * 1 do not see that there would be an}^ 

specific advantage in making such a change. There is one head man 
to all branches or departments of supply—the Secretaiy of War. You 
must have officers enough to do the duty in an}^ case, and to put an 
oflicer as a head to the whole removes the work one degree further 
from the actual head—the Secretary of War.” * * * 

(Page 20 .) ‘‘The increase and multiplication of departments and 
division of responsibility which now exists are things that grew up in 
practice from the necessities of the case—I will not say from the neces¬ 
sities of the case, but from some advantage which , is found in it. 
* * * commissary desires to make his expenses as low as pos¬ 

sible, and so prefers to throw on the Quartermaster’s Department the 
cost of transportation. But ordinarily in cases of that kind, involving 
matters of consequence, we consult and come to an understanding. I 
never object to any legitimate expenditure being thrown on my depart¬ 
ment if thereby the aggregate cost of material and transportation will 
be less to the Government than it would be by a contraiT arrange¬ 
ment. And so w ith the Commissaiy-General. 

“In some European countries thei^e is only one suppl}^ department, 
but without any very accurate knowledge on the subject m 3 " impression 
is that their organizations for that purpose are veiy imperfect. 1 have 
talked with old soldiers of Napoleon who said the}^ were half the time 
starved. * * * Within our ow-n memoVies is the Crimean cam¬ 

paign, w here the French and English supph" departments broke down 
utteiiv, and where an ariii}^ situated only 8 miles from a seaport filled 
with supplies had to undergo, for weeks, the utmost suffering from 
want of food and clothing and other necessaiy supplies. We know 
more of the English arm 3 " during that time than w^e do of the French, 
because the 3 " admitted their newspaper correspondents, Kussell and 
others, and the whole matter was published in their newspapers and 
we read it here. The 3 " are as fond of criticising their officers as we 
are in this countiy, but the French don’t allow" that,” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Robert Allen, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., 
brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the artilleiy before 
appointment in Quartermaster’s Department in 181:6.; served in the 
Florida w"ar, the Mexican war, and the w"ar of the rebellion. 

* ****** 

(Page 153.) “I do not deem it necessary to go into an elaborate 
defense of the present organization, or trace the effect, immediate or 
remote, of compounding the staff departments. The old maxim, 
‘Let well enough alone,’ is replete with w"isdom in its application to 
the proposed changes. The existing organization has been tried b 3 " 
the severest of all tests and proven its perfect adaptation to the 
demands of the service. It has carried us triumphantly through a 
war of gigantic proportions, never failing, never faltering, answering 
eveiy want, meeting promptl}" eveiy requisition.” 

* * * * * * * 


122 


Banning report, 1876. 

General Allen: 

(Page 163.) “ I answer most emphatically, no. The quartermasters 
have always been overburdened with work, and consolidation (of the 
Quartermaster’s, Commissaiy, and Pay departments) is only a change 
of form. No saving would be effected.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Daniel H. Rucker, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., 
brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the dragoons until 
appointed in Quartermaster’s Department in 1819; served in the Mex¬ 
ican war and civil war; afterwards Quartermaster-General, U. S. A., 
with rank of brigadier-general. 

(Page 163.) ‘‘I do not consider such a consolidation (of the Quarter¬ 
master’s, Commissary, and Pay departments) practicable, in the interest 
of the service; but, on the contraiy, I am satisfied that it would be 
injurious. These departments are much more efficient as they now 
are. ” 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Col. Rufus Ingalls, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., briga¬ 
dier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war and civil war; 
was chief quartermaster. Army of the Potomac, succeeding General Van 
Vliet; afterwards Quartermaster-General with rank of brigadier- 
general. 

(Page 117.) “1 have always been of the opinion that the Quarter¬ 
master’s and Subsistence departments at least could be merged, with a 
less number of officers than are now in the two departments; and I 
have been of the opinion that the Pay Department could be merged 
also in the other two, calling it, for instance, the bureau of disburse¬ 
ments and supplies. * * * The Quartermaster’s Department is 

charged with the purchase and transportation of all supplies not par¬ 
ticularly designated as subsistence supplies. * * * There are 

comparatively very few articles of supplies that are purchased by the 
Commissary Department, but when these articles are purchased in large 
quantities at the principal markets they are then turned over, generally 
in bulk, to the Quartermaster’s Department. We have to perform all 
the transportation.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Ingalls: 

(Page 161.) “If the Army were to be organized de novo, I should 
regard the proposition of the consolidation of the duties of the present 
Pay, Commissary, and Quartermaster’s departments with favor. I was 
in favor of consolidating these departments some time ago, and so tes¬ 
tified before the honorable House Committee on Military Affairs. But 
I am now rather of the opinion that it would be as well, and perhaps 
best, to let these departments remain separate. They have been so 
almost since the organization of the Government, and "have answered 
their purposes well.” 


123 


Maish report, 1878. 

General Ingalls: 

(Page 55.) ‘‘I do not think there should be any consolidation of the 
staff departments unless the entire militaiy organization is to be changed 
radically. The Army is satisfied with and used to the present system, 
and in time of war the increased force at once falls in with it, as was 
witnessed between 1861-1865. The conditions of our countiy preclude 
a successful remodeling of our Army after any European s^^stem. IVere 
an army to be organized de novo, a consolidated staff department of 
supply and disbursement, embracing the duties now performed in our 
Army by the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments, might 
be established, and I have been of opinion it would work with increased 
efficiency in the supply and payment of troops, but I am far from rec¬ 
ommending a trial of it now.” " * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Stewart Van Vliet, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., 
brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the artillery before the 
civil war; was chief quartermaster. Army of the Potomac. 

(Page 63.) '^3. Would it be better to have a single department of 
supply, whose duty it should be to discharge the functions of the 
Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments? If so, give 3 mur 
reasons. 

‘‘To this question I would answer most emphatically, no. The duties 
pertaining to the Quartermaster’s and Pa^^ departments are entirely 
dissimilar, and if a quartermaster was obliged to go to the different 
posts to pay the troops he would have to neglect his legitimate duties 
at his proper station. 

***** * * 

“I do not think, if a consolidation took place, that it would reduce 
the number of officers to any appreciable extent. 

* * * * * * * 

“In answer to this question as to the consolidation of the ordnance 
and artillery corps, I would state that, in my opinion, they could not 
be united vdthout injuiy to both corps. The manufacture of arms 
and ammunition requires a vast deal of study and experiment to keep 
pace with the improvements of the age, and to detail an officer for a 
year or two on ordnance duty with the expectation that he would keep 
up to those improvements would be simpl}^ unwise.” 

****** * 

(Page 64.) “The Adjutant and Inspector-General’s departments 
might be consolidated, but the number of officers could not be reduced, 
for a certain number of the officers of the consolidated corps would 
have to be kept constant!}^ on inspection duty. An adjutant-general 
could not leave the headquarters of his division, department, etc., to 
make an inspection without having another detailed to perform his 
duties during his absence. 

* * * * * • * * 

“Our staff' has been assailed for many years. Persons, either through 
envy or a desire to obtain advanced positions, have from time to time 


124 


submitted plans for reorganizing the staff, but I have never seen one 
3 ’et that was any improvement on the present organization. A good 
staff officer must not only understand the workings of his own depart¬ 
ment, but he must understand, to a great extent, the duties of all other 
departments, and the organization of armies, and it appears to me idle 
to suppose that an officer can become a good staff' officer unless he 
devotes years to the constant discharge of the duties of his depart¬ 
ment.” 

(Page 65.) “To detail officers from the line to serve in the staff for 
a short period would certainly make bad staff officers, and not improve 
them as line officers.” * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Van Vliet: 

(Page 164.) “It is easy to tear down, but very difficult to rebuild. 
The present organization of the staff corps is the work of years of 
experience and labor. That it is a good one and has worked admi- 
rabh^, it is only necessary to refer to the late war. When large armies 
were suddenly called into the field, the staff corps supplied their 
wants promptly and efficiently; while almost everything was changed 
during the war, the organization of the staff remained the same. 
They were expanded, but never changed. It is a well-known fact 
that the best results are only obtained in almost all departments of 
life by division of labor.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Rufus Saxton, deputy quartermaster-general, U. S. A.; 
brigadier-general of volunteers, served in artillery until 1861; on 
the staff of General McClellan, and military governor. Department 
•of the South, during the civil war; afterwards colonel and assistant 
quartermaster-general, U. S. A.: 

(Page 32.) “1 can see no good reason why the Quartermaster’s, Com¬ 
missary, and Pay departments should not remain as they now are, 
separate and distinct. The records of the late war show that the 
Quartermaster’s Department was efficient, and did its duty well, and 
although now scarcely large enough to meet the requirements of the 
Army in time of peace, can readily be enlarged to meet the requirements 
of the largest armies. * * * A good commissariat is so important 
to the well-being of an army that its duties should be made a specialty. 

* * * service rendered by the Commissary Department in the 

late war was most creditable to its efficiency; never was so large an 
army so well cared for in the way of food. The corps is now so 
small that its officers can only be stationed at the supply depots. 

* * * All experience has shown that the honesty of the most 

trusted of human agents is not always proof against temptation, and 
it is desirable to diminish as much as possible the opportunities for 
fraud; to this end the Government will be the gainer in the long run, 
if it keeps a quartermaster and commissary (both bonded officers) at 
every depot of supply, thus dividing the patronage and responsibility, 
and lessening the opportunities for dishonest practices. * * * 

The presence of the quartermaster is required constantly at the depot 
of supplies, where there is usualh^ a large amount of public property 


125 


for which he is responsible, and he can not well be spared from that 
charge to travel to the distant posts, paying the troops. * * * 

The experiment (of company and detachment commanders paying 
their commands) was tried in the early days of our Army, and signally 
failed. There are very many good company officers who are very 
poor accountants and who could not with safety be relied upon to keep 
the soldiers’ accounts, never keeping their own; besides there is apt 
to be established a very unfortunate relation between the soldier and 
his commanding officer very detrimental to the service. The soldier 
would charge every tine and every stoppage of pay to his officer, and 
would believe that he had taken it to serve his own purposes. An 
experience of eleven years in the line of the Army nas shown me 
that money relations between a soldier and his company commander 
should be avoided. With the paymaster the case is different; the 
soldier is generally satisfied that his pay is all right when he receives 
it from a paymaster. * * * 

‘■‘1 am of the opinion that the ordnance corps and the artillery 
should be consolidated. The knowledge * * * would be of very 

great service to the artillery officer. It would also widen the field for 
the selection of officers to perform special duties requiring peculiar 
skill and aptitude in the various departments of the manufacture and 
use of arms.” 

(Page 33.) ‘■‘Q. Could the Adjutant and Inspector-General’s depart¬ 
ments be consolidated advantageously? 

‘'A. They could not; their duties being entirely different. The 
Adjutant-General’s Department has charge of all the records of the 
Army, is its historian, who records the history of every officer and 
soldier and communicates all official orders to the Army. The duties 
of the Adjutant-General require that he should alwa^^s be found at 
headquarters. The Inspector-General should alwa 3 ^s be traveling 
from post to post.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Judson D. Bingham, quartermaster, U. S. A., brevet brig¬ 
adier-general. Served in the artilleiy before the civil war; was chief 
quartermaster. Seventeenth Arny^ Corps, and of the Army of the 
Tennessee; afterwards colonel and assistant quartermaster-general, 
U. S. A.: 

(Page 61.) '"In 1113 " opinion, no departments of the staff' of the 
Arm 3 ^ can, advantageoush^ to the service and the countiy, be consoli¬ 
dated, for these reasons: As at present organized, the 3 " have proved 
their efficiency during the war of the rebellion, which is probably the 
severest test that they will ever be subjected to. In the Quartermas¬ 
ter’s Department, with the duties of which I am more familiar than of 
other departments, it was found necessary during the last war to 
organize several subdivisions, showing that it is now in too consoli¬ 
dated a shape for a great war. Any addition to the present duties of 
the Quartermaster’s Department will be detrimental to the service.” 
* ****** 

(Page 62.) “The effect of adopting a system whereby company and 
detachment commanders should pay their commands would be to 
largely increase a kind of accountability which is now great enough. 


126 


They are now accountable for the clothing-, camp and garrison equip¬ 
age, equipments, and ordance stores of their commands. The addition 
of accountability for paying troops would impair their efficiency as 
company commanders.” 

* ****** 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Bingham: 

(Page 166.) ‘Gt would not be practicable to consolidate the Quar¬ 
termaster’s with any other department.” 

Maish report, 1878. 

Maj. J. M. Moore, quartermaster, U. S: A., brevet lieutenant- 
colonel; served in the Nineteenth and Ninetieth Pennsylvania Volun¬ 
teers during the civil war until appointed in the Quartermaster’s 
Department in 1863; now colonel and Assistant Quartermaster-General, 

U. S. A. 

(Page 56.) “ The consolidation of the Subsistence and Quartermas¬ 
ter’s departments (as proposed by H. R. bill 2865) will totally destroy 
the efficiency of the officers composing the proposed organization. 

“ It is hardly possible for any one man to be thoroughly proficient 
in either department; that is, a thorough judge of all the supplies he 
is compelled to purchase for army use. Now, add the duties of the 
Commissaiy to that of the Quartermaster’s Department and you 
overburden an officer and make him dependent upon the judgment of 
hired help instead of having him rely upon his own judgment.^ * * * 

‘‘ How man}" quartermasters know anything about sugar, tea, rice, 
beans, etc. ? How many commissaries know anything about mules, 
grain, iron, steel, hardware, blacksmiths’ and wheelwrights’ tools, and 
the ten thousand articles purchased by the Quartermaster’s Depart¬ 
ment? How many complaints would be made of the inferior quality 
of stores received at posts; what an expense it would be to the 
Government to transport worthless stores purchased by officers of the 
supply department, and how unjust to impose the task upon them of 
supplying the Army with stores of which they admit they are not 
competent to judge of their quality ? Yet it is expected that every offi¬ 
cer assigned to duty as purchasing officer is an expert in the selection 
of the stores he is ordered to furnish, and he is held to a rigid account¬ 
ability for the quality of those supplies by the bureau in which he 
serves. 

‘ ‘ Officers at small posts do and can perform the duties of post quar¬ 
termaster and commissary when there are no purchases to make in 
either department. When the posts are large, two officers are detailed 
to perform the duty. The quartermaster is required to look after his 
animals, wagons, forage, grain, wood, etc., and if on a march, to look 
after his transportation. On the other hand, the commissary is needed 
at his warehouse, and could not give that attention to the issuing of 
stores if compelled to attend to matters requiring his presence out of 
doors, now performed by the quartermaster. 

****** * 

‘‘ Our present staff administration is founded upon the wise princi¬ 
ple of proper division of labor, which the world teaches is necessary 


127 


to insure success in operations of an}- magnitude. During the rebel¬ 
lion it was found necessary to divide the duties of the quartermasters 
and make specialties' of wagon transportation, purchase of horses, 
hay, grain, etc., to insure profficiency and thoroughness in the officers 
charged with these several branches of the Quartermaster’s Department. 

‘‘■It has stood the test during the various Indian wars, the war with 
Mexico, and the late civil war. It successfully performed such pecu¬ 
liar labors without causing the delay or failure of a single campaign, 
and can not be pronounced a failure, while the consolidation of the 
Commissary and Quartermaster’s departments as it existed during the 
war of 1812 was utterly inadequate to the discharge of its duties, so 
much so as to require a division of the supply department as exists at 
the present time.” 

* * * * * * * 
(Page 58.) * * As our people are opposed to maintaining a 

large standing army in time of peace, commensurate with our necessi¬ 
ties in time of war, the staff organization must have reference espe¬ 
cially to a rapid increase of our Army, and while the Army itself is 
small, the staff' corps must be larger in proportion, and so flexible that, 
when occasion demands, it may be ready to meet any emergency, and 
at the same time serve as a nucleus of educated and expert officers, 
around whoin the volunteers can gather, be divided, and take part in 
such staff' duties as they may be called upon to perform. The adapta¬ 
bility of the present organization to such a demand was clearly mani¬ 
fested in the late civil war, and since the return of the volunteer staff' 



Garfield report, 1869. 

Brig. Gen. Amos B. Eaton, Commissary-General of Subsistence, 
U. S. A., brevet major-general; served in the infantry until appointed 
in Subsistence Department in 1838; in the Florida war, Mexican war, 
and civil war; was chief commissary to General Taylor in Mexican wdr. 

(Page 9.) ‘Mt is my opinion that no system can be devised, by the 
union of the Quartermaster’s Department and the Subsistence Depart¬ 
ment under one departmental head, that will not introduce confusion, 
uncertainty, and failure into the service.” * * * 

(Page 10.) “The Quartermaster’s Department has many important 
and some minor functions attached to it, but its first great office and 
that by which it is principally connected with the Subsistence Depart¬ 
ment, as also with the Ordnance and Medical departments, is its func¬ 
tion as the common carrier of the Army.” * * . * 

(Page 11.) “The first and most important interest of the Subsistence 
Department, as it is the first aim of its officers, is to supply the troops 
with good stores, possessing the requisite keeping and other necessary 
qualities; second, so to purchase and supply the stores that they may 
be delivered at the several final points of consumption at as low a total 
cost to the Government as possible. * * * 

“■I am not aware of any deficiency of a just and proper cooperative 
interchange of views and measures between the bureaus of the two 
departments.” * * * 

(Page 12.) “I do not doubt that it is practicable to devise some sys¬ 
tem of consolidation of those departments, with perhaps the addition 


128 


also of the Pay Department, by which all these interests may be placed 
under one common head or chief, and I do not doubt that now and 
then a man of such unusual grasp of mind, of such wisdom, experience, 
sagacit}^, and skill in devising and managing judicious s 3 ^stems of busi¬ 
ness, of such untiring industry and unfailing health, that he might till 
the place reasonably well, provided the consolidated department should 
be by law subdivided into divisions and subdivisions or subbureaus, 
having somewhat separate and independent subchiefs, placed in con¬ 
trol of the details of the several branches into which such a consoli¬ 
dated department would necessarily have to be arranged. It is my 
opinion, however, that the past experience and results in the working 
of the present S 3 "stem, both in peace and in war for man 3 ^ 3 ^ears, have 
been so favorable as not to call for such a change.” * * * 

(Page 13.) ‘‘During the recent war 1 was for most of the time sta¬ 
tioned in New York City, where I was fully occupied. It would then 
and there have been utterl 3 ^ impossible for any one man—I care not 
how able he might be—to have performed successfully the dut 3 " of the 
Quartermaster’s Department and also of the Subsistence Department 
in that city.” 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Col. Alexander E. Shiras, assistant commissaiy-general, U. S. A., 
brevet major-general; service in artilleiy before appointment in Sub¬ 
sistence Department in 1847; was in the Florida war, Mexican war, 
and civil war; afterwards Commissaiy-General of Subsistence, U. S. A., 
with rank of brigadier-general: 

(Page 19.) “Q. From 3 "our experience in the two branches of the 
service (quartermaster and commissaiy), if you were called upon to 
manage all the duties of the two departments, and that, too, for a long 
period of time, and 3^011 yourself were to be made responsible for eveiy- 
thing, would you keep up two separate organizations or make the two 
into one? 

‘‘A. I would make several more separate ones, each with its distinct 
head, and have a general superintendence. * * * x have frequently 
acted as Commissaiy-General, and 1 know he has ample to do to per¬ 
form that duty perfectly. I regard the Quartermaster’s Department 
as an overworked department, and the consequence is that an officer of 
that department on duty according to his rank has to intrust much of 
his duties to others, having merely a supervision over his agents.” 

Cobtirn report, 1873. 

General Shiras: 

(Page 54.) “ No advantage is presented to my mind as likely to arise 
from having a single department of supply to discharge the functions 
of the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments. * * * 

“Such a consolidation, if it should lessen" the number of officers, 
must be followed b 3 ^ increasing the number of citizens employed to 
fulfill the duties now performed b 3 ^ officers.” * * * 

‘“The eliect of adopting a system whereby company or detachment 
commanders should pay their commands would be the loss of larp*e 
sums to the Treasuiy.” * * * 

“The consolidation of the artilleiy and ordnanee could produce no 
beneficial effect, but might produce much harm in rendering the offi- 


129 


cers now in the ordnance corps less interested in the study of their 
profession, while the artilleiy officer, detailed temporarily for duty 
as an ordnance officer, would take but little interest in his temporary 
duty; such at least was the case betore the act of 1832, establishing 
an ordnance corps.” * * * 

‘‘The Adjutant-General’s and Inspector-General’s departments 
could not be advantageously consolidated. The Inspector-General’s 
Department should be entirely detached from any other, that its offi¬ 
cers ma}^ fully and fearlessly perform their duties to all branches of 
the Army without partialit 3 ^” * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

Brig. Gen. Robert Macfeely, Commissary-General of Subsistence, 
U. S. A. Served in infantry before appointment in Subsistence De¬ 
partment in 1861; was chief commissary. Army of the Ohio, Fifteenth 
Army Corps, and Army of the Tennessee: 

(Page 167.) “It would not, without impairing the efficiency of each 
department (be practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster’s, Com¬ 
missary, and Pay departments). The experience of the past fifty 
3 ^ears and the late war proved that each department, as now organ¬ 
ized, had as much as it could do to perform its appropriate and legiti¬ 
mate duties, and the manner in which these duties were performed 
and the immense armies supplied proved the efficiency and wisdom of 
the separate organizations. Any consolidation that might be made 
would result in a division of duties practically^ as under separate 
organizations, and would not be advantageous or economical.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Capt. John P. Hawkins, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A., 
brigadier-general of volunteers, during the civil war, was chief com¬ 
missary, Thirteenth Army Corps and Army of the Tennessee, also 
brigade and division commander; afterward Commissary-General of 
Subsistence, with rank of brigadier-general: 

* * * » * * * 

(Page 65.) “I do not think it would be better to have a single 
department of supply, to discharge the present duties of the Quarter¬ 
master’s, Commissary, and Pay departments. So far as the organi¬ 
zation of these departments is concerned, and their relationship to 
each other, I think that their operation during the late war showed 
their efficiency; and probably the only thing that might have been 
noticed as objectionable was that the Quartermaster’s Department was 
very heavily weighted, and in ordei to be managed had to be divided 
into difierent branches, with a head to each branch. By this plan 
responsibility must have been very much divided. 

* * * * * * -x- 

(Page 66.) “ I do not think it would be advantageous to consolidate 
the ordnance and artillery corps, but I think it would be well if the 
Ordnance Department were organized as to have no lieutenants belong¬ 
ing to it; the lowest rank being that of captain, any vacant captaincies 
to be filled from the first lieutenants of the Army; the fitness of the 


Tdld—00-9 



130 


applicants being determined by competitive examination. The lieu¬ 
tenants of artillery would generally procure the appointments, as they 
have opportunities for study not in the reach of other lieutenants of 
the line; still it would be advisable to have competition open to all the 
first lieutenants of the Army. It would prevent a certain amount of 
grumbling, and that is a desirable thing to attain to. 

* ****** 

“I do not see any advantage to result, in time of peace, from con¬ 
solidating the Adjutant and Inspector General’s departments. In 
time of war the Adjutant-General’s Department is overworked, and 
the Inspector-General’s Department is then of such veiy great impor¬ 
tance that it should have a separate head for it. 

During the late war it was only after a thorough organization of 
the inspector’s department in army corps and divisions that the troops 
became disciplined and efficient.” 

* * * -X- * * * 

Maish report, 1878. 

Maj. Michael P. Small, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A., brevet 
brigadier-general. Served in the artillery until appointed in subsistence 
department in 1861; was chief commissary of the Thirteenth Army 
Corps of the departments of Virginia and North Carolina and of the 
Army of the James; afterwards lieutenant-colonel and assistant com- 
missaiw-general of subsistence: 

(Page 66.) “Ask any of the distinguished ofiScers of the late Con¬ 
federate service about the efficiency of their stall departments, which 
was in part a consolidated one, and the reph^ will be, ^ a failure,’ and 
that our splendid system of supply by the staff departments, as at 
present constituted, was their constant admiration. 

“Surely it is not wise to neglect such experiences as above, and 
throw away the results gathered during many years of laborious and 
successful service; and break down a S 3 ^stem so adapted to the wants 
of our countiy, and which took so many years in building up.” 

* ****** 

Banning report, 1876. 

Brig. Gen. Joseph K. Barnes, Surgeon-General, U. S. A., brevet 
major-general. Entered the service in 1810; surgeon and Surgeon- 
General during the civil war: 

(Page 168.) “The experience of the war would appear to have 
proven the impracticability of such consolidation (of the Quartermas¬ 
ter’s, Commissaiy, and Pay departments).” 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Brig. Gen. Benjamin W. Brice, Paymaster-General, U. S. A. 
Entered the service in the infantry in 1829; served in the Mexican 
war and civil war in the Pay Department. 

(Page 46.) “Q. What would be your answer in regard to using 
the Quartermaster’s Department as the channel through which to pay 


131 




the troops?—A. In the first place, there would be an insuperalfie objec¬ 
tion to placing large deposits at these smaller and more exposed sta¬ 
tions; and, in the second place, so far as 1 am advised, I don’t believe 
any officer could perform the duties and make all the proper returns 
now required by both departments and do it satisfactorily and 
promptly. It would produce a confusion in the disbursements and 
confusion in the train of thought of an officer charged with the double 
duties under widely different systems. It would not be homoge¬ 
neous, as it is now, and it would tend inevitably to inaccuracy, as 
past experience demonstrated before the organization of the present 
system.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Benjamin Alvord, paymaster, U. S. A., acting paymaster- 
general, afterwards Paymaster-General with rank of brigadier-general. 
Brigadier-general of volunteers; served in infantry until appointed 
in Pa}" Department in 1854; served in Florida war, the Mexican war, 
and in the civil war commanded District of Oregon. 

(Page 17.) ‘'My judgment is opposed to any of the proposed schemes 
of consolidation, but I will here especially present my objections to the 
consolidation of the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay Depart¬ 
ments. * * * 

“The present system has shown efficiency in war and in peace, and 
there are no failures to correct. By subdivision of labor it has ele¬ 
ments of perfection and thoroughness. Consolidation would cause 
overcrowding and neglect. * * * The present subdivision has the 

merit of simplicity, unity, and efficiency. * * * It is proposed to 

interpose between each and the Secretary of War a chief of supply. 

* * * It would only make another remove, another link, in the chain. 

* * * As the new chief could not master all three of the branches 

thoroughly, he would be apt to degenerate into a mere automaton, to 
sign his name without sufficient investigation. * * * He could not 

attend to the duties of all three branches in time of peace; much less 
could he do so in time of war. 

“ To authorize company and detachment commanders to pay their 
commands would endanger the public funds. * * * Could company 

officers of volunteers pav their commands, when they have enough to 
do to learn their military duties, and on final muster out could not, of 
course, make final payment ? Or shall one system prevail for the regu¬ 
lars and another for the volunteer forces? Which would never be a 
judicious arrangement. * * * The consolidation of ordnance and 

artillery would be unwise. * * * The consolidation of that depart¬ 

ment (inspector-Generars Department) with the Adjutant-GeneraPs 
Department would only divert officers from duties and studies in which 
they are accomplished, without an}" benefit to the public service.” 

Maish report, 1878. 

General Alvord: 

(Page 68.) “In reenforcement of what I have before said repeatedly 
in various reports against the consolidation of the staff, I will quote 
the language recently seen in the new and valuable ‘ Military Diction¬ 
ary,’ by General Voyle of the British army, London, 1876, page 91, 
under article ‘ Control Department: ’ 


132 


“‘It is unadvisable to mix up, in one department, suppl}", store, 
passage, transport, and half a dozen other things, each of which should 
be a department of itself. To crowd department upon department 
under one head, and to expect efficiency, is simply courting failure.’ 

“To this we will add that the British Government, dissatisfied with 
its six years’ experiment of consolidation, did, by a royal warrant of 
January 1 , 1876, abolish the ‘department of control.’ We should be 
pardoned for glorifying our own institutions. It may be a national 
failing, but there is in our past history and military successes as much 
just cause for pride in our Army and in its staff as in any other 
American product.” 

***** * * 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Maj. George P. Ihrie, paymaster, U. B. A.; entered the service as 
second lieutenant. Third Artilleiy, June 18, 1855; colonel and act¬ 
ing aid-de-camp of volunteers; brevet brigadier-general; was colo¬ 
nel and acting inspector-general of the staff' of General Grant. 

(Page 120 .) “I have the past twenty years held that these three 
departments (Quartermaster, Commissaiy, and Pay) should be consoli¬ 
dated, but if, in the wisdom of Congress, only the Quartermaster’s 
and Commissary Departments should be consolidated, it is 1113 ^ judg¬ 
ment the Pa 3 " Department should be abolished as unnecessary. * * * 
I have alwa 3 "S argued that one officer could perform the duties of the 
three departments. * * * The commanding officer of a compan}" 

who is not able to make out the roll of his compan}" and pay it at the 
end of each month is not, in ny judgment, qualified to hold his 
position.” 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, Chief of Engineers, U. S. A.; 
major-general of volunteers; served in the Florida war and war of the 
rebellion; division and corps commander; chief of staff to General 
Meade. 

(Page 59.) “I should be inclined to think that the duties we are 
now engaged upon, which are various and extensive, are quite as much 
as the Corps of Engineers should have devolved upon it. There is a 
very marked line between the duties of fabrication and suppty of 
hea\y ordnance, field artillery, and heav}^ guns, and all their appurte¬ 
nances, equipments, accouterments, and ammunition, and the duties 
of the Corps of Engineers.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Zealous B. Tower, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.; brigadier- 
general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; in the civil war; 
served in the Army of the Potomac as chief engineer, defenses of 
Nashville, and as chief engineer, Military Division of the Tennessee. 

(Page 184.) “The impression of my early service in the Army still 
remains with me, that the Commissarv and Pa}" Departments are 


133 


models of economical administration, and 1 do not think that anything 
would he gained by uniting them with the Quartermaster’s Department, 
already overburdened with its various duties and responsibilities.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Horatio G. Wright, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., 
major-general of volunteers, brigade, division, corps, and department 
commander; commanded Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac; after¬ 
wards brigadier-general, U. S. A., Chief of Engineers. 

******* 

(Page 1:29.) “In my opinion none of the departments of the staff of 
the Army can, advantageously to the service of the country, be con¬ 
solidated. The present division of the staff' into its several branches 
is the result of experience, extending from the first formation of our 
Government to 1838, when the present organization, substantially, 
was adopted, and has since been continued, naving, in the meantime, 
been thoroughly tested in the Mexican war and the war of the rebel¬ 
lion. The results in both have fully vindicated the wisdom of the 
advocates of the existing plan of staff' subdivision. * * * 

******* 

“ * * * The Subsistence Department is limited in its duties, 

mainly to the supply of subsistence to the Army—that is, in providing 
for the daily wants of the soldier in the way of food; and, as the worst 
results would follow from a failure in supplying this even for a single 
dav, this important service is wisely assigned to a special organization 
ofUe Staff'.” * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. John Newton, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., major- 
general of volunteers, brigade, division, and corps commander; after¬ 
wards brigadier-general, U. S. A., Chief of Engineers. 

(Page 89.) “I know of no departments of the staff which, in my 
opinion, should be consolidated. 

******* 

(Page 90.) “The advantage of consolidating the Quartermaster’s 
Commissary, and Pay departments into a single department of supply 
is not clear to my mind. * * * 

******* 

“In my opinion the ordnance could never be consolidated with the 
artillery in such a sense as to have the offices interchangeable. The 
ordnance service requires a number of officers skilled by practical 
familiarity with the fabrication, etc., of arms and munitions of war, 
which is acquired only by special attention to these matters. 

******* 

“The principle duties of the Adjutant-General’s Department are the 
preservation of the records, and a system of returns of the Army, and 
the issuing of orders—duties of importance, involving much labor and 
care. 


134 


“There is no analogy whatever between these functions and those 
of an inspector-general, and hence officers of different qualifications 

are required in these departments.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. tTohn G. Foster, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., major- 
general of volunteers, served in the Mexican war; in the civil war 
was brigade, corps, and department commander. 

(Page 26.) “1 do not think there are any departments of the staff of 
our Army that can be consolidated with advantage to the service. 

“These de 4 )artments have from time to time been created, increased, 
and modified to meet the requirements of the service. * * * 

“The idea seems to have prevailed to secure the most efficient serv¬ 
ice with the greatest economy. To secure both objects as far as prac¬ 
ticable the different divisions of the staff were organized upon the 
principle of ‘division of labor.’ By this each division of the staff was 
enabled to perform its duties efficienth" and with great perfection of 
detail; at the same time great economy in the disbursement of the 
public mone}^ was secured. * * * j believe in ‘specialties’ to 

secure the greatest perfection in the details of staff service, as much as 
I do in its necessity in the ordinary avocations of life, in which each 
branch of business is a specialty. 

* * * * * * * 

“I do not think that a consolidation would reduce the number of 
officers that would be required to perform the same amount of duty.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Quinc}^ A. Gillmore, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., major-gen 
eral of volunteers, division, corps, and department commander; after- • 
ward colonel Corps of Engineers. 

******* 

(Page 165.) “I can not see that any advantage can reasonably be 
expected to result from a consolidation of any of the present staff 
corps and departments of the Army. My knowledge of the practical 
operations and routine duties of other corps than m 3 " own has been 
derived principally from my experience as a commander in time of 
war. I am clear in mv convictions that we need no better organization 
than we now possess to meet all the contingencies of a war of great 
magnitude, and that for a peace establishment an 3 " saving in the sala¬ 
ries of officers that might possibly be achieved by forced and unnatural 
consolidation would be wholl}’’ swallowed up b\" numerous small losses 
resulting from impaired efficiency, supplemented by a large class of 
minor evils for which there would be no compensation, even in theory. 

* * *•* * * * 

(Page 166.) “In my judgment, the number of officers required for 
dutv can not be reduced b}" consolidation, except at the expense of 
efficienc}". 

* " * * * * * * 

“I think the ordnance and artillery corps should be kept distinct as 
they are at the present time. * * * The duties confided to ord¬ 
nance officers are sufficiently important to justify the maintenance of a 
distinct organization and line of promotion.- In m 3 " opinion efficiency 
can not be secured in an 3 ^ other * * * 


135 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. John D. Parke, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.; major-general 
of volunteers, corps commander; afterwards colonel. Corps of 
Engineers. 

* ****** 

(Page 74.) ‘‘In my opinion, it would not be advantageous to the 
service nor to the country to consolidate any departments of the staff 
of the Armv. This opinion is based upon an experience of several 
years on the frontier, and from my observation while in command of 
troops during the war. * * * 

(Page 74.) "‘The effect in time of war of adopting a system whereby 
company and detachment commanders should pay their commands 
would be to impair the efficiency of the commanders and to reduce the 
effective fighting force. The former would be anxious about the 
money box and vouchers, and the latter would be weakened by just 
the number of men required as guards. The system might answer in 
peace times, but even then I think it would be of very doubtful pro- 
priet^^” 

******* 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Gouverneur K. Warren, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.;major- 
general of volunteers, brigade, corps, and department commander; 
chief engineer. Army of the Potomac; commanded Fifth Army Corps, 
Army of the Potomac; afterwards lieutenant-colonel of engineers. 

(Page 48.) “Do not think any of the staff' departments of the Arm}^ 
can, advantageously to the service and the country, be consolidated 
with another, except the Inspector-General’s, which should be under 
the Adjutant-General. Do not think this would make material differ¬ 
ence as to the number of officers required, but would make the inspect¬ 
or’s work more direct in its effect upon the Army, and be more con¬ 
venient for the use of commanding officers in all grades. * * * 

(Page 49.) “Think that the Commissary and Pay departments should 
be kept separate from the Quartermaster’s. The latter have too much 
to do now. Think that all matters of transportation of commissary 
supplies should be taken from the Quartermaster’s Department and 
given to the Commissary Department. * * * 

“Think such consolidation could not reduce the number of officers 
required if duty be done equally well. * * * 

“Think the ordnance and artillery corps should not be combined. 
See no reason for a change in the ordnance corps, but believe tfie artil 
lerv should be made into a corps instead of having its present organ¬ 
ization.” * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

Maj. Godfrey Weitzel, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.; major-general 
of volunteers, division and corps commander; afterwards lieutenant- 
colonel of engineers. 

(Page 185.) “I do not think that any corps should be consolidated. 
It will prove poor economy when the Army is needed. It cost our 


136 


Government over two billion dollars to get good officers, staff and line, 
during the first two years of the war.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. William E. Merrill, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.; colonel,U. S. 
Volunteer Engineers; assistant engineer. Army of the Potomac; chief 
engineer. Army of Kentucky and Army of the Cumberland; after¬ 
wards lieutenant-colonel of engineers. 

(Page 79.) * * * • “ Were an officer to be employed at one time 

in building barracks, at another in buying horses and means of trans¬ 
portation, and then be suddenh^ ordered to purchase an army’s sup¬ 
plies of bacon, bread, flour, coffee, tea, pepper, salt, soap, etc., the 
result would probably be that the Government would be badl}^ swindled 
and the Army would suffer from lack of wholesome food. 

* * * * * * * 

“1 do not think that there could be any appreciable reduction in the 
number of officers were the Quartermaster and Commissary depart¬ 
ments combined. 

* * -X- * * * * 

(Page 80.) * * * think that a special ordnance corps is a 

necessit}^ to the efficiency of the service. Modern w^arfare, with its 
collateral arts and sciences, has become so scientific and the success¬ 
ful manufacture and invention of its ever-varying weapons requires so 
much special knowledge and practice that it is unreasonable to expect 
such knowledge from those who have not made it a specialty. At the 
same time ordnance and artillery duties are so interwoven that an 
ordnance officer should have practical artillery experience, and an effi¬ 
cient artillery officer should be well posted in theory and on the manu¬ 
facture, the preservation, and the repair of his guns and equipments, 
besides knowing how to make and take care of powder and other 
explosives. * * * The duties now performed by the lieutenants 

of ordnance should be performed by detailed lieutenants from the 
artillery, the length and mode of detail being similar to that now pre¬ 
scribed for service with the light batteries.” * * * 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Brig. Gen. Alexander B. Dyer, Chief of Ordnance, U. S. A., brevet 
major-general. Served in the artillery before appointment in Ord¬ 
nance Department in 1838. Served in the Florida, Mexican, and civil 
wars. 

(Page 66.) know so little about the duties performed b}" the 
Nav}" Bureau of Ordnance that I can not form a proper judgment in 
regard to the matter (why there should be two ordnance bureaus in 
the Government). * * * It is a delicate thing for an officer at the 

head of one corps or department to answer a question which assumes 
that he is perfectly acquainted with all the duties and details of another 
branch of the service. * * * could supply guns, small arms, 

and ammunition. The Ordnance Department is now manufacturing 
1,000,000 cartridges for the Navy for their breech-loading carbines.” 


137 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Stephen Benet, Ordnance Department, U. 8. A; served dur¬ 
ing the civil war as captain of ordnance; afterwards brigadier-general 
and Chief of Ordnance. 

* ***** 

(Page 102.) ‘On all the occupations of life, whether professional, 
scientific, commercial, or mechanical, through all their various ramifi¬ 
cations, the doctrine of specialties is well established. Division of 
labor and personal accountability within prescribed limits of duty are 
absolutely essential to the execution of schemes of any magnitude. 
The nearer and more direct the individual is brought to specific objects 
or duties the more satisfactorily, economically, and intelligently will 
those objects be attained or those duties performed. The application 
of the doctrine to the execution of so vast a scheme as that of the 
military state is a matter of absolute necessity; its application in 
time of peace is a question of degree only. It is exemplified in the 
present organization of the stafi corps and departments, in each of 
which the principles of the divisions of labor, positive responsibility, 
and intelligent accomplishment are recognized and applied.” * * * 

(Page 103.) ‘'It is an undoubted fact that these divisions \^ere not 
considered too many during the rebellion, and that no complaint was ever 
made that the subdivision of the War Department into bureaus had 
been carried too far. On the contrary, the experience of that, the 
greatest war of modern times, proved that the system worked admir¬ 
ably and the execution of its enormous duties a marvelous success. 

‘“As the organization of an army is intended for war purposes, its 
success in war is the sole test of its excellence. Temporaiy expe¬ 
dients, on economical grounds, during peace, with the undefined inten¬ 
tion of a change in time of war, must of necessity lead to disaster. 
The system must be perfected in time of peace, so that without chang¬ 
ing or modifying the principle of its organization each branch of the 
system can be at once expanded to meet the sudden necessities of war 
of greater or lesser magnitude. It would be unwise to ignore the 
lessons of the rebellion and in a spirit of wantonness destroy a system 
that has been the work of half a centuiy and has by its labors and 
its successes wrested from military history the highest approval. 
******* 

“The original establishment of the Ordnance Department as a sep¬ 
arate corps dates back to the act of May II, 1812, when its organiza¬ 
tion and the duties which it was to perform were accurately defined; 
and by the act of March 3, 1813, ‘ for the better organization of the 
general staff of the Army of the United States,’ the Secretaiy of War 
was empowered to prepare general regulations for its government. 

“At the close of the war of 1812-1811 a reorganization of the Ord¬ 
nance Department was directed by the act of February 8, 1815, when 
its status and duties were again defined. This act is esteemed the 
organic law^ notwithstanding the department was subsequently merged 
in the artillery for a time. 

“On the lith of May, 1820, the House of Representatives b}^ a 
resolution called upon the Secretary of War (Mr. Calhoun) for a 
comprehensive scheme for the reduction of the Army at that time to 
6,000 men, and on the 12th of December following Mr. Calhoun sub- 


138 


mitted his plan, the main features of which were embodied in the 
‘Act to reduce and fix the military peace establishment of the United 
States,’ approved March 2, 1821. This act etiectuated the mergence 
of the Ordnance Department in the artillery, and the duties of the 
department were from 1821 to 1832, a jyeriod of eleven 'yearn^ per¬ 
formed under the direction of Col. George Bomford, the various ord¬ 
nance posts and establishments being placed under the command of 
artillery olficers, in pursuance of the fourth section of the act. 

“After five years’ trial of this system (1826) the officer on ordnance 
duty in charge of the department (Colonel Bomford) felt it his duty 
to invite the attention of the Secretary of War to the defects of the 
plan, and avowedly confessed that it had not answered the expectations 
which had been entertained for it. 

* * * * * * * 

‘ ‘A bill was accordingly introduced in the House of Representatives 
in 1827 for reestablishing the Ordnance Corps as a separate organiza¬ 
tion, when the chairman of the Committee on Military Afi[‘airs (Mr. 
Vance) stated that ‘the plan which had been tried of appointing only 
four supernumerary captains as permanent officers in the ordnance 
service .was no more than an experiment, and had been found not to 
be attended with beneficial consequences.’ * * * 

“The bill did not become a law at this session. 

* * * * -K- * * 

(Page 104.) “ * * * The annual report of Colonel Bomford for 

1831 was transmitted to Congress November 21,1831, by the Secretary 
of War, and the latter, alluding to the condition of the Ordnance 
Department, says: 

“ ‘ * * * Unless our arms are well fabricated and preserved and 

in sufficient abundance and unless we keep pace with the improve¬ 
ments which modern science and ingenuity are making, the conse¬ 
quences may hereafter prove disastrous. The necessaiy provision for 
these objects can not be made without much time and experience, and 
that they may be ready for war they must be procured in peace. A 
stable and efficient organization is therefore essential to the Ordnance 
Corps, and in the report of the officer at the head of it will be found 
his views of its present condition. I recommend the subject to your 
favorable notice.’ * * * 

“A bill was therefore introduced in the Senate early in the session 
(first session. Twenty-second Congress) providing for the reorganiza¬ 
tion of the Ordnance Department, which, by a subsequent debate in 
the House on the same bill we are informed, was passed by a unani¬ 
mous vote of the Senate. * * * At the conclusion of the discussion 
in the House the vote was taken on the bill—yeas 101, nays 66—and 
the bill was duly approved and became a law on April 5, 1832. 

“Such is the history of the Ordnance Department from 1821 (when 
it was merged in the artillery) to 1832, when, the merging having 
proved bv its results an utter failure, it resumed its previously dis¬ 
tinct organization and entered upon its career as a staff corps of the 
Army. The experiment of a mixed or merged organization had been 
tried and experience, the only infallible test of excellence, had brought 
conviction of its want of efficiencv to the minds of the colonel on 
ordnance duty, the Secretary of War, and finally to Congress. The 
records of the times are replete with confessions of inefficiency and 


139 


confusion, and so far as the improvement of the material of the 
Ordnance Department was concerned the merged period may be con¬ 
sidered one of utter stagnation. That -system and uniformity of 
manufacture which have characterized the labors of the Ordnance 
Department since its resuscitation found no place in the merged 
organization. Nor can this be wondered at, since the report of 
Colonel Bomford in 1830 says that ‘ during the eight years that the 
system had been in operation one hundred and tifty diiferent officers 
had been detached and engaged in the performance of ordnance duties.’ 
Such a constant change in details must prevent officers from taking- 
more than a casual interest in their new but temporary duties, even 
at large stations where important duties are performed. Officers 
undergoing such a routine instead of being bettered by it would 
become poor officers in their own special branch and much worse 
ordnance.” 

* ****** 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Benet: 

(Page 186.) ‘‘Without reference to the doctrine of specialties, 
which is so well established, especialh^ in the execution of labor of an}- 
extent, it is sufficient to say that the experience of the war found no 
fault in the organization of the Army in its general features. All 
army organization is for war purposes, and while a consolidation of 
these three departments (Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay) might 
possibly be an economical measure in time of peace—of which 1 can 
not judge—it might be at the expense of efficiency, and in the event 
of war might lead to ultimate disaster. Our whole staff organization 
is intended for expansion in time of war, and this consolidation would 
not unlikely end in an unwield}^ department, with possibly not even 
economy to recommend it.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Charles P. Kingsbury, U. S. A. (retired), late of the 
Ordnance Corps; brevet brigadier-general; served in the Mexican 
war; during the civil war was chief ordnance officer. Department of 
the Ohio and Ariu}^ of the Potomac. 

(Page 36.) “ The most important principle to be observed in a mili¬ 

tary organization is simplicity of administration b}^ making the num¬ 
ber of bureaus or chiefs of administration a minimum. * * * A 

single department of suppl}" made up of the most experienced officers 
of the present divers departments might efficiently perform all the 
duties now belonging to the Subsistence, Quartermaster’s, and Ord¬ 
nance departments. * * * 

(Page 37.) “If the Ordnance Corps is to be continued with the 
several grades now recognized by law, all future vacancies below the 
grade of major should be filled by selection, from the cavalry, artillery, 
and infantry, of officers who have served at least five years, and these 
selections should not be permanent until after a certain term of service 
in the corps had developed in the officer a proper aptitude and fitness 
for its peculiar duties. * * * In 1821 the Ordnance Corps was 

merged in the artillery, but the result was not such as had been antici- 


140 


pated or predicted. That there are some plausible reasons now for 
repeating the experiment can not be denied, but it is believed that the 
substantial benefits of such a combination can be secured, and what is 
most worthy of preservation in the present organization be retained, 
without the radical change involved in an affirmative answer to the 
question. To abolish the corps absolutely is to sacrilice the most 
valuable element it possesses in the catalogue of professional qualifi¬ 
cations, for, whatever may be his material ability or strictly scien¬ 
tific attainments, it is the experience of a staff officer, the wisdom 
gathered and compacted from the study and observation of years, 
that is worth most to the country. * * * my judgment, there 

should be no Adjutant-General’s Department; but for the regulation 
of details and the preservation and classification of the records of the 
Army, and for the ready availability of these records in military 
administration, there should be an officer—call him adjutant-general 
if you please—permanently in charge of the Bureau, with one assist¬ 
ant, of a grade next below his own, and who should succeed to the 
higher place in case of vacancy.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Albert J. M^^er, Chief Signal Officer, U. S. A., brevet briga¬ 
dier-general; entered the service in 1854 as assistant surgeon; after¬ 
wards Chief Signal Officer with rank of brigadier-general. 

(Page 156.) ‘‘The consolidation Avould be an experiment. The 
Commissary, Quartermaster’s, and Pay Departments successfully dis¬ 
charged their duties, which were very extensive, during the late war 
under their present organization.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Cuvier Grover, First Cavalry, U. S. A., brigadier-general of 
volunteers, served in the Army of the Potomac, commanded a division 
in the Nineteenth Corps of the Department of the Gulf, and in the 
Shenandoah campaign. 

(Page 50.) “I do not think it would be advisable to consolidate the 
Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments in one.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Innis N. Palmer, Second Cavalry, U. S. A., brigadier-general 
of volunteers, served in the Mexican war, and in the civil war was 
brigade, division, and corps commander. 

(Pape 51.) “It is a matter of great doubt with me whether it would 
not therefore be for the interest of the service to consolidate the Quar¬ 
termaster’s, Commissary, and Fay departments.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Joseph J. Reynolds, Third Cavalry, U. S. A., major-general of 
volunteers, chief of staff', Army of the Cumberland; corps and depart¬ 
ment commander. 

* * ***** 

(Page 209.) “Q. State whether, in your opinion, any departments 
of the staff' of the Army can, advantageously to the service and the 


141 


country, be consolidated; if so, what departments, and for what rea¬ 
son^—A. Would not advise such consolidation; would reduce the 
number of officers in these branches of the service so as to retain only 
a number sufficient to supply one officer of each branch to all military 
division and department headquarters, in addition to the number 
required in the city of Washington. Abolish the heads of all these 
departments, and detail an officer of the Department to act as such 
during his tour in Washington. Prohibit by law any officer of these 
stall' corps from service in Washington for a longer period than four 
consecutive years. iVIajor should be the highest grade permanently on 
duty in these branches of the stall', and better to have no lower grade. 

***** * * 

Q. Could the ordnance and artilleiy corps be advantageously con¬ 
solidated, and what would be the etl'ect in point of economy and effici¬ 
ency? State 3 "Our reasons for 3 "our views upon the subject.—A. 
Would advise this consolidation or regulate the service so that artil- 
leiy officers could have tours of dut^^ at arsenals of construction, for 
improvement. A better plan would be to abolish the Ordnance Depart¬ 
ment, as a separate organization, and merge it into the artilleiy. A 
certain number of officers must be on ordnance duW; would supph^ 
them lyv detail, as a rule, from officers of artilleiy, or abolish the lower 
grades in the Ordnance Department and have no officer of less rank 
than major. Would assign no officer to this department on graduation 
from the Military Acadeny.” 

***** * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Re^uiolds. 

(Page 54.) ‘‘Yes, I think it practicable (to consolidate the Quarter¬ 
master’s, Commissary, and Pay departments). 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Benjamin S. Roberts, U. S. A. (retired), late of Third 
Cavalry, brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; 
during the civil war was chief of cavaliy, Department of the Gulf, and 
commanded cavalry division. District of West Tennessee. 

(Pages T-6.) “The Subsistence and Pay departments can be consoli¬ 
dated‘advantageously ’ into the Quartermaster’s Department. * * * 

It would insure more" prompt settlement of all accounts for purchase, 
supplv, and pay of the Army * * * and simplify systems of 

auditing. * * * One great supplving and pay department could 

be made efficient and far more economical. 

* * * ordnance and artillery could be consolidated to 

advantage, promoting efficienc}^ and with great economj^. * * * 

Ordnance is only one branch of artillery, and can never be carried to 
an^^ high degree of perfection, independent of practical experience 
both in the held, in garrison, forts, and fortihcations. Ordnance offi¬ 
cers * * * do not become practical artillerists, and practical 

artillerists can never become eminent and carry artillery to its highest 
perfection, without experience in the fabrication of artillery. 

Q. “Could the Adjutant and Inspector-General’s departments be 
consolidated?—A. “ I think not. The Adjutant-General’s Department 


142 


as an independent permanent organization should be abolished, and a 
system of detail by selection from the line of the Army substituted. 

(7). “The Inspector-General’s Department should not be consoli¬ 
dated. * * * Permanence and independence of detail in such a 

department is an exacting necessity to its efficiency and usefulness. 
Resentments, revenge, and retaliation would pursue the most zealous 
and faithful officers under any plan of detail that could be devised.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Capt. Guy V. Henry, Third Cavalry, U. S. A., colonel Fortieth 
Massachusetts Volunteers; served on the staff of General McDowell; 
batteiy, battalion, regimental, and brigade commander, afterwards 
brigadier-general, U. S. A. 

(Page 190.) “I think if consolidation is necessary, the only two 
departments that could be advantageously consolidated would be the 
Quartermaster’s and the Commissaiy. * * * j think, therefore, 

it would not be well to consolidate the pay corps with the other two; 
but, if necessary, the Quartermaster’s and Commissary departments 
might be consolidated.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Ranald S. Mackenzie, Fourth IT. S. Calvary, brigadier-general 
of volunteers; assistant engineer. Ninth Army Corps; regimental, 
brigade, and division commander; commanded cavalry division. Army 
of the James; afterwards brigadier-general, IT. S. A. 

(Page 57.) “Of the consolidation of the artilleiy and ordnance I 
have no very special opinion. It would, probably, be a benefit to the 
artillery, and not good for either the cavalry or infantry, also armed 
by the ordnance. * * * I do not believe that either the Adjutant- 
General’s or the Inspector-General’s Department should be decreased. 
I believe that they should be consolidated, and that there should be a 
careful revision and alteration of the laws regulating and governing 
these departments; * * * that it would be better were no posi¬ 

tions made permanent in the joined department, at least in the lower 
grades, and that, in the higher, transfers for very considerable periods 
of time to service with troops would be a benefit. * * * 

(Page 58.) “I believe that it would be practicable to consolidate 
the Quartermaster’s, Subsistance, and Pay departments, and to largely 
decrease the total number of officers, to improve their administration, 
and to lessen expenses, both in personnel, and more yet by improved 
administration.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. James Oakes, Sixth Cavalry, U. S. A., brevet brigadier- 
general; served in the Mexican war; in the civil war served in the 
Army of the Ohio, Army of the Mississippi, and after 1863 on recruit¬ 
ing and mustering duty. 

(Page 61.) “I think^ it would be practicable to consolidate the 
Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments into one corps. 
* * * opinion the interests of the staff' and line have become 

too distinct; they should be one and the same, and all under control of 
the General of the Army.” 


143 


Banning report, 1876. 

Col. bamuel D. Sturgis, Seventh Cavalry, U. S. A.; brigadier-gen¬ 
eral of volunteers; served in the Mexican war and in the civil war; 
was chief of staff to General Hunter; served in the army of the 
Potomac, and was chief of cavalry, army of the Ohio. 

(Page 62.) ‘"Yes, not only practicable but advisable (to consolidate 
the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments).” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Edward Hatch, Ninth U. S. Cavalry; brigadier-general of 
volunteers; brigade and division commander; commanded cavalry 
division, army of the Tennessee. 

* ****** 

(Page 100.) “Quartermaster’s and CA^mmissary departments can be 
consolidated; also artillery and ordnance, as a matter of economy and 
effectiveness.” 

* ****** 

(Page 101.) “The ordnance and artillery could be consolidated 
advantageously. There would be economy in it, since the artillery 
during peace could guard the arsenals and do nearly all the duties of 
the ordnance corps. * * * 

“The Adjutant-General’s and Inspector-General’s departments could 
not, in my opinion, be consolidated with propriety.” * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Hatch: 

(Page 63.) “It would (be practicable to consolidate the Quarter¬ 
master’s, Commissary, and Pa\" departments).” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Wesle}^ Merritt, Ninth Cavaliy, U. S. A.; major-general 
of volunteers; commanded cavalry brigade and division. Army of the 
Potomac, and in the Shenandoah and Richmond campaigns; afterwards 
major-general, CT. S. A. 

* ****** 

(Page 156.) “In my opinion it w^ould be advantageous to the service 
to consolidate the Quartermaster and Pa}^ departments; that is, require 
the quartermasters in addition to their other duties to make all 
payments to the Army. 

* * * * * * * 

“I do not think it would be better to have a single department of 
supply, nor to effect a greater consolidation than that mentioned 
above. 

****** * 

“Such consolidation would not in my opinion reduce the number of 
officers required to efficiently perform "the duties of the suppl}^ depart¬ 
ment as it now exists or when consolidated. 

****** * 

“The effect of adopting a system whereb}" compan}- and detach¬ 
ment commanders should pay their commands would, I think, be 


144 


disastrous. Apart from the liability to produce fraud and embezzle¬ 
ment on the part of those officers whose responsibilities might not be 
commensurate with the sums which would pass through their hands, 
it would diminish the respect of the enlisted men for officers thus 
brought in the relation to them of an overseer or boss workman. 

* * * vf- * * * 

“I see no reasons why the artillery should be rendered different from 
the other arms of the service by a consolidation with the ordnance. The 
duties of the officers of the ordance and artillery are as distinct as the 
duties of the cavalry from either of them. A consolidation could not 
decrease the aggregate number of officers, if efficiency is regarded, 
and would tend to favoritism and exclusiveness. 

‘‘I do not think that the Adjutant and Inspector-General’s depart¬ 
ments could be consolidated to advantage, either for efficiency or 
economy. The Inspector-General’s Department I consider full}^ as 
important as that of the Adjutant-General, if not more so, on account 
of the personal supervision necessary for the perfect efficiency of the 
Army on the part of the former department. A consolidation could 
accomplish nothing toward reducing the number of officers in these 
departments, if their efficient organization be kept in view. I know of 
no reasons why the grade of cajjtahi would not be useful as well as 
economical in both these departments.” 

****** * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Benjamin H. Grierson, Tenth Cavalry, U. 8. A.; major-general 
of volunteers; commanded cavalry brigade, division, and corps; 
brevetted major-general for gallant services in raid through Missis¬ 
sippi; afterwards brigadier-general, U. 8. A. 

(Page 150.) ‘‘Yes. I think that the Quartermaster’s, 8ubsistence, 
and Pay departments could be advantageous^ placed under one sup¬ 
ply department, for the reason that such consolidation would facilitate 
business generally, and especiall}^ in the delivery of stores and the 
prompt payment of troops. 8uch consolidation would reduce the 
number of staff' officers at least one-third. The work could be done 
by the addition of one clerk in each department to the officer now 
charged with a single supply department at posts. 

****** * 

“It is not advantageous to consolidate the Ordnance Department 
with any arm of the service, as it is a supply department and does not 
assimilate with the artillery any more than with the cavalr}^ and 
infantry; it might, however, be advantageously consolidated with the 
8ubsistence, Quartermaster’s, and Pay departments, as it is essentially 
and only a supply department. As at present organized, it is too inde¬ 
pendent of control; it should be like all other departments, subject to 
the control of division, corps, and department commanders. 

* ****** 

‘‘ I think the Inspector-General’s Department should not be con¬ 
solidated with any other, but that it should be abolished. Department 
commanders should be held responsible for the performance of military 
duty in their departments, inspecting them personally; or this could 
be done by inspecting officers, temporarily detailed by them for that 


145 


duty. In case any department required special inspection, it could be 
done by the General of the Army, division commander, or l)v any officer 
ordered by them on this speciafduty. 

‘‘The law for the regulation of the Arm}" already provides that 
inspections of posts be made by post commanders, and they are in fact 
more competent to discharge this duty than any other officer who might 
visit a post temporarily for duty. The Adjutant-General’s Depart¬ 
ment could also be abolished, and for this duty officers could be sup¬ 
plied by detail from the line of the Army.” 

******* 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Grierson: 

(Page 64.) “The Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, Ordnance, and Pay 
departments should be consolidated into one corps or supply depart¬ 
ment, and such consolidation would facilitate business and greath" 
reduce expenses.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Israel Vogdes, First Artillery, U. S. A.; brigadier-general of 
volunteers; served in Florida hostilities, and at beginning of civil 
war commanded Fort Pickens; served on staff of General Reynolds; 
commanded Morris and Fo ly islands, South Carolina: 

(Page 66.) “Yes, I think all the administrative departments should 
be united under one head, with the rank of brigadier-general.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Emory Upton, First Artillery, U. S. A.; brigadier- 
general of volunteers; commanded artillery brigade. Sixth Arm}" 
Corps; brigade and division commander; afterwards colonel Fourth 
Artillery. 

******* 

(Page 138.) “The effect of adopting a system whereby company and 
detachment commanders should pay their commands would unquestion¬ 
ably be detrimental to the public interests, and especially in time of 
war. Each company would require its money chest. These, on the 
march, would be distributed through all the wagon trains of the Army, 
at all times liable to robbery and capture, and constantly demanding 
the protection of strong guards. Again, the principle of the Govern¬ 
ment requiring disbursing officers to give sufficient bonds would have 
to be violated, as the responsibility for the funds might shift with 
every casualty in the regiment, making it impracticable to procure 
bonds. Another strong objection naturally arises on account of the 
uncertain character of officers who might enter the service temporarily 
in case of emergency. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 139.) “The union of the ordnance with artillery, and the 
transfer of its officers to serve temporarily in the artillery, which is 
a prominent feature in the German staff' system, would keep them in 
sympathy with the Army and make them alive to every requirement 
of the service, while the careful selection of the captains of ordnance 
7414—00-10 


146 


from a class of young officers, who, by apprenticeship and examination, 
had demonstrated their fitness for promotion, could not fail to restore 
the scientific character of the corps and increase its efficiency. 

******* 
‘‘The Adjutant and Inspector-General’s departments could, in my 
opinion, be consolidated advantageously. 

* * * W vr * * 

“The duty of an inspector requires great firmness and fearlessness, 
and to be properly discharged the officer should not only have rank but 
he should be made thoroughly independent in his action b}^ having a 
permanent position in the Army. * * * 

“It is, further, very important that a knowledge of the responsible 
duties of these officers should not be confined to the few officers in that 
department, but should likewise be extended through the troops of the 
line, which can easily be accomplished by permitting first lieutenants 
of artillery, infantry, and cavalry to serve as adjutant and inspector 
generals, not exceeding four years at a time. By this method, in case 
of sudden war, accomplished adjutant and inspector generals could 
instantly be selected for every brigade, division, and corps in the new 
army. By consolidating the two departments as the}" now stand, stop¬ 
ping the promotion till the number of officers in each grade is reduced 
to the number proposed, five officers only would have to be absorbed to 
reach the new basis.” 

******* 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. John M. Brannan, First Artillery, U. S. A.; brigadier-general 
of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war w"as 
divdsion commander in the Army of the Cumberland; afterwards 
colonel Fourth Artillery: 

(Page 46.) “ One department of supply could discharge the duties of 
three departments—Quartermaster, Commissary, and Pay. The same 
reason that applies to the duty of a post quartermaster and commissary 
will apply to the purchasing and transporting department of the Gov¬ 
ernment. The Pay Department could be added without requiring too 
much labor from the same officer. I don’t believe every officer is 
adapted for the duties of a supply officer, particularly a quartermaster 
and commissary. It requires a peculiar knowledge for these depart¬ 
ments so that the Government would not be sw"indled by shoddy 
articles. He should be what is usually understood as a shrewd hmi- 
ness man, with great energy and industry and practical common sense. 
Honesty is, of course, the first requisite.” * * * 

(Page 47.) “I believe it would be of great advantage to the service 
and country to consolidate the Ordnance Department and artillery regi¬ 
ments into one corps; abolish the regimental organization of artillery, 
as it is in all European armies; have a chief of ordnance and artillery; 
* * * require the chief of ordnance and artillery to detail a 

sufficient number of officers of the corps for service at the arsenals, 
armories, and foundries for the period of two or three years. When 
an officer is discovered to have a peculiar and unusual talent for inven¬ 
tion or improvements in ordnance generally, let him remain per- 


147 


manently at the arsenal or foundr}^ so that the country could have the 
benefit of his superior ability in that specialty. * * * 

I don’t think it would be any advantage to consolidate the Adjutant 
and Inspector General’s departments. An inspector-general should 
know everything about an army; be posted as to accounts, so as to 
detect immediately anything wrong or irregular in the duties of a dis¬ 
bursing officer; understand everything relative to the interior disci¬ 
pline, economy, and police of a post, battery, troop, or company; be 
perfectly acquainted with all kinds of drill of artillery, cavalry, and 
infantry, and their armaments, so that the commanding general can 
understand in a minute by the written or verbal report the precise 
condition and state of his command.” * * * 

Maish report, 1878. 

Maj. John INIendenhall, First Artillery, U. S. A., brevet colonel; 
served during the civil war as battery commander, Army of the Ohio; 
judge-advocate, Fourth Army Corps; chief of artillery. Twenty-first 
Army Corps; assistant chief of artillery. Army of the Cumberland; 
afterwards colonel. Second Artillery. 

(Page 161.) “T would have two staff departments only, besides the 
Medical, Engineer, and Ordnance corps—an executive (or adjutant- 
general’s) department and a supply department. The officers to be 
detailed; the chief of each to be selected from the general officers, and 
the other officers from the line. 

“Of the present staff departments I would consolidate the Quarter¬ 
master’s Department, the Subsistence and Pay departments into the 
supply department; the Adjutant-General’s, Inspector-General’s, and 
the Judge-Advocate-General’s departments into the executive or Adju¬ 
tant-General’s Department.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. William F. Barry, Second Artillery, U. S. A., brigadier-gen¬ 
eral of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; was chief of artillery. 
Army of the Potomac, and military division of the Mississippi during 
the civil war. 

(Page 2.) “The Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments 
of the Army can and ought to be consolidated in one department. 

* It would be more economical, because the business would be 
transacted with much greater simplicity and celerity, because the 
accountability would be more direct and simple. * * * Such a 

consolidation would not reduce the number of officers engaged in those 
duties, but would reduce the number who are specially so engaged. 
* * * The Ordnance and artillery could be most advantageously 

consolidated into one ‘corps of artillery.’ The effect in point of 
economy would be considerable, and in point of efficiency would be 
almost incalculable, * * * because fewer officers would be re¬ 
quired and because the field of selection for assignment would be 
greatly enlarged. * ^ * 


148 


‘*1 do not think the Adjutant-General’s and Inspector-General’s 
departments could be consolidated without great injuiy to the effi¬ 
ciency of the last named. Both might and ought to be reorganized, 
* * or might be abolished, and the officers who are to perform 

the duties might be made a matter of detail, but all appointees or 
detailed officers, as inspectors, should be special for the three arms—i. e., 
there should be inspectors of artillery, of cavalry, and of infantry.” 

* * * * * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Cob William H. French, Second U. S. Artillery, major-gen¬ 
eral of volunteers; served in the Florida and Mexican wars; corps 
commander during the civil war, afterwards colonel Fourth Artillery. 

(Page 52). ‘Gt is my opinion that the executive duties of the Quar¬ 
termaster, Commissary, and Pay departments can be performed b}" 
the same officer; that the administrative duties of heads of bureaus 
should remain distinct, as at present—a field officer of each branch at 
division and department headquarters. Reasons: Personal experience 
in active seiwice, where it has actually and successfully been put in 
practice.” * * * 

“It would not be better to have a single department of supply. The 
three bureaus should remain. The executive duties should be con¬ 
solidated.” * * ^ 

(Page 53.) “The effect of making company and detachment com¬ 
manders disbursing officers for their commands would be injurious to 
young and inexperienced officers, exposing them to temptation and the 
liability to loss by carelessness, want of aptitude, or theft. Post and 
regimental quartermasters could perform the duty. * * * 

“ It would not be adv^antageous to again merge the ordnance with 
the artillery, as was done in the reorganization of the Aruw in 1821. 
The experience of eleven years separated them again in 1832, and my 
experience as an artillery officer in the Florida, Mexican, and other 
wars since that time, commanding light and heavy artilleiy, is that the 
present is the most economical and efficient system, both for ordnance 
and artillery. The ordnance department has always proved equal to 
the emergency, and in my opinion is beyond the necessity of going- 
back to the acknowledged failure of 1821-1832. Officers of artillery 
who mind their legitimate business on this coast find abundance to 

* * f . 

“The duties of an adjutant-general and an inspector-general are so 
distinct that I can not assimilate them. An efficient armv must have 
both.” * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. George W. Getty, Third Artillery, U. S. A., brigadier-general 
of volunteers, served in the Mexican war, and during the civil war in 
the Arm}" of the Potomac and the Shenandoah campaign; was for a 
time acting inspector general, Army of the Potomac. 

(Page 67.) “It would be practicable; but to consolidate the three 
corps (quartermaster’s, commissary, and pay) into one would not in 
my opinion be for the best interests of the service.” 


149 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Horace Brooks, Fourth Artillery, U. S. A., brevet brigadier- 
general, served in the Florida and Mexican wars; during the civil war, 
regimental commander and on recruiting and mustering duty. 

(Page 51.) think the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay 
departments could be advantageously consolidated, and that those 
duties could be performed by one staff corps with a less number of 
officers than now required in the three separate departments. * * * 

‘Hf the ordnance and artilleiy had never been separated, and thus 
created the chasm which now exists between them, I think a united 
corps would have continued efficient, but under existing circumstances 
it would take years to make it so. 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Brooks: 

(Page 68.) ‘‘Yes (practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster’s, 
Commissary, and Pay departments).” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Henry J. Hunt, Fifth Artillery, U. S. A.; brigadier-general 
of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was 
chief of artillery. Army of the Potomac, succeeding General Bariy. 

(Page 73). “Practicable, but perhaps not advisable (to consolidate 
the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments).” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Maj. Truman Seymour, Fifth Artillery, U. S. A.; served in the 
Mexican war; during the civil war was brigade and division com¬ 
mander; brigadier-general of volunteers. 

(Page 55.) “The Quartermaster’s and Subsistence departments could 
be consolidated, and without diminishing the efficiency of their service 
during war as well as in peace. * * * 

“The payment of troops, however, involves wide knowledge upon 
points and decisions not assimilated to that required in other supply 
departments, and the duties and responsibilities of paying large num¬ 
bers of men in time of war are so greatly increased that the interests 
of the service would probably best be promoted by preserving this as 
a separate organization. * * * 

* * * * * * * 

“The ordnance and artillery can not be consolidated without impair¬ 
ing the efficiency of each or both.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Capt. Robert E. Johnston, First Infantry, U. S. A.; major. Eighth 
Pennsylvania Volunteers, and lieutenant-colonel. Veteran Reserve 
Corps; served in the Army of the Potomac; regimental commander; 
three brevets. 

(Page 200.) “I do not think anything will be gained by it (the con¬ 
solidation of the Quartermaster’s,*^Commissary, and Pay departments). 


150 


except probably making an additional major-general. The same 
duties exactly will be performed by the same officers. If consolidated 
into one corps, the head of the corps would evidently want additional 
rank and you would be required to have the same officers you have now.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Samuel W. Crawford, Second Infantiy, U. S. A.; brigadier- 
general of volunteers; division commander at Antietam and Gettys¬ 
burg; brevet major-general. 

(Page 85.) ‘‘That there are certain departments of the staff which, 
if united, would prove more advantageous to the service in point of 
economy and efficiency there is no doubt, in my judgment, but such 
union should be so eff ected as to be susceptible of expansion in case of 
any increase in the numerical force of the Army. 

* * * judgment, such consolidation can be advanta¬ 

geously attained; and, first, by a consolidation of the Commissary 
with the Quartermaster’s Department; second, an interchange of dut 3 ^ 
of the ordnance and artilleiy, and, third, a consolidation of the Adju¬ 
tant-General’s and Inspector-General’s departments.” 

* * ■5;- * * * * 

(Page 87.) “Pay Department: But in regard to the consolidation of 
the Pay Department, it is very questionable whether that important 
department could, with advantage, be merged in anv other. Its duties 
are specific, and require experience and separate and distinct individual 
responsibiliG^ and accountability. * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 88.) * * * “ The officers of the Adjutant-General’s and 

Inspector-General’s Department are nearer to the line of the Army 
than any other of the staff*. Their duties concern the personnel of the 
Arm}^, and they come directly in contact with the machineiy of the 
service in all of its workings, and upon the agency of these two 
departments largely depends the efficiency" of the Army. 

“The officers of these departments embrace many of the best of 
their grades in the Armv, and if now consolidated into one department 
and increased, a larger influence would be exerted for good to the 
Army. 

* * ‘-‘Tiien, if the consolidated corps was increased by- addition 

from the line, and the officers after a specific term of service were 
subject to a return to their regiments, it would send back to the line 
from time to time men instructed in these important staff duties. It 
w"Ould give us in time of war a class of officers to draw from for the 
service generally whose value could not well be overrated.” 

* * * * * * * 

Maish report, 1878. 

Col. De Lancey" Floy-d-Jones, Third Infantry, U. S. A.; served in 
the Mexican war and civil war; regimental commander. Army of the 
Potomac. 

(Page 121.) “I think the present organization of the staff* depart¬ 
ment veiy good. 1 have no changes to suggest. 

* * *x- * * * * 

I do not favor any such ‘changes or reductions,’ ‘by consolidation 
or otherwise. ’ ” 


151 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Silas Casey, U. S. A. (retired), late of Fourth U. S. Infantry; 
major-general of volunteers; served in the Florida war, Mexican war, 
and war of the rebellion. 

* ****** 

(Page 92.) "‘I am of the opinion that the Quartermaster’s, Com¬ 

missary, and Pa}^ departments of the Army could be advantageous!}" 
consolidated, for the general reason of greater efficiency. 

* * * * * * * 

‘"The chief of the department of supply should be an officer of 
talent and of good administrative ability, and should have the rank of 
a major-general, to be selected from the Army. The department 
should be so constituted as to admit of a sudden expansion to meet 
every emergency. 

* * * * * * * 

“ I am of the opinion that the ordnance and artillery corps could not 
be advantageously united, and principally for the following reasons: 

‘‘ The duties are not sufficiently homogeneous. It is the duty of the 
Ordnance Department not only to manufacture the cannon for the 
artillery corps, but the muskets, rifles, pistols, and swords for the 
cavalry and infantry; also the horse equipments for all. 

‘‘An accomplished ordnance officer should be a good metallurgist, 
and should also be acquainted with the different fulminates. He should 
know the methods of fulminating the various articles used in his 
department, and be able to judge of their quality.” 

* * * * * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Franklin F. Flint, Fourth Infantry, U. S. A.; served in the 
Florida war and civil war; acting inspector-general. Department of the 
Ohio; chief commissary of musters. Departments of the Ohio and 
Kentucky. 

(Page 80.) “I think not (practicable to consolidate the Quartermas¬ 
ter’s, Commissary, and Pay departments), having a due regard for the 
true interests of the service.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Nelson Miles, Fifth Infantry, U. S. A., major-general of vol¬ 
unteers, regimental, brigade, division, and corps commander. Second 
Army Corps, Army of the Potomac; in command of the Army since 
October 2,1895; now Lieutenant-General, U. S. A. 

(Page 81.) “They could be consolidated, the Quartermaster’s, Com¬ 
missary, and Pay departments.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. IVilliam B. Hazen, Sixth Infantry, U. S. A., major-general of 
volunteers, brigade, division, and corps commander; afterwards Chief 
Signal Officer, U. S. A., with the rank of brigadier-general. 

* * ***** 


152 


(Page 169). '‘I think the duties of the Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, 

and Pay departments could be advantageously performed by one 
department, to be known as the administrative branch of the Army, or 
as the department of supply.” 

* * ***** 

(Page 170.) ‘‘I think the ordnance and artillery could be advanta¬ 

geously consolidated, for the reason that the Ordnance Department as 
now constituted, is not a corps of soldiers, but of special master 
mechanics, separated from the Army, both in fact and from their 
associations, in sympathy. ^ * 

‘‘ I do not believe the Adjutant and Inspector-General’s departments 
could be combined with advantage, for the following reasons: Except 
in the case of the supply department, I do not believe it is ever advan¬ 
tageous, but always pernicious to permanently separate officers into 
corps apart from the troops. * * * Xhe duties of adjutant-gen¬ 

erals and inspectors should be performed by officers who form a part 
of the line of the Army, and who shall from time to time command 
troops and perform duty with them. In no other way can there be an 
army with that harmony of S37^mpathy and interest so essential to its 
efficiency.” 

* * ***** 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Hazen: 

(Page 83.) ‘‘Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments 
could be consolidated in a corps of one-third the present number of 
officers, and a sufficient detail of lieutenants from the cavalr^^ and 
and infantry. The Medical Department could dispense with one- 
fourth its officers. * * * Xhe Adjutant’s, Inspector’s, and Judge- 

Advocate’s departments, should be consolidated and reorganized, to be 
known as the general staff, and their duties should be largely^ military, 
not office. Lieutenants of the line should act as routine office men.” 

Burnside report, 1878. 

General Hazen: 

****** * 

(Page 453.) “II. In place of the Adjutant and Inspector-General’s 
departments, I recommend a general staff upon the model now adopted 
by all European governments, from the most extended experience and 
careful study; the officers to belong to regiments, taking tours of duty 
with them. In no other way can a staff always know what is best 
for an army. It fosters union and sympathy, while these officers are 
trained in the best possible school for high commands. 

“III. In place of the Quartermaster’s and Commissary’s depart¬ 
ments, I recommend a bureau of supplv. 

“ IV. In place of Medicafand Pa}^ departments, I recommend a med¬ 
ical and pa^^ bureau.” 

****** * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. John Gibbon, Seventh Infantry, U. S. A., major-general of 
volunteers. Served in the Mexican war. During the civil war was 


153 


chief of artillery to General McDowell; brigade, division, and corps 
commander; commanded Second Corps at Gettysburg; afterwards 
brigadier-general, U. S. A. 

(Page 146.) “I do not believe that any of the staff departments of 
the Army can be consolidated with benefit to the service. 

****** * 

do not believe it would be better to have a single department to 
discharge the functions of the Quartermaster’s, (Commissary, and Pay 
departments. 

****** * 

‘‘6. Could the Ordnance and Artilleiy Corps be advantageously con¬ 
solidated, and what would be the effect in point of economy and effi¬ 
ciency ? State your reasons for your views upon the subject. 

‘‘Yes. [ think both econoiu}^ and efficiency would be the result. 
This is a controversy of long standing in the Army. The consolida¬ 
tion has always been vigorously opposed by the Ordnance Department, 
principally, 1 think, from that ‘close corporation’ idea which objects 
to outsiders reaping any of those advantages which can be confined to 
a few. The ordnance and artillery duties are close!}" allied. There is 
no artillery officer whose efficiency would not be increased by the 
information and experience to be had in the Ordnance Department, 
and, vice versa, no ordnance officer who would not be benefited by 
experience in the artillery arm, in commanding troops and learning the 
practical use of the arms he is employed in manufacturing.” 

****** * 

(Page 147.) ‘‘ Every one who served in the Army during the late 

war knows that without our staff we could not have gotten along any¬ 
thing like as easily as we did. Such an expansion would have been 
much more difficult and inefficient if instead of having each of the sup¬ 
ply departments a separate and distinct organization, they had all been 
consolidated into one; and few, I think, will contend that such a con¬ 
solidated supply department would work well in time of war.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Gibbon: 

(Page 88.) “I do not think that consolidation of these departments 
(Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay) would add to their efficiency 
or the best interests of the service. It is, of course, practicable, but 
by no means advisable. 

(Page 89.) “It is a matter of very great importance to the service 
that some system of exchange between the subordinate grades of the 
Adjutant-General’s, Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, Inspector-General’s, 
and Pay departments, and the similar grades in the line, should be 
instituted. * * * Such a system, if properly inaugurated and 

gradually carried out, will not interfere with that permanency in the 
staff* departments by which efficiency is gained in specialties, since the 
officers of the higher grades would be changed only in case of marked 
unfitness.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. August V. Kautz, Eighth Infantry, U. S. A., brigadier-general 
of volunteers; served in Mexican war as private, First Ohio Volunteers; 


154 


during the civil war served in the Army of the Potomac; commanded 
cavaliT brigade, Army of the Ohio; chief of cavalry, Twenty-third 
Army Corps; commanded cavalry division, Army of the James, and a 
division in the Twenty-fifth Army Corps; afterwards brigadier-general, 

U. S. A. 

(Page 91.) ‘‘I believe it would add to the efficiency of the militaiy 

service if the Pay, Quartermaster’s, and Subsistence departments were 
all united into one corps for supplying the Army, but I have already 
given the opinion that there is a doubt whether such consolidation 
would cause any saving in the number of officers.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. John II. King, Ninth Infantry, U. S. A., brigadier-general of 
volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was 
brigade and division commander. 

(Page 93.) “I think not (practicable to consolidate the Quarter¬ 
master’s, Commissaiy, and Pay departments).” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Henry B. Clitz, Tenth Infantry, U. S. A., brevet brigadier- 
general ; served in the Mexican war, and during the civil war in the 
Army of the Potomac and in South Carolina. 

(Page 94.) think not (practicable to consolidate the Quarter¬ 
master’s, Commissary, and Pay departments). These departments as 
organized have worked admirably and satisfactorily through two long 
wars, and I do not think any change would be for the better, or would 
save expense.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. William H. Wood, Eleventh Infantry, U. S. A.; served in the 
Mexican war and civil war; assistant inspector-general on staff of 
General McDowell; assistant provost-marshal-general. Army of the 
Potomac. 

(Page 95.) “It would not only be practicable to consolidate the 
Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments, but, in my opin¬ 
ion, the Government would be better served by so doing. At almost 
every military post the duties of quartermaster and commissary of 
subsistence are now both performed b}^ an officer of the line, detailed 
for that purpose. In addition to these duties the troops could just as 
well be paid by him, as he is now a disburser of public funds.” 

Maish report, 1878. 

Colonel Wood: 

(Page 130.) “The number of general and staff' officers in the Army, 
and the number of field, staff, and line officers in each subdivision 
should, in my opinion, remain as now authorized by law. 

******* 

“The organization of the staff departments should, in my opinion, 
remain as at present. 


155 


“I do not think that the service would be benefited by any change 
or reduction in the various staff departments, by consolidation or other¬ 
wise.” 

******* 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. George P. Buell, Eleventh Infantry, U. S. A., brevet 
brigadier-general; during the civil war was colonel Fifty-eighth 
Indiana Volunteers ; served in the Army of the Ohio and Army of the 
Cumberland, brigade commander; afterwards colonel Fifteenth 
Infantry. 

(Page 154.) ‘‘In my opinion some of the staff departments could be 
combined and consolidated advantageous!}^ to the country and service— 
the Adjutant with the Inspector-General and Judge-Advocate depart¬ 
ments, the Quartermaster’s and Commissary with the Pay Department. 
Such an organization could be made so that greater economy, honesty, 
a higher standard of integrity and honor, more energy, less laziness, 
drinking, and gambling on the part of the officers of both line and 
staff, and a much more elevated degree of loyalty, pride of service, 
rank, and country, pn the part of the officers, would be the result, and 
have a similiar effect on the men. * * *” 

(Page 155.) Q. “Could the Ordnance and Artillery Corps be advan¬ 
tageously consolidated, and what would be the effect in point of 
economy and efficiency ?—A. No, sir. Efficiency would be destroyed. 
A man may be an excellent artillerist but be unable and incompetent 
to make the necessary theoretical investigations and calculations for 
the improvement of ordnance. The Engineer and Ordnance depart¬ 
ments might be one and the same.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Orlando B. Willcox, Twelfth Infantry, U. S. A., brigadier- 
general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; in the civil war was 
division and corps commander; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A. 

(Page 96.) “I do not think it would be practicable to consolidate 
the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments. It would 
require a chief of staff at the head of the whole whose importance 
might interfere with that of the Secretary of War, in whom the con¬ 
trol is practically centered already; in which case there would result 
either a divided responsibility, for one thing, or the chief of the sup¬ 
ply department would become a cipher. Besides, although the pres¬ 
ent staff' system has some defects, yet it has proved to be a great 
improvement on the consolidated system in vogue during and prev 
ous to the war of 1812.” 

Maish report, 1878. 

General Willcox: 

(Page 132.) “My experience with the staff' organization is that it is 
very good so far as the supply departments are concerned. * * * 

The supply departments might all be organized under one good head, 
but suppose it were a poor head, and suppose the poor head had 
influence ? The great change needed is in the method of selections for 


156 


the corps. I do not believe in consolidation of departments. Any 
change of form or name would not do away with the number required 
to do the work.” * * * 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Isaac V. D. Reeve, U. S. A. (retired), late of Thirteenth Infantry, 
U. S. A.; brevet brigadier-general; served in the Florida war, Mexican 
war, and the civil war; was captured by General Twiggs, and after¬ 
wards on mustering duty and in command of draft rendezvous. 

(Page 158.) ‘‘It is my opinion that the staff departments can not be 
consolidated with any advantage to the public service and the country. 
They have grown out of and been organized as necessities of the serv¬ 
ice, both in peace and war; have been recommended and approved by 
the best military heads the country has produced, and seem to offer the 
best organization admitting of ready expansion and contraction to 
meet the largest and smallest demands of the country as they have 
been (or may be) made manifest. * * * it is argued that the heads 

of these departments are very expensive grades to maintain. This is 
true, but to my mind they are the necessary expenses of efficiency. 

“Would it be better to have a single department of supply, whose 
duty it should be to discharge the functions of the Quartermaster’s, 
Commissary, and Pay departments? If so, give 3 ^our reasons. 

“It would be impossible in time of war, with large armies in the 
field, for any one officer, as the head of such a department, to perform 
in an efficient manner the duties now performed by the heads of the 
three departments named. Consolidation would be onl^" appointing a 
chief to the three departments, each still having an executive head, 
such chief performing the administrative duties in a very general waj", 
the final result being heads of an inferior grade and different title from 
the present incumb^ents. The duties of these departments must still 
run independent of each other, for they can not be amalgamated. * * * 

“The consolidation would not materially reduce the number of offi¬ 
cers engaged in these duties, for the duties must be done, and thev are 
only done now; and it is not just to assume that anv of these staff offi¬ 
ces are mere sinecures, for it is not true. If, in consolidation, their 
number should be materially" reduced, details from the line of a suffi¬ 
cient number would be added to those of the department of supply 
to insure the prompt performance of all the duties. Such details would 
be manifestly injurious to the service, as 1 have never known an 
instance where there were too many or even enough officers on duty 
with their regiments, the various causes of their absence even now 
proving detrimental. It is m\^ opinion that but small reduction would 
be made in the number of officers engaged in these duties, and then at 
the expense and injury of other branches of the service.” 

(Page 159.) “ What would be the effect of adopting a s\"stem whereby 
company and detachment commanders should pay^ their commands? 
* * * It would be gross injustice, both to the Government and to 

the officer, to place a large amount of funds in his (the company" com¬ 
mander’s) hands for custody and disbursement, he perhaps being a 
young and inexperienced lieutenant (for such do have command of 
companies), and with very insufficient means of protection; often in 
camp or on the march, on detached duties away from his post and his 
funds, and even though protected by an iron safe (which article of fur¬ 
niture would be necessary for every company commander), ever sub- 


157 


ject to robbery and perhaps innocent ruin. The present system is 
more secure, and can be so executed that all troops shall be paid accord¬ 
ing to law.” * * * 

*■‘6. Could the ordnance and artillery corps be advantageous^ con¬ 
solidated, and what would be the effect in point of economy and effi¬ 
ciency ? State your reasons for your views upon the subject. 

If the consolidation should be so made as to reduce materially the 
number of officers, it would be highly detrimental to the service, 
because the necessary details for ordnance duty would withdraw from 
the artillery corps so many officers whose presence with their compa¬ 
nies is almost indispensable. Besides, at the arsenals of construction 
and repairs, the duties can be much better done by officers specially 
instructed and experienced in them, and they are in fact, and must 
remain, permanent duties. 1 do not think that the economy or effi¬ 
ciency of the Ordnance Department or artillery corps would be 
enhanced by consolidation.” 

* ****** 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Philip R. De Trobriand, Thirteenth Infantiy, U. S. A., briga¬ 
dier-general of volunteers; brigade and division commander. Army of 
the Potomac: 

(Page 99.) “Such a measure (consolidation of the Quartermaster’s, 
Commissary, and Pa}^ departments) may have some objections to con¬ 
tend with and some partial difficulties to overcome, but I consider it 
altogether as not only practicable but also desirably for the Army.” 

Maish report, 1878. 

General De Trobriand: 

(Page 135.) “The Quartermaster’s, Commissaiy, and Pay depart¬ 
ments can and ought to be consolidated into one corps.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. John E. Smith, Fourteenth Infantry, U. S. A., brigadier- 
general of volunteers; division commander in Fifteenth, Sixteenth, 
and Seventeenth corps. Army of the Tennessee: 

(Page 101.) “The Engineer and Ordnance departments being scien¬ 
tific, require officers constantly practiced in the study, practical^ and 
theoretically, of their departments, respectively; it would be doubtful 
economy to consolidate them. * * * 

“I do not think it would be wise to consolidate the Pay Department 
with the Quartermaster’s and Commissary departments. The Pay 
Department has a large responsibility, which 1 presume will be very 
much increased if the Pension Bureau is transferred to the War 
Department.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Galusha Pennypacker, Sixteenth Infantry, U. S. A. Colonel 
Ninety-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers and brigadier-general of vol¬ 
unteers. Brigade commander; commanded brigade in expedition 
against Fort Fisher: 

(Page 103.) “I think it would (be practicable to consolidate the 
Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments).” 


158 


Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Thomas L. Crittenden, Seventeenth Infantry, U. S. A. Major- 
general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war as lieutenant-colonel 
Third Kentucky Infantiy; during the civil war was division and corps 
commander, Army of the Ohio, and corps commander. Army of the 
Cumberland: 

(Page 104.) ‘‘1 look upon the Ordnance Department of our Army 

as almost perfect. * * * Of the Subsistence Department I can only 

say that since I have known anything about it, i. e., since the Mexican 
war, it has been conducted with eminent efficiency.” * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Crittenden: 

(Page 104.) After witnessing the extraordinary ability and effi¬ 
ciency of the Quartermaster’s and Subsistence departments during 
the Mexican war and the late war, and considering their present 
efficiency, I think any change would be detrimental to the service.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Charles H. Smith, Nineteenth Infantry, U. S. A., colonel First 
Maine Cavalry; brevet major-general; commanded cavalry brigade 
in the Army of the Potomac. 

(Page 105.) 1 believe that the Bureau of Military Justice and the 

Inspector-General’s Department should be consolidated with the 
Adjutant-General’s Department, which should consist of just officers 
enough, with a brigadier-general for chief, to perform the duties of 
the Adjutant-General’s Office at Washington, and that lieutenant- 
colonels and majors of the line (lieutenant-colonels for inspectors and 
majors for adjutant-generals) should be detailed to perform all duties 
pertaining to those departments, except in Washington. * * * 

I also recommend that all captains detached from their companies 
be returned to duty with them, and that hereafter no captain shall be 
detailed or detached from duty with his company. * * * Lieutenant- 
colonels, majors, first lieutenants, and second lieutenants that have 
served at least three years with their companies, are the onh^ grades 
from which details should be made.” * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

Gen. 0. H. Smith: 

(Page 105.) “I believe that it is practicable to consolidate the 
Quartermaster’s and Commissary departments.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. George Sykes, Twentieth Infantry, U. S. A., major-general of 
volunteers; served in the Florida war, the Mexican war, and war of 
the rebellion; commanded Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac: 

(Page 106.) “It would not be practicable to consolidate the Quar¬ 
termaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments. Division of labor, if 
performed by faithful and competent officers, their number not in 
excess of the present wants of the service, is advantageous in every 
respect.” 


159 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Lieut. Col. Alfred Sully, Nineteenth Infantry, U. S. A.; brigadier- 
general of volunteers; served in the Florida war and the Mexican 
war; in the civil war was brigade commander, afterwards colonel 
Twent 3 '-tirst Infantry. 

(Page 39.) “I think the Adj utant-GeneraPs, Inspector-General’s, and 
Judge-Advocate-General’s departments could be consolidated. Bv 
this means, officers of the Adjutant-General’s Department could attend 
to the duties of inspector and judge-advocate; there are so few officers 
in these two departments that thev can not attend to all of the duties 
pertaining to them. * * * 

"‘On some accounts, perhaps, it would be well to have one single 
department of supply". It frequently occurs that one officer could 
attend to all three of those duties (quartermaster, commissaiy, and 
paymaster) at his station, without having too much to do; it would 
also parth" obviate the necessity of putting inexperienced subalterns 
on duties of much responsibiliD^ as the three departments being con¬ 
solidated, there would necessarily be more officers available for these 
duties. * * * 

“I think the ordnance and artilleiy could be advantageously con¬ 
solidated; it would render both the artillery and ordnance corps more 
efficient. 

Officers placed on ordnance duty should be selected with the great¬ 
est care; their natural talent for such duty should be taken into con¬ 
sideration, as well as their capability in other respects. At present 
officers of the ordnance corps are selected from cadets who graduate 
near the head of their class. * * * 

“I think the Adjutant and Inspector General’s departments could 
be consolidated. AVe have veiy few officers in the Inspector-General’s 
Department; no doubt there is a sufficient number for. the present 
strength of the Armj^, if the Arm}" was concentrated; but scattered as 
it is all over the country, the number of the inspectors is altogether 
too small to attend properly to their duties, and in consequence of 
this officers of little experience are frequently detailed to perform 
this duty—one of the most important ones in the service. If officers 
of the Adjutant-General’s Department were made to do this duty in 
connection with their present duties, it would perhaps give the Army 
the benefit of officers experienced as inspectors.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Sully: 

(Page 109.) “1 think in time of peace, with additional clerks, one 
officer could in many cases attend to all three of these duties (quarter¬ 
master, commissary, and paymaster); but in case of war, I do not 
think it would work well.” 

Maish report, 1878. 

General Sully: 

(Page 138.) “I am of the opinion that the Adjutant-General’s and 
Inspector-General’s departments could be consolidated, and that the 
Adjutant-General’s Department could take charge of the Bureau of 
Justice, but this would make no important decrease in the number of 
officers.” 


160 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. David S. Stanley, Twenty-second Infantry, D. S. A.; major- 
general of volunteers; division and corps commander; chief of cavalry, 
Army of the Cumberland; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A. 

(Page 113.) ‘‘A single department of supply, embracing the Quar¬ 
termaster’s and Commissary departments, should work well; as I 
have written before, the duties are of the same nature. I do not think 
the Pay Department can be dispensed with. The number of paymas¬ 
ters might be greatly reduced. The absurdity comes in again, of fifty- 
tive paymasters to pay forty regiments. There are now ten mili¬ 
tary departments in the United States, and twenty paymasters. Two 
to each department—one to act as banker, the other to rectify and 
supervise accounts—are all that are necessary. And in point of fact, 
banking and supervising accounts is all that iiftj^-five of them do now. 
For live years I have been in this Upper Missouri country. The pay¬ 
ments for half the year (winter) have been made by cap<^ains of com¬ 
panies, or the trader, and a part of this time three, and always two, 
paymasters were stationed in Sioux City.” 

* * * * * * -X- 

(Page 141.) ‘‘6. Could the ordnance and artillery corps be advanta¬ 
geously consolidated, and what would be the effect in point of economy 
and efficiency? State 3 ^our reasons for your views upon the subject. 

* * * I believe the consolidation would bring more talent and 

more liberal ideas into the Ordnance Corps, and in time of war we 
probably would not have so many men killed with our own shells. 
But would not the command of arsenals become a subject of intrigue 
and favoritism in time of peace and the resort of skulkers from danger 
in time of war ? ” 

* * * * * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

General Stanley: 

(Page 110.) ‘‘It would be practicable but hardly advisable (to con¬ 
solidate the Quartermaster’s, Commissarv, and Pay departments).” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. Jefferson C. Davis, Twenty-third Infantiy; brigadier-general 
of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was 
brigade, division, and corps commander. 

(Page 111.) “The Pay and Subsistence departments can and should 
be united. Their duties are perfectly homogeneous. They should be 
under one head, that of ‘pay and subsistence.’ * * * 

“Medical Department: The general organization and working 
of this department is good; it can not be consolidated with anv 
other. * * * 

“The Adjutant-General’s and Inspector-General’s departments can 
and should be united; * * * their duties are homogeneous, and 
should be performed by the same officers. * * * 

(Page 113.) “I would, as before recommended, unite the Commis¬ 
sary and Pay departments, but the status of the Quartermaster’s 
Department I would not change except to reduce it in number, and 


161 


turn over none of its duties to the line officers. It disburses now, 1 
understand, about $12,000,000 annually; besides, it has large propert}^ 
responsibilities. Disbursements required to be made by the Quarter¬ 
master’s Department are very varied in kind and sometimes compli¬ 
cated; it is on this account the most difficult department to manage; 
extraA^agance in it is more difficult to correct.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Lieut. Col. Richard I. Dodge, Twenty-third Infantry, U. S. A.; 
during the ci\dl war was lieutenant-colonel and assistant inspector- 
general, Fourth Army Corps, and on recruiting and mustering duty; 
afterwards colonel, Ele\^enth Infantry. 

(Page 122.) I think it Avould be a A^eiy great mistake to consoli¬ 
date the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments. The 
duties of these three departments are very dissimilar, and one officer 
can not possibly attend to the details of all.” 

Coburn report, 1873. 

Col. Abner Doubleday, Twenty-fourth Infantry, U. S. A.; major- 
general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; was brigade, dm- 
sion, and corps commander during the civil war; commanded First 
Corps at GettA'sburg. 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 141.) ‘‘I think both the Commissar}" and Pay departments 
could be advantageously consolidated, in case the present system of 
making payments is to continue. Neither of these departments have 
enough to do. 

* * * * * •>:• * 

‘‘At the close of the Mexican war it was proposed by officers of 
rank, like Joseph E. Johnston and Robert E. Lee, to divide the Quar¬ 
termaster’s Department into two parts, on account of the overwhelm¬ 
ing amount of business w"hich appertained to it. 

* * * * * * * 

“ In my opinion it would be a great benefit both to the Army and 
to the Treasury to alloAV company and detachment commanders to pay 
their commands. Experience shows that when men are paid large 
amounts at long intervals, drunkenness, dissipation, and gambling 
ensue. * * * 

“The artillery and ordnance corps ought to be consolidated. The 
intelligence w"hich makes and improves arms, and the intelligence 
which uses arms, should be united to be efficient. 

* * * * * * * 

“As an adjutant general holds a very important and confidential 
relation to his immediate commander, and as the Inspector-General 
knows everything concerning the different portions of the command, 
it would be ad\"antageous to unite the two.” 

* * * * * * * 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col.'Joseph H. Potter, Twenty-fourth Infantry, U. S. A., brigadier- 
general of volunteers. Served in the Mexican war; during the civil 
7414—00-11 


162 


war was brigade commander, and chief of staff. Twenty-fourth Army 
Corps; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.: 

(Page 114.) “I think the ordnance and artillery might be consoli¬ 
dated without detriment to the service; * * * that the Pay, Quarter¬ 
master’s, and Commissary departments should be consolidated into 
one department; that the Adjutant-General’s and Inspector-General’s 
departments should remain as now constituted. 

* * * * * * * 

‘‘ 1 am of the opinion that the Pay, Commissary, and Quartermaster’s 
departments should be consolidated into one corps; that it is practi¬ 
cable, and that it would be for the best interests of the service.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. George L. Andrews, Twenty-fifth Infantry, C. S. A. During 
the civil war was lieutenant-colonel First Missouri Volunteers, major 
Seventeenth Infantry, and lieutenant-colonel Thirteenth Infantiy, 
regimental and brigade commander Army of the Potomac: 

(Page 116.) “The result of a consolidation (of the Quartermaster’s, 
Commissaiy, and Pay departments) will be veiy apt to be the same 
thing under a new name. The Subsistence Department gives general 
satisfaction. In regard to the Quartermaster’s Department, it is a 
difficult subject to handle.” 

RECOMMENDATIONS OF COMMITTEES AND EXTRACTS FROM 

BILLS REPORTED BY THEM PROVIDING FOR CONSOLIDATION 

OF AND DETAILS TO STAFF DEPARTMENTS, WITH REVIEW 

OF LEGISLATION ON ARMY ORGANIZATION BY GENERAL 

GARFIELD. 

Garfield report, 1869. 

Mr. Garfield, from the Committee on Military Affairs, nade the fol¬ 
lowing report: 

(Page 1.) “As the committee will not have an opportunity to report 
any bill to be acted upon before the expiration of the present Con¬ 
gress, they can only present the information they have gathered, and 
ask that it be printed for the information of all concerned, and for 
use in the next Congress. 

“The committee are convinced from their examination of the sub¬ 
ject tjiat a number of modifications in the organization of the Arny 
can be made, which will secure equal or greater efficiency at less 
expense. A few of the most important of these will be mentioned. 

“The staff' departments or corps are, in the opinion of the commit¬ 
tee, too numerous and too large in proportion to the line of the 
Army.” ^ ^ ^ 

(Page 2.) “The inquiries of the committee have satisfied them that 
the number of separate staff departments can be reduced by consolida¬ 
tion without detriment to the service and with considerable saving of 
expense.” 

(Note.— For views of committee on staff' in time of war, see page 15, 
ante; on consolidation of staff departments, see page 86, ante.) 


163 


Coburn report, 1873. 

Mr. Coburn, from the Committee on Militaiy Affairs, made the fol¬ 
lowing report: 

(Note.—F or views of the committee on testimony of arnn^ officers, 
see page 10, ante; on an efficient staff', see page 11, ante; on staff' in 
time of war, see page 16, ante; on permanent staff', details, etc., see 
page 22 , ante ; and on consolidation, see page 86, ante.) * * * 

(Page X.) “The committee * * * deem it advisable to pro¬ 
vide that an opportunity shall be afforded for as many officers as pos¬ 
sible to be put upon staff' duty. To do this, present vacancies should 
be kept open, and, if possible, others created; this can be done by 
promotion in the higher grades of the staff, without the creation of 
additional officers, there being already quite a number of vacancies in 
the lower grades of the staff. 

“ In order that these vacancies may be tilled by the most capable 
and meritorious officers, competitive examinations would probably 
furnish the best method of selection. And in order that as large a 
number of line officers as possible shall become acquainted with staff 
duties, a limited period should be tixed for continuance upon them. 
The Medical Department and the Bureau of Military Justice ought 
not to be included in these provisions, and the large number of 
vacancies in the Medical Department, and large number of contract 
surgeons employed, seem to indicate forcibly the importance of allow¬ 
ing new appointments in that Department.” 

(Page XI.) “The importance of having a chief of the various arms 
of the service has been often suggested, and it is believed that a capa¬ 
ble and thoroughly informed officer, whose duty it shall be to look after 
the interests of each arm, specialh", will add greatly to its efficiency. 

“The accompanying bill is submitted for consideration as in some 
measure embodying the foregoing suggestions: 

(Page XI.) “A BILL (H. R. 3937) to amend an act entitled ‘An act making appro¬ 
priations for the support of the Army for the year ending June thirtieth, eighteen 

hundred and seventy, and for other purposes,’ approved March 3, 1869. 

“Sec. 2. That whenever there is a vacancy in any department or 
corps of the staff', except in the Medical Department and Bureau of 
Military Justice, in any office below the grades hereinafter named, 
the Secretary of War shall detail an officer of the line to fill the same 
for a period not to exceed four years. And he shall appoint a board 
of not less than five officers, three of whom shall be of the line and 
two of the staff', to conduct competitive examinations of all officers 
who may be applicants or may be recommended to be detailed to ffll 
such vacancies in any corps or department of the staff'. And the 
Secretary of War shall detail those having the most favorable recom¬ 
mendations of said board to ffll all of said vacancies by detail, and not 
more than five officers from one regiment shall be so detailed at one 
time. And at the end of four years any officer so detailed may be 
transferred to other staff' duties for another term of four years, at 
the end of which time he shall be returned to his duties with his regi¬ 
ment. And in the Medical Department new appointments below the 
grade of major shall be lawful. 

“Sec. 3. Hereafter five vacancies in the grade of major shall be 
filled bj^ detail in the Adjutant-General’s Department; ten vacancies 
in the grade of captain shall be filled by detail in the Quartermaster’s 


164 


Department; six vacancies in the grade of captain shall be filled by 
detail in the Subsistence Department; ten vacancies shall be filled by 
detail in the grade of major in the Pav Department; ten vacancies in 
the grade of first lieutenant and five vacancies in the grade of second 
lieutenant shall be filled by detail in the Corps of Engineers; five 
vacancies in the grade of first lieutenant and five vacancies in the 
grade of second lieutenant shall be filled by detail in the Ordnance 
Department. And it shall be lawful to fill any such vancancy in the 
stall' by detail from the same or the next lower grade in the line. 
And no such officer shall be so detailed until he shall have served at 
least four 3 "ears with th6 troops in the field, if above the grade of 
second lieutenant, and if a second lieutenant, at least two 3 ^ears upon 
such dut}". And nothing herein prescribed shall be construed to pre¬ 
vent regular appointments and promotions in the permanent staff' for 
vacancies not hereby reserved for details. 

******* 

‘‘Sec. 5. There shall be detailed by the Secretar\^ of War, from the 
officers of the line, an ofiicer of artillery, one of cavaliy, and one of 
infantiy, not below the grade of major, to be several!}^ the chief of 
artillery, the chief of cavaliy, and the chief of infantry; and it shall 
be the duty of such chief of artilleiy, cavaliy, and infantry to super¬ 
vise the arming, the equipment, the clothing, the feeding, the supplies, 
the drill, the discipline, and the sanitaiy condition of his special arm 
of the service, under the direction of the Inspector-General of the 
Arm\\” 

FeWuaiy 11, 1873: H. R. 3937, introduced by Mr. Coburn, and 
referred to Committee on Military Affairs. 

Februaiy 13, 1873: Reported back b}^ Mr. Coburn from the Com¬ 
mittee on Military Affairs, with a report of the Committee on Staff 
Organization of the Amy", and recommitted. 

Coburn report, 1874. 

Mr. Coburn, from the Committee on Militaiy Affairs, made the fol¬ 
lowing report: 

(Note. —For views of the committee on permanent staff and details, 
see page 23 ante.) 

(Page III.) * * * ‘‘ The committee, therefore, deem it not to be 

unsafe to reduce the Army, now composed of thirty thousand men, to 
twenty-five thousand men of all arms. They found it necessary" to 
inquire into the expediency" of reducing the number of officers as well 
as men in the Army. It was found that the annual average decrease 
in the number of officers was about eighty-three.” * * * 

(Page IV.) “It is believed that the number of officers should be 
reduced with the men; and recommend that five regiments of infantry, 
one of cavaliy, and one of artilleiy be disbanded after the first of Jan¬ 
uary, 1875, and that the officers be assigned to other duties in other 
regiments, or to details in the staff corps. Many vacancies will neces¬ 
sarily" occur in the official list, both of the staff and line, and it is 
believed that in a short time the supernumeraiy force will be all 
absorbed and put upon regular duties.” * * * 

(Page VI.)“These reductions will take place gradually, but the 
larger part of them will occur within a year and continue until the 


165 


whole work is accomplished. The organization of the Army is to be 
left as complete as before, without any material or radical change; 
capable of expansion to the largest demands, and ready to meet the 
grav^est emergencies.” * * * 

(Page VII.) “The committee have prepared the following bill, and 
recommend its passage: 

(Page VII.) “A BILL (H. R. 2546) to provide for the gradual reduction of the Army 
of the United States.” 

******* 

“ Sec. 7. That the Adjutant-General’s Department of the Army shall 
hereafter consist of * * * . As vacancies occur in the grade of 

major, no appointment to till the same shall be made until the number 
shall be reduced to four; and thereafter the number of permanent 
officers in said grade shall continue to conform to said reduced number. 
And there shall be in addition eight assistant adjutants-general, with 
the rank, pay, and emoluments of captains of cavalry, to be detailed 
from the officers of the line of the Army.” 

(Page VIII.) “Sec. 8. That the Inspector-General’s Department 
shall consist of * * * ; and the Secretary of War may, in addi¬ 

tion, detail officers of the line, not to exceed four, to act as assistant 
inspectors-general: Provided^ That officers of the line detailed as act¬ 
ing inspectors-general shall have all the allowances of cavalry officers 
of their respective grades, and no new appointment shall be made in 
the Inspector-General’s Department until the number of inspectors- 
general is reduced to live.” 

Sec. 9. (Provides for the Bureau of Military Justice — no details.) 

“Sec. 10. That the Quartermaster’s Department of the Army shall 
hereafter consist of * * * . And there shall be in addition ten 

assistant quartermasters, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of first 
lieutenants of cavalry, and no appointments to fill the same perma¬ 
nently shall be made, but the same shall be made by detail from the 
lieutenants of the line of the Army. 

“ Sec. 11. That the Subsistence Department of the Army shall here¬ 
after consist of * * * . As vacancies shall occur in the grade of 

captain, no appointment to fill the same shall be made until the num¬ 
ber shall be reduced to eight; and thereafter the number of permanent 
officers in said grade shall continue to conform to said reduced num¬ 
ber; and the remainder, six in number shall be filled by detail.” 

Secs. 12 and 18. (Provide for the Medical and Pay departments—no 
details.) 

(Page IX.) “Sec. 15. That the Ordnance Department shall consist 
of * * * second lieutenants, with the same pay and emolu¬ 

ments as now provided by law. And as vacancies occur in the grade 
of first lieutenant, no appointment to fill the same shall be made until 
the number shall be reduced to ten; and thereafter the number of 
permanent officers in said grade shall.conform to said reduced number; 
and the remainder, six in number, shall be filled by detail from the 
officers of the line of the Army; and as vacancies shall occur in the 
grade of second lieutenant, no permanent appointment shall be made 
to fill the same until the number be entirely reduced; and thereafter 
the same, as far as shall be required by the exigencies of the service, 
shall be filled by detail from the officers of the line of the Army: 
Provided^ That no new appointment of ordnance storekeeper shall be 
made until otherwise provided by law. 


166 


‘‘Sec. 16. That whene\er a vacancy shall occur in any department 
or corps of the staff which is to be tilled by detail, it shall be the dut}^ 
of the Secretary of War to till the same from the officers of the line 
of the Army of the same or the next lower grade, for a period not to 
exceed four ^^ears with the same officer. And he shall appoint a board 
of not less than five officers, three of whom shall be of the line and two of 
the staff', to conduct competitive examinations of all officers who may 
be applicants or may be recommended to be detailed to till such vacan¬ 
cies. And the Secretary of War shall detail those having the most 
favorable recommendations of said board, and not more than five offi¬ 
cers from one regiment shall be so detailed at one time. And at the 
end of four years any officer so detailed may be transferred to other 
staff' duties for another term of four years, at the end of which time 
he shall be returned to his duties with his regiment, unless he shall 
be appointed permanently to fill a vacancy in the staff'. And no officer 
shall be detailed or appointed to serve in any department or corps of 
the staff' until he shall have served at least four years in the field with 
the troops, if above the grade of second lieutenant; and, if a second 
lieutenant, at least two years upon such duty consecutively. And no 
officer shall serve in an}^ one department or corps of the staff' by detail 
for a longer period than four years consecutively. 

“ Sec. 17. That no officer now in service shall be reduced in rank or 
mustered out by reason of any provision of law herein made reducing 
the number of officers in any department or corps of the staff., or by 
reason of the consolidation of regiments, as hereinbefore provided.” 

****** -X' 

March 17, 1874: H. R. 2546, reported b}^ Mr. Coburn from the 
Committee on Military Affairs. 

May 28, 1874: Bill considered. 

May 29, 1874: Bill passed House of Representatives. 

eTuly 23, 1874: “An act reorganizing the several staff corps of the 
Army,” approved July 23, 1874 (18 Stat., 244), reduced certain of the 
staff' department, but contained no provision as to details, except in 
the Inspector-General’s Department. 

Banning report, 1876. 

Mr. Banning, from the Committee on Militaiy Affairs, submitted 
the following report: 

(Note.— For views of the committee on Army organization see 
page 11, ante, and on consolidation see page 88, ante.) 

(Page 3.) * * * “The accompanying bill (H. R. 2264) ‘to pro¬ 
mote the efficiency of the Army, to provide for its gradual reduction, 
and to consolidate certain of its staff' departments, and for other pur¬ 
poses,’ is submitted for consideration, as embodying the conclusions 
deA^eloped through the labors of the committee. 

* * * reduction does not muster out or discharge a single 

worthy or efficient officer, unless the officer may so desire, and, in that 
event, he will receive a stated amount of pay.” * * * 

February 23, 1876: H. R. 2264—“To promote the efficiency of the 
Army, to provide for its gradual reduction, and to consolidate certain 


167 


of its staft‘ departments, and for other purposes,” introduced by Mr. 
Ba;nning‘, of Ohio, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. 
(Bill not printed in report of committee.) 

March 29, 1870: Reported back by Mr. Banning with a bill (H. R. 
2935, same title) as a substitute, and recommitted. 

June 1, 1876: Bill considered. The amendment offered by Mr. 
Hurlbut as a substitute for the bill was read, as follows: "'"Be it 
enacted^ etc.^ That the President of the United States be requested and 
directed to appoint a commission of seven officers of the Army, of dis¬ 
tinguished service and knowledge, who shall report through the Presi¬ 
dent, as soon as practicable, their opinions upon the best method of 
reorganizing the Army of the United States, and especially upon the 
best method of organizing the staff' departments, with a view to econ¬ 
omy and efficiency.” The yeas and nays were ordered, and the amend¬ 
ment was not agreed to. 

June 1, 1876: The bill passed the House of Representatives. 

elline 2, 1876: Reported to the Senate and referred to the Committee 
on Military Affairs. 

July 21, 1876: “An act making appropriations for the support of 
the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1877, and for other pur¬ 
poses,” approved July 21, 1876, provided in section 1 (20 Stat., 101): 
“That the whole subject-matter of reform and reorganization of the 
Army of the United States shall be referred to the commission herein¬ 
after provided for, who shall carefully and thoroughly examine into 
the matter with reference to the demands of the public service, as to 
the number and pay of men and officers and the proportion of the sev¬ 
eral arms, and also as to the rank, pay, and duties of the several staff' 
corps, and whether any and what reductions can be made either in the 
line or staff', in numbers or in pay, bv consolidation or otherwise con¬ 
sistently with the public service, having in view a just and reasonable 
economy in the expenditure of public money, the actual necessities of 
the military service, and the capacity for rapid and effective increase 
in time of actual war. The commission hereb}" created shall consist 
of two members of the Senate and two members of the House of Rep¬ 
resentatives, to be appointed by the presiding officer of each House, 
respective^, of the Secretary of War, and two officers of the Arm}-, 
one from the line and one from the staff corps, to be selected by the 
President with special reference to their knowledge of the organiza¬ 
tion and experience in service. Such commission shall * * * 

make report to Congress by the first day of the next session through 
the President of the United States. B^ joint resolution, approved 
January 15, 1877, the period fixed by the fourth section of the act of 
July 24, 1876, for the report of the commission was “extended to the 
29th da}" of January, 1877.” 

Maish report, 1878. 

•‘Mr. Maish, from the Committee on Military Affairs, submitted 
the following:” 

(Page V.) “The subcommittee of the Committee on Military 
Affairs, who were charged with the collection of information and facts 
in relation to the organization of the Army, beg leave to submit the 


168 

following testimony, reports, letters, and copies of bills agreed to by 
the committee: 

‘‘mr. Banning’s bill to reorganize the army of the uniteh 

STATES. 

* * * * * * * 

Sec. 7. That hereafter the Adjutant-General’s Department shall con¬ 
sist of * * *. And the President is hereby authorized to detail, 

from the captains and first lieutenants of the Army, such number, not 
exceeding ten, as he may deem necessary, to serve as assistant adjutants- 
general, who shall have, while so serving, the rank and pay of captain 
of cavalry. Vacancies in the grade of major in said department shall 
be tilled by selection from the officers who shall have been detailed to 
duty therein pursuant to the provisions of this act.” 

(Page VI.) ‘‘Sec. 8. That hereafter the Inspector-General’s Depart¬ 
ment shall consist of * * *. And the President is hereby author¬ 

ized to detail, from officers of the Army not below the rank of major, 
such number, not exceeding one for each military geographical divi¬ 
sion and department, as he may deem necessary, to serve as assistant 
inspectors-general. Vacancies in the grade of lieutenant-colonel in 
said department shall be filled by selection from the officers who shall 
have been detailed to duty therein pursuant to the provisions of this 
act. 

“Sec. 9. That all acts and parts of acts authorizing the appointment 
of a Judge-Advocate-General, an assistant judge advocate-general, or 
judge-advocates of the Army, so far as they, or either of them, author¬ 
ize the appointment of such officer, or either, or any of them, be, and 
the same are hereb}^, repealed; and the President is authorized and 
required, on or before the first day of July next, to honorably dis¬ 
charge from the service of the United States the Judge-Advocate- 
General and the judge-advocates of the Army: Provided^ That each of 
said officers shall receive, in addition to the pay and allowances due 
him at the date of his discharge, one year’s pay and allowances. 

“ Sec. 10 . That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint, from the officers 
of the Army not below the rank of captain, a suitable person as judge- 
advocate for the Army, who shall have the rank and pay of colonel, 
and shall perform the duties that have heretofore been performed by 
the Judge-Advocate-General of the Army. 

“Sec. II. That the Quartermaster’s Department and the Subsistence 
Department, as separate and distinct branches of the Army, are hereby 
abolished; and the President is hereb}^ authorized and required, on or 
before the first day of July next, to cause said departments to be con¬ 
solidated into one organization, which shall hereafter be known as the 
department of supplies. 

^ “Sec. 12. That the department of supplies of the Army shall con¬ 
sist of one chief of supplies, with the rank of brigadier-general, three 
colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, ten majors, and thirty-five captains, 
who shall each have the rank, pa}", and allowances of cavaliy officers 
of their respective grades. The chief of supplies shall be selected, 
length of service, military record, and efficiency considered, from the 
brigadier-generals of the present Quartermaster’s and Subsistence 


169 


departments: Provided, That the brigadier-^-eneral not selected as 
chief of supplies shall be assigned as inspector of said department; 
and upon the occurrence of a vacancy therein, the grade and position 
shall not be lilled: And^^rovided furthei\ That on the occurrence of a 
vacancy in the grade of chief of supplies, the inspector shall be pro¬ 
moted thereto, and when a vacancy shall next occur the President 
shall appoint one of the colonels of said department as such chief; 
and thereafter the chief of supplies shall have the rank of colonel.” 

(Page VII.) ""Sec. 13. That the President shall till the various- 
grades in the department of supplies not expressl}^ provided for in 
section tw^elve of this act by the assignment to duty therein of officers 
of the present Quartermaster’s and Subsistence departments; and such 
officers, when so assigned, shall retain the present relative rank held 
by them in their respective grades. After all these grades shall have 
been tilled as herein provided, no appointment shall be made to the 
grade of captain in said department until the number of officers of 
that grade is reduced below tifteen; and thereafter there shall be but 
lifteen captains in said department, and the President may, from time 
to time, detail, from the captains of the line of the Army, officers to 
serve as assistants in said department, not exceeding twenty at an}^ 
one time: Provided^ That the number of captains in said department, 
together with the captains of the line so detailed as assistants, shall 
not exceed, in the aggregate, thirty-five: And pyxwided further^ That 
nothing in this section contained shall be so construed as to prevent 
officers in command of troops from making such temporary details of 
officers for duties pertaining to the department of supplies as the}" are 
authorized to make by existing laws and regulations for duties per¬ 
taining to the Commissary or Quartermaster’s Department. Vacancies 
in the grade of captain in said department shall be filled by selection 
from the officers w"ho shall have been detailed to duty therein pursuant 
to the provisions of this act. 

* * * * * * * ' 

‘‘ Sec. 15. That until otherwise authorized by law, no new appoint¬ 
ments or promotions shall be made in the Medical Department of the 
Army; and the Secretary of War is hereby authorized and required to 
report to Congress, on the first day of the session next succeeding the 
passage of this act, what, if any, reductions can be made in said depart¬ 
ment without detriment to the service. 

“Sec. 16. That hereafter the Pay Department shall consist of * * 
Vacancies in the grade of major in said department shall be filled by 
appointment from the captains of the line of the Army. 

“ Sec. 17. That the President is hereby authorized and required, on or 
before the first day of July next, to constitute a board, to consist of the 
three major-generals of the Army, whose duty it shall be to examine 
into and report to the President, on or before the first day of Decem¬ 
ber next, upon the organization, practical working, and efficiency of 
the Corps of Engineers and the Ordnance Department, and to make 
such suggestions as, in the judgment of said board, will increase the 
usefulness and reduce the cost of their maintenance, which report, when 
so made, shall be submitted to Congress by the President, and, until 
otherwise authorized by law, no new appointments nor promotions shall 
be made in the Corps of Engineers or the Ordnance Department.” 

* * * * * * * 


170 


(Page IX.) Sec. 23. * Provided farther^ Thfit wo officer 

shall be detailed to any staff appointment or other situation the duties 
of which will detach him from his company, regiment, or corps,^ until 
he has served at least ffve years with the regiment or corps to which he 
properly belongs. 

* * * * . * * * 

‘‘ Sec. 28 . That no officer shall be detailed to duty in any staff, corps, 
or department, or be eligible to appointment or promotion therein until 
he shall have served at least five 3 ^ears in the line of the Army; and no 
such detail shall be for a longer term than four years, or for two suc¬ 
cessive terms in the same corps or department: Provided^ That the 
transfer of officers pursuant to the provisions of this act shall be with¬ 
out prejudice to their rank or promotion in the line, according to their 
said rank and seniority, which promotion shall take place according to 
law in the same manner as if they had not been so transferred.” 

* * ***** 

Januaiy 28, 1878: H. R. 2865. “To reorganize the Army of the 
United States, to consolidate certain of its staff departments, to reduce 
the cost of its support, and for other purposes,” introduced by Mr. 
Banning, of Ohio, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. 

February 25, 1878: Reported back by Mr. Banning with amend¬ 
ments, and recommitted. 

March 25, 1878: H. R. 4032. “To reorganize the Army of the 
United States,” introduced hy Mr. Banning, and referred to the Com¬ 
mittee on Militaiy Affairs. 

Ma}^ 6, 1878: Reported back b}" Mr. Banning with amendments, 
and recommitted. 

June 15, 1878: Conference report on Arm}^ appropriation bill (H. R. 
4867) agreed to. Mr. Hewitt, of the House conferees, said: “ When 
the conference committee upon this bill met, the}" found themselves in 
opposition, in absolute antagonism, upon three points: First, the 
number of men of which the Arnw was to be composed; secondty, the 
question of the immediate reorganization of the Arm}", and third, the 
transfer of the Indian Bureau from the Interior to the War Depart¬ 
ment. 

“Now the preponderance of votes in the Senate had been so great 
upon these three points as to be almost overwhelming, while the 
majority in the House on these three points was very narrow, running 
in one case down to four votes. * * * We therefore yielded the 

number of men, and they stand in the report of the conference com¬ 
mittee at 25,000. 

“On the question of reorganization we yielded the immediate 
attempt to reorganize the Army, but we procured in lieu thereof a 
joint committee of the Senate and the House, to be composed of five 
members of the House and three of the Senate, thus securing the con¬ 
trol of the committee to the House.” 

June 18, 1878: H. R. 4867 approved by the President (20 Stat., 145). 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Mr. Burnside, from the Joint Committee on the Reorganization of 
the Army, submitted the following report to accompany bill S. 1491: 

(Page 2.) “It is not deemed necessary to give in this report minute 
details of the changes made in the laws touching the Army, as the bill 


171 


explains itself. Many of the sections of the bill are identical with 
those now in the Revised Statutes; but as many changes in the present 
laws have been recomniended by the committee, it was deemed wise to 
make a new arrangement of all the sections to replace all the laws upon 
the statute books touching the Army except such chapters as the com¬ 
mittee recommends to leave unchanged, so that this bill, if adopted, 
will, with the unchanged chapters referred to, make a condensed and 
complete military code. 

The bill provides * * *. 

(Page 3.) “ That promotions shall be made by seniority in the differ¬ 
ent corps and departments, but that appointments to the rank of major 
(the lowest established grade) in the staff departments (other than in 
Medical Department) shall be made from the captains and first lieu¬ 
tenants of the line in the order of merit and service in the said depart¬ 
ments, but such appointments in the Ordnance Department are to be 
made only from the artillery. 

****** * 

'‘That the manufacture of ordnance and ordnance stores by the 
Ordnance Department be prohibited, and that all purchase of arms 
and ammunition be made in open market or by contract.” 

****** * 

“A BILL to reduce and reorganize the Army of the United States, and to make 
rules for its government and regulation. 
****** * 

(Page 2 of part 2.) “Sec. 8. That the General Staff of the Army 
shall consist of one Adjutant-General, with the rank of brigadier- 
general, * * * and such captains and first lieutenants of the line 

as may be deemed necessary by the President, not exceeding sixteen, 
to be detailed as hereinafter provided; and officers of the General 
Staff other than aids-de-camp shall, according to the nature of their 
duties, be known as the adjutant, or the Assistant Adjutant, or as 
the Inspector or Assistant Inspector, General, to the commands in 
which they are serving.” 

****** * 

(Page 3.) “Sec. 26. That the Quartermaster’s Department of the 
Army shall consist of one Quartermaster-General with the rank of 
brigadier-general, * * * and such captains and first lieutenants of 

the line as may be deemed necessary by the President, not to exceed 
thirty, to be detailed as hereinafter provided, and to be styled assistant 
quartermasters. 

“Sec. 27. That the Subsistence Department of the Army shall con¬ 
sist of one Commissary-General of Subsistence with the rank of brig¬ 
adier-general, * * * and such captains and first lieutenants of the 

line as may be deemed necessary by the President, not to exceed twelve, 
to be detailed as hereinafter provided, and to be styled assistant com¬ 
missaries of subsistence; and not exceeding one hundred and fifty 
commissary-sergeants. 

'•Sec. 28. That the commanding officer of each military post, or of 
a detachment in the field of two or more companies, when no officer 
of the Quartermaster’s or Subsistence Department is present for duty, 
may appoint from among the subalterns one to act both as assistant 
quartermaster and commissary, who shall be subject to all the rules 
and regulations for officers of these departments, and shall perform 
the duties thereof. 


172 


‘‘Sec. 29. That the Ordnance Department of the Army shall con¬ 
sist of one Chief of Ordnance with the rank of brig'adier-general, 
* * * and such captains and first lieutenants of the artillery as may 

be deemed necessary by the President, not exceeding thirty, to be 
detailed as hereinafter provided. 

* ->^ * * * * * 

“Sec. 34. That the Pay Department of the Army shall consist of 
one Paymaster-General with the rank of brigadier-general, * * * 

and such captains and first lieutenants of the line as may be deemed 
necessary by the President, not exceeding ten, to be detailed as here¬ 
inafter provided, and to be styled assistant paymasters. 

****** * 

(Page 4.) “Sec. 36. That when volunteers or militia are called into 
the service of the United States in such numbers that the officers of 
the Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments, authorized 
by law, are not sufficient for their proper maintenance, the President 
ma}", with the advice and consent of the Senate, add such number of 
captains, not exceeding one to each department for each brigade, as 
the service may require: Provided^ That the additional quartermasters^ 
commissaries, and paymasters shall be retained in service, as such, 
onty so long as their services shall be necessary to the militia and 
volunteers. 

‘ ‘ Sec. 37. That the Signal Bureau of the Army shall consist of one 
Chief Signal Officer with the rank of colonel, such captains and first 
lieutenants as may be deemed necessary by the President, not exceed¬ 
ing six, to be detailed from the line as hereinafter provided, and to be 
styled signal officers, * * * all of whom may, when necessary, be 

mounted. 

“Sec. 38. That the Bureau of Military Justice shall consist of one 
Judge-Advocate-General, with the rank of colonel, * * * and such 
captains and first lieutenants of the line as may be deemed necessary 
by the President, not exceeding three, to be detailed as hereinafter 
provided, and to be styled assistant judge-advocates.” 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 5.) “Sec. 45. That the Military Academy shall be constituted 
as follows^ * * * 

“Sec. 46. That the professors shall be appointed by the President 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The superintend¬ 
ent, the commandant of cadets, and the instructors shall be officers of 
the Army assigned to duty at the Academy by order of the President. 
All other officers of the Academy shall be officers of the Army assigned 
to duty there by the Secretary of War.” 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 8.) “Sec. 77. That the Adjutant-General, the Chief of Engi¬ 
neers, the Quartermaster-General, the Commissary-General of Sub¬ 
sistence, the Chief of Ordnance, the Surgeon-General, the Pa 3 unaster- 
General, the Chief Signal-Officer, and the Judge-Advocate-General 
shall, for the administrative service of their several departments and 
bureaus, be chiefs of bureaus in the War Department, and with their 
assistants shall be stationed at the seat of government.” 

* * * * * * * 


173 


(Pao-e 10.) ‘‘ Sec. 96. That the chiefs of the General Staff of the Staff 
Departments and of the Corps of Engineers shall be selected from the 
Army; the Chief of Engineers from the field officers of that corps; 
the Surgeon-General from the surgeons or higher officers of the Medi¬ 
cal Department; the Chief of Ordnance from the field officers of ord¬ 
nance and artilleiy, and the chiefs of the other branches of the staff 
from the field officers, either of the bureau or department in which 
the vacancy occurs or of the line. 

‘"Sec. 97. That appointments into the lowest permanent grades in 
the several dex)artments and bureaus of the staff shall, except in the 
Medical Department, be made by selection, upon competitive exami¬ 
nation, from such officers as have served not less than two years in 
that branch of the staff' in which the appointment is to be made.” 

* * * * * % * 

(Page 11.) ‘‘ Sec. 110. No officer of the Regular Army below^ the rank 
of field officer shall be promoted into a higher grade until he shall 
have passed a like examination before a board of not less than three 
officers senior to him in rank, appointed as aforesaid, and so consti¬ 
tuted, whenever practicable, that a majority of the members shall be 
officers of the corps or other branch of the service tow^hich the officer 
belongs.” * * * 

(Page 12.) ‘‘Sec. 120. The details for duty in the General Staff, 
other than aids-de-camp, and in the several staff departments and 
bureaus, except as provided in sections 28 and 46 of this act, shall be 
made by the President by selections from nominations submitted by 
the Commanding General of the Army: Provided^ That except in 
cases of emergency no officer shall be thus detailed against his will, 
nor in any case till he has served at least six years with his regiment, 
and that no such details shall be for a longer period than three years, 
or, except at the Military Academy, for two successive terms, in the 
same department of the staff; and that as far as may be these details, 
except for ordnance duty, shall be equalized between the corps of 
artillery, cavalr}^, and infantry. 

* * * * * * * 

“Sec. 122. That an officer detailed for duty in the staff shall 
not thereby forfeit either his lineal position or right to promo¬ 
tion in the" line; but when an officer is appointed into a permanent 
grade of the staff, he shall thereupon vacate his commission in the line. 
These officers, appointed to the additional offices provided for in sec¬ 
tion 36 of this act shall, upon discharge therefrom, be entitled to 
resume their relative positions in their proper corps, as though they 
had not been thus appointed.” 

* * * * * * * 

“the general staff. 

(Page 15.) “Sec. 153. That the Department of the General Staff 
shall be charged, under the direction of the Secretary of War and the 
orders of the Commanding General of the Army and subordinate com¬ 
manders, with all business connected with the organization of the 
Army and Militia; and with all the preparation and preservation of 
snch" records as will perpetuate the militaiy history of all organiza¬ 
tions or individual officers and soldiers wfiile in the service of the 


174 


United States, and will insure justice to such officers and soldiers in 
all matters of rank, pay and allowances, pensions and bounties. 

‘‘This department shall also be the medium of communication in 
reference to all matters of organization, discipline, stations for officers 
and soldiers, and military operations, between the Commanding Gen¬ 
eral and the Army, and between the several subordinate commanders 
and the troops under their control. Such general inspections into the 
discipline and administration of the Army as may be enjoined by law, 
or may be ordered by competent authority, shall, when other officers 
are not specitically named for such duties, be made by officers of the 
General Staff.” 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 41.) “Sec. 451. That quartermasters and assistant quarter¬ 
masters, in addition to their own duties as such, shall do duty in the 
Subsistence Department whenever the convenience of the service 
requires.” 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 47.) “Sec. 520. That Commissaries and Assistant Commis¬ 
saries of Subsistence, in addition to their own duties as such, shall do 
duty in the Quartermasters Department whenever the convenience of 
the public service so requires.” 

* * * * * * * 

(Page 54.) “Sec. 587. That general denomination ‘ordnance and 
ordnance stores’ shall include all cannon and artillery, carriages and 
equipments; all apparatus and machines for the service and maneuver 
of artillery; all small arms, accouterments, and horse equipments; all 
ammunition and all tools, machinery, and materials for the ordnance 
service; horse medicines, materials for shoeing, and all horse equip¬ 
ments and harness for the artillery. 

******* 

“Sec. 589. That ordnance and ordnance stores shall be provided b}^ 
purchase, by contract, or in open market. Officers of the Ordnance 
Department shall be charged with making all such purchases, except 
when otherwise specialty directed by the Secretary of War.” 

***** * * 

December 12, 1878: Mr. Burnside, from the joint committee on the 
reorganization of the Army, submitted a report accompanied by a bill 
(S. 1491) to reduce and reorganize the Army of the United States, and 
to make rules for its government and regulation. 

January 30, 1879: Considered, and certain portions of the bill with¬ 
drawn by Senator Burnside, by unanimous consent. 

December 12, 1878: Mr. Banning, from the joint committee of the 
two houses upon the subject of the reform and reorganization of the 
Army, submitted a report accompanied by a bill (H. li. No. 5499) to 
reduce and reorganize the Army of the United States and to make 
rules for its government and regulation. 

February 1, 1879: The House determined not to proceed to the con¬ 
sideration of the bill for the reorganization of the Arm 3 ^ 

February 1, 1879: Mr. Hewitt, of New York. I now move that the 
rules be suspended and the House resolve itself into Committee of the 
Whole on the state of the Union for the purpose of considering the 


175 


bill (H. R. No. 6145) making appropriations for the support of the 
Army for the fiscal year ending June 80, 1880, and for other purposes. 

The motion was agreed to. 

Mr. Hewitt, of New York. * * * There were two conflicts in 

that Congress (Forty-fourth), one of which determined the result of the 
Presidential election. This House agreed to a method of settlement 
of the gravest of all political questions which had ever arisen in this 
country and it was loyal to its engagements. The second question arose 
on the Army appropriation bill. * * * There was then presented 

to the majority of this House one of those crucial tests which try the 
patriotism and statesmanship of Representatives. True to the lessons 
of the past, they attached to the Army appropriation bill a provision 
in the exercise of the unquestionable right of Congress directing 
where, when, and how the Army should be used in the States of South 
Carolina and Louisiana; that the Army should not be used to main¬ 
tain certain State governments which had been created and only kept 
in existence by the exercise of the military power under the orders of 
the President—1 mean by his ‘Ynilitary power” his control over the 
military forces of the country which he exercised under certain 
statutes passed at the close of the war. The Senate refused to assent 
to that provision. 

Three several conference committees composed of difi'erent mem¬ 
bers met and conferred upon the matter in difference. They failed to 
come to an agreement and the result was the Forty-fourth Congress 
adjourned without passing any bill for the support of the Army. * * * 

An extra session of Congress was made necessary by the failure of the 
army bill. * * * X was placed, to my own surprise, in charge of the 

army bill. * * * j thought it was a mistake even to attempt any 

reorganization or reduction, and the bill was brought into this House 
without anv reduction. * * * This omission was done purposely 

and the bill passed. * * * (Act November 21, 1877; 20 Stat., p. l.^) 

When the new bill came along—the bill under which the Army is 
being maintained for the present 3 ^ear—then it seemed to me the ques¬ 
tion thus passed over ought to be raised anew. And here I want to 
make my acknowledgments to the distinguished gentleman from Ken¬ 
tucky (Mr. Knott), the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciaiy, to 
whom 1 applied for help on that occasion, and who, with the skill of a 
Somers, drew the clause which is now known as the posse comitatus 
clause. * * * It was passed and it went to the Senate where it and 

the entire reorganization scheme were rejected. Then came the con¬ 
ference committee. * * * We secured more than the 
tahcs clause. We secured a clause providing for the reorganization of 
the Army; that is to say, creating a commission whose business it was 
made to examine into the whole question and make report by bill or 
otherwise to this House, and pending such report and action thereon 
by the House all appointments and xjromotions were suspended. (Act 
June 18, 187820 Stat., p. 145.) 

That provision will secure a reorganization of the Arm}^, whether 
in this Congress or in the next I know not. * * * 

February 8, 1879: Bill amended by inserting part of the bill (H. R. 
5499) to reorganize the Army, and passed. 

February 10, 1879: Received in the Senate and referred to the Com¬ 
mittee on Appropriations. 

February 22, 1879: Bill amended by striking out sections 3 to 47, 
inclusive, relative to reorganization of the Army. 


176 


February 24, 1879: Bill passed Senate. 

March 3, 1879: Mr. Blaine submitted the following- report: 

“The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two 
Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. No. 6145) 
making appropriation for the support of the Army for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1880, and for other purposes, having met, and after 
full and free conference have been unable to agree. 

J. G. Blaine, 

Wm. B. Allison, 

• Wm. a. Wallace, 

Managers on the part of the Senate. 
Abram S. Hewitt, 

Wm. a. J. Sparks, 

Chas. Foster, 

Managers on the part of the House. 

Mr. Blaine. Now, I move that the Senate simply insist. This is 
the third conference on the Army bill, and the record of the House 
last sent is that they have insisted without asking a conference. 

The motion was agreed to. 

Burnside report, 1878. 

REVIEW OF LEGISLATION ON ARMY ORGANIZATION BY GENERAL 
GARFIELD. 

Two numbers of the North American Review, containing articles by 
General Garfield on the Army of the United States, were submitted 
to the joint committee, of which Senator Burnside was chairman, by 
General Sherman Jul}" 15, 1878. These articles are published in the 
report of the committee (see pages 101 to 126). On the subject of 
legislation. General Garfield in his first article says (page 102): “At 
every session of Congress, since 1868, the question of the strength, 
organization, and administration of the Army has been examined and 
discussed with more or less thoroughness. But legislation on the sub¬ 
ject has consisted only of fragmentaiy acts—temporar}^ makeshifts—in 
which repeated reductions have been effected in the force of the Army, 
accompanied with the intimation that the work of reorganization was 
only postponed. By the act of March 3, 1869, all appointments and 
promotions in the line and staff of the Army were stopped until further 
legislation by Congress, and all enlistments were stopped until the 
number of infantry regiments should be reduced to twent 3 ^-five. This 
act, together with the act of July 15, 1870, effected a reduction in the 
number of commissioned officers from 3,036 to 2,277; and the number 
of enlisted men was reduced b\Gwo steps: first, from 51,605 to 35,000, 
and then to 30,000. 

“The act of June 16, 1874, reduced the number of commissioned 
officers to 2,161, and the number of enlisted men to 25,000. B}^ the 

act of August, 15, 1876, a temporary increase of 2,500 enlisted in the 
cavalry regiments was authorized to meet the necessities of the Sioux 
war, but they were to be continued onl}^ during the Indian hostilities. 
And finally a bill is now pending (February, 1878) in the House of 
Representatives which abolishes several of the staff departments, some 
by actual muster out and others by consolidation, and musters out 10 


177 




regiments of infantry, 1 of cavalry, and 2 of artillery. It reduces 
the force of enlisted men to 20,000, and requires the mustering out of 
835 commissioned officers, with the provision, however, that in case 
the Indian Bureau shall be transferred to the War Department, the 
President ma}^ retain in the service 198 of the prescribed officers of 
the lowest rank: but 637 commissioned officers will be peremptorily 
dismissed if the bill becomes a law. 

“Early in the discussion of the subject the difficulties connected 
with the proper adjustment of the several departments were so great 
that the expedient was adopted of suspending promotions in the stall* 
altogether until it should be so reduced b}" the casualties of the service 
as to make the problem of reorganization more eas}" of solution. By 
the act of July 24, 1876, Congress referred the whole subject of 
reforming and reorganizing the army to a commission, to consist of 
two members of the Senate, two members of the House of Represent¬ 
atives, and two officers from the Army, one from the line and one 
from the staff corps. Unfortunately the act required the commission 
to report to Congress the results of their deliberations b}^ the 1st day 
of December following. The commission accumulated much valuable 
material, but their term of service expired before it was possible to 
reach satisfactory conclusions; and now the whole subject is again 
pending in Congress as unsettled as ever. In the meantime the 
efficiency of the Army is seriously impaired by the uncertainty and 
apprehension which the situation produces; and the continual agita¬ 
tion of the subject by Congress, without reaching any conclusion, is a 
grievous wrong to the officers. * * * The papers laid before the 

commission already referred to, but not yet published, are of great 
value, both on account of the ability with which they were prepared 
and the high character and varied experience of their authors.” After 
quoting letters from (lenerals Sherman and Hancock, he concludes: 
“Those who are seeking fame by destro 3 dng or crippling our Army 
will do well to withhold the fatal blow until they have disposed of the 
facts and reasonings of the letters already quoted.” 

In his second article General Garfield says (p. 125): 

“The House Committee on Military Affairs have reported a bill 
for a large reduction of the pay of those who may continue in service. 
* * * Should the bill become a law, it would be better, so far as 

pay is concerned, to be a doorkeeper in the House of Representatives 
than a senior captain of infantry; better to be the locksmith of the 
House than a second lieutenant of the line.” 

7414—00-12 


178 


PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW AS TO THE ORGANIZATION OF 

THE STAFF DEPARTMENTS AND APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS, 

AND TRANSFERS THEREIN. 

[From Davis’s “Military Laws of the United States,’’ third edition, 1898, War Department Document 
No. 64, and subsequent legislation to the end of the first session. Fifty-sixth Congress.] 

1. Okganization of Staff Depaktments. 

THE adjutant-general’s DEPARTMENT. 

‘‘That the Adjutant-General’s Department of the Army shall consist 
of one Adjutant-General, with the rank, pa}^, and emoluments of briga¬ 
dier-general (present incumbent to have rank, pay, and allowances of 
a major-general—act of June 6, 1900); five assistant adjutants-general, 
with the rank, pa 3 % and emoluments of colonel; six assistant adjutants- 
general, with rank, pay, and emoluments of lieutenant-colonel, and five 
assistant adjutants-general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of 
major: Provided^ That * * * upon the mustering out of the 

volunteer forces and the reduction of the Regular Armv to a peace basis, 
no appointments shall be made in the Adjutant-General’s Department 
until the number of officers in each grade in that department shall be 
reduced to the number authorized by the law in force prior to the pas¬ 
sage of this act.” Act of Ma\^ 18, 1898 (30 Stat., 419); also see acts of 
February 28, 1887 (24 Stat., 424), and August 6, 1894 (29 Stat., 234). 

THE inspector-general’s DEPARTMENT. 

“That the Inspector-General’s Department of the Army shall here¬ 
after consist of one Inspector-General, with the rank, pa^", and emolu¬ 
ments of brigadier-general; three inspectors-general, with the rank, 
pay, and emoluments of colonel; three inspectors-general, with the 
rank, pay, and emoluments of lieutenant-colonel; and three inspectors- 
general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of major: Provided^ That 
* * * upon the mustering out of the volunteer forces and the 

reduction of the Regular Arm\" to a peace basis, no appointments shall 
be made in the Inspector-General’s Department until the number of 
officers in each grade in that department shall be reduecd to the number 
now authorized by law.” Act of July 7, 1898 (30 Stat., 720); also see 
act of Februaiy 5, 1885 (23 Stat., 297). 

THE judge-advocate-general’s DEPARTMENT. 

“That the Bureau of Militaiy Justice and the corps of judge-advo¬ 
cates of the Army be, and the same are hereby, consolidated under the 
title of Judge-Advocate-General’s Department, and shall consist of 
one Judge-Advocate-General, with the rank, pay, and allowances of a 
brigadier-general; one assistant judge-advocate-general, with the rank, 
pay, and allowances of colonel; three deputy judge-advocates-general, 
with the rank, pa^^, and allowances of lieutenant-colonels; and three 
judge-advocates, with the rank, pay, and allowances of majors; * * 

and the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to detail such number 


179 


of officers of the line as he ina}^ deem necessary to serve as acting 
judge-advocates of military departments, who shall have while on such 
duty, the rank, pay, and allowances of captains of cavalry.” Act of 
July 5, 1884 (23 Stat.,113). 

THE QUAIITERMASTER’s DEPARTMENT. 

‘‘’That the Quartermaster’s Department of the Army shall hereafter 
consist of one Quartermaster-General, with the rank, pa}^, and emolu¬ 
ments of a brigadier-general; four assistant quartermasters-general, 
with the rank, pay, and emoluments of colonels of cavalry; eight 
deputy quartermasters-general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments 
of lieutenant-colonels of cavalry; fourteen quartermasters, with the 
rank, pay, and emoluments of majors of cavalry; and thirty assistant 
quartermasters, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of captains of 
cavalry.” Sec. 1, act of March 3,1876 (18 Stat., 339). 

THE SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT. 

“The Subsistence Depai’tment of the Army shall consist of one 
Commissary-General of Subsistence, with rank of brigadier-general; 
two assistant commissaries-general of subsistence, with the rank of 
colonel of cavalry; three assistant commissaries-general of subsistence, 
with the rank of lieutenant-colonel of cavalry; eight commissaries of 
subsistence, with the rank of major of cavalry; and eight commis¬ 
saries of subsistence, with the rank of captain of cavalry.” Acts of 
June 23, 1874 (18 Stat., 244), and February 12, 1895 (28 Stat., 656). 

THE PAY DEPARTMENT. 

“ The Pay Department of the Army shall consist of one Paymaster- 
General, with the rank of brigadier-general; two assistant paymasters- 
general, with the rank of colonel of cavalry; three deputy paymasters- 
general, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel of cavalry; and twenty 
pavmasters, with the rank of major of cavalrv.” Acts of Julv 22, 
1876 (19 Stat., 95), March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 457),‘July 5,1884 (22 Stat., 
108). July 16,1892 (27 Stat., 175), and February 12,1895 (28 Stat., 655.) 

‘ ‘ That the Secretary of War is also authorized to arrange for the 
payment of the enlisted men serving at posts or places where no pay¬ 
master is on duty, by check or by currency, to be sent to them by 
mail or express, at the expense and risk of the United States.” Act 
of February 27, 1893 (27 Stat., 175). 

THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 

“That the Medical Department of the Army shall hereafter consist 
of one Surgeon-General, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a 
brigadier-general; six assistant surgeon-generals, with the rank, pay, 
and emoluments of colonels, and ten deputy surgeon-generals, with 
the rank, pay, and emoluments of lieutenant-colonels, who shall give 
the same bonds which are or may be required of assistant paymasters- 
general of like grade, and shall, when not acting as purveyors, be 
assignable to duty as surgeons by the President; fifty surgeons, with 
the rank, pay, and emoluments of majors; one hundred and twenty-five 


180 


assistant surgeons, with the rank, ]Day, and emoluments of lieutenants 
of cavalry for the first five years’ service, and with the rank, pa}^ and 
emoluments of captains of cavalry after five years’ service; and all the 
original vacancies in the grade of assistant surgeons shall be filled by 
selection by competitive examination. In emergencies the Surgeon- 
General of the Army, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may 
appoint as many contract surgeons as may be necessary, at a compen¬ 
sation not to exceed one hundred and fifty dollars per month.” Acts 
of June 23, 1874, sec. 4 (18 Stat., 244); June 26, 1876 (19 Stat., 61); 
July 27, 1892 (27 Stat., 276); August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 403), and May 
12, 1898 (30 Stat., 406). 

THE ENGINEER DEPARTMENT. 

‘•The Corps of Engineers of the Arm}" shall hereafter consist of one 
Chief of Engineers, with the rank of brigadier-general; seven colonels, 
fourteen lieutenant-colonels, twenty-eight majors, thirty-five captains, 
thirty first lieutenants, twelve second lieutenants, and the Battalion of 
Engineers.” Act of July 5, 1898 (30 Stat., 652). 

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. 

“That the Ordnance Department shall consist of one Chief of Ord¬ 
nance, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a brigadier-general; 
four colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, twelve majors, twenty-four 
captains, twenty first lieutenants; and all vacancies which may here¬ 
after exist in the grade of first lieutenant in said Department shall be 
filled by transfer from the line of the Armv.” Acts of June 23, 1874 
(18 Stat., 245); July 7, 1898 (30 Stat., 720).' 

“That when a vacancy shall occur through death, retirement, or 
other separation from active service, in the office of storekeeper in the 
Quartermaster’s Department and Ordnance Department, respectively, 
now provided for by law, said oftices shall cease to exist.” Act of 
March 2, 1899 (30 Stat., 979). 

THE SIGNAL CORPS. 

“ The commissioned force of the Signal Corps shall consist of one 
brigadier-general, who shall be the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, 
and selected from the corps; one colonel, who shall be assistant chief 
signal officer, and one lieutenant-colonel, one major, and three captains 
(mounted), to be appointed from the corps according to seniority, and 
three first lieutenants (mounted), to be appointed as now provided by 
law, who shall each receive the pay and allowances of like grades in the 
Army.” Acts of August 6, 1894 (28 Stat., 234); March 2, 1897 (29 
Stat., 611), and joint resolution No. 57, July 8, 1898 (30 Stat., 752). 

“All vacancies which may hereafter exist in the grade of first lieu¬ 
tenant in the Signal Corps shall be filled by transfer from the line of 
the Army, after competitive examination and recommendation by a 
board of officers of the Signal Corps, to be appointed by the Secretary 
of War.” Sec. 7, act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 653). 

THE RECORD AND PENSION OFFICE. 

“The division organized by the Secretary of War in his office for 
the preservation and custody* of the records of the volunteer armies. 


181 


under the name of the Record and Pension Div^ision, is hereby estab¬ 
lished as now org’anized, and shall hereafter be known as the Record 
and Pension Office of the War Department; and the President is hereby 
authorized to select an officer of the Army, whom he may consider to 
be especially well qualitied for the performance of the duties hereinafter 
specihed, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to 
appoint him in the Army to be chief of said office, who shall have the 
rank, pay, and allowances of a colonel, and shall, under the Secretary 
of War, have charge of the military and hospital records of the volun¬ 
teer armies and the pension and other business of the War Depart¬ 
ment (‘onnected therewith; and all laws or parts of laws inconsistent 
with the terms of this act are herebv repealed.” Act of Mav 9, 1892 
(2T Stat., 2T). 

‘‘dliat the Chief of the Record and Pension Office of the War Depart¬ 
ment shall hereinafter have the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier- 
general, and there shall be an assistant chief of said office, who shall 
have the rank, pay, and allowances of a major, and who may be 
appointed from civil life: Provided^ That whenever a vacancy shall 
occur in the office of Chief of the Record and Pension Office, subse- 
(pient to the passage of this act, said grade shall cease and determine, 
and thereafter the chief of said office shall have the rank, pay, and 
allowances of a colonel.” Sec. 8, act of March 2, 1899 (30 Stat., 979). 

•‘That the requirements of law relative to the reduction of the Army 
on July tirst, nineteen hundred and one, shall not apply to the officers 
of the Record and Pension Office.” Act of March 3,1899 (30 Stat., 
1007). 

2. Appointments in Lowest Grades of Commissioned Officers in 

Staff Departments. 

adjutant-general’s, inspector-general’s, quartermaster’s, and 

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENTS. 

‘Mlereafter all appointments to till vacancies in the lov'est grade of 
the Adjutant-General’s, Inspector-General’s, Quartermaster’s, and Sub¬ 
sistence departments, respectively, shall be made from the next lowest 
grade in the line of the ArnuL” Act of August 6, 1891 (28 Stat., 231). 

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 

“No person shall receive the appointment of assistant surgeon unless 
he shall have been examined and approved l)y an army medical board, 
consisting of not less than three surgeons or assistant surgeons, desig¬ 
nated hy the Secretary of War.” Sec. 1172, Rev. Stat. 

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. 

“That the Ordnance Department shall consist of * * *; and all 
vacancies which may hereafter exist in the grade of first lieutenant in 
said department shall be filled by transfer from the line of the Army: 
Provided^ That no appointment or promotion in said department shall 
hereafter be made until the officer or person so appointed or promoted 
shall have passed a satisfactorv examination before a board of ord¬ 
nance officers senior to himself.” Act of June 23, 1871 (18 Stat., 21). 


182 


SIGNAL CORPS. 

“All vacancies which may hereafter exist in the ^rade of first lieu¬ 
tenant in the Signal Corps shall be filled by transfer from the line of 
the Arni}^, after competitive examination and recommendation by a 
board of officers of the Signal Corps to be appointed by the Secretary 
of War.” Sec. 7, act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 653). 

JUDGE-ADVOCATES, PAYMASTERS, AND CHAPLAINS. 

“That no person in civil life shall hereafter be appointed a judge- 
advocate, paymaster, or chaplain until he shall have passed satisfac¬ 
torily such examination as to his moral, mental, and ph 3 ^sical qualifica¬ 
tions as ma}^ be prescribed b}- the President; and no such person shall 
be appointed who is more than foi’W-four 5 ^ears of age: Provided fur¬ 
ther^ That in case of the appointment of an officer who has served in a 
similar capacity during the war with Spain and has demonstrated his 
moral, mental, and ph 3 'Sical qualifications for the position, then such 
examination shall not be required.” Act March 2,1899 (30 Stat., 979). 

3. Appointment of Chiefs of Staff Departments. 

“ The Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Commis- 
saiy-General of Subsistence, the Surgeon-General, the Chief of Engi¬ 
neers, the Chief of Ordnance, and the Pa 3 miaster-General shall be 
appointed b 3 " selection from the corps to which the 3 ^ belong.” Sec. 
1193, Rev. Stat. 

The act of Februar 3 ^ 5, 1885 (23 Stat., 297), provides that the 
Inspector-General shall be appointed b 3 " selection from the officers of 
the Inspector-General’s Department, and the act of August 6, 1894 
(28 Stat., 234), provides that the Chief Signal Officer shall be selected 
from the Signal Corps. 

4. Promotion and Examination for Promotion. 

“Hereafter promotion to eveiy grade in the Arm 3 ^ below the rank 
of brigadier-general, throughout each arm, corps, or department of 
the service, shall, subject to the examination hereafter provided for, 
be made according to seniorit 3 " in the next lower grade of that arm, 
corps, or department.” Act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 562). 

“That the President be, and he is hereb 3 y authorized to prescribe a 
S 3 ^stem of examination of all officers of the Arm 3 " below the rank of 
major to determine their fitness for promotion.” * * * Sec. 3, act 

of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 562). 

“That the examination of officers appointed in the Arm 3 ^ from civil 
life, or of officers who were ofiicers of volunteers onH, or were ofll- 
cers of the militia of the several States called into the service of the 
United States, or were enlisted men in the regular oi* volunteer service, 
either in the Arny^, Navv, or Marine Corps during the war of the 
rebellion, shall be conducted ly boards composed entirel^^ of officers 
who were appointed from civil life or of officers who were officers of 
volunteers onlv during said war, and such examination shall relate to 
fitness for practical service and not to technical and scientific knowl¬ 
edge.”^ * * * Sec. 3, act of October 1,1890 (26 Stat., 562). 

Officers ma 3 " bv written waiver relinquish such right.” See act of 
July 27, 1892 (27 Stat., 276). 


183 


IN THE COEPS OF ENGINEERS AND ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. 

‘'“No officer of the Corps of Engineers below the rank of field officer 
shall be promoted to a higher grade until he shall have been, examined 
and approved bv a board of three engineers senior to him in rank.” 
Sec. 1206, Rev. Stat. 

"‘’No appointment or promotion in said (Ordnance) Department shall 
hereafter l3e made until the officer or person so appointed or promoted 
shall have passed a satisfactory examination before a board of ordnance 
officers senior to himself.” Sec. 5, act of June 23,1871 (18 Stat., 215). 

‘‘That the examination of officers of the Corps of Engineers and 
Ordnance Department, who were officers or enlisted men in the regular or 
volunteer service, either in the Army, Navy, or the Marine Corps, during 
the war of the rebellion, shall be conducted by boards composed in the 
same manner as for the examination of other officers of their respective 
corps and departments; and the examination shall embrace the same 
subjects prescribed for all other officers of similar grades in the Corps 
of Engineers and Ordnance Department, respectively.” Sec. 2, act of 
July 27, 1892 (27 Stat., 276). 


IN THE SIGNAL CORPS. 

That all appointments and promotions in the Signal Corps * * * 
shall be made after examination and approval under sections 1206 
and 1207 of the Revised Statutes, which are hereby amended so as to 
be applicable to and to provide for the promotion of the lieutenants of 
the Signal Corps in the same manner as they now apply to the Corps of 
Engineers and the Ordnance Corps.” Sec. 7, act of October 1, 1890 
(26 Stat, 653). 

5. Transfers. 

“Officers may be transferred from the line to the staff of the Army 
without prejudice to their rank or promotion in the line; but no officer 
shall hold, at the same time, an appointment in the line and an appoint¬ 
ment in the staff' which confer equal rank in the Army. AVhen an 
officer so transferred has, in virtue of seniority, obtained, or become 
entitled to, a grade in his regiment equal to the grade of his commis¬ 
sion in the staff', he shall vacate either his commission in the line or 
his commission in the staff'.” Sec. 1205, Rev. Stat. 

“ Engineers shall not assume nor be ordered on any duty beyond 
the line of their immediate profession, except by the special order of 
the President. They may, at the discretion of the President, be trans¬ 
ferred from one corps to another, regard being paid to rank.” Sec. 1158, 
Rev. Stat. 

6. Inspection of Accounts. 

“ That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to cause frequent 
inquiries to be made as to the necessity, econom}% and propriety of all 
disbursements made by the disbursing officers of the Army, and as to 
their strict conformity to the law appropriating the money ; also to 
ascertain whether the disbursing officers of the Army comply with the 
law in keeping their accounts and making their deposits; such inquiries 
to be made by officers of the inspection department of the Army, or 


184 


others detailed for that purpose: Provided^ That no oflicer so detailed 
shall he in any way connected with the department or corps making 
the disbursement. That the reports of such inspections shall be made 
out and forwarded to Congress with the annual report of the Secretary 
of War.” Secs. 1 and 2, act of April 20, 1874 (18 Stat., 33). 


WASHINGTON’S VIEWS OF THE NEED OF A STANDING ARMY, 
FOLLOWED BY GENERAL REMARKS UPON THE SUBJECT. 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Gen. George Washington: 

FROM THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, BY JARED SPARKS—YOLS. 

IV AND VII. SUBMITTED BY GENERAL SHERMAN TO SENATOR BURN¬ 
SIDE, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE REORGANIZATION 

OF THE ARMY. 

[Extract from letter of General Washington to the President of Congress, dated “ Heights of Harlem 

24 September, 1776.”] 

(Page 89.) ‘‘A soldier reasoned with upon the goodness of the 
cause he is engaged in and the inestimable rights he is contending for 
hears you with patience and acknowledges the truth of your observa¬ 
tions, but adds that it is of no more importance to him than to others. 
The officer makes the same reply, with this further remark, that his 
pay will not support him, and he can not ruin himself and family to 
serve his country, when every member of the community is equally 
interested and benefited by his labors. The few, therefore, who act 
upon principles of disinterestedness, comparatively speaking, are no 
more than a drop in the ocean. 

‘‘It becomes evident to me then that, as this contest is not likeh" to 
be the work of a da}", as the war must be carried on systematically, and 
to do it you must have good officers, there are no other possible means 
to obtain them but by establishing your army upon a permanent foot¬ 
ing, and giving your officers good pay. * * * They ought to have 

such allowances as will enable them to live like and support the char¬ 
acter of gentlemen, and not be driven by a scanty pittance to the low 
and dirty arts, which many of them practice, to filch from the public 
more than the difierence of pay would amount to upon an ample allow¬ 
ance. Besides, something is due to the man who puts his life in your 
hands, hazards his health, and forsakes the sweets of domestic enjoy¬ 
ment.” * * 

(Page 90.) ‘"To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly 
resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes 
of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted 
with any kind of military skill (which is followed by want of confidence 
in themselves, when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined, 
and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms), are timid 
and ready to fly from their own shadows. Besides, the sudden change 
in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sick¬ 
ness in many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of 
returning to their respective homes, that it not only produces shameful 


185 


and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit 
in others. Again, men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no con¬ 
trol can not brook the restraint which is indispensably necessary to the 
good order and government of the army, without which licentiousness 
and every kind of disorder triumphantly reign. To bring men to a 
proper degree of subordination is not the work of a da}", a month, or 
even a year; and, unhappily for us and the cause we are engaged in, 
the little discipline I have been laboring to establish in the army under 
my immediate command is in a manner done away by having such a 
mixture of troops as have been called together within these few months. 

“Relaxed and unlit as our rules and regulations of war are for the 
government of an army, the militia (those properly so called, for of 
these we have two sorts, the six months’ men and those sent in as a 
temporary aid) do not think themselves subject to them, and therefore 
take liberties which the soldier is punished for. This creates jealousy, 
jealousy begets dissatisfaction, and this by degrees ripens into mutiny, 
keeping the whole Army in a confused and disordered state, rendering 
the time of those who wdsh to see regularity and good order prevail 
more unhappy than words can describe. Besides this, such repeated 
changes take place that all arrangement is set at naught, and the con¬ 
stant huctuation of things deranges every plan as fast as it is adopted. 

“These, sir. Congress may be assured, are but a small part of the 
inconveniences which might be enumerated and attributed to militia; 
but there is one that merits particular attention, and that is the expense. 

“Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep hfty or a hundred 
thousand in constant pay than to depend upon half the number and 
supply the other half occasionally by militia. * * The jealousy 

of a standing army and the evils to be apprehended from one are remote 
and, in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all 
to be dreaded; l3ut the consequences of wanting one, according to my 
ideas formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable 
ruin. For, if I was called upon to declare under oath whether the mili¬ 
tia have been most serviceable or hurtful upon the whole, 1 should sub¬ 
scribe to the latter. I do not mean by this, however, to arraign the 
conduct of Congress; in so doing I should equally condemn my own 
measures if I did not my judgment; but experience, which is the best 
criterion to work by, so fully, clearly, decisively reprobates the prac¬ 
tice of trusting to militia that no man who regards order, regularity, 
and economy, or who has any regard for his own honor, character, or 
peace of mind, will risk them upon this issue.” 

[Extract from letter of General Washington to the President of Congress, dated “Trenton,-5 Decem¬ 
ber, 1776.”] 

(Page 94.) * * * “My first wish is that Congress may be con¬ 
vinced * * * of the necessity of raising a larger standing army 

than what they have voted. The saving in the article of stores, provi¬ 
sions, and in a thousand other things, by having nothing to do with 
militia unless in cases of extraordinary exigency, and such as could 
not be expected in the common course of events, would amply support 
a large army, which, well officered, would be daily improving, instead 
of continuing a destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob. I am clear 
in the opinion that if 40,000 men had been kept in constant pay since 
the first commencement of hostilities, and the militia had been excused 
from doing duty during that period, the Continent would have saved 


186 


money. AYhen I rellect on the losses we have sustained for want of 
good troops, the certainty of this is placed beyond a doubt in my mind. 
In such a case the militia, who have been harassed and tired by repeated 
calls upon them, and farming and manufactures in a manner suspended, 
would, upon any pressing emergency, have run with alacrity to arms; 
whereas the cry now is, ‘The}^ may be as well ruined in one way as 
another,’ and with difficulty they are obtained. I mention these things 
to show that, in my opinion, if any dependence is placed in the militia 
another year. Congress will be deceived. When danger is a little 
removed from them they will not turn out at all. When it comes 
home to them the well affected, instead of ff^dng to arms to defend 
themselves, are busil}^ employed in removing their families and effects, 
while the disaff ected are concerting measures to make their submission 
and spread terror and dismay all around to induce others to follow 
their example. Daily experience and abundant proof warrant this 
information.” 

[Extract from letter of General Washington to the President of Congress, dated “ Headquarters, 15 

September, 1780.”] 

(Page 97.) ‘‘Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of 
modern war, as well as for defense as offense, and whenever a substi¬ 
tute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous. * * * The 

firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained 
by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never been 
witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion, and it 
is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no 
longer be trusted in any material degree to so precarious a dependence.” 

[Extract from letter of General Washington to the President of Congress, dated “ Headquarters, near 
Passaic Falls, New Jersey, 11 October, 1780.”] 

(Page 99.) “It is not easy to be conceived except by those who are 
witness to what an additional waste and consumption of everything, 
and consequently what an increase of expense, result from laxity of 
discipline in the Army; and where the officers think they are doing the 
public a favor b}^ holding their commissions, and the men are continu¬ 
ally ffuctuating, it is impossible to maintain discipline. Nothing can 
be more obvious than that a sound military establishment and the 
interests of economy are the same. * * * Twenty-tw^o thousand 

fighting men appear to be necessary on a defensive plan. To have 
these our total number must be thirty thousand, rank and file. The 
wagoners, workmen at factories, waiters, men for other extra services, 
and sick on an average make at least a fourth of the total number, 
which Congress ma}" see by recurring to the returns of the Army 
from time to time.” 

[Note. —General Sherman estimates the number absent from all 
causes at one-third the total number. See page 26, ante.] 

(Page 100.) * * * “ I sincerel}^ wish Congress had been pleased 
to make no alternative in the term of service, but had confined it to 
the war b}" enlistment, draft, or assessment, as might be found neces¬ 
sary. On the footing on which this requisition now stands we shall 
be certain of getting few men for the war and must continue to feel 
all the evils of temporary engagements.” * * * 

^ (Page 101.) “1 must confess, also, that it would have given me infi¬ 

nite pleasure if Congress had thought proper to take the reduction and 


187 


incorporation of the regiments under their own direction. The mode 
of leaving it to the States is contraiy to my sentiments, because it is 
an adherence to the State system, and because 1 fear it will be pro¬ 
ductive of great confusion and discontent.” 

Burnside report, 1878. 

Gen. James A. Gartield: 


[Extract from an article in the North American Keview by General Garfield, submitted to the joint 
committee of which Senator Burnside was chairman by General Sherman, July 15, 1878.] 

(Page 123.) “It is a significant fact that while numberless petitions 
and remonstrances upon almost all subjects of legislation have been 
constantly pouring into Congress, yet during the last eight years not 
one petition has been addressed to either the Senate or the House 
praying for the decrease of our military establishment. Our people 
remember with gratitude the great captains who, in the late war, led 
their soldiers to victory to save the Republic from overthrow. They 
thoroughly learned the lesson that in times of extreme peril the pres¬ 
ervation of liberty and peace depends upon the disciplined valor of the 
nation, and that the science and art of war can be acquired only by the 
thorough and patient study and practice of its elements. This work 
they expect of the Army; and the annual amount which they cheer¬ 
fully pay for its support is the cost of national insurance against foes 
from without and anarchy within.” * * * 

(Page 124.) “The Army should be large enough to preserve invio¬ 
late our national boundaries and protect our widely extended frontier 
settlements against Indian hostilities; to keep the peace and protect 
the public property in all places subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States, and to aid the several States in case of invasion or insur¬ 
rection too powerful to be controlled by their local authorities. * * * 
In determining how large an army is needed we must consider the 
extent of territory for the defense of which it was created.” * * * 

(Page 126.) “A republic, however free, requires the service of a 
certain number of men whose ambition is higher than mere private 
gains, whose lives are inseparable from the life of the nation, and 
whose labors and emoluments depend absolutely upon the honor and 
prosperity of the Government, and who can advance themselves only 
by serving their country.” 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. N. A. Miles, Fifth Infantry; major-general in volunteer serv¬ 
ice, now Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army: 

(Page 83.) “In organization and administration it is indispensable 
that the first place be given to the system and method that will make 
the Army most efficient as a body of fighting men; that the essential 
functions of supply, equipment, and administration, that require the 
commercial virtues, honesty, and industry, but not great military 
capacity, should take their proper place as subordinate members, not 
usurp those of the directing head of the body, the Army ; that the 
ability to organize, care for, discipline, command, and fight troops be 
sought for, cultivated, and rewarded. 


188 


Garfield report, 1869. 

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. A.; major-general of volun¬ 
teers, commanded Second Corps at Gettysburg: 

(Page. 87.) believe, and I presume you know as well as 1 do 
(although it is a matter requiring too much time to be gone into fully 
here), that one of our greatest aeficiencies in time of war is the want 
of a general staff of the Army, as it is called in Continental Europe. 
The officers are selected from all the branches of the service—engi¬ 
neers, artillery, infantry, and cavalry—tried and talented t^oung 
men. They are then sent to a school for, 1 believe, two years, where 
they learn the matters of administration, etc., so far as it can be taught 
to them theoretically and practically in that time. They are then sent 
to serve in each arm of the service, for probably two years, except 
their own, to familiarize them with the tactics and the practical opera¬ 
tion of each arm of the service. This plan forms a large body of men 
of general information—accomplished men. From that body are 
taken the chief of staffs of armies, corps, divisions, and sometimes 
brigades, and also the adjutant-generals of the different commands. 
Also from that body are taken the aides, and it is quite a useful school 
for the education of general officers, too. The tendency of the system 
is, of course, to make of these officers men who know more about the 
details of all the branches of the service than any other officers, 
because they serve with all arms of the service. This in our country 
would be especially important, as we raise large armies from the 
people.” * * ->5- 

Banning report, 1876. 

Col. August V. Kautz, Eighth Infantry, commanding Department 
of Arizona; brigadier-general in volunteer service, and brevet major- 
general : 

(Page 92.) ‘‘With all that the late war has cost the country in life 
and propert}^ it has taught us nothing for the future, and the nation 
is as destitute of military system to-day as when that war began. 
Should such a disaster come upon us again to-morrow, I would expect 
to see again the distressing spectacle of the youth of the land called 
out for sixty or ninety days and returning at the end of that time 
with ranks depleted and constitutions broken, not b}- the foe, but sim¬ 
ply because there was not a soldier of experience in the regiment to 
tell them how to take care of themselves. I should expect to see a 
cavalry regiment, after six months, training and organizing at the cost 
of half a million to the country, march to the field twelve hundred 
strong, fully and completely equipped, and at the end of six months 
rendered totally unserviceable without having encountered the enemy, 
requiring to be remounted and refurnished, because the officers in 
charge had no militaiy knowledge or experience. Regiments of cav¬ 
alry will require three sets of horses in a single year, and armies in 
the field will be delayed in their movements waiting for recruits that 
never arrive, at a cost of millions per day, because they are at the rear 
making from $1,000 to $1,500 each every time they can jump the 
bounty, and the war that should end in a few months will extend to 
years, and the cost that should be millions will amount to billions. I 
shall expect to see gallant men marched like sheep to the slaughter. 




189 


the victims of military ignorance, and every other possible profession 
than the military contending for martial honor at the expense of 
national life and treasure. With the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 
and the Fran co-Prussian war of 1870 to contrast with our war of the 
rebellion, the merits of a perfect military system should be understood 
and appreciated by everyone whose duty it is to look after the nation’s 
safety. * * * jf ^re to have an army, in order that it may be 

efficient it should be fixed upon a permanent basis as to organization, 
pay, and subsistence, and officers and soldiers should feel that there is 
a career before them in which they may hope to advance, and that, 
after spending the first and best years of life in the service, when 
debility or age comes upon them they will be provided for.” 









INDEX OF NAMES. 


Page- 

Albright, Hon. Charles, House of Representatives. 6 

Allen, Gen. Robert. 121,122 

Allison, Sir Archibald, colonel in English Army. ’ 13 

Allison, Hon. William B., United States Senate. 176 

Alvord, Gen. Benjamin. 63, 64,131,132 

Anderson, Gen. Thomas M. 81 

Andrews, Col. George L. 85,162 

Augur, Gen. Christopher C. 12,18, 46,105 

Baird, Gen. Absalom. 20, 57,58,118,119,120 

Banning, Hon. Henry B., House of Representatives... 6, 7, 8,11, 88,166,167,168,174 

Barnes, Gen. Joseph K. 130 

Barry, Gen. William F. 77,147,148 

Belknap, Hon. William W., Secretary of War. 88, 89 

Ben^t, Gen. Stephen V. 68,137-139 

Bingham, Gen. Judson D. 20, 21,125,126 

Blaine, Hon. James G., United States Senate. 176 

Bomford, Col. George. 138 

Boyer, Hon. Benjamin M., House of Representatives. 5 

Bragg, Hon. Edward S., House of Representatives. 7 

Brannan, Gen. John M. 75,146,147 

Breck, Gen. Samuel. 15,18,19,114 

Brice, Gen. Benjamin W. 130,131 

Brooks, Gen. Horace. 77,149 

Buell, Gen. Don Carlos. 47,106,107 

Buell, Gen. George P. 81,155 

Burnside, Hon. Ambrose E., United States Senate. 7, 9,170-176 

Butler, Hon. iVlatthew C., United States Senate. 7 

Calhoun, Hon. John C., Secretary of War 1. 11,12, 55, 64,137 

Cameron, Hon. J. Donald, Secretary of War. 6, 9 

Campbell, Hon. Lewis D., House of Representatives. 5 

Carlin, Gen. William P. 82, 83 

Casey, Gen. Silas. 80,151 

Clark, Hon. Alvah A., House of Representatives. 7 

Clitz, Gen. Henry B. 154 

Coburn, Hon. JoKn, House of Representatives . 5, 6, 8,10,11,16, 22-24,86-88,163-166 

Cockrell, Hon. Francis M., United States Senate. 6 

Cook, Hon. Philip., House of Representatives._. 6 

Crawford, Hon. William H., Secretary of War.. 54, 55 

Crawford, Gen. Samuel W. 79,150 

Crittenden, Gen. Thomas L. 158 

Crook, Gen. George. 84, 85,105 

Davis, Col. George B. 178 

Davis, Gen. Jefferson C... 160,161 

De Trobriand, Gen. Philip R.-. 157 

Dibrell, Hon. George G., House of Representatives. 7 

Dodge, Hon. Grenville M., House of Representatives. 5 

Dodge, Col. Richard 1. 85,161 

Donnan, Hon. William G., House of Representatives. 5, 6 

Doubleday, Gen. Abner. 85,161 

Dyer, Gen. Alexander B. 136 

Eaton, Gen. Amos B. 127,128 

Evins, Hon. John H., House of Representatives. 7 

Flint, Col. Franklin F. 151 

Floyd-Jones, Col. De Lancey.-. 150 

Foster, Hon. Charles, House of Representatives. 176 

Foster, Gen. John G. 21, 66,134 

Franklin, Gen. William B.47,107,108 

French, Gen. William FI. 77,148 

191 

7414—00-13 




























































192 


Paga 

Fry, Gen. James B. 52,112 

Garfield, Hon. James A., House of Kepresentatives. 5, 

6, 7, 8,15,16, 86,162,176,177,187 

Getty, Gen. George W. US 

Gibbon, Gen. John. 80, 81,152,153 

Gillmore, Gen. Quincy A.21, 67,134 

Glover, Hon. John M., House of Kepresentatives. 6 

Grierson, Gen. Benjamin H. 74,144,145 

Grover, Gen. Cuvier. 140 

Gunckel, Hon. Lewis B., House of Representatives. 6 

Halleck, Gen. Henry W. ^ 120 

Hamilton, Col. John. 75-77 

Hancock, Gen. Winfield S. 17, 35-41, 95-100,177,188 

Hardenbergh, Hon. Augustus A., House of Kepresentatives. 6 

Hardie, Gen. James A. 19, 20, 57,117,118 

Harris, Hon. George E., House of Representatives. 5 

Hatch, Gen. Edward. 74,143 

Hawkins, Hon. Isaac K., House of Kepresentatives. 5 

Hawkins, Gen. John P. 62, 63,129,130 

Hawley, Hon. John B., House of Kepresentatives. 6 

Hawley, Hon. Joseph K., House of Representatives. 6 

Hay, lion. John B., House of Kepresentatives. 5 

Hazen, Gen. William B. 80,151,152 

Heintzelman, Gen. Samuel P. 46,105,106 

Plenry, Gen. Guy V. 142 

Hewilt, Hon. Abram S., House of Representatives. 170,174,175,176 

Holt, Gen. Joseph. 120 

Hooker, Gen. Joseph. 46,47,106 

Howard, Gen. Oliver O. 18,44, 45,102,103 

Humphreys, Gen. Andrew A. 64, 65,132 

Hunt, Gen. Henry J. 78, 79,149 

Hunton, Hon. Eppa, House of Kepresentatives. 6 

Hurlbut, Hon. Stephen A., House of Representatives. 6,167 

Thrie, Col. George P. 132 

Ingalls, Gen. Rufus. 60, 61,122,123 

Johnson, Col. Robert E. 149,150 

Johnston, Gen. Joseph E. 161 

Jomini. 13,14, 63 

Jones, Gen. Roger. 118 

Kautz, Gen. August V. 12,13,153,154,188,189 

Kelton, Gen. John C. 112,113 

Ketcham, Hon John H., House of Representatives. 5 

King, Gen. John H. 81,154 

Kingsbury, Gen. Charles P. 69,139,140 

Lee, Gen. Robert E. 161 

Longstreet, Gen. James .i. 49,109,110 

McClellan, Gen. George B. 12,16, 29-31, 55, 92, 93 

McCook, Hon. Anson G., House of Representatives. 7 

McDougall, Hon. Clinton D., House of Representatives. 6 

McDowell, Gen. Irvin. 17,18, 41,42,101,102 

Macfeely, Gen. Robert. 21, 62,129 

Mackenzie, Gen. Ranald S. 71-73,142 

Maish, Hon. Levi, House of Representatives. 7, 9,10,167-170 

Marcy, Gen. Randolph B. 13,19,53-56,115,116 

Marsh, Hon. Benjamin, House of Representatives. 7 

Meade, Gen. George G. 16, 26, 34, 35,93, 94 

Meigs, Gen. Montgomery C.. 6, 58-60,120,121 

Mendenhall, Col. John. 147 

Merrill, Col. William E. 68,136 

Merritt, Gen. Wesley. 73, 74,143,144 

Miles, Gen. Nelson A. 151,187 

Moore, Gen. James M. 126,127 

Morey, Hon. Frank, House of Representatives. 5 

Myer, Gen. Albert J. 69,140 

Nesmith, Hon. James W., House of Representatives. 6 

Newton, Gen. John. 66,133,134 

Oakes, Gen. James. 142 




































































193 


Pagft 

Ord, Gen. Edward 0. C. 10,11, 46,104 

Palmer, Gen. Innis N. 140 

Parke, Gen. John G. 22,67,135 

Pelonze, Gen. Louis H. 114 ^ 115 

Pennypacker, Gen. Galusha. 157 

Pile, *Hon. William A., House of Representatives. 5 

Plinnb, Hon. Preston B., United States Senator. 7 

Poinsett, Hon. Joel R., Secretary of War. 97 

Pope, Gen. John. 10,42-44 

Potter, (Jen. Joseph H. 161,162 

Raum, Hon. Green B., House of Representatives. 5 

Reeve, Gen. Isaac V. D. 82,156,157 

Reilly, Hon. John, House of Representatives. 6 

Reynolds, Gen. Joseph J. 69, 70,140,141 

Ricketts, Gen. James B. 48,109 

Roberts, Gen. Benjamin S. 70,141,142 

Rucker, Gen. Daniel H. 122 

Saxton, Gen. Rufus. 20,124,125 

Schofield, Gen. John M... 17, 31-34,100,101 

Schriver, Gen. Edmund. 56,57,116,117 

Seymour, Gen. Truman. 79,149 

Sheridan, Gen. Philip H. 16,63,92 

Sherman, Gen. William T. 6,11,16, 24-29,55, 89-92,176,177,187 

Shiras, Gen. Alexander E. 21, 61,62,128,129 

Sitgraves, Hon. Charles, House of Representatives. 5 

Slocum, Hon. Henry W., House of Representatives. 5 

Small, Gen. Michael P. 130 

Smith, Gen. Charles H. 83,158 

Smith, Gen. John E. 157 

Sparks, Hon. William A. J., House of Representatives. 176 

Staffel, Baron, of Prussia. 63 

Stanley, Gen. David S. 84,160 

Stoughton, Hon. William L., House of Representatives. 5 

Strait, Hon. Horace B., House of Rei)resentatives. 6, 7 

Sturgis, Gen. Samuel D. 143 

Sully, Gen. Alfred. 84,159 

Sykes, Gen. George. 158 

Terry, Gen. Alfred H. 45, 46,103,104 

Terry, Hon. William, House of Representatives. 5, 6 

Thomas, Gen. George H. 26,35,94,95 

Thornburg, Hon. Jacob M., House of Representatives. 6 

Tower, Gen. Zealous B. 132,133 

Townsend, Gen. Edward D. 18,49-51,110-112 

Towson, Gen. Nathan. 64 

Upton, Gen. Emory. 74, 75,145,146 

Vance, Hon.-House of Representatives. 138 

Van Vliet, Gen. Stewart. 20, 61,123,124 

Vincent, Gen. Thomas M. 13-15,53,113,114 

Von Moltke, Field Marshal of Prussia. 24,63 

Von Leedinghausen, Baron, Prussian writer. 63 

Vogdes, Gen. Israel. 145 

Wallace, Hon. William A., United States Senator. 176 

Warren, Gen. Gouverneur K. 67,135 

Washington, Gen. George. 184-187 

Washburn, Hon. Henry D., House of Representatives. 5 

AVeitzel, Gen. Godfrey. 23,135,136 

We.«t, Hon. Joseph R., United States Senator. 6 

AVhipple, Gen. William D. 52,53,113 

AVhite, Hon. Harry, House of Representatives. 7 

Willcox, Gen. Orlando B. 82,155,156 

Williams, Hon. Alpheus S., House of Representatives. 6 

AVilliams, Hon. James, House of Representatives. 7 

AVood, Gen. Thomas J. 18,109 

AA'ood, Col. AVilliam H. 154,155 

AA^'right, Gen. Horatio G. 65,66,133 

Young, Hon. Pierce M. B., House of Representatives. 6 




































































INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 


Page. 

Army: 

The jealousy of a standing army and the evils to be apprehended from 
one are remote, and, in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as 
we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequences of wanting one, 
according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is cer¬ 
tain and inevitable ruin.—(Washington). 185 

Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well 
for defense as offense; and whenever a substitute is attempted, it must 

prove illusory and ruinous.—(Washington). 186 

A sound military establishment and the interests of economy are the 

same.—(Washington). 186 

Give military establishment in time of peace the organization it must 
have to render it efficient in a state of war.—(Crawford, Secretary of 

War). 54 

Designed for a state of hostilities in some measure commensurate with 
the power of our people, and with foreign foes of great force against 
whom we may be compelled to contend.—(Coburn committee, 1873). 86 

How large needed.—(Garfield). 187 

Number of officers in permanent establishment should be very large in 

proportion to number of men.—(McClellan). 12 

Views of foreign officers who visited the Army of the Potomac.—(Meade). 16,17 

Greatest deficiency in time of war is want of a general staff.—(Hancock). 188 

Organization and administration.—(IMiles). 187 

It cost our Government over two billion dollars to get good officers, staff 

and line, during the first two years of the war.—(Weitzel). 135,136 

Temporary expedients.—(Benet). 137 

Peace establishment acquires and jireserves military knowledge and per¬ 
fects discipline.—(Vincent). 14 

A prophecy.—(Kautz). 188,189 

Army organization: 

Every company should have two first and one second lieutenant, to 
provide enough first lieutenants for detail for temporary service in 

staff bureaus.—(Sherman).". 26 

The wagoners, workmen at factories, waiters, men on other extra services, 
and sick, on an average, make at least a fourth of the total number.— 

(W ashington). 186 

On considering any paper organization it is safe to assume that about 

one-third are usually absent—causes enumerated.—(Sherman). 26 

False economy to reduce peace establishment undulv. Hee, “Saving,” 

(McClellan) ._.*.. 30 

From natural causes and details, the regiment is left in scarcely an effi¬ 
cient state because of lack of officers.—(Merritt).". 73 

Absence. (See Army organization.) 

Black Hawk war, expenses. 14 

Bonded officers: 

With consolidation, law should provide a number of bonded officers of 
the line, subject to be relieved from staff duty whenever expedient, 

and returned to their regiments.—(Schofield). 33 

Changes in organization shouhl be very few, and those carefully matured.— 

(Weitzel)../. 22 

Chief of staff: 

I think the principle (of a chief of staff) pernicious. Every officer in 

command should perform his own duties.—(Schofield). 32 

194 
























195 


Consolidation of staff departments: 

ith less diversity of organization cost might have been largely reduced— 
Recommend consolidation of Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay 
departments; the Adjutant-General’s and Inspector-General’s depart¬ 
ments; Signal Corps with Engineers, and union of Ordnance with 

Artillery.—(Garbeld committee, 1869). 

In a momentous emergency can we safely trust under control of a single 
man more than one of the present departments or corps of the staff ? 
Head of each department should have a thorough and personal knowl¬ 
edge of all its affairs, of its entire operations, and manage them with 
facility; should never be at a loss to detect errors or derelictions of 
duty. Nothing but long experience as a permanent officer can give 
this. The consolidation of any one of the different staff corps and 
departments with another is inexpedient. AVhatever might be gained 
in peace would probably be lost in war.—(Coburn committee, 1873).. 
The question a vexed one; results reached eml^raced in section of bill 

looking to a department of supplies.—(Banning committee, 1876)_ 

Present division most natural. If called by a different name, necessity 

not diminished nor number nor responsibility.—(Belknap) . 

Alay change the names, but same duties will hav^ to be performed, and 
I doubt if we will gain anything in quality or efficiency. If the 
officer attends to his duties properly, he will generally have as much 
as one man can or ought to do. No economy in it. Simply changes 
the name, as has been done in England, and there was a unanimous 
conclusion there, as I was informed, on the part of line officers, that 

the change works badly.—(Sherman). 

Of course they can be, but I doubt whether you will get as good results; 

would not recommend it.—(Sheridan). 

Should not be; duties quite distinct and require special experience and 

training.—(McClellan). 

I can not say that, after reading all that has been written and said, I am 

prepared to advocate consolidation.—(Meade). 

Inquiry was as to practicability rather than advisability of consolida¬ 
tion. A careful examination of all the views expressed will not only 
show that the weight of evidence has been against consolidation, but 

that opposition has decidedly increased.—(Hancock). 

Economy gained more than counterbalanced by loss in efficiency.— 

(Howard) . 

Opposed to any consolidation— 


Sherman. 

Sheridan. 

McClellan. 

Meade. 

Thomas. 

Hancock. 

Schofield: Little or no economy; 

would cause confusion. 

Howard. 

Terry: Would be productive of evil 

alone. 

Augur. 

Franklin. 

Ricketts. 

Longstreet. 

Townsend. 

Fry. 

Whipple. 

Vincent. 

Marcy. 


89-92 

92 
92,93 

93 
94,95 

95-100 

100,101 

102,103 

45 

105 

107 

108.109 

109.110 
111 
112 
113 

113,114 

115 


Schriver.... 

Jones. 

Meigs. 

Allen. 

Ingalls. 

VanVliet... 
Bingham... 

Small. 

Alvord . 

Wright. 

Newton .... 

Foster. 

Gillmore ... 

Parke . 

Weitzel. 

Floyd-Jones 

Gibbon. 

Wood. 

Willcox .... 
Reeve. 


Page. 


86 


86-88 

88 

88 


89-91 

92 

92 

93 


96 

102 


116 

118 

121 

121 

123 

123 

125 


130 

131 
1^3 

133 

134 


134 


135 

135 

150 


154,155 

155 

156 
















































196 


Consolidation of staff departments—Continued. 

Consolidation of Adjutant-General’s and Inspector-General’s departments— 


For— 



Against— 


McDowell.... 

101 


Sherman. 

. 89 

Hooker. 

106 


Sheridan. 

. 92 or J. A. G. 

Wood. 

109 


McClellan. 

. 92 

Baird. 

118 

fA. G.,I.G.,J.A.G., 
t and Signal. 

Hancock. 

Augur. 

. 95 or J. A. G. 

. 105 or J. A. G. 

Howard. 

102 

A. G. and J.A.G. 

Townsend. 

. no 

Warren. 

135 


Marcv. 

. 116 

Mackenzie... 

71,142 


Hardie. 

. 117 

Upton. 

145 


Van Vliet. 

. 123 

Mendenhall.. 

147 


Saxton. 

. 124 

Crawford .... 

150 


Shiras. 

. 128 

Hazen. 

151 

and J. A. G. 

Hawkins. 

. 129 

Buell.. 

155 

and J.A.G. 

Newton . 

. 133 

Smith,C. H... 

158 

and J. A. G. 

Roberts ...t.. 

. 141 

Sully. 

159 

and J. A. G. 

Hatch. 

. 143 

Davis. 

160 


Merritt. 

. 143 

Doubleday... 

161 


Brannan. 

. 146 



Barry. 

. 147 




French. 

. 148 




Floyd-Jones. 

. 150 or J. A. G 




Potter. 

. 161 


Consolidation of Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments— 

For— Against— 


Sherman: Practicable. 92 

McDowell: Q. M. and Subs. 101 

Howard.....-. 103 

Crook: Practicable. 105 

Hooker. 106 

Buell. 106 

Wood. 109 

Kelton. 112 

Baird. 118 

Ihrie. 132 

Kingsbury. 139 

Palmer. 140 

Roberts. 141 

Henry: If necessary. 142 

Mackenzie. 142 

Oakes. 142 

Sturgis. 143 

Hatch. 143 

Merritt. 143 

Grierson. 144 

Vogdes. 145 

Brannan. 146 

Mendenhall. 147 

Barry. 147 

Brooks. 149 

Seymour. 149 

Crawford. 150 

Casey. 151 

Miles. 151 

Hazen. 151 

Kautz. 153 

Wood. 154 

Buell. 155 

De Trobriand. 157 

Pennypacker. 157 

Smith, C. H. 158 

Sully. 159 

Stanley: Hardly advisable. 160 

Davis: Subs, and Pay. 160 

Doubleday: Subs, and Pay. 161 

Potter. 161 


Consolidation of ordnance and artillery. 


For— 

Howard. 103 

Reynolds. 140 

Roberts. 141 

Hatch. 143 

Upton. 145 

Brannan. 146 

Barry. 147 


Sherman. 89 

Sheridan. 92 

McClellan. 92 

Thomas. 94 

Hancock. 95 

Howard. 102 

Terry. 103 

Ord. 104 

Augur. 105 

Longstreet. 109 

Townsend. 110 

Breck. 114 

Pelouze. 115 

Marcy. 116 

Schriver. 116 

Allen. 121 

Rucker. 122 

Ingalls. 123 

Van Vliet. 123 

Saxton. 124 

Moore. 126 

Eaton. 127 

Shiras. 128 

Macfeely. 129 

Hawkins. 129 

Barnes. 130 

Brice. 130 

Alvord. 131 

Tower. 132 

Newton. 133 

Warren. 135 

Merrill. 136 

Ben 6 t. 137 

Myer. 140 

Reynolds. 140 

French. 148 

Getty. 148 

Hunt. 149 

Johnson. 149 

Flovd-Jones. 150 

Flint. 151 

Gibbon. 152 

King. 154 

Clitz. 154 

Wood. 154 

Willcox. 155 

Smith, J.E. 157 

Crittenden. 158 

Sykes. 158 

Dodge. 161 

Andrews. 162 


Against— 

Sheridan. 92 

Thomas . 94 

Hancock. 95 

Howard. 102 

Ord. 104 

Augur. 105 

Buell. 106 











































































































































197 


Consolidation of staff departments—Continued. 

Consolidation of ordnance and artillery—Continued. 


For— Page. Against— 

Hunt. 78 Franklin.. 

Ora word. 150 Wood. 

Hazen. 151 Longstreet 

Gibbon . 152 Townsend. 

Sully. 159 Schriver... 

Stanley. 160 Baird. 

Doubleday. 161 Van Vliet . 

Potter. 161 Saxton.... 


Shiras. 

Hawkins. 

Newton. 

Gillmore. 

Warren. 

Merrill. 

Ben^t. 

Kingsbury. 

Merritt. . 

Grierson. 

French. 

Brooks . 

Seymour. 

Flovd-Jones. 

Buell. 

Crittenden. 

Crimea. [See English army.) 

Details for staff duty. [See Records.) 

It would seem that, with capable heads to each branch of the staff and 
an experienced corps of officers to aid him, no possible detriment 
could occur from a system of details from officers of the line.—(Coburn, 

committee, 1873)... 

If the detail for staff duties was made after a thorough examination, and 
as a reward for meritorious service, competition would furnish capable 

and qualified officers.—(Ibid.) . 

Certain portions of the staff not to be filled permanently, but by details 

from the line.— (Ibid.). 

A system of details gives to the Army an opportunity to have a selection 
of the best talent for staff duties in addition to the highest degree of 

training and development.— (Ibid.) . 

This principle does not apply to the medical, legal, and engineer 
departments, but does apply to adjutants-general, inspectors, quarter¬ 
masters, and commissaries.— (Ibid.). 

We never separate an officer from troops except by way of detail.—(Von 

Moltke).. 

Graduates should serve in the line before being eligible for ordnance or 
engineer service; after such service to go back to the line for a certain 

period, and then reeligible.—(Sherman). 

It would be an excellent policy to limit officers to a short term of staff 

duty, and then send them back to troops.—(Sherman). 

The fighting soldier should be tlie very highest part of the military pro¬ 
fession, all others adjuncts. I would make it the interest of the officer 
to be with his company and regiment wherever that company and 
regiment may be; he should feel more honored in the discharge of 
the particular duty attached to his company or regiment than in any 

other detached duty whatever.— (Sherman). 

The number of staff officers can be reduced only by devolving their 
duties upon officers of the line. If the companies are to be kept at 
effective strength, then the line officers have enough to do in their 

proper sphere.—(Schofield). 

A person only engaged temporarily in a thing will not take so much 
interest in it as one who is engaged in it permanently.—(Thomas)... 
To say that a staff should consist of officers temporarily detached from 
the line and to be interchanged at short intervals does not appear 

sound.—(Pope).-.-. 

I do not consider any proposition to do without a staff and to depend 
upon details from the line for staff duties at all tenable.—(Pope)_ 


Page. 

108 

109 

109 

110 
116 
118 

123 

124 
128 
129 

133 

134 

135 

136 

137 
139 

143 

144 

148 

149 

149 

150 
155 
158 


23 

23 

23 

23 

23, 24 

24 


25 

25 


26 


32 

35 

43 

43 


Details to quartermaster and commissary duty would be at the expense 
of efficiency of companies, which already suffer by large number of 
absentee officers, and a loss of efficiency of service rendered, by reason 
of inexperience—my judgment inclines against the detail and transfer 
system.— (Howard). 44 














































198 


Details for staff duty—Continued. 

It is more than doubtful whether any other system could be substituted 

for present staff system without injury to the service.—(Terry). 

The old Florida war exemplified inefficiency of system of temporary 

details for staff duty.—(Townsend). 

Present system of the staff evStablished in 1837-38.—(Townsend). 

What might be good for Germany and France in staff organization not 

suitable for United States.—(Sheridan). 

Present system resulted so favorably in war, exceedingly unwise to revert 

to a system tried and condemned long ago.—(McClellan). 

Distribution of labor to distinct departments adopted from the very 

fact of the previous systems not working well.—(Meade). 

Need more first lieutenants because of details.—(Sherman). 

Proposed plan of organization provides two first lieutenants and one 
second lieutenant to every company, to give enough first lieutenants 
for detail to staff bureaus, limiting details to four years, then to return 
t) company to be replaced by others, thus affording some variety of 

employment for this most valuable class of officers.—(Sherman). 

On considering any paper organization it is safe to assume that about 

one-third are usually absent; enumerates causes.—(Sherman). 

Details to the lower grades desirable; should not be longer than four 
years. To provide this without injury to regimental and company 
service there should be sufficient number of supernumerary officers.— 

(McClellan) . 

Losses occur from detailing officers who are not bonded officers, and 

who lack experience.—(Schofield) . 

Few men ever do their best in functions of an office not their own.— 

(Howard).. 

Transfer or detail impairs usefulness and weakens knowledge.—(Picketts) 
Greater freedom of detail and transfer would not be beneficial. Danger 
of nepotism, politi(;al influence, or personal solicitation. The most 
trifling class of officers in the service is composed of those who are 

constantly seeking fancy details.—(Wood). 

Had the Executive uncontrolled power to transfer and appoint, there 
might be a time when, by skillful manipulation, a most dangerous 

power could be wielded.—(Townsend). 

Officers are employed to get work done well, not for the appearance of 
knowing all possible things. It would be an injury to service to make 

tenure less secure than now'.—(Hawkins). 

Might secure respectable mediocrity among the many at the expense of 

professional eminence among the few'.— (Gillmore). 

Generally— 


For— 

Sherman: Below grade of major . 

McClellan: Lower grades. 

Schofield: Below major. 

Hancock: Below major. 

Marcy: Lower grades. 

Meigs: Below major. 

Macfeely: Capt. in Sub. Dept. 

Kingsbury . 

Reynolds: All grades. 

Grierson. 

Roberts. 

Upton: A. G.and I. G. 

Hamilton. 

Crawford. 

Hazen: A. G. and I. G. 

Gibbon. 

Anderson: Apparently. 

Buell. 

Willcox. 

Carlin. 

Stanley. 

Crook . 

Doubleday. 

Andrews. 

Mendenhall. 

Smith,C.H.: A.G.and I.G. 


Against— 


26 

Howard .. 

30 

Pope. 

Thomas .. 

33 

40 

Ricketts.. 

53 

Town.send 

58 

Fry. 

62 

Whipple . 

69 

Vincent .. 

69 

Baird. 

74 

Ingalls ... 

70 

Van Vliet 

145, 74 

Bingham . 

75 

Shiras .... 

150,79 

Hawkins . 

151,80 

Alyord ... 

152,80 

W'right... 

81 

Newton .. 

81 

Foster .... 

82 

Gillmore.. 

82 

W'arren... 

84 

Merrill ... 

84 

Ben^t. 

85 

Merritt... 

85 

Barry. 

147 

French ... 

158 

Brooks ... 
Seymour . 

Casey. 

King. 

Reeye .... 
Sully. 


Page. 


45 

51 

18 

16 

16 

17 

26 


26 

26 


30 

31 

44 

48 


. 49 


50 


63 

67 


44 

42 

35 

48 

49 
52 

52 

53 
57 
60 

61,133 

61 

61 

62 

63 

65 

66 
66 
67 

67 

68 
68 
73 
77 
77 
77 

79 

80 
81 

156,82 
84 










































































Details for staff duty—Continued. 
In tlie several departments: 


199 



Page. 

Adjutant- 

general. 

Inspector- 

general. 

Judge- 

advocate- 

general. 

Quarter¬ 

master. 

Sub.sist- 

ence. 

Reynolds. 

69 

Yes. 

Yes. 

No. 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Mackenzie. 

71 

Yes. 

Yes. 



Upton. 

74 

.A 

^ es. 

Yes . . 


Yes 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Hamilton. 

75 

Yes. 



Y es. 

King. 

81 





Buell. 

81 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Willcox. 

82 

Yes. 



Yes. 

Yes. 

Carlin. 

82 

1 Yes. 

A'es .. . 


Yos 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Sully. 

84 

Yes. 

Yes... 

Yes 

Yes 

Doubledav. 

85 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Andrews.. 

85 

Y es. 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Yes. 







Page. 

Pay. 

Medical. 

Engineer. 

Ordnance. 

Signal. 

Reynolds. 

69 

Yes 

No 

No. 

No. 

Yes. 

McKenzie. 

71 



Upton. 

74 

Yes. 

No. 

No. 

No. 


Hamilton. 

75 

Yes. 

No. 

No. 


King. 

81 

Yes. 





Buell. 

81 

Yes. 

No. 

No. 

No. 

Yes. 

Willcox. 

82 





Carlin. 

82 




Yes. 


Sully. 

84 

Yes. 

No. 

No. 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Doubleday. 

85 

Yes. 

No. 

No. 

No. 

Yes. 

Andrews. 

85 

Yes. 

No. 

Yes. 

Yes. 

Yes. 







Adjutant-General: 

In time of war, a general should choose from among his own offi¬ 
cers the best man he can find for his adjutant and inspector; in 
time of peace better the officer should be assigned by the Adju¬ 
tant-General’s Department.—(Sherman). 

Public interests might be promoted in some instances, but the tend¬ 
ency to indulge in friendly and personal considerations would be 
more likely to detract from than add to the efficiency of the serv¬ 
ice.—(Meade).. 

I am inclined to think that it would be better to select the Adjutant- 

General from the corps of adjutants-general.— (Thomas). 

It has even been suggested that the corps (adjutant-general’s) should 
be abolished and its duties performed by officers detailed at will 
from the line of the Army. The officer detailed would, however, 
rarely be as well qualified in all respects/or staff duty as the Ad¬ 
jutant-General.— (Hancock). 

In Adjutant-General’s Department— 

For— 

General Schofield: Below field officer. 

General Hancock: Below field officer. 

General McDowell: Major and captain. 

In Inspector-General’s Department— 

For— 

General McDowell: Below lieutenant-colonel... 

General Schofield: Below field officer. 

General Hancock: Below lieutenant-colonel. 

In Judge-Advocate-General’s Department— 

For— 

General Hancock: Below field officer. 

In Quartermaster’s Department— 

For— 

General Schofield: Below field officer. 

In Subsistence Department— 

For— 

General Schofield: Below field officer. 

In Pay Department— 

For— 

General Schofield: Below field officer. 

General Hancock: Below field officer. 


Page. 


26 


35 

35 


39 


32 

40 

41 


41 

32 

40 


40 


33 


33 


33 

40 





















































































































200 


Details for staff duty—Continued. 

In Ordnance Department— 

Against— 

General Thomas: Detailed officer would not take so much interest 

as one permanently appointed. 35 

For— 

General Schofield: Below field officer.. 33 

General Heintzehnan: To lower grades from artillery. 105 

General Hooker: To lower grades from artillery. 106 

General Townsend: It was the day of flintlocks and smoothbores 

when artillery officers M'ere detailed on ordnance duty. Ill 

General Hawkins: Lieutenants. 129 

Colonel Merrill: Lieutenants. 136 

General Benet: History of Ordnance Department, including the 

merging of artillery and ordnance. 137 

General Reynolds. 140 

General Brannan. 146 

English army: 

In Crimean campaign. 13 

Staff defective at Sebastopol. 13 

Supply organizations defective at Sebastopol. 13 

At Balaklava. 63 

Experiment of consolidation not yet tested in a great war.—(Hancock). 97 

In Crimean campaign.—(Meigs) . 121 

Department of control abolished January 1, 1876.—(Alvord). 132 

European armies: 

Not more efficiently supplied.—(Meade). 94 

Theories fail and break down.—(Hancock). 97 

Extracts: 

Jomini. 13, 63 

Crawford, Secretary of War, 1815. 54 

Calhoun, Secretary of War, 1818. 10,11,55 

Sherman, annual report, 1869. 55 

McClellan, letter, 1872 . 55 

Baron Staff el. 63 

Baron von Leedinghausen. 63 

General Sheridan quoted. 63 

Florida war: 

Expenses. 14 

The old Florida war is a standing exemplification of the inefficiency of 
the system of temporary details for staff duty. There were well- 
grounded complaints of lack of supplies. Large commands were well- 
nigh losing their scalps in consequence of starvation in beleaguered 

forts.—(Townsend) . 50 

French army: 

Jomini quoted. 13 

Our system of administration superior.—(Meade). 17 

In Crimean caanpaign.—(Meigs). 121 

General staff: 

The term as used by us means something very different from the same 
term in France, where it is used to designate the marshals and general 

officers only.—(Humphreys). 65 

The want of, our greatest deficiency in war.—(Hancock). 188 

The organization of a general staff for the Army I believe to be of very 

great importance.—(Hazen).!!. 80 

I recommend a general staff upon the model now adopted by all Eu¬ 
ropean Governments.—(Hazen). 152 

Legislation suggested by army officers— 

General Sherman: Provides captains in Quartermaster’s and Subsistence, 
captains and first lieutenants in Engineers, and captains, first and 
second lieutenants in Ordnance departments; Chiefs of Bureaus to be 
selected from Army at large, except the Inspector-General, the Judge- 
Advocate-General, and the Chief Signal Officer not mentioned in 
section 83; transfers from line to staff and from staff to line authorized, 

also detail of depot or post quartermasters and commissaries. 27-29 

General McClellan: Clause permitting selection of Chiefs of Bureaus from 
Army at large most objectionable. 30 







































201 


Legislation suggested by army officers—Continued. Page. 

General Schofield: Whatever can possibly be done by Executive action 
in relation to military matters had better be done in that way than 
by legislation. It is a pretty difficult thing to command an army by 

law-.. 3^ 

Captains and lieutenants required for service in Adjutant-General’s, 
Inspector-General’s, Ordnance, Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay 
departments to be detailed from the line for, say, six years; Chiefs of 
Bureaus to be selected from Army at large; appointments to grade of 
major in staff to be made from captains of the line; officers of the line 
to be so assigned that the junior officers generally shall have experi¬ 
ence in administrative duties of staff, and before appointment in staff 

shall have served not less than six years with troops. 33-34 

General Hancock: As many captains to be detailed from line of Army 
for service as assistant adjutant-general, judge-advocate, and in Pay 
Department, and as many majors to be detailed in Inspector-General’s 


Adjutant-General’s, Judge-Advocate’s, and Pay departments, and as 
lieutenant-colonel in Inspector-General’s Department to be filled by 
selection from officers serving or who have so served by detail; 
vacancies in grade of captain in Quartermaster’s and Subsistence 
departments to be filled from regimental or post quartermasters or post 

commissaries who have so served two years. 40,41 

General McDowell: Merges Adjutant-General’s and Inspector-General’s 
departments, and the Quartermaster’s and Subsistence; provides for 
detail for three years from majors and captains of line of twelve 

assistant adjutant and inspector generals. 41,42 

General Terry: Suggests amendments to General Sherman’s bill. 45 

General Townsend: Provides for permanent organization of staff depart¬ 
ments . 51 

General Marcy: No officer to be detailed until he has served four years 

with troops, and no detail longer than four years. 56 

General jNIeigs: Provides for details to rank of captain in Quartermaster’s 
and Subsistence departments, lieutenants in Engineers, captains in 

Ordnance, Pay, and Judge-Advocate-General’s departments. 58,59 ' 

General Alvord: Paymasters to be appointed from captains of the line, 
or from those who have served as additional paymasters, not over 

45 years of age. 64 

Legislation recommended by committees: 

Garfield committee, 1869. 162 

Coburn committee, 1873 . 163 

Coburn committee, 1874 . 164 

Banning committee, 1876 . 166 

Maish committee, 1878. 167 

Burnside committee, 1878 . 170 

Legislation, review of, on Army organization by General Garfield. 176 

Methods pursued by committees in conducting investigation of Army organ¬ 
ization: 

Garfield report, 1869. 7 

Coburn report, 1873 . 8 

Coburn report, 1874 . 8 

Banning report, 1876. 8 

Cameron commission, 1876 . 9 

Maish report, 1878. 9 

Burnside report, 1878 . 9 

Mexican war: 

Expenses. ' 14 

Military science: 

Views of Jomini.^.. 18 

Views of another writer, who says perfection of, assists in the diffusion of 

peace. 14 

Similar to that of law, medicine, philosophy, etc., in this, that military 
men should be selected and promoted according to their special 
qualifications.—(Longstreet). 49 





























202 


Militia: , Page. 

To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a 

broken staff.—(Washington). 184 

Officers: 

No other possible means to obtain good officers but by establishing 
your army ui:)on a permanent footing, and giving your officers good 
pay.— (Washington) . 184 

Pay: 

The present (staff) grades are about fair and just, and sufficiently 

remunerative to make them desirable.—(Sherman). 26 

Give your officers good pay.—(Washington). 184 

Pay Department: 

Conducted honestly and economically. Percentage of losses since 1808 

stated.—(Marcy). 115 

Permanent staff: 

As to the question whether there should be a permanent staff, there 

was no doubt.—(Coburn committee, 1873). 22 

There was great diversity as to what portion should be permanent and 

what detailed.—(Ibid) . 22 

Higher grades should be permanently filled from best line officers who 

have been detailed in lower grades.—(McClellan). 30 

Nothing is better settled in army organization than the need of a 

staff.—(Pope). 42 

A sense of permanent responsibility is necessary to give the highest 

degree of cultivated and enlightened capacity.—(Wood). 48 

Permanent appointment enervates officer and he becomes a trimmer.— 

(Hamilton). 76 

Permanent staff provided in bills suggested by— 

General Sherman, and some details. 27 

General Schofield, and some details. 33 

General Hancock, and some details. 40 

General McDowell. 41 

General Townsend. 51 

General Meigs. 58 

Post or company commander to pay command: 

I would not like it; would tie him down when he should be on the 

wing.—(Sherman). 92 

It does not follow that a man may not be a very good company 

officer and yet a poor disbursing officer.—(Franklin). 107 

Promotion: 

Principle of seniority the safest one.—(McClellan). 31 

Should be within the department or corps.—(Brannan). 75 

Prussian staff a permanent corps.—(Hancock). 99 

Rank: 

It makes men more careful if they occupy a position of high rank and 

trust.—(Sherman) . 26 

Records: 

System of keeping originated in Adjutant-Generars Office; now pre¬ 
served in good form; when assistant adjutants-general were detailed, 
letters and correspondence regarded as private property; slight traces 

of old records for that period.—(Townsend). 50 

Regular Army: 

In time of war; advantages of a sufficient. 14 

Saving: 

Saving in expense by having sufficient Regular troops. 14,15 

The employment of large masses of new troops upon the breaking out 
of war involves an immense expenditure, out of all proportion with 
the savings resulting from reducing the peace establishment too 

much.—(McClellan) . 30 

The saving in the article of stores, provisions, and in a thousand other 
things, by having nothing to do with militia unless in cases of extraor¬ 
dinary exigency, and such as could not be expected in the common 
course of events, would amply support a large army.—(Washington).. 185 

Btaff: 

Ought to be liberal in its numbers. They are undergoing a system of 
instruction and preparation for war. We found in the Mexican war 
and in our civil war the large number of staff officers very advan¬ 
tageous.—(Sherman). 25 






























203 


Staff—Continued. Page, 

Deficient in numbers during the late war; number of officers in perma¬ 
nent establishment should be very large in proportion to number of 

men.— (McClellan).1_'. 12 

Before appointment in staff should be examined, first having served 

with troops.— (McClellan). 29 

Most important part of skeleton army; preserves military knowledge 

and experience.—(Kautz).1.. 12 

Too small when war of rebellion began.— (Hardie). 19 

Expanded during war of rebellion, but not changed.— (Van Vliet)_ 20 

Simple, effective, and common sense; not faulty. — (Saxton). 20 

Equal to any demands.—(Bingham).. 20 

It is the national military staff, not merely for the Regular Army.— 

(Vincent).1.. 14 

Not merely for present necessities, but to assist in raising an army and 

putting it in the field when war conies.— (Breck.). 15 

The stationary staff of a military establishment should be substantially 

the same in peace as in war.—(Crawford, Secretary of War). 55 

No part of our military organization requires more attention in peace 

than the general staff.—(Calhoun, Secretary of War). 55 

Expend too much time over little things.—(Mackimzie). 71 

The effect of continuing the same officer in a particular staff I consider 

bad.—(Hatch). 74 

Should be capable of indefinite expansion.—(Gibbon). 81 

Difiiculty in organizing a new army is more in the special and staff corps 

than in the line.—(McClellan).. 93 

Staff duties have their origin in the fact that it is beyond human capa¬ 
city for a commander to attend in person to all of those details of 
service which are unavoidable in military commands.—(Hancock)... 98 

Staff organization: 

Views of Jomini. 13 

See “Value of an efficient staff”. 11-15 

To be such that there will be no departure in time of war.—(Banning 

committee). 11 

To adjust and perfect the subtle and intricate machinery by which great 
masses of soldiers are fed, clothed, armed, moved, and inspired with 
confidence, and carried through victorious battles, is wrapped up in 

the perfection of staff organization.—(Coburn committee, 1873). 11 

Efficient, not susceptible of much improvement.— (Calhoun). 11 

Can be relied upon under the present system to perform duties in the 

most successful manner.— (Hancock). 17 

Must rely in the future, as in the past, upon these departments for great 

war exigencies.—(Marcy). 19 

We have experimented with many systems, the present successful.— 

(Baird). 20 

Should regret to see any change in the interest of mere experiment.— 

(Foster). 21 

I think the present organization was recommended by General Thomas, 

General iVIeade, and myself in 1868. The grades are about fair and 
just, and sufficiently remunerative to make them desirable.—(Sher¬ 
man) . 26 

In proposed plan of organization I omit all regimental quartermasters 
and commissaries, and all officers of the general staff below the grade 

of major.—(Sherman). 26 

Number of staff officers actually required is much greater than the num¬ 
ber composing the several corps of the general staff of the Army. 

This number supplied by detail.—(Schofield). 32 

Engineer, Ordnance, and Medical departments special corps, and impor¬ 
tant; the Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Fay departments, essen¬ 
tially the supply departments, have worked well in war and peace; 
the ' Judge-Advocate’s Department necessary and important; the 
Inspector-General’s one of the most important, and the Adjutant- 

General essentially the staff corps of the Army.—(Hancock). 36-39 

Do not think a study of army organizations of Old World will suggest 
any important change or modification in our Army as it is now.— 
(Merritt). 7^ 






























204 


Staff system: ^ .Page. 

How it worked during war of rebellion— 

Garfield committee, 1869: Efficient. 15 

Coburn committee, 1873: Successful. 16 

Gen. W. T. Sherman: Entitled to our respect. 16 

Gen. P. H. Sheridan: Very satisfactory. 16 

Gen. Geo. B. McClellan: Unwise to change... 16 

Gen. Geo. G. Meade: Always worked well. 16 

Gen. W. S. Hancock: Gave great satisfaction. 17 

Gen. J. M. Schofield: Remarkably effective. 17 

Gen. I. McDowell: Army abundantly supplied. IT 

Gen. 0. 0. Howard: Expansion only required. 18 

Gen. C. C. Augur: Efficient.-. 18 

Gen. E. D. Townsend, Adjutant-General: Attracted admiration of 

military world. 18 

Gen. Sami. Breck, Adjutant-General: Wonderful results. 18 

Gen. R. B. Marcy, Inspector-General: Contributed largely to success. 19 
Gen. J. A. Harclie, Inspector-General: Provided ample administra¬ 
tive service. 19 

Gen. A. Baird, Inspector-General: Successful. 20 

Gen. S. Van Vliet, Assistant Quartermaster-General: Prompt and 

■ efficient. 20 

Gen. R. Saxton, Deputy Quartermaster-General: Stood the test 

nobly.-. 20 

Gen. J. D. Bingham, Quartermaster: AVithout a superior in the 

world. 20 

Gen. R. Macfeely, Commissary-General of Subsistence: Efficient.. 21 
Gen. A. E. Shiras, Commissary-General of Subsistence: No exam- 

j)le in all history where troops so well supplied. 21 

Gen. J. G. Foster, Engineers: Excellent. 21 

Gen. Q. A. Gill more. Engineers: Efficiency never questioned. 21 

Gen. J. G. Parke, Engineers: As Avell as it was possible. 22 

Gen. Godfrey Weitzel, Engineers: Successful. 22 

The present, established 1837-38.—(Townsend). 18 

What might be good for Germany and France not suitable to the 

United States.—(Sheridan).‘ 16 

Present system resulted so favorably in war, exceedingly unwise to re¬ 
vert to a system tried and condemned long ago.—(McClellan). 16 

AVar experience attests its advantage.—(Shiras). 21 

Essentially an American one; excellent.— (Foster). 21 

To say that because a system of army organization and administration 
has worked well in Germany and France, or elsewhere, it should 
therefore be adopted in this country, is no more sound than to say 

the same thing of a political form of government.—(Pope). 44 

Should remain unchanged.—(Terry). 45 

If we are to hold ourselves in readiness to raise an enormous army rap¬ 
idly when war comes upon us, impossible without a staff quite as 
large, and as much separated into corps as now exists.— (Franklin).. 47 

The systems of other countries, so far as we are concerned, are mere 

theories.— (Fry). 52 

Staff departments, present state of the law as to the organization of the— 

Adjutant-Generahs Department. 178 

Inspector-General’s Department. 178 

Judge-Advocate-General’s Department. 178 

Quartermaster’s Department. 179 

Subsistence Department. 179 

Pay Department. 179 

Medical Department. 179 

Engineer Department. 180 

Ordnance Department. 180 

Signal Corps. 180 

Record and Pension Office. 180 

Appointments in lowest grades. 181 

Appointments of chiefs of bureaus.. 182 

Promotion. 182 

Examination for promotion. 182 

Transfers. 183 

Inspection of accounts. 183 


















































205 


standing army: Page, 

Washington’s views. 184-187 

What it is expected to do in keeping pace with the progress of the 

profession.—(Hancock). 36 

No petitions presented to Congress for decrease.—(Garfield). 187 

Subordination: 

To bring men to a proper degree of, not the work of a day, a month, or 

even a year.— (Washington). 185 

Supplies: 

All war material not liable to deterioration should be furnished in time 

of peace.—(McClellan). 30 

Arms, equipments, ammunition, etc. Should they be made in arsenals 
or obtained by purchase, thus encouraging private companies and 

placing larger facilities at disposal of Government?—(McClellan)_ 30 

Thanks of Congress by name to— 

General Sherman, public resolution, approved Feb. 19,1864, and Jan. 10, 

1865. 89 

General Sheridan, public resolution, approved Feb-. 9,1865 . 92 

General Meade, public resolution, approved Jan. 28,1864. 93 

General Thomas, public resolution, approved Mar. 3,1865. 94 

General Hancock, public resolution, approved Apr. 21,1866 . 95 

General Hooker, public resolution, approved Jan. 28,1864.1 106 

General Howard, public resolution, approved Jan. 28,1864. 102 

General Terry, public resolution, approved Jan. 24,1865 . 103 

Transfers: 

General Sherman’s bill provides for transfers from line to staff, and staff 

to line. 27-29 

General Terry: Pay Department should not be included. 45 

General Ord: President should be allowed to transfer from staff to line, 

or the reverse. 46 

General Augur: No transfers unless by consent»of officers transferred .. 46 

General Picketts: Transfer or detail impairs usefulness and weakens 

knowledge. 48 

General Wood: A greater freedom of transfers than at present would 

not be beneficial. 49 

General Townsend: If sure of a continuance and promotion in the line 

of duties of their choice, officers’ zeal and fidelity rarely flag. 49 

Had the Executive uncontrolled power to transfer and appoint, there 
might be a time when, by skillful collection of agents from all 

branches of Army, a most dangerous power could be wielded. 50 

General Fry: If vacancies could be so easily created by transfer, it is 
not going too far to say that they might often be produced by trans¬ 
ferring out better staff officers than they brought in. 52 

General Mackenzie favors transfers. 71, 72 

General Upton favors transfers. 75 

There are no transfers between officers of the line and officers fully 

admitted to the Prussian staff.— (Hancock). 100 

Value of an efficient staff: 

Without an efficient staff, courage, good conduct, or skill unavailable— 

army becomes a mob.—(Coburn committee, 1873). 11 

Army "a nucleus to radiate instruction and discipline.—(Banning commit¬ 
tee, 1876). 11 

With a defective staff must be exposed at commencement, of a war to 

great losses, embarrassments, and disasters.—(Calhoun). 12 

One of the greatest difficulties met with in organizing armies during the 
late war was in the deficiency of the number of educated staff offi¬ 
cers.—(McClellan). 12 

Deliver us from the perils and dangers of a cheap army.—(Augur). 12 

Most important part of a skeleton army.—(Kautz). 12 

Illustrated by reference to English army in Crimean campaign.—(Marcy) 13 

Jomini quoted, and past experience referred to.—(Vincent). 13,14 

Probability of war; staff for necessities of the present not sufficient.— 

(Breck). 15 

Value of specialties: 

The testimony is concurrent that the knowledge and experience gained 
by the performance of staff duties is of the highest value.—(Coburn 
committee, 1873). 22 



































206 


^ ( • 

Value of specialties—Continued. Paffe. 

Kenders officers competent.— (McClellan). 29 

Adds to their efficiency.—(Meade). 34 

Doctrine of specialties.—(Ben4t). 137 

Value of testimony of army officers: 

Views of Coburn committee, 1873. 10 

Views of General Pope. 10 

Views of General Ord. 10 

Volunteer Army. (See “ War of the rebellion.”) 

War of the rebellion: 

Expenses. 14 

How the present staff system worked during. 15-22 

Army abundantly supplied.—(McDowell). 17,18 

Number of officers very limited.— (Parke). 22 

Present staff system severely tried and has endured every test.—(Terry). 45 

Confusion and extravagance of organizations called into service.— 

(Franklin). 48 

War: 

Probability of.—(Breck). 15 

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